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Silence and the Crisis of Self-Legitimation in English Romanticism 
My thesis depicts the crisis of self-legitimation that has accompanied the onset of 
modern hermeneutics, with its historicised and organicised version of the Enlightenment's 
'imiversal perspective.' In this it follows the lead of the contemporary hermeneuticist Hans-
Georg Gadamer in resuscitating the notion of prejudice, but contrasts it with Hannah Arendt's 
discussion of the human condition. She implicitly locates the problem in modem 
hermeneutics, the aporia, in the very philosophy of life that Gadamer embraces as its 
solution. Gadamer confuses the task of the humanities as a search for truth with what it ought 
to be, a search for meaning. I begin with his depiction of Kant's attack on the sensus 
communis; I conclude with an examination of the consequences of this attack on the 
orientation and interpretative practices of current schools of literary criticism with specific 
reference to Keats's Ode on a Grecian Urn. 
In the central chapter, I focus upon Coleridge's attack on Wordsworth's Preface to 
Lyrical Ballads (1802) in the Biographia Literaria, reading it as a fundamental defence of 
prejudice based on the very fact that man has been made in imago Dei. The consequent 
logocentricity of humanity that Coleridge insists upon opposes Wordsworth's emphasis upon 
a transcendental idea of'feeling.' This fundamental notion forms the basis of Coleridge's 
definition of the primary imagination. I argue the distinctiveness of his definition from that of 
the other Romantics and maintain its necessity to escape the aporia. This point is proved 
negatively by Shelley's Mont Blanc, which seizes upon the radical consequences of 
Wordsworth's poetics, presenting both heresy and obscurity in the poem. The word 'crisis' 
thus reflects the urgency with which I advocate the need to re-adopt Coleridge's emphases in 
contemporary literary criticism. 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published 
without his prior written consent and information derived from it should be acknowledged. 
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Introduction 
Why is there something rather than nothing? This has been the metaphysical question 
that philosophers have sought to answer since the time of the ancient Greeks. Aristotle said 
that to speak the truth is 'to say of what is that it is and of what is not that it is not.'' The 
attempt to establish that 'what is' actually is however is complicated in a world in a continual 
state of change. Even the ancient philosophers had never based then- speculation upon 
worldly appearances alone. On the contrary, metaphysical speculation was always to a 
certain extent an exercise in 'saving the appearances' from their tendency to decay and 
disappear. For Plato, this involved contemplating (theoreo) the relations of truth behind 
geometric reality. Plato's emphasis was not unusual. The assimiption that some form of 
analogous correspondence lay between the visible world and an invisible one was fairly 
ubiquitous in Western philosophy imtU the time of the Enlightenment. The worldly and 
imperfect particulars had perfect divine forms corresponding to them. 
Philosophical speculation had its counterpart in theological dogma as well. Hie 
Biblical writings assert that certain earthly things created or instituted by God have the status 
of shadows of a greater reality. This is a consistent emphasis in the New Testament. To cite 
some exanples, the author of the letter to the Hebrews writes that the Jerusalem temple had 
been constructed according to divine specifications as 'a copy and shadow of what is in 
heaven. '^  He also refers to the Mosaic law in such terms, as 'only a shadow of the good 
things that are coming not the realities themselves.'^  The apostle Paul observes that this 
holds true of certain hiunan relations too, ejqjlaining the relation of husband to wife in 
marriage as an analogy that points to the relationship of Christ to the church.'* This world's 
pattern of intimating a better world and a right relationship with its Creator in hfe to come in 
'a new Heaven and a new Earth' is acknowledged by the apostle in his famous disquisition on 
love: 'for now we see through a glass darkly, but then fece to face.'^  What the apostle refers 
to pre-eminently as having been 'seen darkly' though is the foremost instance of divine love: 
the fulfilment of Old Testament prophesy in the incarnation of the Christ himself who 
'tabernacled among us,'* the temple that was destroyed and then raised in three days and in 
whom believers dwell as 'living stones.'^  
' Aristotle. Metaphysics. 4.7.1. (1011b). 
^ Heb. 8: 5. 
^ Heb. 10: 1. 
'Eph.5:21-33. 
^ 1 Cor. 13:12. 
^Johnl: 14. 
^John2:19-22;l Cor. 3:10-17. 
The plan of education delineated in Milton's tract 'Of Education,' in its tacit 
acknowledgement of the necessity of cultivating common sense through an appeal to the 
senses, displays just how profoundly the emphases of Greek philosophy and Christian 
theology on a correspondence between two worlds continued to pervade the thinking of the 
late-Renaissance mind: 
The end then of learning is to repair the ruins of our first parents by regaining to 
know God aright... But because oiu: understanding cannot in this body foimd itself but 
on sensible things nor arrive so clearly to the knowledge of God and things invisible 
as by orderly conning over the visible and inferior creature, the same method is 
necessarily to be followed in all discreet teaching.' 
The traditional focus of the humanities, the study of man in respect to his person and in 
particular to his words and deeds in light of the world to come as a secondary means of 
knowing more about God and about truth formed a significant part of Western education until 
the Enlightenment. 
However, since the time that GaUleo discovered with his telescope, contrary to its 
appearance to the naked eye, that the universe revolved around the sim rather than the earth -
entailing that the worid and everything in it must be in an inpercq)tible state of motion - the 
answer to the metaphysical question that Aristotle posed has taken on a revolutionary turn. 
Galileo's discovery has effects that resonate throughout the modem age, even i f it went 
largely unheralded at the time and hardly captured the popular imagination as his 
demonstration of felling bodies fi-om the tower of Pisa did. 'Since a babe was bom in a 
manger, it may be doubted whether so great a thing has happened with so little stir.'' For not 
only did it suggest that the senses were utterly unreliable as a means of accessing the invisible 
realm of truth through their visible proxy, it also brought into doubt everything and everyone 
that lay within the earthly sphere, fi-om laws to institutions to human relations. It did so by 
demonstrating that the same sort of force moved heavenly bodies as affected terrestrial 
objects. John Donne poignantly notes the impotence of the 'old philosophy' in countering the 
new universal philosophy and records the resultant decline in belief in the testimony of the 
world of appearances: 
And new Philosophy cals all in doubt 
ITie Element of fire is quite put out; 
The Sunne is lost, and Ih'earth, and no mans wit 
Can well direct him, where to looke for it. 
And fireely men confesse, that this world's spent. 
When in the Planets, and the Firmament 
JohnMUtoa'OfEducatioa' Anenpagitica and Other Prose Works. (1941). 44. 
A.N. Whitehead. Science and the Modem World. (1967). 2. 
They seeke so many new; they see that this 
Is crumbled out againe to his Atomis.'" 
The telescope's discrediting of the testunony of the bare senses and the physical 
world they mediated by its appeal to a contradictory imiverse had an enormous i f only 
gradually realised effect upon education and on man's sense of his place in the world. The 
Enlightenment ideals of clarity and distinction that followed in the wake of Gahleo's 
observation, it could be said, were universal prejudices that cast a new shadow over thinking, 
the shadow of universal doubt. Its shadow did not merely hearken to a greater reality as 
before. Instead, it promised to bring the greater, universal, reality that qjerated behind the 
visible immediately into the world of the finite and particular, the here and now. I attempt to 
explore some of the consequences of importing this universality into Western thinking in the 
following by looking at its influence in the poetry and theoretical speculation of the English 
Romantics. 
A useful means of identifying the revolutionary universality adopted into Romantic 
poetics is by observing a foregoing analogy for it in cosmological thinking. Cosmology had 
one fairly superficial change made to it by Gahleo's discovery: the tendency since the ancient 
world to regard not only immediate cu-cumstances but even the distant planets to exert a 
profound influence upon human beings - reflected in their appellation as Roman gods - was 
totally disrupted. The universe appeared to operate autonomously, without reference to the 
earth or its inhabitants. But a far more portentous diange was also enacted in the new 
perspective with which man took to regard the cosmos. C.S. Lewis informs us that medieval 
man, when he gazed upon the night sky, would probably have viewed it much as one would 
now regard a great building fi-om its base." To note just how markedly GaUleo's telescope 
changed this sense of looking up on God's massive and finite universe we need only reflect 
upon the famous statement of the French philosqpher and mathematician Blaise Pascal. 
Probably alluding in his reference to 'silence' to the debunking of the Platonic idea of the 
harmonious music of the perfect heavenly spheres, Pascal, the first agoraphobe on record, saw 
in the night sky not a massive but finite and harmonious structure, but wdiat we now refer to 
as 'outer space.' The sense of solitude at being on the inside looking out into infinite and 
autonomous vacancy terrified him: 'Le silence etemel de ces espaces infinis m'efifraie.'*^ 
Lewis, comparing the effect of the two cosmological views, helpfully remarks that: 
John Donne. 'The First Anniversary: An Anatomy of the World' 205-12. 
" E.M.W. Tillyard's stu<fy The Elizabethan World Picture (1972) and C.S. Lewis's The Discarded 
Tmape: An Introduction to Medieval and Renaissance Literature (1964) both emphasise the profound 
influence on human affairs attributed to the celestial bodies. 
"Pensfes. iii, 206-201. 
.. .to look out on a night sky with modem eyes is like looking out over a sea that fedes 
away into mist, or looking about one in a trackless forest - trees forever and no 
horizon.... The 'space' of modem astronomy may arouse terror, or bewilderment or 
vague reverie; the spheres of old present us with an object in which the mind can rest, 
overvdielming in its greatness but satisfying in its harmony. That is the sense in 
which our universe is romantic, but theirs is classical. (99) 
The change in cosmological perspective was significant because it affected how the 
issue of truth was approached in the humanities as well, a change well captured by Lewis's 
reference to the 'classical' and 'romantic' universes. For truth io the 'romantic age' - which 
in a sense at least begins with Galileo and a cosmological change - was no longer sought as a 
form of correspondence that the visible world bore to the invisible world, but as a relationship 
man's thoughts bore to a perspective that disregarded the world of finite appearances 
altogether - the 'romantic universal perspective.' From its vantage, the distance between man 
and reality became both infinitely remote - as Pascal sensed it - and simultaneously 
intimately realisable - as the newly discovered reahn of intimacy attested. This effect did not 
owe itself to the feet that the distance between man and the universe had become more 
accurately measured. It owed itself to the feet that the terms of perception had altered to 
those of Cartesian internal cognitive processes, processes as invisible and yet 'real' as it 
argued the terms of the 'real world' of ancient philosophy and Christian theology to be 
doubtful. For with the emerging modem sciences' ability to harness the powers of the 
universe, the infinite seemed now at hand in the present. The new shadows of the 'real world' 
that the 'romantic universal perspective' attested to were those of the world of the 
imagination. 
But even an appeal to this much-touted word 'imagination,' so strongly identified 
with the Romantic poets, can be deceiving. The 'images' that the developing sense of the 
'Romantic imagination' enq)loyed were not mimetic ones imitating the visible world as had 
occupied the imagination before, but rather Junctional ones whose primary place of reference 
was the 'inner-world' of the mind. Hie new Cartesian terms of universality in feet dissolved 
the old relationship between the visible and the invisible worlds. The invisible and real world 
now lay outside the visible world, in the autonomous, 'ideal' realm of theory." Because of 
the capacity of the feculty that Kant later designated as the 'reason' to delve into the workings 
of the universe 'purely' without reference to worldly things, the opinion on the nature of the 
This is marked by a conceptual change in die sense of 'theoretical.' It was no longer die sense in 
which Plato had established die use of die word, as die 'observation of the eternal' (Gr. theoria -
contemplation) by an inner sense, die 'eyes of die mind' Hannah Arendt, whom I refer to frequendy in 
die second chapter of the thesis, suggests it was as if the eyes of the mind were transported outdde die 
visible universe altogedier in die new perspective. 
'things invisible' changed.Arendt observes an aspect of Cartesianism often 
unacknowledged by histories of philosophy: 
What has come to an end is the basic distinction between the sensory and the 
suprasensory, together with the notion, at least as old as Parmenides, that whatever is 
not given to the senses - God or Being or the First Principles and Causes (archai) or 
the Ideas - is more real, more truthfiil, more meaningfiil than what appears, that it is 
not just beyond sense perception but above the world of the senses. What is "dead" is 
not only the localization of such "eternal truths" but also the distinction itself... 
(However) the sensory, as still understood by the positivists, cannot survive the death 
of the suprasensory. No one knew this better than Nietzsche, who, with his poetic 
and metaphoric description of the assassination of God, has caused so much 
confusion in these matters. In a significant passage in The Twilight of the Idols, he 
clarifies what the word "God" meant in the earher story. It was merely a symbol for 
the suprasensory realm as imderstood by metaphysics; he now uses, instead of "God," 
the expression "true world" and says: "We have abolished the true world. What has 
remained? The apparent one perhaps? Oh no! With the true world we have also 
abolished the apparent one."" 
The loss of the true world and the apparent world have left a rather odd legacy, a 
legacy that has been somewhat masked by the feet that certain basic terms of human 
knowledge have survived the destruction of the old two-world view. They are however 
otherwise unrecognisable as their earher terms of reference. As was the case with the term 
'hnagination,' the conceptual changes we note m the notions of physics, logic and geometry 
from being references to the natural world, the rules of the spoken word and the measurement 
of the earth respectively to being 'analytical sciences' with no correspondence to earthly 
reality but a theoretical one are all symptoms of the collapse of this 'basic distinction' 
between the sensory and suprasensory in modem thinking. 
But the loss of this distinction also affected how man came to be regarded too: 'the 
visible and inferior creature' that Mdton still cited as his mam focus of study was less and less 
frequently to be found in his Enhghtenment successors. In its place, a new conception of man 
became the object of interest and the source of speculation. Man either became the focus of 
biological study, which examined hun universally as a form of life with no apparent 
prejudicial judgement attached - he was an organism like any other - or he became the focus 
of psychological study, which examined the mind, the focus of modem selfliood, as an 
elaborate processing mechanism. This latter interest appears most acute in the period that is 
commonly referred to as the Romantic period, and it is the area that interests me here. The 
It is of course significant that Kant saw the central development of his critical philosophy as a 
perspectival change, a change he Ukened to the Copemican tum on astronomy. 
Hannah Arendt. The Life of the Mmd (1975) 10-11. (Hereafter LoM). Nietzsche's claim is from 
"How the 'Trae Worid' finally became a fable." The Twiheht of the Idols or. How to Philosophise 
'invisible man' that is addressed in Romantic bermeneutics corresponds to an inhabitant of 
the world of purely self-referential intellectual processes, the processes of Descartes' cogito. 
But these processes are connected back to 'life' in the thinking of the period by the model of 
creation that the authors of the period adopt, the model of the organism, whose metabolic 
processes offer such a connection - and such a unifying vision. My study of 'Silence and the 
Crisis of Self-Legitimation in English Romanticism' explores some of the consequences of 
this change, particularly on the sphere of the humanities. 
The changes that took place in the study of man are analogous to those that had taken 
place in the knowledge of the natural world. Franz Kafka, in one of his modem myths 
wamed man against using the Archimedian point against himself, but his waming has gone 
imheeded. The possibility that Kafka foresaw a century ago has become the subject of critical 
attention in the area now known as hermeneutics. Hermeneutics concerns itself with the 
problem of establishing the legitimacy of this new study of man. There is little doubt that this 
area of study, which commenced in the Romantic period, has remained a central 
contemporary concem. Charles Taylor asserts that the primary interest of contemporary 
Continental philosophy is the study of man as 'a self-interpreting animal.''* The German 
physicist Wemer Heisenberg comments that our astrophysical world-view delivers to us not 
so much knowledge of the universe as of how it affects the instruments that measure it. In 
other words man only ever encounters in his science projections of himself.'^ And what he 
discovers within his 'inner world' is not an image of any permanence upon which he could 
reflect, but a constant whirr of sensual perceptions and mental activities. The same holds tme 
of the organic model that the Romantic poets adopted. 
It is my intention to e^qilore the problem of self-legitimation that contemporary 
hermeneutics has observed to accompany the study of man since the onset of what is called 
'modem hermeneutics.' It is not a work of historical scholarship; rather it purports to be a 
philosophical engagement with Romanticism that draws upon contemporary hermeneutic 
theory. Hie first diapter provides an overview of the field firom the time of the Romantics 
until the present and observes the repeated hermeneutic problem of self-legitimation in 
contemporary thought. Following the cue of the contemporary hermeneuticist Hans-Georg 
with die Hammer. New York: Russell & Russell, 1964. 26. Arendt traces this sentiment to Kant in 
his pre-critical writings. 
Charles Taylor. Hmnan Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers 1. (1985). 45. 
Wemer Heisenberg. The Hiysicist's Conception of Nature. (1958). 17-18. This is a view expanded 
upon by Thomas Kuhn in his widely influential work The SOiicture of Scientific Revolutions. (1996). 
Kuhn rejects the thesis of the logical positivists tiiat scientists choose between competing theories in a 
purely rational fashion, i.e. by appealing to theory-neutral observations. 
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Gadamer, I trace this problem to the replacement of the previous sense of common sense by 
one based on universality, which ignored the two-world distinction of the former. Like 
Gadamer, I try to estabhsh that the axiomatic 'prejudice agamst prejudice' employed by Kant 
and the Enhghtenment is an absurd modus operandi that has aUenated mankind from the 
world - as prior judgements are always necessary for any subsequent acts of judgement to 
take place. However, unlike Gadamer, I do not think that Heidegger solves the problem of 
the hermeneutic aporia with his concept of truth as being-in-the-world. I agree with Hannah 
Arendt in seeing Gadamer's problem m Heidegger's confiision of the question of meaning 
with the question of truth. This is how he begins his Being and Time, by raising 'anew the 
question of the meaning of Being.'" The Kantian idea of reason (Vemunft), as she reminds 
us, with its characteristic and 'scandalous' striving for certain and verifiable knowledge about 
matters it cannot know, yet needs to know about, i.e. the 'ultimate questions' of God, freedom 
and immortality 'w not inspired by the quest for truth but by the quest for meaning. And truth 
and meaning are not the *ame.'" It is the urgency of 'reason's need' that differentiates it 
from the normal need of knowledge, which concerns the understanding (Verstand) and the 
world of appearances that Heidegger calls the provenance of truth, but equally conflates with 
meaning: 'Heidegger himself, in a later interpretation of his own initial question, says 
explicitiy: "Meaning of Bemg' and 'Truth of Being' say the same."^° 
In the second chapter, I tum to Hannah Arendt's historical discussion of the human 
condition and attevapt to prove Gadamer's hypothesis about the historical influence of the 
universal 'prejudice agamst prejudice.' Arendt's discussion lends credence to the view that 
the contemporary dilemma indeed owes itself to the replacement of the old two-world views 
(and then- common sense) by one based on universaUty and intimacy. She asserts against this 
new common sense the fundamental plurality and logocentricity of the human condition, the 
bases of individuality. But Arendt also makes a decidedly different contribution to the 
hermeneutic debate by examining the emergence of the phenomenon of 'life as the greatest 
good' in the organicist concq)ts of the Romantic period and beyond. This emergence is 
influential upon Romantic notions of poetry and also accounts for the emergence of the 
general hermeneutic movement - and the aporia. The 'prejudice' of Ufe becomes the form of 
universality that informs thinking thereafter. To put it in the terms she suggests, sensible tiuth 
is grasped as i f it were meaning and could provide the basis of an ejq)lanatory model of life. 
Martm Heidegger. Being and Tune. (1962). 1. (Cf 151,324) 
" " ^ q u ^ i s ^ m H e i d e ^ ^ ^ ^ 
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The third chapter steps backwards to examine how Coleridge confi-onted Wordsworth 
and his universal hermeneutics of feeling, related to this new sense of life and the poet's 
calling, in the Biographia Literaria. I shall contend that Coleridge, rather confusingly for a 
writer usually considered the archetypal Romantic theorist, employs a different sense of the 
imagination than that of his contenq)oraries and his successors, one that more strictly adheres 
to a traditional 'two world' view, and he points out the crisis of legitimation in the theory that 
Wordsworth proposes. The crisis is this: the Romantic poet wished to see himself as a 
prophetic figure, but on what basis can his utterances be termed legitimate? For Coleridge, 
the question of truth and the question of meaning had a unified answer because Christ, the 
meaning of life, is the truth, whereas for Wordsworth 'Ufe' was that tnrth that was 
meaningful. The question of the sense and the legitimacy of this explanation is the question 
that I raise in discussing both Wordsworth's theory and that of his two younger 
contemporaries, Shelley and Keats. 
I intend to examine Shelley's Mont Blanc in the fourth chapter as a work of prophetic 
imagination founded upon the common sense of universality in life I establish previously. 
Shelley however also delves into explicit forms of heresy in the poem, a practice that raises 
the question whether prophesy can be divested fi"om the question of orthodoxy. From a 
universal perspective, the notions of heresy and orthodoxy are equally vaUd because firom a 
universal perspective, everything is relative. But the poem is notoriously obscure as well. 
This leaves us in a quandary: how can we be critics of the poem unless we invoke seemingly 
anachronistic notions of legitimacy such as orthodoxy? I try to read the poem as a proof of 
the absurdity of its hermeneutic postulates. The final chapter of the thesis looks to Keats's 
paradoxical Ode on a Grecian Um and discusses his use of silence in it, the confi-ontation of a 
philosopher of life with the um and its silent and etemal depiction. It concludes with a 
discussion of the use of the ode as a touchstone for the legitimacy of various schools of 
literary criticism since the Second World War, returning the thesis full circle to where it had 
begun. 
12 
Chapter 1 Modern Hermeneutics; the development of universal relativity by 
understanding meaning in terms of truth 
The majority of the issues that are raised in this thesis are those that have been 
touched upon by the field of contemporary philosophy that is commonly designated 
hermeneutics. Hermeneutics is a systematic discipline concerned with unearthing the 
principles regulating aU forms of interpretation both in regard to its traditional focus, the text, 
and, since the time of the 'father of modem hermeneutics,' Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-
1834), to the relation of mankind to the idea of universality. His approach was developed 
more fully in the late nineteenth century by Wilhelm Dihhey (1833-1911), who sought to 
provide a methodological foundation for the human sciences (Geisteswissemchaften) that he 
believed Kant had provided for the natural sciences {Naturwissenschaften) but had feUed to 
provide for them. Dihhey maintained that the proper object of the human sciences is 
something specifically human, namely the inner, psychic Ufe {Erlebnis, Uved experience) of 
historical and social agents. Whereas the natural scimces sought to e)q)lain phenomena in a 
causal and, so to speak, extemal feshion of explanation (Erkldren), Dihhey asserted that the 
method proper to the human sciences was that of empathetic understanding {Verstehen). I 
shall provide a more extended discussion of the main emphases of both Dilthey's and 
Schleiermacher's work shortly. They are of particular interest to a discussion of the English 
Romantics because Schleiermacher and, to a lesser extent, Dikhey presented hermeneutic 
perspectives that were similar to theirs. 
My approach concentrates in particular however upon the hermeneutics of the 
contemporary philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer, though it does not rest there. His work has 
become a focal point for contemporary discussions of hermeneutic issues because it appears 
to resolve a long-standing problem within the project of general hermeneutics. It promises to 
unite the now largely discredited 'methodological' or 'Romantic' hermeneutics of 
Schleiermacher and Dilthey^' with a Heideggerian form of ontology. Heidegger's work 
showed little interest of its own in the general hermeneutic project of recovering meaning. 
What he appeared to estabUsh though, which makes him crucial for Gadamer's purposes, was 
how mankind could engage with the truth of being. 
This sq)aration of being fi-om truth had been a philosophical problem ever since 
Descartes had separated being fi^om appearance by his method of universal doubt; but it had 
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also been the central problem of the general hermeneutic project (and thus of the humanities) 
since Schleiermacher. Heidegger provides Gadamer, as the title of his main hermeneutic 
work Truth & Method attests, with a means to unite the 'truth' of his ontology with the 
methodological attempt to recover authorial 'meaning' that had characterised the initial 
project of a general hermeneutics. The unity of the two appears to be a rather uninspiring 
aim, but examining the consequences of their mutual exclusivity soon beUes that inq)ression. 
Before I go on to summarise the inportance of Heidegger to Gadamer and the general 
hermeneutic project, I wish to discuss both the project's fimdamental characteristics and its 
inherent difficulties and briefly mention how they are related to the crisis of self-legitimation 
in Romantic poetry. 
It seems important to distinguish the basic tenor of my account of hermeneutics from 
an account by the influential hermeneuticist, Paul Ricoeiu-, which I shall in part relate in this 
first chapter. Ricoeur, in commenting on the evolution of general hermeneutics since the 
Romantics, described the process hermeneutics has imdergone as follows: 
I see the recent history of hermeneutics dominated by two preoccupations. The first 
tends progressively to enlarge the aim of hermeneutics, in such a way that all regional 
hermeneutics are incorporated into one general hermeneutics. But this movement of 
deregionalisation cannot be pressed to Ihe end xmless at the same time the properly 
epistemological concerns of hermeneutics - its efforts to achieve a scientific status -
are subordinated to ontological preoccupations, whereby understanding ceases to 
appear as a simple mode of knowing in order to become a way of being and a way of 
relating to beings and to being. The movement of deregionalisation is thus 
acconqjanied by a movement of radicalisation, by -vAivh hermeneutics becomes not 
only general but fundamental^ 
Ricoeur is certainly right in noting that the development of 'general hermeneutics' displays 
the increasing rigour with which its premise of imiversality was apphed. He misconstrues 
the issues in two ways however; Firstly, he does not attribute this development and its 
resultant problems sufficiently to the drive for meaning promised by a universal perspective 
and entirely related to the continued influence of the pursuit of reason (Vemunfi). Secondly, 
he attributes a different preoccupation in the ontological movement of modem hermeneutics, 
the focus upon the question of truth, from that vdiich had dominated the epistemological 
movement, whereas the two are merely different modifications of the drive for meaning. And 
the latter movement mistakenly embraces truth meaning. 
21 Dilthey's methodological approach underpinned the study of the humanities at the onset of the 
modem university. It aimed to recover meaning or, what was posited as the same thing, authorial 
intention. ^ j 
22 Paul Ricoeur. Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences: Essavs on language. Action and 
Tntemretatioa (1981). 43-44. (Hereafter I^HS) 
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To trace what I think are misapprehensions in Ricoeur's account, we must take a 
short step backwards to look at the understanding of the philosophical change that took place 
immediately prior to Schleiermacher, in Kantian philosophy. In many histories of 
philosophy, Kant's 'Copemican revolution,' 'the basis of contemporary philosophy,' is 
presented as a shift fi-om objectivity to subjectivity that commenced with the subjective tum 
of Cartesian philosophy. This understanding informs Gadamer's and Ricoeur's accounts too. 
I wish to differentiate my emphasis from this however because understanding the shift as a 
change to a 'subjective perspective' actually misrepresents the motivation of both Kantian 
and Cartesian philosophy (even i f it does so in Kantian terms). This in tum leads to an 
inevitable misinterpretation of the issues that were at work in the initial move to embrace a 
'general hermeneutics.' 
So as not to be misimderstood, I am not denying the anti-traditional dynamic of 
Enlightenment thinking. The change that took place first in Descartes and then more radically 
in Kant did indeed question the objectivity of tradition. But it did not do so on the 
individualistic (and invalid) basis of 'subjectivity' or with the intention of subverting the 
concept of authority as such. To understand the effect of the change as its intention is to offer 
an incredible ejqjlanation for the two philosophers motives, not to mention an historically 
inaccurate one. Descartes and Kant both disputed the objectivity of tradition and of language 
in order to embrace a more meaningful form of objectivity, i.e. universality, the perspective 
that transcended any particular events of history or culture. Universality was seen as a means 
of overcoming the particular 'objective' truths of tradition, whether they were of the Classical 
or the Biblical region of hermeneutics. It is only the self-defeating consequences of this 
universality that have appeared subsequent to the adoption of the universal perspective that 
have created the illusion that a change to a 'subjective perspective' motivated the attack on 
the objectivity oftradition and the tum to the feelings of the subject. It did not. Subjectivity, 
and its absolute relativity, was the ironic consequence of the move in adopting a universal 
perspective on meaning. 
As I argued in the introduction, this change to a universal 'subjective perspective' 
actually came about because Kant and his successors had adopted a novel understanding of 
universality from Cartesian science, an understanding that preyed upon the fimdamental two-
world view of Westem thinking. It had another consequence however: 
With Galileo akeady, certainly since Newton, the word 'universal' has begun to 
acquire a very specific meaning indeed; it means 'valid beyond our solar s j ^ m . ' 
And something quite siriiilar has happened to another word of philosophic origin, the 
word 'absolute,' which is appUed to 'absolute time,' 'absolute space,' 'absolute 
motion,' or 'absolute speed,' in each usage meaning a time, a space, a movement, a 
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velocity which is present in the xmiverse and compared to \diich earth-bound time or 
space or movement or speed are only 'relative.' Everything happening on earth has 
become relative since the earth's relatedness to the universe became the point of 
reference for all measurements.^  
Ricoeur's account of the development of hermeneutics relays a different story. As a 
result of his tendency to understand meaning in the universal terms of 'timeless' or absolute 
truth he is led to explain, as we shall see, the original attempt of Romantic hermeneutics to 
recover meaning as a project without an estabhshed 'ontological' basis, i.e. a basis in truth-
claims. This lack of a basis for truth-claims at the centre of the Romantic hermeneutic project 
ultimately brought their claim to be meaningfiil into question. This was, he says, only 
corrected by the re-orientation of hermeneutics towards a universal model of truth, in the 
model provided by Heidegger. 
Prior to Heidegger's correction, this inversion of truth and meaning under a universal 
perspective created a fimdamental divide between the processes of what Dilthey had called 
ejq)lanation (the scientific process of accessing truth) and imderstanding (the humanities' 
process of accessing meaning) within the ostensibly imified method of general hermeneutics. 
Claims for poetry's meaning could be made by means of a 'Romantic' hermeneutics, but 
claims for truth remained in the domain of science. The claims of poetry were judged to be 
nothing but inferior truth-claims. Dilthey's development of the Geisteswissenschaften was 
based on an attempt to rectify that and, by modelling itself on the Naturwissenschaften, to 
establish the truth that was characteristic of poetry. The consequences of this were no less 
problematic than the attempt to base hermeneutics on the recovery of meaning from a 
universal perspective. 
To take one significant exanqjle of the problem that was created by Dilthey's 
hermeneutics, the attempt to estabhsh truth in poetry and avoid the ultimately reductive 
search for an author's intention (or meaning) was ejq)ressed in the femous claim by one of the 
New Critics of the 1940s that 'poetry should not mean, but Be.' TTiat project, which 
considered the text as an autonomous microcosm of the complexity of human ejqjerience, 
prescribed a process of 'close reading' that was isolated from a consideration of the author's 
intentions or the reader's responses. This process was advocated to preserve the organic 
integrity of the work of art and allow it to e5q)ress its form of truth without reducing it to a 
series of historical processes extending ad infinitum. This methodology allowed poetry to be 
2^  Hannah Arendt The Human Condition. (1998). 270. (Hereafter THC) It is well known that Kant 
tried to emulate what Newton did in the natural sciences in the realm of philosophy. What is usually 
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'truthful,' but it did so at the cost of permitting any interconnection of a poem with its context 
- in other words, it made it meaningless. Instead of the path to truth-claims on par with the 
natural sciences it had sought, Ricoeur argues that Dilthey produced an aporia in the human 
sciences.^ '' This divide characterised the state of hermeneutics over the course of the 
nineteenth and on into the early twentieth century. 
A means of uniting truth and meaning remained outstanding. Both Gadamer and 
Ricoeur see the phenomenological philosophy of Martin Heidegger's Being and Time as the 
basis of breaching that divide. Heidegger argued that this methodological aporia was a direct 
legacy of fundamental problems in Cartesian subjective philosophy. It was a result of 
Descartes' mental act of annihilating the world through imiversal doubt to create an 
ontologically certain, thinking self. This could be rectified by an appeal to what he calls 
'iimer-worldly being': 
The being that Descartes attenpts to pin down ontologically with the extensio is fer 
more one that is initially discovered immediately by inner-worldly being. But be that 
as it may, even though the ontological character of this specifically inner-worldly 
being (nature) may lead to obscurity - both in the idea of its substantiality as well as 
the sense of existit and ad existendum included in its definition - the ontological 
problem of the world may still in some sense have been expressed and advanced by 
means of an ontology founding the 'world' on the radical separation of God and ego. 
But even i f that is not so, it should still be noted that Descartes not only gives an 
ontologically felse definition but also that his interpretation and its basis have led to 
the avoidance of both the phenomenon of the world and the existence of the initially 
present inner-worldly being.^ 
Gadamer's and Ricoeur's hermeneutics both atten^t to surmount this aporia and 
establish a means of making meaningful truth-claims or, conversely, of recovering true 
meaning. They are often grouped together as proponents of a philosophical or 
'phenomenological hermeneutics.'^ ^ Both have seized upon Heidegger's ontology as a way 
into being and as a 'way out' of the Cartesian aporia. This is because they see 
phenomenology as a means of overcoming the problem of subjectivity. The express purpose 
of that branch of philosophy was to overcome the division of subject and object that had 
dominated modem philosophy since Descartes: 
discoimted is how dependent upon this notion of universality the whole project was. 
Aporia is the word Plato used in his dialogues to describe the state in which Socrates left his 
interlocutors after confounding their spurious arguments, i.e. 'without a way out' Of Paul Ricoeur. 
H&HS. 4344. 
Martin Heidegger. SeinundZeit 95. (my translation and itahcs; hereafter S&Z) 
Good synopses of their hermeneutics are provided in the Continental Philosophy of the 20th Century. 
Ed. Richard Kearney. (1994). 290-349; Gerald Bruns. Hermeneutics Ancient & Modem. (1993); 
Anthony Thiselton. New Horizons in Hermeneutics: The Theory and Practice of Tran^ormins 
Biblical Reading. (1992). Kurt Mueller-Vollmer's also has an excellent introduction in his The 
Hermenentics Reader (1994). 
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...the central problematic of modem philosophy itself^ namely, the 'epistemological' 
problem of how an isolated subjectivity, closed in upon itself, can none the less 
manage to 'transcend' itself in such a way as to achieve a 'knowledge' of the 
'external world.'" 
Gadamer claims that what Heidegger accomphshed was to give 'the human sciences a 
completely new backgroimd by making science's concept of objectivity appear to be a special 
case.''" 
Before moving on to a more extensive critical analysis of Gadamer's hermeneutics, I 
will first provide a brief synopsis of some of the issues that arise in it. It seems important, 
given the continued presence of the aporia in contemporary hermeneutics, to introduce a 
'case study' of how Gadamer explains the conflict between two different conceptions of 
hermeneutics leading up to the Romantic period, because it affects the interpretation of the 
problem thereafter. Kant's subjective turn in philosophy and his redefinition of several words 
that were central to the previous understandings of interpretation are central to that 
subsequent discussion. A history of modem hermeneutics, using Paul Ricoeur as its guide, 
provides that. 
A case study: Gadamer on Kant and moral sense philosophy 
While Heidegger traced the problem of the Enlightenment methodology back to 
Descartes (and specifically to the Cartesian cogito), Gadamer concentrates more on the 
implicit systematic structuring of Cartesian thinking upon the thinking of the humanities by 
the late Enlightenment philosopher Immanuel Kant. Gadamer's enqjhases in Truth and 
Method, as we shall see more clearly later, Ue in three areas: the aesthetic sphere, the 
historical sphere and the sphere of language. Language is the current running throughout the 
three, but it is Kant's treatment of aesthetics that Gadamer initially focuses on and which 
particularly marks his own work as well. Before elaborating on that, it will be usefiilto 
recapitulate the argument Gadamer makes about how Kant's sense of aesthetics confronted ' 
that of his contemporaries, who essentially argued from the other side of the hermeneutic 
divide where the issues of hermeneutics were still based around textual 'regions.' 
2^  Rnntledge History. 298. Paul Crowther poses Kant's problem for us in ethical terms: ' i j ^ ^ c m i ^ 
assertion of bur subjective response lay claim to a priori, as opposed to merely pnvate, vahdity? Ihe 
Kantian Sublimf Fmm Morality to Art. (1989). 60. 
2«Hans-Georg Gadamer. TrafiL&^Qd. (1989). 258-59. (Hereafter IM© 
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Gadamer's critique of Kant does not so much contend with him over specific details 
in his philosophy (though it does that as well) as it does with its entire tenor, as is evident in 
his remark: 
I f we now examine the importance of Kant's Critique of Judgement for the history of 
the human sciences, we must say that his giving to aesthetics a transcendental 
philosophical basis had major consequences and constituted a turning point. It was 
the end of a tradition, but also the begiiming of a new development. It limited the 
idea of taste to an area in which, as a special principle of judgement, it could claim 
independent validity - and, by so doing, limited the concept of knowledge to the 
theoretical and practical use of reason. (T&M. 40) 
Gadamer argues that Kantian philosophy, particularly the Critique of Judgement imposed 
Cartesian reason systematically onto humanity in all of its personal and social ethical 
relations. Just as Cartesian science had produced in Isaac Newton a mechanistic view of the 
universe in which physical bodies behaved according to certain immutable but invisible 
imiversal 'laws,' Kant's anthropological Cartesianism elevated a form of reason, a single 
goveming principle without discernible prejudice, to the status of the divine fiat. He called 
this principle the 'categorical in:q)erative.' As his Critique of Practical Reason famously 
expresses it in one instance, 'Act only on that maxim which you can at the same time will as a 
universal law.'^' 
If Gadamer's argument about Kant is correct, his great achievement in uniting the 
empiricist and rationalist schools of thought^ " is a rather pyrhhic victory. The obliteration of 
distinction as a constituent part of human judgement in order to allow this unity to occur only 
came, according to Gadamer, at the cost of the integrity of the moral sense tradition. Indeed 
Gadamer seems to place great value on the Roman philosophical tradition of England and the 
Romanesque coimtries, that of the sensus communis, in the spheres not lying within the 
natural sciences. Gadamer claims that this tradition is particularly well represented in the 
philosophy of the third Earl of Shaftesbury (1671-1713): 
According to Shaftesbury, the humanists understood by sensus communis the sense 
of the general good, but also 'love of the commxmity or society, natural affection. 
As Roger Scruton points out, the problem that Kant's categorical imperative encounters is in 
attaining 'objective necessity,' since he defined it by its lack of 'empirical conditions,' its isolation 
from the antecedent interests of the subject. Thus while Kant argues we ought to afBnn it, he can give 
no proof for i t This proof was to be provided by the Transcendental Deduction, 'but Kant did not 
provide this Transcendental Deduction; instead, he devoted the second Critique to an examination of 
metaphysical questions which, while enormously influential, left the gap between his metaphysics and 
his morals unclosed' A Short History of Modem Philosophy. (1991). 154. This 'gap' of course is the 
source of the contemporary aporia that Gadamer and Ricoeur devote much of theu" hermeneutics to 
attemptmg to resolve. Interestingly, Kant's failure to provide a Transcendental Deduction seems to be 
matched by Coleridge's failure in Book 13 of the Biographia Literaria. The difference is that 
Coleridge's failure there, I shall argue, is a dehberate failure of reasoning, and a reversion to the 
dogmatics of the Christian faith, the unifying tertium aliquid he refers to in his philosophy. 
^ Scruton, op. cit. 140-41. 
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humanity, obligingness.' They adopt a term from Marcus Aurelius, koinonoemosune 
- a most unusual and artificial word, confirming that the concept of sensus commimis 
does not originate with the Greek philosophers, but has the stoical conception 
sounding in it like a harmonic. Cr^ l^«\)^ ' 
TTiis intellectual and social virtue of sympathy which Shaftesbury refers to is, according to 
Gadamer, an ancient Roman concept contained within the word humanitas itself f j g 
defines it as a 'refined savoir vivre, the attitude of the man who understands a joke and makes 
one because he is aware of a deeper union with his interlocutor.'^ ^ It is this tradition in which 
philosophers succeeding Shaftesbury such as Hutcheson and Hume developed their moral 
sense philosophy, generally noted as the coimterpart to the ethics of Kant. Gadamer notes 
that this tradition was not the prevalent one in Germany: 
...the supplanting of pietistic tendencies in the later eighteenth century caused the 
hermeneutic fimction of sensus communis to decline to a mere corrective: that which 
contradicts the consensus of feelings, judgements and conclusions, i.e. the sensus 
communis, cannot be correct. In contrast to the importance that Shaftesbury assigned 
to the sensus communis for society and state, this negative fimction shows the 
emptying and intellectuaUsing of the idea that took place during the German 
enlightenment.^9)^ 
I shall return to this point of tradition and its importance in Gadamer's philosophy in a 
moment, but first I wish to examine his discussion of Kant's notion of taste. 
The concept of taste is crucial to Kant,^ ^ particularly in the ligjit of his reduction of 
the sensus communis to judgements of aesthetic taste, for it allowed him to introduce the idea 
of universal agreement and hence an a priori justification for criticising taste. Gadamer notes 
that this removal of the evaluative capacity of judgement is closely tied to political and social 
changes. These changes prompted a re-interpretation by the Enlightenment thinkers of the 
intention of a moral idea of education for the Christian courtier as an expression of cynical 
class interest: 
'^ Cf. Shaftesbury, Characteristics. Treatise II, esp. part m, sect. 1. (1773). 
2^ Lewis and Short's Latin Dictionary provides us with this definition of humanitas in the sense of the 
word Gadamer intends: 'Mental cultivation befitting a man, liberal education, good breeding, elegance 
of manners or language, refinement.' (869) 
T&M. 24. Gadamer notes that' Shaftesbury explicitly limits wit and humour to social discourse 
among friends.' 
Gadamer tells us that, in Germany, with the exception of Pietism, the political and social dimensions 
contained in the concept sensus communis were not absorbed because the social and political 
conditions of England and France, the leading countries of the EnUghtenment, were absent (Cf T&M, 
26-29) To distinguish between the two entirely different senses of 'common sense,' it is now common 
to refer to the sense used in the Roman tradition (and its 'regional hermeneutics') as that of the sensus 
communis and that used by Kant as that of common sense, though this is confiising for EngUsh 
speakers who tend to associate both aspects of common sense in common usage. 
Jochen Schmidt notes the importance of the concept of taste to Kant's aesthetics in Die Geschichte 
des Genie-Gedankens in der deutschen Literatur. Philosophie und Politik 1750-1945. Band 1. (1988). 
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(Its) ideal of social Bildung seems to emerge everywhere in the wake of absolutism 
and its suppression of the hereditary aristocracy...and is closely bound up with the 
antecedents of the third estate. It no longer recognises and legitimates itself on the 
basis of birth and rank but simply through the shared nature of its judgements or, 
rather, its capacity to rise above the narrowness of interests and private predilections 
to the title of judgement. (35-36) 
Gadamer speculates that it was possible for Kant and others to link the concept of 
judgement with the sensus communis because of the 'intellectualising' of the latter concept as 
an a priori relation of concepts to their objects.^ * He argues that this intellectuahsing was the 
first step towards its inevitable obUvion. For the feet that judgement required a higher 
criterion in order for it to be apphed led the thinkers of the German Enhghtenment (who did 
not have a sense of its 'moral sense') to consider it as a lower feculty of the mind.^ ^ I f we 
look to Britain, where this base intellectuaUsation of common sense did not take place to such 
a degree, we see that a fer different conclusion was possible. Although the dependence of 
judgement upon a unifying and validating sort of criterion - and not just a collection of 
common sensual impressions - is indisputable, the insistence by philosophers such as Hume 
that moral and aesthetic judgements do not obey reason, but rather have the character of 
sentiment (or taste), need not thereby give them the relativistic implications that the German 
Enlightenment thinkers charged them with. 
Instead, Hume and the moral sense philosophers asserted that taste is based upon the 
broader, humanistic notions of the sensus communis, which are of a non-rational, though not 
necessarily irrational nature.^ * These grounds dispute the claims of the pure rationalists, 
whom Hume castigates for their strict Cartesian understanding of mankind as a coalition of 
imiversally certain mental capacities: 
(They) consider man in the light of a reasonable rather than an active being, and 
endeavour to form his understanding more than cultivate his maimers...They think it a 
reproach to all literature, that philosophy should not yet have fixed, beyond 
controversy, the foxmdation of morals, reasoning, and criticism; and should for ever 
®^ This intellectualisation meant the entire distanciation of judgement from any sensible objects except 
in the special instance of aesthetic objects. Thus for Kant the trae sense of community is not entailed 
in the judgements about the common sensual world, but rather in the notion of taste, which concerns 
itself only with these aesthetic 'objects,' subjective projections of an incorporeal Cartesian self. This 
understandiDg of self as 'spirit' was argued at the outset of the mtroduction to express the 'imiversality' 
of the self 
In the Critique of Judgement (hereafter CoD. Kant notes of the faculty of judgement that it must 
itself 'fimush a concept, and one from which, properly, we get no cognition of a thing, but which it can 
itself employ as a rule only - but not as an objective rule to which it can adapt its judgement, because, 
for that, another faculty of judgement would again be required to enable us to decide whether the case 
was one for the ^ Ucation of the rule or not '(5) 
Hume notes the danger of irrationality in this exercise of taste however: 'Nothing is more dangerous 
to reason than the flights of the imagination, and nothing has been the occasion of more mistakes 
among philosophers.' (A Treatise of Human Nature. (1978). 267 
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talk of truth and felsehood, vice and virtue, beauty and deformity, without being able 
to determine the source of these distinctions. (Enquiry. 6) 
Hume responds to such philosophers that human nature itself argues against this error: 
It seems...that nature has pointed out a mixed kind of life as most suitable to (the) 
human race, and secretly admonished them to allow none of these biases to draw too 
much, so as to incapacitate them for other occupations and entertainments. Indulge 
your passion for science, says she, but let your science be human, and such as may 
have a direct reference to action and society. (9) 
It does seem rather unfair to Hume, i f we read him in light of these statements, to 
judge his inq)ortance according to criteria restricted to defining epistemological boundaries 
i.e. as a sceptic vs^ aiting to be outdone by Kant. For it is obvious from them that his 
scepticism, albeit extreme, is as much an instrument of restraining the claims of rationalist 
and dogmatic thinkers as an interest in epistemology per se. Though he may now frequently 
be judged by philosophers of his own tradition according to his contribution to the sphere of 
epistemology, in 'curbing metaphysical pretensions,' his reference to 'action and society' 
would seem to point that his interest lay equally in ethics and expressed an understanding of 
man as a political being. These concems lay close at hand to those of this thesis. On the 
other hand, Hume's sort of arguments needed the extremity of Kant to dissolve their 
pretensions that such a moral sense could be derived iimately from rational principles. 
Hume's failure in the fece of Kant's argimients are the beginning of the call for a defence of 
moral sense vsrithout primary appeal to the senses or subjective reasoning that will grow 
louder as time passes. 
We note the accuracy of Gadamer's observation that Kant Med to understand the 
nature of the sensus communis in section 40 of the Critique of Judgement in which he 
discusses 'Taste as a kind of sensus communis.' The best way of observing this is again by 
comparison to Hume. Hume's sense of a certain moral and communal disposition in human 
nature led him to claim that 'reason ought to be the slave of the passions.' This communal 
sense led him to argue: 
According to my system, all reasonings are nothing but the effects of custom; and 
custom has no influence, but by inlivening the imagination, and giving us a strong 
concqjtion of any object. It may, therefore, be concluded, that our judgement and 
imagination can never be contrary, and that custom cannot operate on the latter 
feculty after such a manner, as to render it opposite to the former. This difficulty we 
can remove after no other manner, than by supposing the influence of general rules. 
(Treatise. 149) 
On the other hand, Kant's derogatory view of any moral sense that could not attain an 
absolute status led him to criticise such arbitrary notions as Hume's in an apparently 
devastating fashion: 
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The name of sense is often given to judgement where what attracts attention is not so 
much its reflective act as merely its result. So we speak of a sense of truth, of a sense 
of propriety, or of justice, &c. And yet, of course, we know, or at least ought well 
enou^ to know, that a sense cannot be the true abode of these concepts, not to speak 
of its being conq)etent, even in the slightest degree, to pronounce universal rules. 
(CoJ. 150-51) 
Statements such as this lead Gadamer to conclude that Kant 'developed his moral 
philosophy in downright opposition to the doctrine of 'moral feeling' that had been worked 
out in Enghsh philosophy. Thus he totally excluded the idea of the sensus communis from 
moral philosophy.'^' While Hume's utter enslavement of reason to the 'passions' must 
certainly held to be dubious as a basis of moral conduct, Gadamer points out the strangeness 
of Kant's conclusion: 
...even i f one draws no sceptical, relativistic conclusions from differences of taste, but 
holds on to the idea of good taste, it sounds paradoxical to call good taste, this strange 
gift which distinguishes the members of a cultivated society from all other men, a 
sense of community. In the sense of an empirical statement that would, in fact, be 
absurd...(33)*' 
What Gadamer I think overlooks here is precisely what Arendt had argued about Kantian 
reason (Vemunft): its characteristic drive for meaning beyond all sensible things. He ovv^Y 
interprets it as a drive for truth and thus argues the absurdity of its universal 'prejudice 
against prejudice.' 
Gadamer illustrates another aspect of taste seemingly excluded by Kant's aoristic 
definition of it. In jurisprudence, the individual case is judged not only according to universal 
principles but, in accordance with the imique time and circumstances of the case, it also 'co-
determines... supplements and corrects'(37) the imiversal principles themselves by the very 
act of judgement itself Moreover, this correspondent relationship is also to be found in 
morality. Hence judgements are not only, nor even primarily to be found in the evaluation of 
the beautiful and the sublime'*' in nature and art but 'spread throughout the moral reality of 
man.'(37) The fact that all general rules are substantiated and also influenced by particular 
instances of judgement is wholly ignored by Kant. But that aspect of judgement entails that 
' ' T & M 31. 
Kant refers to taste as a critical faculty 'which in its reflective act takes account (a priori) of the mode 
of representation of every one else, in order, as it were, to weigh its judgement with the collective 
reason of mankind, and diereby avoid the illusion arising from subjective and personal conditions 
which could readily be taken for objective, an illusion that would exert a prejudicial influence upon its 
judgement' CoJ, 151. 
CoJ, vii. 
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taste is a requirement in aU moral decisions so that 'taste is not the ground, but the supreme 
perfection of the moral judgement.'(38)"*^ 
The imphcations of Gadamer's insights into Kant's philosophy range widely and 
deeply. Not only does his aesthetics remove the case-specific concepts of taste and aesthetic 
judgement cmcial to jurispmdence and moral judgements, but 'by discrediting any kind of 
theoretical knowledge apart from that of natural science, it compelled the human sciences to 
rely on the methodology of the natural sciences in self-analysis.'(39) This form of 
'transcendental analysis' in tum robbed the human sciences of their particular claim to truth, 
that of the study and cultivation of tradition, and forced them to adopt the methodology of the 
natural sciences for legitimacy, which did not suit them. In feet, Gadamer claims that quite 
against Kant's universalist emphasis it is the historical nature of hiunan understanding, laden 
with tradition, that is particular to it. 
This brings us to the final point I wish to discuss in regard to Gadamer's philosophy 
befijre moving on to review Ricoeur's interpretation of it, that of the indispensabihty of 
prejudice to imderstanding. In contrast to the view represented in the Enhghteimient's 
'prejudice against prejudices,'(271-85) Gadamer claims m specific reference to ' . 
. Dilthey that there can be legitimate prejudices, not of course 'arbitrary fancies 
and the limitations imposed by imperceptible habits of thought' but those which are possessed 
in the light of certain expectations that 'are not borne out by the things in themselves': 
Working-out appropriate projects, anticipatory in nature, to be confirmed 'by the 
things' themselves, is the constant task of understanding. The only 'objectivity' here 
is the confirmation of a fore-meaning in its being worked out. Indeed, what 
characterises the arbitrariness of inappropriate fore-meanings i f not that they come to 
nothing in being worked out? But understanding realises its fiill potential only when 
the fore-meanings that it begins with are not arbitrary. Thus it is quite right for the 
interpreter not to approach the text directly, relying solely on the fore-meaning 
already available to him, but rather ejq)licitly to examine the legitimacy - i.e., the 
origin and vahdity - of the fore-meanings dwelling within him.... The important thing 
is to be aware of one's own bias, so that the text may present itself in all its othemess 
and thus assert its own truth against one's own fore-meanings. (267-69) 
This of course is not only an exhortation to leam the basis of one's own culture and the 
limitations imposed on one's actions by a sense of community, the aim of humanism. It is 
particularly an attack on the great Enlightenment aim of freedom, taken in the sense of 
autonomy, i.e. auto-legislation. That aim 'hinder(s) us from understanding (a text) in terms of 
Gadamer claims that this ethics of good taste contains humanistic components which were present m 
Greek ethics as well, citing the 'ethics of measure' of the Pythagoreans and Plato and of the mean 
{mesotes) which Aristotle developed.(38) 
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the subject matter. It is the tyranny of hidden prejudices that make us deaf to what speaks to 
us in tradition.' (269-70)*^ It is with this historicity of our being-in-the-world in mind that we 
can understand Gadamer's claim that absolute reason is impossible as it 'exists for us only in 
concrete, historical terms, i.e., it is not its own master but remains constantly dependent on 
the given circumstances in which it operates.' (276) 
Gadamer points out that part of the pe-Enlightenment notion of prejudice was one that could have 
'either a positive or a negative value. This is clearly due to the influence of the Latin praejudicium." 
(270) The Enlightenment critique of religion however reduced this sense of prejudice to being simply 
an 'unfounded judgement' He mentions Leo Strauss's Die ReUgionkritik Soinozas insightM 
characterisation of the Enlightenment's own prejudice: 
The word 'prejudice' is the most suitable expression for the great aim of the Enlightenment, 
the desire for free, untrammelled verification; the Vorurteil is the unambiguous polemical 
correlate of the very ambiguous word 'freedom.' (163) 
While this is indeed true, the claim to tmth that actually compelled the EnUghtemnent was the very 
ambiguous word 'universal,' the unambiguous polemical correlate to'tradition,' wkrcK (^a4am«-
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Paul Ricoeur on Hermeneutics from Schleiermacher to Gadamer 
Paul Ricoeur gives a fine thematic interpretation of the field of hermeneutics since 
Schleiermacher in his Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, which first traces the 
emergence of an aporia in the initial project of general hermeneutics, and then concentrates in 
particular on the aporia that post-Heideggerian hermeneutics purports to address. He presents 
the historical development of modem hermeneutics phenomenologically, and traces its 
evolution as a movement to two consecutive phases, -which might sketchily be described as 
quantitative and then qualitative, the processes of deregionalisation and radicalisation. A 
good part of the following account is a summary of what Ricoeur has to say about the field of 
hermeneutics over the period concemed, though I place more emphasis on the influence of the 
universal perspective within the 'organic turn' of Romantic hermeneutics than he does. The 
purpose of the following is to trace the main arguments of a series of hermeneuticists and note 
their evolution towards an ever more consistent universality against the objective differences 
of the two-world view presented in language, a process completed by Heidegger's exploration 
of the prejudicial truth of 'inner-worldly being' and his presentation of the project of meaning 
in terms of truth. 
Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768 -1834) 
Ricoeur begins his interpretative history, as most accounts of modem hermeneutics 
do, with an assessment of Friedrich Schleiermacher's work. It is in his work that 
hermeneutics emerges as a general process instead of its previous confinement to two 
'regionalised' domains of interpretation, the sacred and the secular. Like many recent 
commentators, Ricoeur shows himself eager to distance his discussion of Schleiermacher 
from Dilthey's influential but somewhat simplistic portrait of him as a writer promoting 
psychological empathy with the author's creative personality as it is e^ qpressed in his works."" 
Nevertheless, Ricoeur still sees this as the seminal emphasis of Schleiermacher's 
hermeneutics and thus views it as an anticipation of Dilthey. The problems he sees in Dihhey 
can be traced back to Schleiermacher's original general hermeneutic project, a feet he does 
not acknowledge. This is an issue I develop more fully in my reflections on Ricoeur's 
account after this summary history. 
notes the inqwrtance 
impetus for the recent reassessments of his work. 
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Ricoeur portrays the inherent difiiculties with Schleiermacher's attempt to produce a 
general hermeneutic process for all texts to be connected with his notion of the psyche. The 
difficulties that stem from that psychological conception come in the form of a dilemma: On 
the one hand, the impersonal and transcendental nature of the subject that Schleiermacher, 
Uke his contemporaries, adopted from Kant's investigations of physics and ethics in his first 
two Critiques was precisely what allowed him to estabUsh that ««/verja/judgements were 
possible. The utter devaluation of the objective differences inherent in the Kantian reason 
provides the rationale and the method for pursuing a general hermeneutic project towards 
texts. On the other hand, while its evasion of object-derived rules held great promise for 
overcoming the pedantry that so often typified Neo-Classical criticism, such an evanescent 
concept of a human being was self-defeating. It allowed no interaction with specific 
instances, cases or texts because the transcendental subject gave it no common ground for 
doing so with them. 
Quite against what one might expect, the result of the appUcation of a Kantian form 
of the subject to the hermeneutical encounter of texts by Schleiermacher meant that the 
encounter operated according to a biased critical process, albeit a bias towards transcendence. 
This happened by applying the notion of taste that Kant presented, idiosyncratically at the 
time, but thenceforth as an article of common sense: 
Hermeneutics was bom with the attempt to raise exegesis and philology to the level 
of a Kunstlehre, that is, a 'technology' which is not restricted to a mere collection of 
imconnected operations. '(H&HS. 45) 
The mere collection of'imconnected' operations whose restrictions Sdileiermacher's 
interpreter was able to overcome were of course the very ones connected to the sensible world 
and explained by the two previously regionalised interpretative domains of Classical and 
Biblical writing. The removal of the distinction between the regions only in feet took place 
because their connection to the sensible world was no longer of pre-eminent concern to a 
subject conceived in Kant's transcendental terms. 
Schleiermacher's Kunstlehre, which Ricoeur notes is the crucial element of his 
hermeneutics, was a direct reflection of Kant'^lranscendental philosophical basis for Kis 
aesthetics whi«)j afforded him the primary means for accessing a common psychological 
ground. Gadamer summarises Kant's significance to its development: 
In his critique of aesthetic judgement what Kant sought to and did legitimate was the 
subjective universality of aesthetic taste in which there is no longer any knowledge of 
the object, and in the area of 'fine arts' the superiority of genius to any aesthetics 
based on rules. Thus romantic hermeneutics and history found a point of contact for 
their self-understanding only in the concq)t of genius, validated by Kant's 
aesthetics... TTie transcendental justification of aesthetic judgement was the basis of 
27 
the autonomy of aesthetic consciousness, and on the same basis historical 
consciousness was to be legitimised as well. The radical subjectivisation involved in 
Kant's new way of groxmding aesthetics was truly epoch-making. In discrediting any 
kind of theoretical knowledge except that of natural science, it compelled the human 
sciences to rely on the methodology of the natural sciences in conceptuahsing 
themselves. But it made this reliance easier by offering the 'artistic element,' 
'feeliag,' and 'empathy' as subsidiary elements. (T&M. 41) 
Two effects particularly significant to Romantic hermeneutics are to be observed in 
this. Firstly, there is a common feetor of transcendence uniting three different aspects of the 
aesthetic ejq)erience. Transcendence is contained: i) in the c/"eator of the work of art, since 
the genius is understood as a law unto himself; ii) in the definitive form of his aesthetic 
creation, since the sublime was similar in being a form that transcended all means of 
understanding or formulation; iii) in the critical perception of the genius's creation by the 
enlightened observer's taste, since that was also marked by a transcendence of mles. 
Secondly, even at this early stage the description of Schleiermacher and his successors' 
general project to be one of textual hermeneutics is almost absurd, for 'the text' as a literary 
artefect can no longer be said to be the tme area of interest. The recovery of the author's 
intention is the primary concem, which necessitates reading in the 'same spirit' as the author. 
Even what is coined understanding (Verstehen) can only be called textual, i f one is 
being precise, in so fer as it leans on an analogy (of decreasing similarity) with the previous 
sense of interpretation as an act of textual engagement. In and of itself, the written word is of 
entirely secondary interest to Schleiermaeher and his successors. Perhaps the growing 
dominance of the term 'hermeneutics' over its previous designation as 'interpretation' 
signifies the shift in the dynamics of the activity better than any other distinction. Ricoeur 
claims Schleiermacher's hermeneutics took 'from Romantic philosophy its most fimdamental 
conviction, that mind is the creative unconscious at work in gifted individuals.' (H&HS. 46) 
That conviction of course did not stem from Romantic philosophy ait all, but rather from Kant. 
But its consequence is startling, particularly for someone thinking within Descartes' and 
Kant's parameters and accustomed to thinking them universally valid: the general textual 
hermeneutic was immediately reduced or, depending on how one looked at it, elevated to the 
provenance of a few individuals by the apotheosis of the poet's genius and the trae critic's 
taste. Whether one regards the effect of the embrace of universality as an irrqjoverishment or 
an achievement, in either instance its horizons were ironically restricted by the transcendence 
of finite human (and textual) horizons to a common basis in subjectivity. The sense that was 
common was not so common after all. 
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Even i f Ricoeur does err somewhat in. isolating the source of this change, he keenly 
perceives how this transcendence had the ironic effect of frustrating attempts to imify the 
processes of critiquing and understanding any given text. He calls this divergence the 'double 
fihation' of the contradictory critical and Romantic impulses within a general procedure: 
The proposal to struggle against misunderstanding in the name of the femous adage 
'there is hermeneutics where there is misunderstanding' is critical; the proposal 'to 
understand an author as well as and even better than he understands himself is 
Romantic.'*' 
The division of these two processes in a general hermeneutics leaves the abiding legacy of the 
aporia. For \^at Schleiermacher effectively proposed were two processes whose connection 
was to say the least ambiguous, but whose mutual antagonism within a general procedure was 
not in the least ambivalent. Each process warred against the other in fevour of its own 
particular transcendence and also demanded its due for the hegemony its respective form of 
transcendence merited. Schleiermacher called these two forms of interpretation 
'grammatical' on the one hand and 'technical' or 'psychological' on the other, distinctions 
that remained constant in his work for all their conceptual reformulation. 
I shall only mention the fascinating problem that emerges in Romantic and post-
Romantic hermeneutics by breaking with the past understanding of interpretation as an 
engagement with a writer's language, as was characteristic of the two forms of 'regional' 
hermeneutics, and replacing it with and engagement with his mind, as it has been ever since. 
The focus of this change was upon the issue of origin or authorship. Prior to the Romantic 
period, language was a common heritage which one received as a possession and used to 
communicate with one's fellow creatures. 'Creative' or 'original' were adjectives only 
applicable to poets secondarily or derivatively from the feet that they themselves had been 
created, in imago Dei, and ' . ., had acquired through education a shared communal form 
of understanding. Originality was not necessarily and in feet rather infrequently the sign of a 
good artist. Certainly it was not a definitive characteristic. The poet's goal was excellence or 
technical virtuosity, not prophetic vision. But from the Romantic period onwards, language 
itself came increasingly to be understood not as a legacy or as an acquisition or even as a tool, 
but primarily as a means of expressing what one was. The medium was the message that was 
the artist. This is a ftmction of organic model that they adopted to explain the world of 
appearances. It is little wonder then, given its introspective Cartesian anthropological model, 
that the moments of greatest self-ejq)ressiveness in Romantic poetry were those of 
transcendence or silence. In feet, the emphasis on transcending the inherited quality of 
H&HS, 46. One could add as weU to this 'double fiUation' the beginning of the separation of the 
poet from the critic. 
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language and its relation to the historical and material world became somewhat of a crusade. 
The claim associated so strongly with the Romantics of the artist's divine creative powers 
reflected adherence to a common behef that Kant's transcendental subjectivity had provided a 
means of access to a higher plane of being."" 
This subjective or 'psychological' authenticity came however at a high price. For in 
the apparent increase in the power of language to express what they conceived language to be 
used for, that is the ejqjression of a self that transcended external regulation, language 
concomitantly lost its power to lay claims upon 'objects' i.e. it effectively lost its naming 
function. And along with loss of this nominal power of language, the aim of a Romantic 
hermeneutics to recover the intention of the author was also imdercut by the devaluation of 
the common ground of understanding in objective reality. 
The consequences of this, however difficult they are to assess, are formative for the 
course of post-Romantic hermeneutics. Without some sort of substantive interconnection to 
an ab-eady existent worid, i.e. one not sinqjly understood in terms of process of becoming but 
rather of being) even the language that 'informed' the 'creative subject' had no real content in 
its information (except, again, by allusion to the traditional use of and emphasis on language 
in connection to the existing world that it had broken with). The 'reality' of the subject was 
in feet set up in antagonistic opposition to the objective world, and to the detriment of the 
reality perceived to inhere in that world. This is the basis for the Romantics' belief in the 
power of the artist to create a truer expression of reality than that given to him by the senses. 
It testifies as much to the lack of reality perceived to be in the objective world as to their own 
powers to perceive that world. It also locates a rqjeated problem for subsequent 
hermeneutics: the problem of defining what a text is i f the subject that understands that text 
is transcendental or can claim a 'universal perspective,' i.e. not understand as a creature ^\ilo 
exists, but rather as an evolving organism. It is thus that the problem of the aporia in modem 
general hermeneutics can be seen primarily to be an anthropological problem, not an 
interpretative one.*' The interpretative problems of language that define the emergent field of 
hermeneutics for the next two hundred years wallow in the aporia of an 'inauthentic' 
transcendental subjectivity of 'inner-worldly being. '"** 
^ M.H. Abrams' Natural Supematuralism (1971) remains peifa^ the best survey of the quasi-religious 
character and expression of the (post) Romantic period 
This is what the German theologian Wolfhait Pannenberg argues in his Anthropology from a 
Theological Perspective (1985), which takes the German 'pre-Romantic' Herder as the point of 
departure for modem philosophical anthropology. 
The mistaken retreat to 'inner-worldly lining' is part of Hannah Arendt's discussion in Chapter 2. 
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Along with the problem of defining precisely what could be imderstood as a text for a 
transcendental self, one of the great ironies of the Romantic poetics of expressiveness is that it 
claims to be certain of understanding ibis self and its ability to access other selves 
transparaitly. The assumption derived from Cartesian thinking was that the mind could know 
with certainty what it accessed, as long as it encountered that 'reality' within its own 
thoughts. This was thought possible because of the organism's biological connection to the 
external world. The belief resuked in the creation of a hermeneutics dependent upon the 
certainty of imderstanding. Once again, this understood a drive for meaning in terms of truth 
or, i f you will, reason in terms of understanding.'*' But this understanding was anything but 
certain because transcendental subjectivity's removal of the naming function of language (and 
its connection to objective reality) also removed any comprehensible, let alone certain, sense 
in which understanding could be said to take place. 'Understanding,' while a seminal concept 
for the hermeneutics in the legacy of Schleiermacher, therefore remains a confusing 
designation of something that always remains biased towards a transcendental, ideal subject. 
The problem in hermeneutics is in understanding what is meant by understanding. 
But these objections make the entire exercise sound completely debilitating and they 
could not have gone unnoticed at the time. How was communication perceived to be possible 
i f the common world of things was removed from consideration and language's reference to 
that world was subverted, it might be asked? TTie answer to this must be sought in the feet 
that Schleiermacher, like Wilhelm von Humboldt, believed that a psychological 
interconnection between individuals was possible because of a common substratum of sense 
or understanding lying beneath the sediment of the various types of world languages. 
Initially, and again probably because of the propensities of previous paths of thinking, the 
assumption was that this would take the form of a primordial language. The power of this 
shared conviction prompted a great ejqplosion of learning in the search for an 'original' or 
Indogermanic language behind all known languages in the nineteenth century, vAich bore a 
strange sort of correspondence with the search for an Adamic language in the Renaissance. 
The possibility of finding such as language has now largely been debunked.'** However, in 
accordance with the organic model, it still exists in the odd form of the search for a 'genetic-
code' of life. Organicist thinking, and the search for meaning in terms of truth, are still 
prominent in contemporary thought. 
50 
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S^iTs^einer's MerBabel (1998) bear, wxmess 
S^sTq^ est ^vith this search for an 'origmal language. 
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One final thing is worth noting about these processes of linguistic scrutiny and 
psychological empathy in Schleiermacher's work. Although the two processes had equal 
status in his work, what he made clear was that they were not simultaneously practicable. 
Even the relation of individuals to a common language was in some way undermined by the 
transcendental subjectivity of the artistic genius. They merely coalesced in the transcendental 
ground of two entirely different planes. As Kurt Mueller-VoUmer writes, 'Schleiermacher's 
concept of the author... is not a fixed substance... but rather something fluid and dynamic, 
something mediated, an act rather than a substance.One could say that two new forms of 
regional hermeneutics began to live separate lives, while continuing to give the impression of 
sharing one house: 
Schleiermacher makes this clear: to consider the common language is to forget the 
writer; whereas to understand an individual author is to forget his language, which is 
merely passed over. Either we perceive what is common, or we perceive what is 
peculiar. The first interpretation is called 'objective', since it is concerned with 
linguistic characteristics distioct from the author, but also 'negative', since it merely 
indicates the limits of understanding; its critical value bears only upon errors in the 
meaning of words. The second interpretation is called 'technical', undoubtedly due 
to the very project of a Kunstlehre, a 'technology.' The proper task of hermeneutics 
is accomplished in this second interpretation. (H&HS. 47) 
As the nineteenth century progressed, the successors of Schleiermacher's initial foray 
into a general hermeneutics were mainly confronted with the problem of understanding 
history and assimilating it into a general hermeneutics. The teleological views of history of 
Hegel and Marx offered one attenqjt at doing so; the more objectivist academic school of 
Leopold von Ranke and his followers offered another. These carmot be e5q)lored in any detail 
here. The work of Wilhelm von Humboldt and Joharm Gustav Droysen offered a third way, 
one that atterr5)ted to align Schleiermacher's linguistic conception of a Kantian form of 
understanding (Verstehen) (which was actually developed more explicitly as such by 
Humboldt)*^ with the study of history. For both men, the crafl of the historian was like that of 
the artist in that both required acts of the creative imagination to unite the individual parts 
they surveyed into a living whole. 
mihelm DiUhey (1833 - 1911) 
Dihhey's in:q)ortance in the history of hermeneutics is primarily marked by his 
e}q)ansion of the breadth of Schleiermacher's general hermeneutic horizon to account for the 
dimension of history, but not quite as his predecessors had. DiWiey's speculation must be 
understood as a response to the often explicit attacks made upon the intelligibility of the 
MueUer-Vollmer. T h . Hprmmentics Reader (1994) 10. 
2^ MueUer-VoUmer. Md-16. 
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humanities by the positivist thinkers at the turn of the last century. He attempted to defend 
the integrity of what he came to designate as the human sciences (Geisteswissenschaften) 
from attacks upon their iirtelligibility by their rivals in the natural sciences 
(Naturwissenschaften). In this defence, he took on the methodology of its critical attackers. 
This was, as Ricoeur explains it, 'the only way of rendering justice to historical 
knowledge.. .to give it a scientific dimension, con^arable to that which the natural sciences 
had attained.'(49) 
This allowed him to create an understanding of history that vied with those of the 
natural sciences as a science. His inversion also meant that the understanding of what the text 
itself was underwent yet another change: 'the text to be interpreted was reality itself and its 
interconnection (Zusammenhang) .'^^ But the methodological path that Dilthey took was one 
that would lead to a dead end, for in undertaking to 'endow the human sciences with a 
methodology and an epistemology which would be as respectable as those of the sciences of 
nature,' he adopted the femiliar neo-Kantian approach of imderstanding the hiunanities in an 
individualistic (universalistic) feshion (detached from the sensus communis), even when 
seeing them in the area of social relations. 
The deep current that runs throughout Dihhey's attempt to answer the question of 
how human self-knowledge is possible can best be appreciated in the conceptual distinction 
he drew between the means of thought in the natural sciences, which he called ejq)lanation 
(Erkldren), and that in the human sciences, understanding (Verstehen). This distinction 
encapsulated the reason for its dead end however, for the very distinction that permitted a 
claim of scientific objectivity for the human sciences was one that severed it from all Unks 
with nature. Whereas the domain of natural knowledge was in some sense incomprehensible 
because it was other than mankind, Dilthey claimed that the case was different with man's 
study of man. However alien a person or culture might be, the knowledge of man was never 
as alien as such things were. This claim, i f it were true (and Nietzsche, Heidegger and their 
successors would seriously question it), would elevate the human sciences claim of 
knowledge to a status even above that of their rival in the sciences of nature. However with 
this claim, Ricoeur states plainly, the human sciences were 'thrown back into the sphere of 
psychological intuition.'(49) 
Psychological intuition of course required some sort of reification in order to be 
perceived at all, and it is for that reason that Dilthey brought forward the importance of 
"H&HS. 48. 
33 
interconnection. The intercormection between man and the world was perceptible because 
man's 'irmer life' manifested itself in forms: 'feelings, evaluations and volitions (which) 
tend to sediment themselves in a structured acquisition [acquis] wiiich is offered to others for 
deciphering.' (50) Texts thereby had the subordinate status of the dead letter to the primacy 
of the revitalising power of the living, enquiring spirit: 
The organised sj^ems which culture produces in the form of literature constitute a 
second layer, built upon this primary phenomenon of the teleological structure of the 
productions of life. (50) 
Hius while this spirit of past life in texts can be perceived as a sort of psychological sediment, 
in Dihhey's system the human sciences' enquiry always akeady revolves around its 
contemporary moment, and the only differences between present and past seems to be the 
durability of the former. This means that: 
Universal history thus becomes the field of hermeneutics. To understand mj^elf is to 
make the greatest detour, via the memory which retains what has become meaningful 
for all mankind. Hermeneutics is the rise of the individual to the knowledge of 
imiversal history, the imiversaUsation of the individual. (52) 
Dihhey's work thereby makes even clearer the aporia present in Schleiermacher's work in 
subsuming the understanding of texts within an understanding of the author's psychology. 
Ricoeur explains the aporia: 
I f the enterprise remains fundamentally psychological, it is because it stipulates as the 
uftimate aim of interpretation, not what a text says, but who saj^ it. At the same time, 
the object of hermeneutics is constantly shifted away from the text, from its sense and 
reference, towards the lived experience which is expressed therein... in the last 
analysis, the conflict is between a philosophy of life, with its profoimd irrationalism, 
and a philosophy of meaning, which has the same pretensions as the Hegelian 
philosophy of objective spirit. Dihhey transformed this difficulty into an axiom: hfe 
contains the power to surpass itself through meaning. (52) 
It is his claim that this hermeneutics of Ufe is history that is incomprehensible, and 
not just because it removes without warrant a distinction between life and history (i.e. a hved 
life) that seems necessary to human thought. It is also clear that the objectivity of this 
knowledge depends on its no longer being lived or experienced by anyone. The sort of 
Cartesian comprehensibility that Dilthey seeks requires the interconnection of works to Ufe to 
have stopped in order to obtain its objectivity, which is clearly an impossible stipulation, h 
order for it to operate then, it must, as Ricoeur says, 'place speculative idealism at the roots of 
life, that is, ultimately to think of life itself as spirit {Geist): (53) 
Ricoeur thus sees Dikhey's great accomplishment ironically to be inherent in his 
failure to have provided the human sciences with its own methodology. The feilure brings 
forward a caaception of life as spirit grasping 'Ufe' with its life. This is a step forward for 
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Ricoeur because he thereby points in the ontological direction of Heidegger and Gadamer's 
enterprises, where the immanence of life transcends mere historicity 'without,' he claims, 
'invoking a triumphant coincidence with some sort of absolute knowledge.' (53) This only 
becomes possible for them though because of what he calls their 'second Copemican 
inversion' of Schleiermacher's initial, subjective view of hermeneutics. In this second 
'inversion' questions of method are subsimied by 'the reign of a primordial ontology.' (54) 
Martin Heidegger (1889 -1976) 
Ricoeur suggests that the fundamental question that Heidegger attempted to answer is 
what the meaning of being was.*^  According to his line of argument, a relation between 
subject and the world does not first get established, as Descartes claimed, on the level of 
'cognition' or 'knowledge.' Instead, by 'virtue of our very existence i.e. our 'being-in^e-
world', we possess what Heidegger called a 'pre-ontological understanding' of the world (of 
'being'). Heidegger therefore redefmes understanding not so much as a mode of 'knowing' 
as one of 'being.' I f the initial movement from Schleiermacher to Dilthey in creating a 
general hermeneutics was primarily epistemological and its methodology Cartesian, the main 
body of hermeneutics since the time of Heidegger has given up that project and subsumed 
'questions of method to the reign of a primordial ontology.' In this primordial ontology, as 
Ricoeur notes, a new question is raised: 
Instead of asking 'how do we know?' it will be asked 'what is the mode of being of 
that being w i^o exists only in understanding?''* 
What the change in orientation that Ricoeur likens to a 'second Copemican inversion' - to 
Schleiermacher's first - essoitially brings about is the return to the great mystery surrounding 
man and his origins, but it places the meaningful answer in the organic processes of the 
world. 
The question of the meaning of being itself acts much like the aporia that Ricoeur 
traced back to Descartes and saw running throughout the entire general hermeneutic project. 
For the consistent centrality of that question in Being and Time functions to defer the concern 
The formulation of the problem in these terms is almost unavoidable, but it already construes 
Heidegger's primary emphasis on pre-linguistic understanding somewhat towards a secondary 
(logocentric) concern in a way he probably would not have. What Heidegger in his consistency wanted 
to know was what the being of being was. The feet that we nonetheless desire to know the answer 
about its meaning I think mitigates against Heidegger's own claim to present our being authentically 
and argues his own process of thinking to be 'alienating,' not in its transcendence as was the case with 
Descartes but in its immanence. 
"H&HS. 54. 
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for factuality (or interconnection i f one is looking at the issue more broadly) typical of an 
epistemological approach to the more urgent question of the meaning of what it is looking for. 
TTie questioning is therefore a self-reflective (or self-expressive) process seeking the mode of 
(human) being that encounters being. Heidegger's (deferred) answer to that question is 
contained in the rather cryptic description of the human condition as Dasein, the being-there 
that we are, v^ich also provides us with an explanation of how we interact with it: 'not (as) a 
subject for which there is an object, but rather... (as) a being within being.' 'It is part of its 
structure as being to have an ontological pre-understanding of being.' This structure 
appeared to allow Heidegger to break the Cartesian mould in his philosophy, for 'to display 
the constitution of Dasein is not at all 'to ground by derivation"- as was the case in the 
Cartesian subjective model and 'the methodology of the human sciences' - but 'to unfold the 
foundation by clarification. "(54) 
His achievement, real or perceived, was of great significance for his successors as it 
enabled them to redefine the field of hermeneutics by basing the practice of the human 
sciences on his primordial ontology. It promised to link Dihhey's isolated processes of 
ejqjlanation and imderstanding and the search for meaning with the immanent concept of 
truth. Just to clarify the relation between his speculation and that of his predecessors as he 
saw it, he describes in this passage the Cartesian cogito as an instance of ontological 
opermess, but one that only distinguished itself from others by being of the greatest 
individuation, not by its transcendence: 
The fundamental philosophical theme of being is no progeny of being, and yet it 
aiffects every being. Its 'universality' is to be sought at a higher level. Being and its 
structure impos es itself before every possible specific instance of being. Being is 
simply transcendence. Dasein's transcendence of being is exceptional in so fer as it 
contains both the possibility and necessity of the most radical instance of 
individuation. Every disclosure of being belonging to transcendence is 
transcendental insist. Phenomenological truth (openness of being) is Veritas 
transcendentalis!^ 
The significance of his demonstration of the priority of being to the moment of Cartesian 
doubt is that it showed that 'the Cogito is within being, and not vice versa.'" This seemed to 
allow it to overcome the crisis that Western thought had imdergone through the alienation 
(Entfremdung) of Cartesian universality, or, as expressed in terms more central to 
Heidegger's thought, through its 'highly inauthentic way of being.' 
5« S&Z. 38. (my translation) 
5^  ^Ricoeur. -n,. grnholismofEvil. (1969). 352. 
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This first inversion of epistemology to ontology brought about another in its wake. 
As we have seen, Dilthey in particular had isolated the hermeneutic problem to be in gaining 
access to another mind and finding its meaning. This became the problem that dominated all 
of the human sciences of the post-EnUghtenment period, from the field of psychology to 
history. But Heidegger strangely, i f eonsistentiy, made littie attempt to resolve that problem 
of communication. Instead, in the process of abandoning the Cartesian aesthetic of 
individuation as a basis for human understanding, he v/holly sepaizted the question of 
understanding from the problem of communicating with others (which was that of 
understanding other individuals). As we repeatedly witnessed, this had been the source of the 
problem for the Geisteswissenschafien - there was no common ground in the Cartesian cogito 
for this understanding to take place. The cogito's 'anthropology' had neither form or 
substance - and the organic model adopted by the Romantics merely included the processes 
of life as fimctions of this process of thought. Instead of now recovering that common groimd 
for understanding by reverting back to the notion of personal agency, what Heidegger decided 
to do was to seek the foundations of the ontological problem 'in the relation of being to the 
world and not in the relation with another.'(55) 
Heidegger thus appears to have been instructed by Dikhey's methodology, even i f he 
chose not to follow its psychological intention. As was also noted earlier, Dilthey had made 
the rather naive presumption, in following a Kantian line of argument and taking a rosy 
Enlightenment view of human rationality, that human nature was less obscure to us than was 
non-human nature. His rationale for that presimiption was that our knowledge of things runs 
up against the imknown, whereas our knowledge of individuals does not because 'in the case 
of mind there is no thing-in-itself: we ourselves are what the other is.' (55) Heidegger was 
imder no such illusions about human nature and therefore sought his common ground not in 
it, or in an original language, but in a 'natural' imderstanding of humanity i.e. in consonance 
with 'being.' His choice was no doubt influenced, Ricoeur suggests, by Nietzsche's equation 
of life with being^ who had argued against Cartesian rationality on such terms: 
(Heidegger) knows that the other, as well as myself, is more unknown to me than any 
natural phenomenon can be. Here the dissimulation no doubt goes deeper than 
anywhere else. I f there is a region of being v/here inauthenticity reigns, it is indeed in 
the relation of each person with every other; hence the chapter on being-with is a 
debate with the 'one', as the centre and privileged place of dissimulation. It is 
therefore not astonishing that it is by a reflection on being-in, rather than being-with, 
that the ontology of understanding may begin; not being-with another who would 
duplicate our subjectivity, but being-in-the-world.... In thereby making 
understanding woridly, Heidegger de-psychologises it. (55-56)" 
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It is crucial to note that despite removing the aporia of psychological understanding 
caused by the imperious demand of transcendence against human finitude, Heidegger 
ironically continued to apply such a demand for man in relation to the earth, and posited the 
common ground in its immanence, as i f man were merely a part of the life-forces of nature. 
Howeverjthe assxunption he makes of that relation is just as naive as was his predecessors' 
view of human psychology. Wolfhart Pannenberg argues that the evidence of the study of 
mankind shows that the place of mankind in the world is not so simplistically natural as 
Heidegger's ontology would have it to be in offering the model of 'openness to the world.'*' 
'Openness' is indeed, he argues, characteristic of mankind, but it is not to be equated with an 
imcomplicated 'natural' interaction. Whereas the animal species is 'limited to its 
environment that is fixed by heredity and that is typical of the species, '(4) man is not bound 
in that way. It is not just a matter of a greater complexity of the human organism, it is a 
unique drive for ever-greater openness that marks man out. Hiis is man's characteristic 
prejudice, he suggests: 
I f our destiny (Bestimmung) did not press us beyond the world, then we would not 
constantly search further, as we do even when there are no concrete incentives.(8)*° 
For Parmenberg, this characteristic drive directs us in the same direction that Kant's Vemunft 
had, towards meaning, i.e. God. 'Men's dependence on God is infinite precisely because they 
never possess this destiny of theirs but must search for it... .(and therefore) the messages of 
the religions are to be tested on the basis of whether they conceal the infinite opeimess of 
human existence or allow it to emerge.'(11)*' 
Hannah Arendt also suggests that the model suggested by 'openness to the world' 
takes one form of activity, which mankind shares with the rest of the animal world, as a 
'beiag with,' specifically human plurality is not thereby introduced Human plurality, as Arendt shall 
argue in the next chapter, is the very condition that allows for personality and individual distinctiveness 
because it, being in the terms of agency, allows for action. What separates man from the beasts is his 
capacity for individuality (rather than his mere species character), a capacity which is only apparent 
when he discloses himself in the midst of his peers. The human condition of plurality allows the 
disclosure of the agent, not Ihe world The world is dikeaiiy there, however uncertain its being is, but 
the individual is not apparent as such until he discloses himself 
Wolfhart Pannenberg. What is Man? Contemporary Anthropology in Theological Perspective. 
(1970). 
*° Bestimmung has the senses not only of 'orientation towards a goal' and of 'AsstiACktion', but also 
contains the connotation of the word 'voice' (Stimme) that itself has the dual character of condition and 
possibility. 
In this respect, Pannenberg notes that it is no accident that a theologian, Johann Gottfried Herder, 
stands at the beginning of the modem anthropological movement. The genealogy of modem 
anthropology with its idea of 'openness to the world' can be traced back to Christian theology and the 
ideas of the transcendence of God the dominion of man over creation and the emancipation of man from it. 
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model while ignoring far more characteristic 'human' forms of action. I shall outUne her 
objections to Heidegger's ineluctable logic of anti-logic below. A somewhat crude way of 
understanding what Heidegger's phenomenology proposes is to understand human 
'worldliness' and human understanding to have littie if any distinction from human biological 
life. This after all was the real purpose of Heidegger's 'existential' demonstration, not the 
expression of some sort of angst that it has often been misinterpreted as: 
It was not sufficiently recognised that these analyses are part of a mediation on the 
worldliness of the world, and that they seek essentially to shatter the pretension of the 
knowing subject to set itself up as the measure of objectivity. What must be 
reaffirmed in place of this pretension is the condition of inhabiting the world, a 
condition which renders situation, understanding and interpretation possible. Hence 
the theory of understanding must be preceded by the recognition of the relation of 
entrenchment which anchors the whole linguistic system, including books and texts, 
in something which is not primordially a phenomenon of articulation in discourse. 
We must first find ourselves (for better or worse), there and feel ourselves (in a 
certain manner), even before we orientate ourselves... Thus arises understanding -
but not yet as a fact of language, writing or texts. Understanding too must be 
described initially, not in terms of discourse, but in terms of the 'power-to-be. '(56) 
Heidegger's 'thrown project' ofDasein can thus perhaps be understood to guide all of 
humanity's activities, even their linguistic and logical ones. Again it holds great promise to 
solve a problem that plagued his predecessors, the separation of the means of understanding, 
language, in all of its tendency to encompass and name, from inner being. Prior to him the 
hermeneutic circle in a general hermeneutic schema was invariably also a vicious circle, 
because the subject and object were so mutually involved in the interpretative process that 
determining which had determined what first had become an impossible task. By that means 
a subjective attempt to establish truth had always feiled. But Heidegger argues that this 
Dasein fulfils a fimction useful as a basis for successful, i f necessarily limited hermeneutic 
thinking. It is a sort of pre-understanding (Vorverstdndnis) given by life prior to the 
givenness of language in the present or the past. Hie 'anticipatory character' of his pre-
understanding allows us to make certain a priori assumptions about a being that understands 
historically, even prior to the enactment of such a process. This pre-understanding also 
becomes the basis for Gadamer's claim to be able to promote a true notion of prejudice 
without any necessarily pejorative sense: 
For a fimdamental ontology.. .prejudice can be understood only in terms of the 
anticipatory structure of understanding. The femous hermeneutical circle is 
henceforth only the shadow, on the methodological plane, of this structure of 
anticipation. Whoever understands that knows, from now on, that 'what is decisive is 
not to get out of the circle but to come into it in the right way.' (58) (S&Z. 153) 
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The new aporia? 
It is notable that Heidegger's mediations in Being and Time have no principal bearing 
on the interpretation of discourse, let alone of texts. The issue of language in relation to being 
is in feet intentionally entirely secondary to his discussion in it and when it does appear it is ia 
the form of assertions (Aussage) derived from the pre-understanding and explication of 
'being.' How we can know that this pre-understanding functions as it does, let alone constme 
it as true without the antecedent ideas of agency and the aid of language to support its logic 
remains unclear to me. Leaving that reservation aside for the moment, Heidegger maintains 
his logical consistency against the Cartesian paradigm (but includes agency in it) by insisting 
that these assertions of pre-understanding have the functions not of 'commimicating to others, 
nor even attributing predicates to subjects, but rather 'pointing out,' 'showing', 'manifesting' 
(58) (S&Z. 154; B&T. 196). 
It is therefore necessary to situate discourse in the stmcture of being, rather than 
situating the latter in discourse: 'Discourse is the 'meaningful' articulation of the 
understandable structure of being-in-the-worid' (58) (S&Z. 161; B&T. 204) 
This 'reversal' as Ricoeur caUs it removed the last vestige of conunimicative fimction 
remaining from the regional systems of hermeneutics of language. This time it happened in 
regard to language as a whole, the point at which no further deprejudicing could occur. The 
analysis of Cartesian logic completed its process of eradicating the verbal logic of the pre-
modem age. That eradication meant, as Ricoeur notes, that the first level of determination for 
Heidegger in understanding defied the ordinary, linguistic manner of understanding by not 
being of speaking, but rather of listening or keeping silent: 'Hearing is constitutive of 
discourse' (59) (S&Z. 163; B & l , 206). 
Despite Heidegger's apparent removal of the Dihheyan aporia, Ricoeur, like Arendt 
and Pannenberg, thinks that what really happened was that it was transposed elsewhere 'and 
thereby aggravated.' Rather than being evident in the incommensurability between the two 
modalities of knowing within epistemology, that of explanation for the natural and 
understanding for the human sciences, after Heidegger the aporia becomes more solipsistic: 
It is no longer between two modalities of knowing within epistemology, but it is 
between ontology and epistemology taken as a \\iiole. With Heidegger's philosophy, 
we are always engaged in going back to the foundations, but we are left incapable of 
beginning the movement of return which would lead from the fundamental ontology 
to the properly epistemological question of the status of the human sciences. (59) 
Instead of being simply in conflict with the method of the sciences as it was before, the 
universal philosophy of life derived from Heidegger has been rendered utterly incapable of 
40 
addressing anything but itself. In other words, the 'universal perspective' in the initial 
hermeneutic project has been universaUsed by Heidegger to include the Cartesian 'critical' 
moment, rather than to distinguish itself from it: Heidegger's view has becomes conqjletely 
'Romantic.'*^ That is to say, as Arendt's argument towards the end of the next chapter 
implies, he understands life as being. This has other consequences as well. For it is only 
in a logical connection to the world, which Ricoeur characterises as the connection of 
ontology to epistemology, that the veracity and efficacy of Heidegger's ontology can be 
demonstrated. As it stands, it seems, somewhat ironically, logically coherent but inq)otent. 
Ricoeur's final and somewhat understated comment may in feet be his most interesting one: 
'So long as this derivation (from ontology to epistemology) has not been undertaken, the very 
movement of transcendence towards questions of foundation remains problematie.'(59) On 
the contrary, it does not remain problematic, it remains utterly invalid. 
Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900 - present) 
Heidegger's pupil Gadamer's central concern is to resolve the new aporia created in 
his mentor's philosophy while simultaneously trying to avoid felling back into the old one. 
Rieoeur argues that what we saw demonstrated in his discussion of Kant and the 
Enhghtenment's deletion of the old sensus communis and distortion of the notion of taste 
towards transcendence also holds true for his work as a whole: 
The core experience around which the whole of Gadamer's work is organised, and 
from which hermeneutics raises its claim to universality, is the scandal constituted, at 
the level of modem consciousness, by the sort of alienating distanciation 
(Verfremdung) which seems to him to be the presupposition of these sciences. For 
ahenation is much more than a feeling or a mood; it is the ontological presupposition 
which sustains the objective conduct of the human sciences. (60) 
Gadamer attempts to restore a sense of belonging against the methodical distanciation brought 
about by universal doubt by invoking Heidegger's notion of Dasein and the inevitability of its 
prejudice. He does so in three areas: the aesthetic sphere, the historical sphere and the 
linguistic sphere. 
In these three spheres Ricoeur argues that Gadamer ejq)resses a synthesis of the two 
'movements' he regarded as typical of hermeneutics since Sdileiermacher, the movement 
Ricoeur, as was noted earlier, noted the source of the aporia in Schleiermacher's henneneutics to he 
in the divergence he called a 'double fihation' of the contradictory critical and Romantic inqjulses 
within a general pwedure: 
The proposal to stmggle against misunderstanding in the name of the famous adage 'there is 
hermeneutics where there is misunderstanding' is critical; the proposal 'to understand an 
author as well as and even better than he understands himself is Romantic. H&HS. 46. 
41 
from a regional to a general hermeneutics and the movement from the epistemological aim of 
the human sciences to an ontological one. His efforts are concentrated in legitimising 
Heidegger's ontology by applying it to epistemological problems. He notes of Truth and 
Method that 'the very title of the work confronts the Heideggerian concept of truth with the 
Dihheyan concept of method.' (60) However the question that continues to overshadow such 
a venture is whether this procedure will only lead him to combine one aporia with another, 
thereby aggravating the problem, rather than eliminating both. Ricoeur alludes to the 
possibiUty that two aporias have inadvertently crept into Gadamer's work: 'The question is to 
what extent the work deserves to be caUed Truth AND Method, and whether it ought not 
instead to be entitled Truth OR Method.' This seems to me a direct result of Gadamer's 
acceptance of Heidegger's basic error in thinking that the truth of the prejudices of biological 
hfe can fimction as meaning - he assumes that meaning can be methodically derived from 
Dasein. 
Gadamer's methodological intention explains the preoccupation he shows in much of 
Tmth and Method with presenting the historical objections to the Cartesian prejudice of 
universality against the worldly truth-claims of the humanities, to the detriment of the latter. 
Thus he recapitulates in succession 'the struggle of Romantic philosophy against the 
Aufkldrung [Enlightenment], of Dilthey against positivism, of Heidegger against neo-
Kantianism.' (61) Gadamer's own history of the methodological battle is in feet exemplary of 
the sort of xmderstanding he proposes for the critical human scientist. He calls his prescribed 
consciousness of the historical development of methoAolo^wirkungsgeschichtliches 
Bewusstsein, a '^consciousness of the history of effects.' Ostensibly, Gadamer purports to 
present a more or less traditional defence of the special tmth-claims of the humanities. In 
feet, his work is not singly a defence of tradition, but rather of the methodology of the 
defence of tradition. 
The problem that Gadamer quickly encounters in defending methodologies of the 
human sciences generically as a category alternative to the Cartesian paradigm of aUenation 
stems from the universal basisTie decides to establish that generic defence upon, Heidegger's 
historicity of being. A problem emerges there because the very sense of 'belonging' to 
history Heidegger proposes means, as Ricoeur rightly points out, that he cannot be critical of 
it. For since this consciousness of historical effect cannot be objectified, we being in that 
consciousness simultaneously actors of history and the effects of its acts, the sort of truth-
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claims he wishes to claim in this 'belonging' are instantiy undercut.*^  History cannot be its 
own historian any more than the reverse. 
The only means of avoiding this dilemma and allowing a combination of truth with 
critical thinking, Ricoeur suggests, is by combining in this historical consciousness not just a 
repudiation of distanciation, but also an assumption of that distance. There are three ways n 
which Ricoeur suggests Gadamer's hermeneutics already does this. He points out that that 
element of distance is already in feet present in our very consciousness of effective history. 
Knowing (and I would say naming) is always in some sense also objectifying, and knowing 
history perhaps more distanced still by the sense of aUenation brought about by historical 
change: 'There is thus a paradox of otherness, a tension between proximity and distance, 
which is essential to historical consciousness.' (61) fThe relativity of this distance shall not 
be made an issue here] 
Similariy, this paradox or 'dialectic of participation and distanciation' is also present 
in Gadamer's notion of the fitsion of horizons (Horizontverschmelzung). Even if a synthesis 
of the Hegelian sort is in:^ )ossible for an historical creature, his finitude is not thereby 
demonstrated to isolate him solipsistically. For in every encounter of a Uving being, the 
horizon of the individual is either contracted or ejq)anded in some manner. This has the 
concomitant in^lication that there are differences (and therefore distances) that Heidegger's 
ontology did not really develop of its own accord. The mutability of human horizons 
signifies for the subjective perspective, as Ricoeur notes: 
that we neither live within closed horizons, nor within one unique horizon. Insofer as 
the fusion of horizons excludes the idea of a total and unique knowledge, this concept 
inqjlies a tension between what is one's own and what is aUen, between the near and 
the fer; and hence the play of difference is included in the process of 
convergenee.(62) 
Finally, Ricoeur suggests that the most plausible demonstration of distanciation 
within Gadamer's insistence of belonging to tradition is found in his philosophy of language. 
The sheer linguality of human experience (Ricoeur's translation of Gadamer's Sprachlichkeit) 
means that 'belonging to a tradition or traditions passes through the interpretation of the signs, 
works and texts in which cultural heritages are inscribed and offer themselves to be 
The assumjrtion that Gadamer makes is that methodologies that offer an alternative to the Cartesian 
paradigm of alienation can be lumped together generically as the antithesis of alienation i.e. as 
paradigms of 'belonging.' But as both Pannenberg and Arendt argue, the truly traditional notions of 
the Classical and Biblical 'regional domains' combined these aspects of belon^ng and critical distance 
without such an analytical division between them Moreover, there are crucial distinctions between the 
two domains that cannot be reduced to his generic notion of 'tradition,' a designation that, it should be 
noted, owes its lack of discrimination of the past to the universal perspective. 
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deciphered.On the one hand, the integrity of the inherited understanding of the past itself 
should maintain a position of exegetical governance, which includes exegetical restraint upon 
arbitrary, disingenuous or piu-ely self-interested manipulation by an interpreter. That tradition 
is part of -what he calls 'the dialogue that we are,' vAiich we enact even when seeming to 
abandon it. On the other hand, tradition only functions as a transcendent medium because the 
words in it remain when the interlocutors themselves have passed away - this is the 
development from SprachlichkeitXo Schriftlichkeit, 'in other words, where mediation by 
language becomes mediation by the text.' The objectivity or 'the matter of the text," 
demonstrated by the simple feet that in having been created it escapes the control of its author 
and its reader, allows the sort of communication at a distance also required for criticism to 
take place. 
" This notion of SprachUchkeit of course flies in the face of precisely what Heidegger had claimed to 
be the order of language to experience, i.e. that Being discloses itself to us before language as it is 
conventionally understood Ricoeur noted this himself: 
From Being and Time onwards, saying (reden) j^pears superior to speaking (sprechen). 
'Saying designates the existential constitution, whereas 'speaking' indicates tiie mundane 
aspect that lapses into the empirical. Hence the first determination of saying is not speaking, 
but rather the couple hearin^keeping silent.' (58) 
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Reflections on Ricoeur's account of modern hermeneutics 
There are two immediately striking things about Ricoeur's account of modem 
hermeneutics. The first is that his siunmary takes even less accoimt than Gadamer's did of 
the reason why hermeneutics prior to the Romantic period had been divided, as he terms it, 
regionally. Gadamer had at least obliquely brought the legitimacy of one half of the 
foregoing hermeneutic tradition into consideration, as we saw in his discussion of Kant and 
the moral sense tradition. In^)licit in that discussion was the relation of Kantian philosophy 
to the con^eting Classical tradition of the semus communis. Gadamer demonstrated that 
Kant misunderstood that tradition when he rejected it and the notion of taste related to 
morality out of hand as the products of lower judgements deferring to a higher, yet unnamed 
feculty. Gadamer's study thus at least pointed to an area of concern surprisingly neglected by 
a universal rationalist system, the inherently commimal and social aspect of human existence, 
addressed for instance by a system of ethics and values based on a sensus communis. 
In the end of course Gadamer's exposition did not actually engage with the rationale 
for the regionalisation of hermeneutics either; nor did it provide any justification for labelling 
the two regions of interpretation indiscriminately as he did with the generic term 'tradition' -
other than one that could itself be ascribed to a Kantian 'prejudice against prejudice;' nor did 
he present a convincing argument for a concept of truth that could account for the differences 
between varyiug senses of the 'communal' in the post-Classical world. Although that 
demonstration of truth was central to his project m Truth and Method, the sensus communis 
alone caimot bear the weight of meaning he associates with truth, however we may construe 
the criteria for such a claim in the humanities to be different fi-om that which is applied in 
Cartesian science. For there are many communal senses in the world that surely cannot be 
reduced to one by an appeal to the senses humans have in common - not even i f they are 
'universalised' in the form of the Kantian categories of space and time. These are just a few 
of the problems picked up by his critics and the many postmodernist writers who have 
construed his defence of tradition in a way that he appears not to have intended." 
The second thing that is striking about Ricoeur's account is that he interprets the 
general project of hermeneutics as primarily epistemologically motivated. He even 
imderstands Heidegger's ontology, the apparent hiatus in the period, as a means for a more 
radical implementation of the epistemological imperative. There may be more truth in this 
«5 As the social pragmatists such as Richard Rorty have for exanqjle, who have understood communal 
sense to admit a sort of Nietzschean radical polyvalency. They have understood meaning as nothing 
but a 'social construct' 
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than was at first apparent in Schleiermacher's hermeneutics. My observations of 
Schleiermacher were directed at his remarkable attempt to connect his mind organically with 
other minds and in particular at the grounds of his belief that it lay wholly within his capacity 
to do so. This reflected, I suggested, as much the conviction of certainty of Descartes as it did 
of Kant, who certainly did have q)istemological intentions in proposing his 'Copemican 
turn.' Schleiermacher's was a typical ejqjression of the confidence of the man of the 
EnUghtenment in his own reason, a confidence that led him to abandon the uneasy relation he 
had with nature, of which he was a part, and rule over it and the world. Kant's transcendent 
subjectivity provided the hope of certainty that this power was indeed possible for the 
humanities just as it appeared to be in the natural sciences. 
Kant's subjectification of transcendence furnished Schleiermacher and his successors 
with the method for eventually viewing all of reality as a 'text.' Initially in the 
'generalisation' of hermeneutics the text to be interpreted was that of the mind - a transparent 
text for one who assumed that there was a common substance within minds. But even at the 
outset of that movement there was an insoluble conflict between the philological and 
psychological moments of interpretation. The words of the writer were both the means of and 
the medium for accessing that mind, which was a problem for a hermeneutics that considered 
immediacy to have been delivered to it by Kant's universal transcendental subjectivity. It is a 
problem that incited the deconstructive tendency of Romantic poetics, but the organicist 
notions of process masked it as a demonstration of creativity, conceived in the terms of the 
life-processes themselves. 
In Dihhey's hermeneutics his predecessors' feilures were keenly felt, yet their claims 
were only even more boldly stated for that: for him the text to be interpreted was 'history' or 
'context,' which was understood as reality itself and its interconnection (Zusammenhang). 
Dihhey's attempt at estabUshing the certainty of the human sciences alongside its natural 
rivals prompted him to universahse the individual psychological problem, the fector which 
marked 'the rise of the individual to the knowledge of universal history,' in other words to 
construe hermeneutics as he did 'the universaUsation of the individual' (H&HS. 52) 
By that stage, the question that was no longer ever asked was whether any statement 
by an author was meaningful, so long as it was true to experience as conceived in the 
metananative of organicism. Instead t^he focus of interpretation was directed at the relation of 
the hermeneutic problem to history or to the demonstrations of a personified 'history' 
conceived in evolutionary terms : either it was a look at the past relative to the author, in 
which case it perhaps entailed a search for the influences of predecessors on the author; or it 
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was a look at the author's present, in which case it might involve a search for the consistency 
of one statement or work with another in an author's literary corpus or the place of this work 
in a stage of the author's development (or in the general history of thought); or it was a look 
at the future relative to the author, iu which case it might involve a search for how an author 
affected 'his successors' or, more contemporaneously, how often he had been misunderstood 
by scholarship, what the current state of criticism was on the author, or even what was 'the 
present state of the question' about the author. 
Regional to general hermeneutics 
To my mind the greatest failure of Ricoeur's phenomenological rq)resentation of 
hermeneutics consists in his feilure to comment on the significance of the shift fi-om two 
textual regional hermeneutics to a subjective general hermeneutics. It is also the most striking 
thing about his account, and only made more so because it distinguishes itself by percqjtive 
evaluations of the changes within the general movement. Since Ricoeiu" himself notes that the 
initial change is really the fimdamental one, a more evaluative assessment of what precisely 
had made it fimdamental might have been expected. As it stands, Ricoeiu-'s argument about 
the initial stage ushered in by Schleiermacher is that it was fimdamental because it was 
general. This however seems to be discredited by his later account of the radicalisation of the 
movement by Heidegger. Was it just hyperbole in claiming the original movement to be 
fimdamental? I f it was, does this not radically question the claims for the progress made by 
embracing universal transcendental subjectivity? I f not, in what sense are we to understand 
Heidegger's philosophy? 
Ricoeur is no doubt sensing an important development in Heidegger's 
phenomenology. However, i f the hermeneutics characterising the period running fi-om 
Schleiermacher to Dikhey was problematic because it omitted such a radical dimension as 
Heidegger's, then it seems only plausible that this may have been lost in the original move 
fi-om 'regional hermeneutics.' Without a more serious assessment of those regions, that 
possibiUty cannot be dismissed. TTie omission of such a discussion seems that much more 
puzzling since Ricoeur clearly demonstrates that the result of following the initial general 
hermeneutic movement was the aporia, repeated in various ways: by the divide appearing 
between ejqjlanation and understanding, between physics and ethics, in the emergence of the 
two cultxires debate, or however else one wishes to describe it. This demonstration of an 
omnipresent aporia in general hermeneuticsln feet the cornerstone of his argument and it 
remains even in Heidegger's ontology, as he notes. 
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An obvious hypothesis for this development was presented in the introduction. The 
general hermeneutic movement has repeatedly foiled precisely because it recapitulates the 
organicist metanarrative towards all texts as an 'ideal' without discriminating between them. 
This could also be described as its adoption of a universal perspective with correspondingly 
absolute values - the absolute value of Ufe. After all, Gadamer's main point in esqjosing the 
Enlighteimient's 'prejudice against prejudice' was to show how it had, by making subjectivity 
to be the general ground of all thinking, inappropriately enacted an imphcit prejudice against 
all substantial forms of reality - including the humanity it purported to serve. He argued that 
the Cartesian 'subject's' oxymoronic transcendent 'groimd' would admit no (inter)connection 
of its own to anything that had an appearance, while it also simultaneously acted to 
undermine the sensus communis, for w^ich such an intercoimection was crucial. 
I f Gadamer's observations about the Kantian 'prejudice against prejudice' are correct, 
it is logical to assume that it was at the point when divine texts and human texts were 
regarded generically as 'texts' and when the text was subordinated to the subjective 
understanding of the reader, that the aporia emerged. Along with that emergence, the 
possibility of meaningful truth-claims slowly vanished. For the distinctive characteristic of a 
sacred text was to be fi-om God and therefore meaningful - all texts can in a sense be true (the 
new criterion). The consequences are quite immense. Once the distinctions of meaning 
between texts in terms of their authority and origin had been eradicated by the unambiguous 
application of a highly ambiguous form of human subjectivity by Schleiermacher (one in 
which agency is strangely absent), there were no substantive objections to be made to a 
general hermeneutic movement - until it did not fiinction. Nor however are there any 
substantive objects - the text becomes as 'absent' as does the Kantian 'subject' or 'author' -
they all become at best phenomenal appearances. This is an issue with dynamics I first raise 
in the next chapter, the fimdamental human condition of plurality as a condition for 
individuality and the disclosure of the agent. However, it does not receive fiiller treatment 
until Coleridge's assertion of the terms of the primary imagination in the Biographia Literaria. 
which I discuss in detail in the third chapter. The terms of the primary imagination, 'the 
repetition in the fmite mind of the eternal act of creation of the infinite I AM,' those of divine 
revelation, are those which are the basis for meaningful truth-claims. They cannot be treated 
as 'a text' like any other and be subjected to the terms and conditions of the finite mind. 
And there can be little doubt that what Gadamer recounts of Kant and the 
EnUghtenment is precisely what did transpire with regard to texts in the general hermeneutic 
movement. A process of subordination analogous to that which occurred toward the objective 
world in Kantian natural scientific g)istemology also occiured towrard the undistinguished 
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objective entities of 'the text' (or 'literature') in Schleiermacher's hermeneutics. Both of 
these processes came about through the adoption of the 'universal perspective' in modem 
thinking. As Ricoeur points out, Schleiermacher's 'subordination of the particular mles of 
exegesis and philology to the general problematic of understanding constituted an inversion 
fully comparable to that which Kantian philosophy had effected elsewhere, primarily in 
relation to the natural sciences.' (H&HS. 46) It is only all too plausible then that the adoption 
of this same universality is the cause of the aporia and the reason for its insuperability in the 
general hermeneutics following Schleiermacher. And i f this feilure was inherent in 
transcendental enquiry, it might be questioned how these problems could be avoided so long 
as the transcendental or (what is the reverse side of the same coin) immanent subject (as 
Heidegger presents it) remained the critic and criterion of textual evaluation, of the text's 
meaning. 
The possibility that this expression and agenda of transcendence had foiled to 
assimilate a dimension included in the regional hermeneutics of the past should at least have 
been addressed, i f not rebutted, i f Ricoeur still wished to advocate a general course of 
hermeneutics. The reason it was not of course is that Ricoeur imderstood both regional 
domains to have been discredited by Gadamer's feilure to provide truth for the common sense 
tradition. But this feilure came about because he understood both domains to derive their 
ultimate authority fi^om tradition, in other words fi-om an undifferentiated past seen through 
the eyes of universal history. The accident of history that readers the two regions equivalent 
in so fer as they are 'historical' is no rationale for such an equation. The equation represents a 
feilure to discriminate between them and an xmwarranted application of the Enlightenment 
universal prejudice towards the past. And there can be littie doubt that an appeal to tradition 
per se constitutes nothing like a certain sanction of orthodoxy or action even within these 
traditions. In feet, much of the Biblical account records precisely the opposite, the perversion 
of divine intention by God's chosen people and their pursuit after 'dumb idols.' 
What is clear is that without such a discussion, Ricoeur's attenqjts to continue 
pursuing a general hermeneutical model for dealing with all texts seems to fiimble about. I 
am not particularly concerned to trace out Ricoeur's own suggestion for modifying this 
hermeneutics in his theory of the symbol, for lack of space i f nothing else. What I was more 
concerned to do was to discuss how his history quite ably traced the ironic development of an 
irresolvable regionalisation of processes within a purportedly general hermeneutics. By not 
engaging with what he calls a regional hermeneutics, let alone conceding it to contain some 
sort of necessary truth (as Gadamer in some sense did), Ricoeur has been led precisely to that 
ironic outcome. For his history of the course of general hermeneutics following 
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Schleiermacher depicts a perpetuation of regionalised and sundered processes by a whole 
series of 'general hermeneuticists.' 
The irony of that outcome is only heightened when one also recognises that the 
process thus depicts the creation of a new region of hermeneutics, i.e. one regionalised in the 
Cartesian subject conceived as an organism, limited in its application to some of the 
of-the 
characteristics of the writing^ost-EnUghtenment era and characterised by the Enlightenment 
hermeneutic model of the transcendence of prejudice. In the process, this hermeneutics could 
be characterised as isolated from one particularly important region, that which in relation to 
the alienating universality of Cartesian anthropology is most fittingly called 'the human.' 
However, the great irony of this isolation of the human is that it takes place in the terms of an 
embrace of life as the greatest good. To examine how this evolution transpired, we must look 
to Hannah Arendt's contribution to the hermeneutic debate in TTie Human Condition. 
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Chapter 2 Hannah Arendt's study of the human condition 
I have decided to include a summary discussion of Hannah Arendt's work and in 
particular her magisterial treatment of the vita activa. The Human Condition, at this point in 
the thesis for a few reasons. Firstiy, since the Cartesian anthropological model seemed 
decisive in influencing the development of modem hermeneutics, it seemed important to look 
to a study that would assess the subject of anthropology philosophically but without regarding 
the anthropological question as a concern that began vsnth Kant and Sdileiermacher. 
Secondly, since modem hermeneutics has a decidedly different orientation than its forebears, 
it seemed to me that in order to gain any sort of critical perspective upon the issues involved 
in interpretation that would not merely recapitulate the assiunptions of modem hermeneutics, 
a broader historical perspective needed to be taken. Arendt's study was useful on both 
accounts.^ Finally, it seemed to me to provide a plausible rationale for the abandomnent of 
the two-world scheme and the division of hermeneutics into two different regions, the sacred 
and the secular: the contemporary assumption of life as the greatest good. This is a decidedly 
important theme in Wordsworth and his contemporaries' writing, so it seemed necessary to 
provide some sort of historical-critical context for a hermeneutic engagement with it, the 
subject matter of the final three chapters. 
The Human Condition is written in a style and manner that is too idiosyncratic to be 
summarised easily, let alone inimediately consolidated into the coherent themes of the 
previous discussion of hermeneutics. I cannot recapitulate the distinctions she makes, the 
various sources she draws upon or the breadth of the observations she takes hundreds of pages 
to argue. Ncmetheless, there are many important contributions she makes to the discussion of 
hermeneutics that are worth repeating, even i f it were only for the feet that she offers a 
perspective on the central issues of hermeneutics that is different than that of the vwiters who 
are more typically designated 'hermeneirticists.' The difference is perhaps surprising because 
Arendt also came from the German philosophical tradition and indeed was even a protegee of 
Heidegger's. Perhaps only her experience of being a Jew living in Germany in the period 
leading up to the Nazi era can e5q)lain the combination of intimate acquaintance and radical 
divergence that marks the intellectual path she takes away from her mentor and her peers and 
their emphasis on life taken as being. This can be seen by way of contrast with Gadamer for 
^ What Sedn Burke rrh. De^ th and Return of the Author. (1998)) notes of Foucault s history m The 
O ^ ^ ^ holds true ofthe relationship of Ricoeurs study (and most other c o n t e w 
^ ^ i S o u n t s ) with respect to anthropology: they occur without a d i ^ i o n of tel^lo©. 
S ! ^ d ^ u e n i essentiSto the concepts. I think this is due to their adherence to organiast 
premises, which must eschew such notions. 
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instance on the subject of tradition. Although Gadamer had provided a contemporary appeal 
to recognise its importance, Arendt's appeal is fer more radical (and more genuine) because it 
offers a more strictiy traditional 'Classical' critique of the contemporary. It may not be 
entirely wrong to suggest, as one critic has, that she aims to propose 'a kind of New 
Athens.'*^ For the sake of the following, I shall attempt to tailor her account to issues that 
directly relate to the general hermeneutic movement and to her comments on Romanticism, 
without entirely losing the breadth of her discussion. 
To understand the distinctiveness of The Human Condition's contribution to 
hermeneutic debates though, one must first pay attention to how it differs in the way it treats 
its subject matter fi-om the manner that is typical of its genre. The first thing to recognise is 
that The Human Condition is primarily intended to be an exploratory political work that 
dovetails with her earUer work on the origins of totalitarianism.*' In that earher account, 
Arendt had demonstrated that totahtarianism was a nihilistic process motivated by 
paradoxical convictions: 'on the one hand the beUef that 'everything is possible' and on the 
other that human beings are merely an animal species governed by laws of nature or history, 
in the service of which individuals are entirely dispensable.'^  The same observations that 
guided that earlier account of totalitarianism also inform the argument of this later work about 
the development of Cartesian introspection through organicism. Arendt argues that a serious 
misapprehension of human capacities and responsibihties is at work in contemporary thinking 
and it is often based on the same paradoxical convictions as totalitarianism. She traces the 
root of this problem, much as Vico and Gadamer had done, to the retreat of the sensus 
communis and the two-world view in the fece of the Cartesian 'iimer form' of common sense, 
introspection. 
lite alogia of Cartesian introspection and Heideggerian being 
However,to understand how Arendt can maintain that a pohtical study can constitute 
a credible engagement with the problems of this advance of Cartesian introspection - a belief 
which encapsulates the range of diflferences that run between her study and Gadamer's (and 
the project of general hermeneutics) - one must look carefully at how the terms by which she 
Hannah ArendL The Human Condition (1998). Introduction, viii. (Hereafter THQ 
^ 'Shortly after the book's pubUcation, Arendt herself described The Human Conation as 'a kind of 
prolegomena' to a more systematic work of political theory which she planned (but never completed). 
Since 'the central political activity is action,' she explained, it had been necessary first to carry out a 
preliminary exercise in clarification 'to separate action conceptually fi-om other human activities with 
which it is usually confounded, such as lalwur and work." THC. ix. 
ibid JO-. 
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understands politics relate to basic hermeneutic issues. Hers is not a work of 'political 
philosophy as conventionally understood: that is to say, offering political prescriptions backed 
up by philosophical arguments.'™ Instead it is 'political' in the sense tmest to the etymology 
of the word.'' It calls for a return to political action, which turns out to be nothing other than 
a call to discuss what is being done in the world and act, radier than to cede passively to 
dogma of the necessary amelioration of the processes of life. This appeal would seem to have 
hermeneutic irtq)lications. Arendt's account provides an e3q)lanation for the aporia that 
appeared in the project of general hermeneutics in tracing the adoption of universality, the 
Archimedian point of perspective, into all branches of human thinking and acting. And she 
also gives a reason why the general hermeneutic movement took hold when it did: as we 
shall see, the radical questioning of the notion of causahty by Hume combined with the 
normalising processes of society made the process of introspection seem applicable to the 
human condition at the outset of the nineteenth century, particularly to thinkers strongly 
influenced by the Enlightenment. The universality of the general hermeneutic world-view 
pronqjted it to adopt a non-linguistic and 'biological' criterion oftmth, i.e. the 'mind' ofthe 
author as its aim of 'interpretation.' As we shall see in evidence in later chapters, it was 
typical of the 'imiversal perspective' to see the mind itself as nothing other than a place 
through which an 'everlasting universe of things' flows, as the beginning of Shelley's Mont 
Blanc puts it. 
What she imderstands by political philosophy then is the study of human interaction 
in a very basic and yet also very distinctive sense in which human plurality, communication, 
and action are central. She traces a process of political and hermeneutic aUenation in the 
retreat of common sense and a common world of action before the increasing dominance of 
^°THC./x 
'^ The entire second section of the book deals with the political realm and various aspects of the 
distinction between the piblic and the private realms, particularly of the deeply entrenched 
misunderstanding of the political realm as equivalent to the social. Arendt explains that the polis, the 
Greek city-state, was founded to enable men to spend their whole lives in the political reahn where 
action and speech were coeval and equal: 
Aristotle's definition of man as zoon politikon was not unrelated and even opposed to the 
natural association experienced in household life; it can be fiilly imderstood only if one acUs 
his second famous definition of man as a zoon logon echon ('a Uving being capable of 
speech'). The Latin translation of this term into animal rationale rests on no less fundamental 
a misunderstanding than the term 'social animal.' Aristotle meant neither to define man in 
general nor to indicate man's highest capacity, (he) only formulated the current opinion of the 
polis about man and the poUtical way of life, and according to this opinion, everybody outside 
the polis - slaves and barbarians - was aneu logon, deprived, of course, not of the faculty of 
speech, but of a way of life in which speech and only speech made sense and where the central 
concern of all citizens was to talk with each other. (27) 
While not calling for a return to such a poUtical system, her book calls for a recognition of the vahdity 
of the word for human affairs and as the only means by which human understanding, however hmited 
it may be, can be achieved. 
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the Cartesian universal world-view. Arendt's apparentiy improbable thesis is that it is the 
changes in the world of human activity that have been the decisive fector upon the changes 
that have taken place in human thinking (which includes the general hermeneutic movement 
with which we are here concerned). 
As I a r g u e d i n the introduction of the thesis, i f only one cmcial event could be 
held responsible for the spiritual and intellectual development of the modem age, it was 
GaUleo's discovery that the universe was heliocentric.'^ Two things were remarkable about 
that discovery: 
Firstly, the means by which the discovery took place and by which the old geocentric 
cosmology was overthrown was particularly telling, i.e. it happened through the use of a 
technical device, the telescope. In and of itself, that demonstration of the senses' inadequacy 
was not extraordinary. The truth of the world that the senses revealed had always been held 
in suspicion by Christian and Classical thinkers. But in this instance the senses' inadequacy 
had not been argued as it had been before for instance by the ancient Sceptical philosophers, 
it had been demonstrated. Hie very feet that it had been demonstrated without argument had 
the fer more significant consequence of also making its 'testimony' quite literally 
indisputable. This type of certainty meant that Galileo's discovery was fer more important 
than Copemicus's compatible theory (which actually preceded it) ." 
For the telescope's achievement not only undermined tmst in the veritude of the 
senses and discredited the prevailing point of view, it also in:^)licitiy xmdermined the 
hegemony of language over human afifeirs, in particular over human judgements. Henceforth, 
in order to be certain, one could no longer passively contemplate the eternal truth of the 
invisible world in its correspondence with the visible world, as the contenqjlative tradition of 
She suggests that there were two other decisive factors in the birth of the modem age as well, the 
discovery of America and the ensuing exploration of the whole earth and the Reformation, which 
began in appropriating ecclesiastical possessions a twofold process of individual expropriation and 
accumulation of social wealth. But she assigns particular prominence to this one for its effect on the 
development of introspection and the adoption of the universal world-view. 
" Cardinal Bellarmine pointed out to Galileo that what he had done and what Copernicus had argued 
had entirely different significance: 'to prove that the hypothesis... saves the appearances is not at all 
the same thing as to demonstrate the reality of the movement of the earth.' Arendt comments: 
By 'confirming' his predecessors, Galileo established a demonstrable feet where before him 
there were inspired speculations. The immediate philosophic reaction to this reality was not 
exultation but the Cartesian doubt by which modem philosophy - that 'school of suspicion,' 
as Nietzsche once called it - was founded, and which ended in the conviction that 'only on the 
firm foundation of unyielding despair can the soul's habitation henceforth be safely built.' 
(BertiandRusseU) (260-61) 
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the Greek and Christian tradition had estabhshed. In order to achieve certainty, one now had 
to make sure and in order to do that, one had to be active: 
Certainty of knowledge could be reached only under a twofold condition: first, that 
knowledge concemed only what one had done oneself - so that its ideal became 
mathematical knowledge, where we deal only with self-made entities of the mind -
and second, that knowledge was of such a nature that it could be tested only through 
more doing. (290) 
To see how important this was we must look ahead several centuries to the rationale for 
eventually abandoning the regionalisation of hermeneutics in sacred and secular categories 
and embracing a hermeneutics that reflected subjective or, as Arendt would characterise it, 
universal thinking. In that rationale, we can see that both regions were subject to the 
opprobrium of the universal turn against all forms of appearance and the promotion of a 
criterion other than language, i.e. the mind of the author. This could only happen after the 
differences between the two 'regions' were regarded as insubstantial, if not inconsequential, 
which is to say once the witness of language itself was no longer decisive in achieving truth 
and once the new form of 'analytical' truth seemed to promise more than meaning. The 
significance accorded to truth in fact became virtually indistinguishable from a claim of 
meaning. Once that conclusion had been reached, it was irrunaterial whether a text was held 
to be of divine or of human origin: 
Since then, scientific and philosophic truth have parted con:q)any; scientific truth not 
only need not be eternal, it need no even be comprehensible or adequate to human 
reason. It took many generations of scientists before the human mind grew bold 
enough to fiilly fece this implication of modernity. I f nature and the universe are 
products of a divine maker, and i f the human mind is incapable of understanding what 
man has not made himself, then man carmot possibly expect to leam anything about 
nature that he can understand. He may be able, through ingenuity, to find out and 
even to imitate the devices of natural processes, but that does not mean these devices 
will ever make sense to him - they do not even have to be intelligible. As a matter of 
feet, no supposedly suprarational divine revelation and no supposedly abstmse 
philosophic truth has ever offended human reason so glaringly as certain results of 
modem science. (290) 
Secondly, Galileo's discovery was significant because it provoked and inspired 
Descartes' remarkable reaction. Descartes alludes to the influence of the prejudicial effect of 
the telescope on his own step of universal doubt: 
... I before received and admitted many things as vdiolly certain and manifest, which 
yet I afterwards found to be doubtful. What, then, were those? They were the earth, 
the sky, the stars, and all the other objects that I was in the habit of perceiving by the 
senses. But what was it that I clearly [and distinctly] perceived in them? Nothing 
more than that the ideas and the thou^ts of those objects were presented to my 
mind.'^ 
Rene Descartes. 'Meditation m. Of God: That he exists.' Meditations on First Philosophy. (1987). 
A parallel passage is to be found in his famous second meditation in which he finds his Archimedean 
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The 'method of doubt' that Descartes embarks upon following this anecdote has often been 
misunderstood by historians of philosophy as a reaction against the re-appearance of the 
superior sceptical arguments of Sextus Enqjiricus into modem European thinking." But these 
sorts of sceptical arguments, however prolific they undoubtedly were at the time, siu-ely only 
became popular because a ground of uncertainty had already been created for them to 
proliferate.'* 
The way in which Descartes' universal doubt 'considered the nature of the earth from 
the viewpoint of the universe'(248) was exemplified by his method of analytical geometry. 
Geometry prior to Descartes was a branch of mathematics that, as its name suggests, 
concerned itself with the earth and its measurement. Inherent in Descartes' treatment of space 
and extension however was his conversion of these accidents of the natural world into 
patterns identical with human mental stmctures, irrespective of their natural appearance or 
form, so that 'its relations, however eon:^ )lieated, must alwa)^ be expressible in algebraic 
formulae.' Algebra 'freed the mind from the shackles of spatiality.' When Descartes 
counterbalanced this mathematisation of spatiaUty by also demonstrating that 'numerical 
truths... (could) be fiilly represented spatially,' the combined result was astounding. For the 
eflfect of these demonstrations was that: 
A ph5^ical science had been evolved which required no principles for its completion 
beyond those of pure mathematics, and in this science man could move, risk himself 
into space and be certain that he would not encounter anything but himself, nothing 
that could not be reduced to patterns present in him. (266) 
point in the cogito, after persuading himself that 'there was no sky and no earth, neither minds nor 
bodies.' 
The typical explanation given for Descartes' extreme scepticism is the discovery of manuscripts 
presenting the arguments of intellectual scepticism Cf Richard Popkin's thesis in The History of 
Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza. (1979) His adoption of the cogito is thus interpreted as a 
linguistic response - the intellectual equivalent of buniing part of a forest prophylactically to prevent a 
conflagration. 
This ground of uncertainty can be seen more clearly in another tendency from the period. It was a 
similar recognition that also incited the seventeenth century scientist/ philosophers to iwrsue a 
methodology of 'trial and error' against the dictates of tradition, particulariy that of Aristotelian 
science. It inspired the corporate motto of the Royal Society of 'things, not words.' It is facile to 
suggest that a reaction of this magnitude (and formulation) to 'tradition' could have been incited by the 
mere re^pearance of sceptical arguments. Arendt suggests that there were several noteworthy aspects 
of the Royal Society: i) its 'objectivity' was a function of its willingness to subject itself to the King; 
ii) since no scientific teamwork is pure science but also has a motive of empowerment (because 
organising always involves the intention to act), whether in gaining place in society or in dominion 
over nature, science became a poUtical institution, acting m concert, introducing quasi-political action 
into thought, iii) this introduction of action into thought was the basis of the enormous successes of the 
Royal Society, influenced the character of modem thinking, organisatioa 'Organised thought is the 
basis of organised actioa' (271) 
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Newton and Leibniz quickly followed Descartes in their own methods of fiilfilling the 
philosophical preoccupation of 'saving the appearances;' and Kant later was femous for 
providing the aptly named 'Copemican tum' that estabUshed Newton's findings into 
philosophy. 
Although Arendt's insistence that Descartes' adoption of a 'universal world-view' 
that inq)licitly attacked the world of the senses and of language can be traced to the 
implications of Galileo's discovery is surprisingly coherent, it does not lead her to overstate 
its philosophical significance. She wams of two dangers to be avoided that many scholars 
have fellen into when interpreting the cogito. On the one hand, the hasty conclusion that the 
cogito resuhed in some sort of revelation of trae being, something like Plato's realm of ideas 
that bore a correspondence to geometric particulars must be avoided. For it is clear that: 
These are no longer ideal forms disclosed to the eye ofthe mind, but are the results of 
removing the eyes of the mind, no less than the eyes of the body, from the 
phenomena, of reducing all appearances through the force inherent in distance.(267) 
On the other hand, the opposite conclusion must also be firmly rejected, thinking that there 
were no ontological implications involved in Descartes' cogito at all. Hiis is what Nietzsche 
concluded when he remarked that it Descartes' cogito contained a logical error. Rather than 
cogito ergo sum, Nietzsche claimed that Descartes fisrmulation should have been cogito, ergo 
cogitationes sunt. ^ 
In response to Nietzsche's claim that Descartes did not succeed in providing an 
ontological proof in the cogito but had only demonstrated certainty of his thoughts 
(cogitations), Arendt submits that wiiile in one sense that is true, he did not, historically 
speaking, estabhsh the certainty of his thoughts either. That understanding in feet makes 
Hegel's mistake of interpreting what Descartes and Kant did by making everything an 
element ofthe 'universal spirit.' Rather, Descartes, by atten^tingto 'savethe appearances,' 
preserved contemplation in the fece of something he ccmsidered to be a threat to it. But the 
cost of preserving it dianged it beyond recognition.^ 
ITie importance of Cartesian introspection 
There were two primary reasons, she suggests, why Cartesian introspection and its 
response of 'universal doubt' was cmcial to the spiritual and intellectual development of the 
^" Cf. Nietzsche's Will to Power No. 484. (1968) 
n p l ^ ™ ' ? ' * ^ ^ ; demonstration that subsequent discoveries based on the universal 
perspective have only more clearly revealed, that mankind's origins could not he in the created 
umverse. 
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modem age: i) it established an introspective process - the stream of consciousness - as the 
basis for confronting the world of appearances, ii) it led mankind to the conclusion that a 
method of universal certainty had been provided that could dehver knowledge based on the 
invention of new devices. These reasons do not inunediately appear to be 'political' either, 
but have implications that, as we shall see, indubitably become so. The imphcations of these 
aspects of the cogito can be traced and elaborated upon: 
i)The analogy of processes 
Submerging all worldly objects into a stream of consciousness that was isolated from 
that world by the prenuse of universal doubt was cmcial for the advance of science. It created 
an intellectual model conducive to the later understanding of the dissolution of matter into 
energy, for example, and to the understanding of objects as a whirl of atomic occurrences. 
However, the downside of this model of process appeared as soon as it was appUed to 
humaitity, when, to use Arendt's terms, the 'move of the Archimedean point into the mind of 
man' was applied reflexively by Descartes and, more systematically, by Kant.'' The changes 
that the appUcation of the model of process brought there were most evident in the 
prominence that certain activities attained at the e5q)ense of others. 
Most significantly, it caused a change that affected all human activities, 'the reversal 
of the hierardiical order between the vita contemplativa and the vita activa': 
.. .the fundamental experience behind the reversal of contemplation and action was 
precisely that man's thirst for knowledge could be assuaged only after he had put his 
tmst into the ingenuity of his hands. The point was not that truth and knowledge 
were no longer important, but that they could be won only by 'action' and not by 
contemplation. It was an instrument, the telescope, a work of man's hands, which 
finally forced nature, or rather the universe, to yield its secrets... After being and 
appearance had parted company and truth was no longer supposed to appear, to reveal 
and disclose itself to the mental eye of a beholder (as it had done in the vita 
contemplativa), there arose a veritable necessity to hunt for truth behind deceptive 
appearances... Certainty of knowledge could be reached only under a twofold 
condition: first, that knowledge concemed only what one had done himself - so that 
its ideal became mathematical knowledge, where we deal only with self-made entities 
of the mind - and second, that knowledge was of such a nature that it could be tested 
only through more doing.(290, my parenthesis)'" 
The problem it eventually provided for the sciences themselves was not apparent until the twentietii 
century, a topic discussed in the second point, 'The Universal Method,' below. 
To recognise how compelling the motive was to reverse their hierarchical order and prioritise action 
to contemplation (while utterly transforming the latter), Arendt suggests we must first 'rid ourselves of 
the current prejudice which ascribes the development of modem science, because of its ^ hcability, to 
a pragmatic desire to inqjrove conditions and better human Ufe on earth... (its origins he) exclusively in 
an altogether non-practical search for useless knowledge.. .if we had to rely only on men's so-called 
practical instincts, there would never have been any technology to speak of' (289) 
58 
This shift to an emphasis upon doing however did not simply reverse the estimate of the merit 
of the two activities, it also redefined what they were. The effect that the cogito had on 
redefining the activity of contemplation is clarified in this excerpt. It altered the conduct of 
the philosopher from the act of contemplation, where truth was regarded by the mental eye of 
the beholder, to the act of introspection, where only the thoughts themselves are regarded. 
However to explain precisely how the model of intemal process also had an effect on 
all human activities as a side-effect of the project of the reductio scientiae ad mathematicam, 
it is first necessary to understand what various types of human activities there are and to note 
how they can be distinguished. Arendt suggests, using a Classical model, that there are three 
activities typical of mankind. Corresponding to these three types of activity are three 
conditions in which the activities take place, conditions increasing in their order of 
artificiality and in their requirement to have other observers. Consequently, they are also less 
and less compatible with an introspective process that eschews reference to the world and 
others. 
The three activities of mankind 
The first activity of man is that of labour, which corresponds to the biological process 
of the human body, of man as an animal on the earth. Associated with labour and the activity 
of mankind as an animal laborans are the necessities of life. It is thus not accidental that the 
word labour is also associated with child-birth as both were regarded as necessary, biological, 
painful and, perhaps most significantiy for a political understanding, private.*' 'The human 
condition of labour is life itself.' The second activity of man, corresponding to the 
'urmaturahiess of human existence,' that of the homo faber, is that of work. Work creates an 
artificial world of objects that are meant to outiast their makers. This very quality thereby 
accommodates the earth to mankind. 'The human condition of work is worldliness.' The 
third activity of man is that of action, 'the only activity that goes on directly between men 
without the intermediary of things or matter, (which) corresponds to the feet that men, not 
Man, hve on the earth and inhabit the world.'*^ The 'place' where this activity took place was 
The Classical sense of deprivation in privacy has only really been retained in the sense of the word 
privation in the English language, and there it is now associated with the necessities of Ufe. For her 
discussion of the word labour and its modem redefinition that excludes this sense of deprivation, see 
THC. 4748. 
ibid. 7. The pluraUty that characterises this activity is fimdamental to all poUtical Ufe precisely 
because of the pecuUar generic quaUty of human individuality. 'PluraUty is the condition of human 
action because we are aU the same, that is, human, in such a way that nobody is ever the same as 
anyone else who ever Uved, Uves, or will Uve.'(8) Arendt points out it this plurahty was the very 
reason why 'to live' and 'to be among men' (inter homines esse) and 'to die' and 'to cease to be among 
men' (inter homines esse desinere) were synonymous for the Romans. Similarly, she points out, the 
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known as the pubUc sphere and the life that was led there was known as the bios politikos or 
vita activa by the Greeks and Romans respectively.*^ This place was the most artificial and 
tenuous of all precisely because it could only exist once the need to serve biological necessity 
had been relieved and a world had been constmcted where such a public and political life of 
appearing and acting in conjunction with one's equals could take place. What was most 
significant about it for our purposes is that the activities that took place in it could not be 
foreseen or predicted; they were events with inherent potential to bring about radical changes, 
not the 'results of processes.' 
The internal processes of the cogito, which Arendt depicts as Descartes' relocation of 
GaUleo's imiversal Archimedian point to a place within the mind, had a different effect on all 
three areas. On the one hand, the model of introspection led to the 'uimatural growth of the 
natural' processes of labour (first through the organisation and division of labour and later by 
its replacement with automatic machines).** On the other hand, Arendt ejqilains that it 
worked to undermine work and action because, in the act of doubting appearances on a 
universal scale, it feiled to allow for the revelatory, event-like and public character of their 
forms of activity or for their intention to achieve permanence. TTie dependence of events or 
actions on either achieving quasi-permanent visibility or on being seen by others meant that 
they were distinctive and could never be repeated exactly. Nor could they be imderstood as 
an 'intemal process' like that of the cogito. The modem mind informed by the process of 
introspection and its imiversal prejudice thus either rejected these activities as outdated 
'traditions' or attacked them as prejudices - since no events of any meaning could be verified 
by experiment.*^ 
At this point, it might be worth noting how Arendt differs from Gadamer in her 
interpretation of this problem. We should recall the similarities first: Gadamer argued that 
Kant and the Enlighteimient had (mistakenly) enployed a 'prejudice against prejudice' in 
understanding the world, speech and action according to premises that doubted all forms of 
appearance universally. This had operated against traditional claims to truth because it 
human condition of action was impUcit in the creation account of Genesis 1:27 'Male and female 
created He/Ae/n.' 
Indeed the polls was constmcted for the very purpose of enabUng the activities of the pubUc sphere. 
'Descartes beUeved that the certainty yielded by his new method of introspection is the certainty of 
the I-am Man, in other words, carries his certainty, the certamty of his existence, within himself, the 
sheer functioning of consciousness, though it cannot possibly assure a worldly reality given to the 
senses and to reason, confirms beyond doubt the reality of sensations and of reasoning, that is, the 
reaUty of processes which go on in the mind These are not unlike the biological processes that go on 
in the body and which, when one becomes aware of them, can also convince one of its woridng reahty. 
(280) 
This is the basis of the divide between truth and meaning in modem thinking. 
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exposed their lack of 'universality.' He also attributed Kant's replacement of the sensus 
communis by an altogether different 'healthy common sense' to the same rationale.'* Finally, 
he argued, quite against the sensibilities inculcated in contemporary thinking by the 
Enlightenment, not only that truth-claims could still be made but that they were unavoidable, 
as prejudice was an inahenable part of the 'anticipatory' thinking of conditioned and 
historical beings. 
Arendt's account effectively records the same process of world aUenation as 
Gadamer's does, but it is fer more insightful than his because it seeks the significance of the 
original sensus communis rather than simply recording that it was a necessary form of 
prejudice. By imderstanding its rationale and the unique quaUties it possessed, she can 
elaborate upon the implications of its loss. She argues that the sensus communis entailed 
more than what Gadamer had correctly noted about it, that it was the means by which the 
intimately private sensations of the five senses were fitted into the common world through 
language. What was particularly significant about this sense of the community was that it 
bore witness to the results of the unique words and actions that had taken place within the 
content of Hie public sphere. This should not be misunderstood though. The sensus 
communis was not just the sense agreed upon any given community (as modem reader-
response critics have argued in agreement with Gadamer's resuscitation of the necessity of 
communal prejudices). That is merely a universal perspective on community that leads to 
pure relativism. Rather, it was the sense of a particular type of community, that of the Greek 
polis or the Roman res publica. This type of community is not intrinsically superior to others 
(or i f it is, that is not the point being made), but it demonstrates better than others the 
particular character of humanity to act in common and creates a place where individuality can 
be revealed. The human condition of plurality is the condition that allows man's uniqueness 
as an individual agent to manifest itself - it can be noted and hopefully, immortalised by 
others. It allows it to escape the ubiquitous account in contemporary thinking reducing 
human action to the determinations of biology, and thereby to equate it with behaviour. 
It can demonstrate this precisely because the conditions imder which the Greek 
'politician' or Roman citizen acted ensured that he was fi-ee fi-om the charge of being 
motivated by the irrepressible burden of human needs. Because of the Ancients' requirement 
that one be fi-ee fi-om serving or pursuing the necessities of life in order to be a citizen (one 
Both Gadamer and Arendt note the tiansfonnation of common sense into an inner sense in the 
difiference between the older German word Gemeinsim and the more recent expression gesunder 
Menschenverstand. 
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could not be a labourer or an artisan or a trader), a sense of the relation between the free 
interaction o f the individual with his community of equals is revealed. The (inter)-actions of 
such citizens cannot be attributed to the compulsion of necessary processes, as they do not 
pursue them. This differentiates them from modem social studies. It means that they display 
in all prominence the'condition of humanity that caimot be reduced or even related to 
biological necessity: action, with which words were inextricably linked. This was also 
displayed in the very purpose of the polls or the republic, which was to debate or contest over 
policy and then act in conjimction with others in carrying it through. This freedom of action, 
manifested and even enacted in language, enables mankind to initiate consequences and also 
to understand tiiem. Understanding remains inalienable from the power of language, but it is 
only in the context of such a community that the relation of language to action becomes clear. 
The consequences of this demonstration are significant. Hie sensus communis 
established by free individuals speaking and acting in the pubhc sphere before a community 
of equals guarantees a communal ethics that acknowledges the freedom of the individual (and 
of the community) to act. Along with that, it also accoxurts responsibility for those free acts. 
Without a common sense that entails the freedom of action, which the system of common law 
in some sense still embodies (in defiance of the spirit of modem introspection), there can be 
no such thing as ethical conduct for example. One problem that emerges in understanding 
human activity only as processes then (or stemming from them) is that it inplicitly denies the 
individual the freedom to act. The accompanying side of that problem is that responsibility, 
justice and judgement are thus always deferred to the outcome of processes that are 
ineluctable but also inconclusive. This is what has been called the hermeneutic or vicious 
circle. The tendency that such a model of human activity inculcates is to disregard the 
freedom and responsibility inherent in thinking and in acting on both an individual and a 
corporate level. Responsibility can be indefinitely deferred to the inescapable formation of 
processes. TTiis is precisely the threat posed by the new concept of life that emerges in the 
Romantic period and is enshrined in contenqjorary universal hermeneutics - it relates human 
being fundamentally to the order o f an inexpressible sense, the empathetic power of 'feeling' 
that the Romantic poet seeks to mediate to others. I wi l l elaborate upon this in greater detail 
in the next chapter. 
The terrible consequences of the cogito's emphasis on process can be seen in the 
effect it had, even in mathematics, its first conquest, on the way human understanding was 
formulated: 
The mind of this man - to remain in the sphere of mathematics - no longer looks 
upon 'two-and-two-are-four' as an equation in which two sides balance in a self-
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evident harmony, but imderstands the equation as the expression of a process in 
which two and two become four in order to generate further processes of addition 
which wi l l eventually lead into the infinite. This faculty the modem age calls 
common-sense reasoning; it is the plajong of the mind with itself, which comes to 
pass when the mind is shut off from all reality and 'senses' only itself The results of 
this play are compelling 'truths' because the structure of one man's mind is supposed 
to differ no more from that of another than the shape of his body. Whatever 
difference there is may be is a difference of mental power, which can be tested and 
measured like horsepower. Here the old definition of man as an animal rationale 
acquires a terrible precision: deprived of the sense through which man's five animal 
senses are fitted into a world common to all men, human beings are indeed no more 
than animals who are able to reason, 'to reckon with consequences.' (283-84) 
The onset of society and the public concern with life 
HoweverjCartesian science would never have been able to gain credibility in the 
human sphere or appUcation to it simply on the strength of its ability to perceive the reality of 
the natural world as a network of processes or its ability to come up with technical inventions 
that ejqjloited those processes. The human world, at least initially, obviously worked 
differently. The world created by architects and by artisans was obviously meant to 
accommodate man to the earth beyond the span of one generation; indeed in the case of 
public buildings, these accommodations of mankind to the earth were to be monuments that 
transcended the ravages of time, not to change in conjunction with nature." Similarly, men of 
action strove not just for the maintenance of life but for immortality in the annals of historians 
or the tales of poets." 
In order for introspection to gain hold in the human sphere to the point where its 
validity could be regarded as self-evident it required that these activities became less and less 
characteristic and that this world became less and less 'permanent' in order that its biological 
pattern of process could become more and more plausible as a general account of human 
activity. Christianity was indirectly responsible for this by valorising the eternal at the 
ejq)ense of the immortal in its contempt for worldly fame. But the entirely selfless and 
gratuitous nature of Christian charity hardly poses less of a problem than action does for an 
attenqjt to understand activity as a series of necessary processes. There is little necessary in 
the character o f self-sacrifice. Instead, something totally different than such an act needed to 
take place. Human activity would need to be normaUsed and attuned to the processes of life 
for the modem understanding of humanity as animals who reason to become credible. 
Arendt accounts the decline in the constmction of public buildings to the change in the estimation of 
what human activity is, i.e. its orientation towards the processes of life. 
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Arendt argues that this is precisely what came about with the emergence of modem 
society in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as society marks nothing other than 'the 
pubUc organisation of the life process itself. '(46)*' The condition of uniformity that was 
instilled by the public institutions that society had created to suppress the 'traditional' or 
individualistic actions which did not serve its household needs made society compatible to the 
mode of the cogito's terms of understandmg, the terms of a process towards the infinite. In 
many respects the emergence of society thus indicated the inversion, in form and content, of 
the public and private, spheres: 'Society is the form in which the feet of mutual dependence 
for the sake of l ife and nothing else assumes public significance and where the activities 
connected with sheer survival are permitted to appear in public.'(46) Ultimately however, 
this inversion came at the expense of both the private domain of the femily and the political 
domain of action: 
The social reahn, where the life process has established its own public domain, has let 
loose an unnatural growth, so to speak, of the natural; and it is against this growth, 
not merely against society but against a constantly growing social realm, that the 
private and intimate, on Ihe one hand, and the political (in the narrower sense of the 
word), on the other, have proved incapable of defending themselves.(47) 
The successes of hegemonic social institutions in instilling human conformity (and 
thus bolstering the claim for the universal validity of the model of process in the human 
sphere) are manifest in the very feet that by the nineteenth century humanity had been 
normalised enough for scientists to think that human activity could be examined just as it 
could in the case of animals, in terms of behaviour. It was this behef that human activity 
could be anal5^ed, quantified and predicted that in tum created the social sciences. The 
project of the behaviourist sciences, which operated on the assiunption instilled by conformity 
that men behave and do not act towards one another, is inconceivable prior to the onset of 
society and its normative powers. 
I f as a resuh of the onset of society human behaviour became more attuned to the 
productivity of labour and thus more 'natural' i.e. biological, this did not mean that it became 
more egalitarian; or i f it was, then it was so not in the sense that individuality was preserved, 
but rather extinguished: 
The striking coincidence of the rise o f society with the decline of the family indicates 
clearly that vs^at actually took place was the absorption of the femily unit into 
corresponding social groups. The equality of the members of these groups, far fi-om 
being an equality among peers, resembles nothing so much as the equality of 
household members before the despotic power of the household head, except that in 
This was precisely because the Classical understanding of history was cyclical. Only by achieving 
immortality throu^ words and deeds could that cycle be escaped. 
«'Cf. Chapters 4-6 of THC. 
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society, where the natural strength of one common interest and one unanimous 
opinion is tremendously enforced by sheer number, actual mle exerted by one man, 
rqjresenting the common interest and the right opinion, could eventually be 
dispensed with. The phenomenon of conformism is characteristic of the last stage of 
this modem development. (40) 
Arendt would argue that the life of man also became less human, not in its very nature, which 
still possesses the capacity for words and for action in concert, but in its conduct towards 
itself and the world. The paradoxical beliefs that were instilled, on the one hand that 
'everything is possible' and on the other that human beings are merely an animal species 
governed by laws of nature or history are the basis of totalitarianism: 
Statistical uniformity is by no means a harmless scientific ideal; it is the no longer 
secret political ideal of a society which, entirely submerged in the routine in everyday 
living, is at peace with the scientific outlook inherent in its very existence.(43) 
It might be useful to draw back from this summary of Arendt's work just for an 
instant to make a remark about the onset of society and the development of modem 
hermeneutics. It can hardly be accidental that in Schleiermacher the general hermeneutic 
movement was introduced by a writer coming from the scattered fiefdoms and feudal 
principalities o f what is now Germany, in other words from a place where no substantial 
political sphere per se was in evidence.^ This is where hegemonic social institutions had 
been brought most thoroughly into force at least since the time of the benevolent despotism of 
the Enq)eror Joseph I I (1765-90). The lack of a political culture in German society and the 
strong pressures of Enlightened conformity placed upon it made organicism a more plausible 
political model in the humanities there, where it would and did still encounter grave 
opposition elsewhere. It was perhaps only the onset o f industrialisation and the power it 
delivered to the nations that adopted itwKkVibrced the conformity that took hold of German 
society to be adopted throughout Europe of the EnUghtenment. This social pressure to 
conform acts as the rather confusing backdrop of the English Romantic movement, to which 
more attention wil l be devoted in the next chapters, in particular in relation to Wordsworth's 
exaltation of feeling. However it is worth noting that along with that development o f patterns 
of process into the human sphere, the Cartesian moment o f doubt and, ultimately, the aporia 
of unintelUgibility, was brought into the very heart of hermeneutics. 
What Arendt's account does next, having demonstrated that historically speaking 
such an alogical understanding of the human condition is absurd, is to demonstrate how 
^ Gadamer and a whole htany of other writers have referred to the lack of a real political culture in 
Germany, or its attendant sensus communis, and cited that lack as the primary reason why Kant first 
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Cartesian introspection has now brought universal relativity not only into the human sciences, 
but, since Einstein, also into the 'natural sciences.'" This once again sheds an entirely 
dilTerent light on the hermeneutic discussion. 
i f ) The Universal Method 
.. : - ."^  -C . Cartesian introspection initially led the modem mind 
to the conclusion that even i f one caimot know truth as it is given and disclosed (as the 
philosophical act of contemplation had understood), man can at least know what he himself 
made. The ejqjeriments that followed were part of an exercise in 'saving the appearances', 
which happened through its method of securing certainty against universal doubt. The 
conviction of certainty provided by the demonstration of instruments and experiments 
characterised modem science up imtil the early twentieth century. It was the basis of the 
natural sciences' claim of certainty that Dihhey had accepted axiomatically when he wrote 
and it was the certainty that he strove to emulate in the Geisteswissenschaften in 
understanding meaning in terms of truth. 
However this belief in the certainty and in the truth provided by universal science 
became infinitely problematic when Einstein's theory of relativity actually permitted the real 
conversion of mass into energy and vice versa, and when mankind actually developed the 
capability to depart fi-om the confines of the earth's environment.*^ The 'victories' in these 
instances were rather pyriWc. For these astonishing and very real mathematisations of 
physics did not just result in yet another advance toward the infinite, as previous ejqjeriments 
had. They had the implication that mankind could apply virtually any principle and create a 
sort of virtual reality, but still without providing any real sense of what reaUty is. This created 
the contemporary scenario, which is almost a nightmare, that through applied introspection 
mankind can bring the powers of the universe to bear on the world, but without any real 
awareness of the meaning of what it is doing. Its access to this 'virtual world' is v^ dioUy 
misunderstood taste as merely a lower form of judgement and then reworked it according to the 
'prejudice against prejudice' into his 'Cartesian' gesunder Menschenverstand. 
''Arendt argues that our continued use of the term natural sciences is somewhat misleading as a 
description of contemporary science: 
I f one wishes to draw a distinctive line between the modem age and the world we have come 
to Uve in, he may well find it in the difference between a science which looks upon nature 
fi-om a universal stanc^int and thus acquires complete mastery over her, on the one hand, and 
a truly 'universal' science, on the other, which imports cosmic processes into nature even at 
the obvious risk of destroying her and, with her, man's mastery over her. (268) 
^ The particular event with which the 1958 Prologue of The Human Condition began was the first 
launch of a satellite into the earth's orbit in 1957. That event provoked the revealing response fi-om its 
scientists that mankind had made a first 'step toward escape from the earth's imprisonment' Arendt 
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relative: 
artificial, mediated (and interpreted) by instruments of man's own making. In other words, 
the demonstration of the applicability of the theory of universal relativity meant that 
ejqjeriments could no longer attain demonstrable validity, because the world of appearances 
(in which validity had been demonstrated in the past) had now itself hoeix made utterly 
At this point, the connection between thougjit and sense experience, inherent in the 
human condition, seems to take its revenge: while technology demonstrates the 
'truth' of modem science's most abstract concepts, it demonstrates no more than that 
man can always apply the results of his mind, that no matter which system he uses for 
the explanation of natural phenomena he wi l l always be able to adopt it as a guiding 
principle for making and acting... I f ... present-day science in its perplexity points to 
technical achievements to 'prove' that we deal witii an 'authentic order' given in 
nature, i t seems it has fallen into a vicious circle, which can be formulated as follows: 
scientists formulate their hypotheses to arrange their ejqjeriments and then use these 
experiments to verify their hypotheses; during this whole enterprise, they obviously 
deal with a hypothetical nature. (287) 
Arendt's account therefore depicts a development in contemporary science that has made the 
general hermeneutic problem as imderstood by Ricoeur et al. far more complicated than his 
attenqjts, based on Heidegger's primordial ontology, to find the residual traces of being 
through symbolic language wi l l allow. It depicts how the divide between explanation and 
understanding of the human sciences, the problematic aporia that plagued the venture of 
general hermeneutics, has now extended to engulf the natural sciences as well. The poets 
trumpeting organicism were indeed the imacknowledged legislators of the imiverse. 
The aporia for understanding that Ricoeur depicted, which is a result of nothing but 
the adoption of the universal world-view into textual interpretation, was pursued as a goal as 
long as it had served to further the scientific metanarrative of progress towards the infinite. 
The pursuit of its progress towards 'truth' was tolerated right up until the twentieth century 
even though the consequences o f devices that had come about through abstract reasoning had 
extraordinary and not always beneficial effects on humanity, effects which could only be 
comprehended in the ethical and political terms of human commxmity, which are those of 
language, after they have already become apparent in the world. The effect on human 
activities and on human thinking has akeady been noted. But now science has consequences 
that carmot be grasped even after the fact because it harnesses powers of the universe that are 
ahen to the earth and remain alien to it: 
The trouble (now) concems the feet that the 'truths' of the modem scientific world 
view, though they can be demonstrated in mathematical formulas and proved 
technologically, wi l l no longer lend themselves to normal e?q)ression in speech and 
claimed that both the event itself and the sentiments of the scientists were unpecedented - and only 
failed to achieve recognition as such because they were already the banal stuff of science fiction. 
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thought. The moment these 'truths' are spoken of conceptually and coherently, the 
resulting statements wi l l be 'not perhaps as meaningless as a 'triangular circle,' but 
much more so than a 'winged lion." (Erwin Schrodinger) (3) 
It is not only the recent development of science's own inability to conceptualise 
'truths' of its own making that concems her account however. In addition to the way in 
which the implements of scientific advances always precede the conq)rehension of their 
consequences, Arendt also wishes to explain how this aporia has been turned inwardly, as an 
'Archimedian point against ourselves.' The use of such a point of power explains the 
common metaphors of contemporary science: 
TTie reason why scientists can tell us about the 'hfe' in the atom - where apparently 
every particle is 'fi-ee' to behave as it wants and the laws ruUng these movements are 
the same statistical laws which, according to the social scientists, rule human 
behaviour and make the multitude behave as it must, no matter how 'firee' the 
individual particle may appear to be in its choices - in other words, why the 
behaviour of the infinitely small particle is not only similar in pattern to the planetary 
system as it appears to us but resembles the life and behaviour pattems in human 
society is, of course, that we look and live in this society as though we were as far 
removed fi-om our own human existence as we are fi-om the infinitely small and the 
immensely large which, even i f they could be perceived by the finest instruments, are 
too fer away to be e>q)erienced. (323) 
This universal alienation o f humanity fi-om its own existence is a movement that may owe 
itself to the appUcation of what Gadamer had called the Enlightenment's 'prejudice against 
prejudice.' Language itself, Arendt suggests, has been ahenated as an essential characteristic 
of human being because being human has lost its commimal and political sense. The 
commimal, active and verbal characteristics of mankind were, she argues, central to 
understandings of humanity in both strands of the Western tradition, the Classical and the 
Biblical. 
Arendt, Heidegger and Gadamer 
The problem Arendt locates in currait thinking then centres around the theme 
famiUar since Heidegger of alienation, in particular o f the aUenation that has been encouraged 
by Descartes' 'inauthentic concq)t o f being,' the form of the knowledge that its 'universal 
perspective' provides that is inadequate to the specific requirements o f created beings. In 
short, it is inadequate because it presents knowledge to fundamentally speaking beings in an 
analytical, mathematical form that is aUen to them as creatures of flesh and blood in 
symbiosis with the earth's other creatures and as inhabitants of a world of things. The anti-
traditional Cartesian concept of being, Arendt argues, has led over the centuries to an 
aUenation fi-om the world - a gradual process of attuning human work to the processes of life, 
intensified through the process of automation an aUenation fi-om the earth and aUenation from 
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the world - o f which more shall be said in a moment - developments that offer striking 
demonstrations of human transcendence of them both but wiiich also thereby entail 'a 
rebellion against human existence as it has been given.'(2) But Arendt diverges sharply from 
the accoimts of Heidegger and Gadamer in several ways: 
The most important of these is that whereas Heidegger and Gadamer had placed - in 
contradistinction to the atemporality of Cartesian being - an en^hasis on the anticipatory 
character of human mortality aknost as i f it were the only formative contingency upon human 
knowledge and human being (for, as Gadamer made clear, according to Heidegger being is 
time), Arendt places her enq)hasis on natality. This difference is absolutely cmcial. While 
their emphasis on human mortality does reject universal claims for human knowledge by 
demonstrating that the Cartesian 'prejudice against prejudice' is inadequate and inappropriate 
for finite beings' imderstanding (precisely because of its transcendental power), the 
exclusivity of their contrary emphasis on finitude gives them a ciuious tendency to regard the 
human condition as static, even i f the character of this stasis is that of permanent process. 
'Dauer im Wechsel' Goethe called it. That enphasis on the historicity of being thus had the 
consequence that human action was denied any truly formative power. It could in-form, but 
not form the human condition. It reflected the life processes themselves. 
Arendt wishes to make distinctions here that they do not. She would certainly agree 
that human actions do not change the fundamental human condition, that of human nature. 
That is a central premise of her thesis. But Arendt does not follow her mentor Heidegger or 
her contemporary Gadamer's impulses towards absolute statements against absolute 
statements. On the one hand she emphasises that the power of change is intrinsic in human 
nature. Her emphasis on natality affirms the primacy of creation and of human creativity. 
This is so vital because it reminds us of the characteristic that Arendt is at pains to 
demonstrate in her account o f The Human Condition, extending from the understanding of 
humanity in the Greek polls and in Judaeo-Christian thought to the accoimt of historical 
changes leading up to the present day: it reminds us that human beings are creatures who can 
and do act. Along with the power of action comes the genuine power to initiate subsequent 
events and create new things with consequences that caimot be foreseen. 
On the other hand, she denies that that power for change is absolute. To absolutise 
temporality as a form of truth is to render changes (and actions) in time meaningless. Human 
being is certainly inalienably temporal, but it is not time (and since we are tenq)oral, it seems 
meaningless to define what we are not as time either). This means that although the human 
power to act in unison (according to the basic human condition of plurality) is perennial, the 
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power does not extend so fer as to change human nature.^ Arendt makes it clear that the sum 
total of human activities and capabiUties and conditions do not constitute anything like human 
nature: 
The problem of human nature, the Augustinian quaes tio mihi/actus sum ('a question 
have I become for myself), seems imanswerable in both its individual psydiological 
sense and its general philosophical sense. It is highly unlikely that we, who can 
know, determine, and define the natural essences of aU things surrounding us, which 
we are not, should ever be able to do the same for ourselves - this would be like 
jumping over our own shadows. Moreover, nothing entitles us to assume that man 
has a nature or essence in the same sense as other things. In other words, i f we have a 
nature or essence, then surely only a god could know and define it, and the first 
prerequisite would be that he would be able to speak about a 'wdio' as though it were 
a 'what.'(10) 
She thus separates the fundamental perspective on human nature from the totaUsing, a 
distinction that they repeatedly feil to make. One illustration she makes presents this point 
about the incalculable consequences of actions lucidly (and pertinently to the issue of being 
and time). She reminds the reader that the invention of the clock had originally been intended 
for the abstract purpose of conducting certain ejqjeriments, of proving what introspective 
analysis had suggested as a hypothesis. It was only afterwards that its practical uses were 
reaUsed. 
Gadamer's sense of tradition, I beUeve Arendt would say, unwittingly reflects the 
individualism characteristic o f the Cartesian prioritisation of the universal because it does not 
acknowledge the proper dynamics of language in relation to human agency. This is precisely 
her rationale for questioning scientists' own judgement about their work, that they 'move in a 
world where speech has lost its power,' a feet which discredits their political and ethical 
judgements. For she observes that: 
.. .whatever men do or know or ejqierience can make sense only to the extent that it 
can be spoken about. There may be truths beyond speech, and they may be of great 
relevance to man in the singular, that is, to man in so fer as he is not a political being, 
whatever else he may be. Men in the plural, that is, men in so fer as they live and 
move and act in this world, can experience meaningfulness only because they can talk 
with and make sense to each other and to themselves. (4) 
^ The emphasis on an unchanging human nature is cracial in Arendt's account, but it only occupies the 
outset of her account. For this reason, her thesis is somewhat confiising, as the introduction to the 
second edition suggests. This is because she places her erqphasis on the unique, and now obsolete, 
conditions of the Greek poUs rather than on a creation account such as that in Genesis, which she only 
briefly aUudes to at the outset of her work. This is surprising since the accoimts in Genesis also 
emphasise that Man was created in God's image and that he was a speaking God, with a relationship 
both to mankind and, looking forward to the fiirther revelation in John's Gospel, to the other two 
persons of the Trinity. It also had a greater role in the development of the Western world's sensus 
communis than her account accords. Her failure to make expUcit the importance of a correct 
understanding of human anthropology is addressed by Wolfhart Pannenberg in his Anthropology from 
a Theological Perspective. (1985). 
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Arendt as a political writer? 
The hermeneutic imphcations of Arendt's discussion of the human condition seem to 
have evaded scholarship. In fact, she has had little impact upon contemporary thought other 
than as a political writer concemed particularly with totalitarianism. And at one level this 
book could also be imderstood as a political study. As we saw. The Human Condition depicts 
the decline in Western civilisation of the public (and political) reahn of action, which was 
defined in Ancient Greece and Rome as a place where a man who was free from serving Ufe's 
necessities could speak, act and be heard by his peers. This gradual decline of politics has 
almost brought it to a state where it no longer can be comprehended for what it had meant by 
the onset of society and its tendency to pubUcise the processes of labouring. 
I f they were only taken in their entirely modem sense as issues of govemment or 
administration, these political considerations could mask the further, hermeneutic 
in^lications of the decline in the efficacy of the word that Arendt catalogues. But her 
account of the decline in the power of the spoken word along with the removal of the public 
sphere in which it had flourished is matched by the correspondent rise she traces in the power 
of science, which had brought about the 'unnatural growth of the natural' by e)q)anding the 
power of labour, wdiere language was eschewed in expressing analytical relations. The 
relation and implications of the two movements of decUne and ascendance preoccupy her 
entire, fundamentally hermeneutic discussion of the problem of the aporia created by modem 
science. TTiat problem is the decline of meaning in contemporary society, which is reflected 
in the orientation of both poetry and hermeneutics towards the truth of life and its processes 
and away from its meaning. 
The fact that the hermeneutic implications of Arendt's account have thus fer been 
ignored may be precisely because of the subtie maimer in which she has blended what is 
apparently incompatible in her accoimt: an insistence upon the essential characteristics of 
humanity, which we possess prior to any 'conditioning,' together with an insistence upon the 
feet that we are also fimdamentally conditioned beings and thus are open to adapt ourselves to 
our circumstances, including the ones we create. In this marriage of opposites, Arendt 
announces that an understanding of humanity according to the terms of a nature versus 
nurture debate is hopelessly reductive. It misconstmes the simple feet that language (which 
she shows has always been definitive of humanity) always bears the marks of both influences. 
I t is inalienable from a definition of human nature and yet i t is also undeniably a conditioned 
attribute. It is natural and artificial; it is active and it reflects what it perceives. The 
combination of all these characteristics are what Pannaiberg calls the peculiar way in which 
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mankind maintains its 'openness to the world,' its destiny (Bestimmung). Therefore she 
argues that to insist on the priority of one at the ejqjense of the other (which is inherent in 
taking Ufe as being and its 'truth' as meaning) is to misconstrue that relationship and to 
pervert the harmony of the whole, eventually at the expense of both. 
It is her own insistence on a coincidence of opposites that allows her to bring novel 
arguments directly to bear on the discussion of hermeneutic issues that have been the subject 
of these past few chapters. Hie view of language that she carefiiUy argues from the outset of 
her book emphasises that it is both a natural and an acquired capacity for humanity, an aspect 
of human agency developed from birth. TTiat is the point at wdiich she radically departs from 
Heidegger and Gadamer's account of 'being.' For as we have akeady noted, by relegating 
one of the types o f language to be a secondary characteristic of 'being,' i.e. the language 
which refers to the empirical world,^ Heidegger and Gadamer had effectively excluded 
language from primordial 'human being.' Hie human being they had proposed was based on 
silent listening - as i f life spoke to humanity.^' In the process of discussing the changes in the 
human condition, she therefore implicitly demonstrates that the source of the Heideggerian 
account o f being was to be found in the central premises of modem science and not in a return 
to the questions of pre-Socratic philosophy that Heidegger had claimed. 
That demonstration again has some subtlety to it. On the one hand, she seems to 
agree with Heidegger and Gadamer. She argues quite similarly that the current crisis in 
thinking displayed by the launch of the satellite, the convertibility o f mass into energy and 
vice versa and subsequent marvels since then was a resuh of the pursuit of the 'universal 
world-view' o f modem science. This is what Gadamer had called the EnUghtenment's 
characteristic 'prejudice against prejudice.' On the other hand, she does not jump to 
Heidegger's conclusion that Descartes' cogito necessarily entailed an 'inauthentic 
representation of being.' Descartes demonstration of the capacity of mankind for universal 
thinking - thoughts that could not be related in any respect to terrestrial life - in feet showed 
that mankind's destiny could not sinply be reduced to or derived from the material world. In 
feet, Descartes had thereby demonstrated - as well as any sacred writing - that mankind's 
origio could not possibly lie in the created universe: his speculations were made in complete 
'From Being and Time onwards, saying (reden) appears superior to speaking (sprechen). 'Saying 
designates the existential constitution, whereas 'spealdng' indicates the mundane aspect that lapses into 
the empirical. Hence the first determination of saying is not speaking, but rather the couple 
hearing/keeping silent." (Ricoeur, H&HS. 58) 
It could be argued that neither Heidegger nor Gadamer are wont to use the term human being in their 
writing and thus that they are immune to this charge. 
72 
alienation from i t . ^ His thoughts were alwaj^s pushing beyond that borne by means of ever 
more powerful instruments, but always only locating a fixrther absence. The capacity of 
mankind to harness forces beyond those of the terrestrial sphere demonstrated that mankind's 
power to think was akin, i f entirely derivative, of the divine act of creation. This corresponds 
to the argument that Coleridge wi l l make about the human imagination, related to a coherent 
sense of agency, in the Biographia Literaria. He described there the primary imagination as 
the ' l iving power and prime agent of all human perception, and as a repetition in the finite 
mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I A M . ' 
What had been inauthentic however, she argues, was how the cogito had been 
interpreted. Firstly, it had led science to the tendency to regard nature as something that 
needed to be escaped or utteriy dominated. Secondly, and attending the first incorrect 
inteipretation, it led to the tendency to think that the problem posed by Cartesian science 
could only be solved by an analogous course of method, i.e. by seeking certainty in a ground 
of supposed ontological priority, life itself I shall tum to this development now. 
Romanticism and the emergence of life as the greatest good 
However helpful Arendt's account of the human condition is for providing a more 
detailed and historical overview of the in^ortant subject of anthropology in contenqjorary 
thought, her decisive contribution to the discussion of hermeneutics consists in her study's 
recognition of the novelty of the idea that emerges in the nineteenth century, the idea of life as 
the greatest good. It is on that point that her discussion of the various activities of man -
those corresponding to labour, work and the vita activa - sets itself apart from discussions of 
modemity that merely examine the development of ideas. For a narrative recounting the 
effects of universality and world-alienation only extend so fer as an e5q)lanation of the 
contemporary intellectual landscape. What must be recognised, she emphasises, is that 
human activity has also undergone a radical reassessment in late modemity. The 
philosophical turning point for this development was probably located in David Hume's 
radical critique of the notion of causality. Hume's critique of Deism and the idea of God as a 
sort of divine watchmaker was vastiy influential on posterity. We shall see evidence of its 
influence in all of the Romantics' (and post-Romantics') thinking about creativity and the 
^ She argues fiirthermore that 'to demask such philosophic concepts of the divine as conceptualisations 
of human capabilities and qualities is not a demonstration of, not even an argument for, the non-
existence of God; but the fact that attempts to define man lead so easily into an idea which definitely 
strikes us as 'superhuman' and therefore is identified with the divine may cast suspicion upon the very 
concept of 'human nature.'(II) 
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artist's role and purpose in writing poetry in the last three chapters of the thesis. This 
debunking of the notion of causality also functions as an e^qjlanation for the emergence of 
modem hermeneutics. For the change in the model of creative activity necessarily had an 
effect upon how creativity was to be interpreted. TTie change, it seems to me, is the source of 
the incorporation of what has since been designated as the hermeneutic aporia into 
contemporary thinking. 
The change took place because of the association of a certain type of activity with 
causality and thus entails its rejection as a model along with it. Far more inqjortant than the 
ofl-cited shift from a principle of mimesis to one of expression in the Romantic period is the 
shift we can observe in the model of action taken for the artist. The two axiomatic principles 
of causality - 'that every thing must have a cause (nihil sine causa) and that the cause must be 
more perfect than its most perfect effect' (312) had provided poets in the past with the model 
of the artist as a maker {homo faber). In that model, the maker was obviously superior to his 
product. He had an idea of what he wished to create, he formed it according to his purposes 
and he brought it into being by bringing i t into the world of appearances. This concept of the 
artist as a (second) maker predominated the notions of Western creativity up until the late 
eighteenth century. The key change to that concept took place when an organic notion of life 
replaced notions in which causality was emphasised.*^ For that change paved the way for the 
idea that a lower form of being, such as an ape, could evolve and cause the appearance of a 
higher being, such as man. The mechanistic notion of creation represented in the 
EnUghtenment by the image of the divine watchmaker was replaced by a more organic notion 
that eschewed the inference of causality and the idea of formal agency in the creative 
processes. Hie change informed the characteristic perception of organic progress in human 
history in the time following the French Revolution in thinkers in the Hegelian mould (and it 
is certainly not aUen to Shelley's accoimt o f the organic progress of the 'human spirit' 
through poetry in his Defence of Poetry). 
Arendt observes that this change was decisive in another significant respect, wiiich 
almost made the twofold consequences of Galileo's discovery, the method of experiment and 
making on the one hand and the method of introspection on the other, seem to have been 
utterly incompatible: 
For the only tangible object introspection yields, i f it is to yield more than an entirely 
empty consciousness of itself, is indeed the biological process. And since this 
^ The model of the artist as a maker, modelling himself after the Divine Maker, was a model of 
expUcit comparison in Shelley's Mont Blanc and Keats's Ode on a Grecian Urn, against which a model 
in which the artist mediated the life-processes was presented. I address these presentations in chapters 
four and five below. 
74 
biological life, accessible in self-observation, is at the same time a metabolic process 
between man and nature, it is as though introspection no longer needs to get lost in 
the ramifications of a consciousness without reality, but has found within man - not 
in his mind but in his bodily processes - enough outside matter to connect him again 
with the outer world. The split between subject and object, inherent in human 
consciousness and irremediable in the Cartesian opposition of man as a res cogitans 
to a surrounding world of res extensae, disappears altogether in the case of a living 
organism, wdiose very survival depends upon the incorporation, the consunq)tion, of 
outside matter. (312-13) 
This connection of man to nature in a form of organic unity took place most obviously in 
EngUsh Romantic poetry in Wordsworth's emphasis upon feeling, the sense of connection 
between man and the rest of the universe. But organicist notions emphasising this sort of 
unity of 'one life within us and abroad' are no less current in the thought of Coleridge, 
Shelley or Keats, wiiatever their individual differences might be. 
However, Arendt's awareness of the role of organicist notions in both perpetuating 
and apparentiy solving the fundamental split of Cartesian dualism is not restricted to noting 
the progress of intellectual history. The change that took place in the evaluation of labour and 
its rise to a status of pre-eminence is not explicable on such terms alone: 
The defeat of homo faber may be e)q)lainable in terms of the initial transformation of 
physics into astrophysics, of natural sciences into a 'universal science.' What still 
remains to be explained is why this defeat ended with a victory of the animal 
laborans; wiiy, with the rise of the vita activa, it was precisely the labouring activity 
that was to be elevated to the highest rank of man's capacities or, to put it another 
way, why within the diversity of the human condition with its various human 
capacities it was precisely life that overmled all other considerations. (313) 
Arendt suggests that the reversal was possible because it operated within the framework of 
Christian thinking, whose beUef in the sanctity of human hfe survived the general decUne in 
belief in the feith as a whole. It is interesting to note the irony of the change. It was precisely 
this aspect of the Christian feith that had broken with the ancient world and its political 
notions and proved ultimately disastrous for them, for it offered immortality in the life to 
come rather than in the world: 
Political activity, which up to then had derived its greatest inspiration from the 
aspiration toward worldly immortality, now sank to the low level of an activity 
subject to necessity, destined to remedy the consequences of human sinfulness on one 
hand and to cater to the legitimate wants and interests of human life on the other. 
Aspiration toward immortality could now only be equated with vainglory; such feme 
as the worid could bestow upon man was an illusion, since the world was even more 
perishable than man, and a striving for worldly immortahty was meaningless, since 
Ufe itself was immortal. (314) 
However scmpulous and self-conscious the thinkers of modemity had been in 
attempting to eradicate the prejudices of Christianity and tradition in the name of human 
reason, the priority of life over everything else retained for them, as Arendt notes, the status 
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of a 'self-evident truth.' But it did so in a manner of emphasis that is characteristically 
modem, for the sense of the meaning of this self-evident truth of Ufe was lost. One example 
of this is sufficient to demonstrate the change. In all of the Utilitarian arguments that 
emerged in the nineteenth century (often confused with hedonism) based on Bentham's 'pain 
and pleasure calculus,' it is worthy of note that there was no attempt to present a radical 
justification o f suicide. Suicide however was essential however to Classical hedonism and its 
characteristic understanding of the goal of life to be in avoiding pain. But i f the new 
significance of life was not, strictly speaking, hedonistic, the new priority of Ufe did not retain 
its Christian emphasis either. For what mattered in the current form was not the immortality 
of life or Uving it in the knowledge that there would be a last judgement on actions in this 
world, making all actions meaningful, but rather taking life as the greatest good in 'the pursuit 
of happiness.' This development, so strongly associated with the late Enlightenment in its 
famous formulation in the American Declaration of Independence - the 'inalienable rights' of 
'life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness' for its citizens - may be due to the decline in the 
estimation of the vita contemplativa that has come about with the onset of Cartesian doubt, 
for the life of contemplation had been affixed by Christianity to reflection upon the character 
of revealed divine perfection: 
Only when the vita activa had lost its point of reference in the vita contemplativa 
could it become active Ufe in the fu l l sense of the word; and only because this active 
hfe remained bound to life as its only point of reference could Ufe as such, the 
labouring metaboUsm of man with nature, become active and unfold its entire 
fertility. (320) 
Arendt attributes this loss o f beUef in the benefits of the contemplation of divine perfection as 
presented in Biblical revelation more to the influence of prominent religious writers such as 
Pascal and Kierkegaard than to ejqjlicitly antagonistic doctrines.'* 
Only once life had been deprived of its certainty of immortality by the incorporation 
of Cartesian doubt into the life of feith by the influence o f such thinkers, could something like 
the contemporary state of thinking arise, the redefinition and re-evaluation of life that forms 
the backdrop of Romanticism and the modem hermeneutie movement: 
Individual Ufe again became mortal, as mortal as it had been in antiquity, and the 
world was even less stable, less permanent, and hence less to be relied upon that it 
had been during the Christian era. Modem man, when he lost the certainty of a world 
to come, was thrown back upon himself and not upon this world; fer from beUeving 
that the world might be potentially immortal (as in antiquity), he was not even sure 
that it was real. And in so fer as he was to assume that it was real in the uncritical 
^ 'For what undermined the Christian faith was not the atheism of the eighteenth century or the 
materialism of the nineteenth - their arguments are firequently vulgar and, for the most part, easily 
refutable by traditional theology - but rather the doubting concern with salvation of genuinely reUgious 
men, in whose eyes the traditional Christian content and promise had become 'absurd." (319) 
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and apparently unbothered optimism of a steadily progressing science, he had 
removed himself from the earth to a much more distant point than any Christian 
otherworldliness had ever removed him. Whatever the word 'secular' is meant to 
signify in its current usage, historically it cannot possibly be equated with 
worldliness; modem man at any rate did not gain the world when he lost the other 
world, and he did not gaio life, strictly speaking, either; he was thrust back upon it, 
thrown into the closed inwardness of introspection, wdiere the highest he could 
experience were the empty processes of reckoning of the mind, its play with itself 
TTie only contents left were appetites and desires, the senseless urges of his body 
which he mistook for passion and which he deemed to be 'unreasonable' because he 
found he could not 'reason,' that is, not reckon with them. The only thing that could 
now be potentially immortal.. .was life itself, that is, the possibly everlasting hfe 
process of the species mankind. (320-21) 
It is precisely this sort of rationale that could lead to a reassessment of poetry as something 
completely unrecognisable from its previous estimation as an artistic representation of reality 
or the creation of a work of art in emulation of the divine maker: the 'natural' mediation of 
life itself by the introspective acts of the poet. 
What poetry became from the Romantic period onwards was something 
commensurate with a new definition of life, reinforced by the tendency of society to instil one 
interest in its members, as a 'natural force.'" Poetry, being strictly speaking unnecessary for 
Ufe's metabolism with nature, attained nonetheless a new status and fimction in the Romantic 
period as it was perceived that it could symbolise and vitalise the unity of man with nature, a 
unity that remained under threat by the alienating forces of technology. It could do so 
because the poet took on the character of a prophet of life, expressing the spirit of the age. I 
shall look at some of the definitions of the poet and his activity in next three chapters. 
Concluding remarks 
The emergence of life as the highest good entailed far more than a mere change in the 
model for the artist in the Romantic mould. It also became the source of modem life 
philosophy, whose greatest representatives are among the most influential thinkers of the 
twentieth century - Marx, Nietzsche, Bergson and Heidegger - philosophers who 'rebel 
against philosophy' and equate Life with Being. To make this equation, they rely no less on 
introspection than their modem predecessors, for 'hfe is indeed the only 'being' man can 
" 'Socialised mankind is that state of society where only one interest rules, and the subject of this 
interest is either classes or man-kind, but neither man nor men. The point is that now even the last 
trace of action in what men were doing, the motive inqjlied in self-interest, dis j^peaied. What was left 
was a 'natural force,' the force of the life process itself, to which all men and all human activities were 
equally submitted.. .and whose only aim, if it had an aim at all, was the survival of the animal species 
man ' nil) 
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possibly be aware of by looking merely into himself.' The differaice between these 
philosophers and their predecessors in the modem age is that 'life appears to be more active 
and more productive than consciousness, which seems to be still too closely related to 
contemplation and the old ideal of truth.' . These philosophers of life share the 
appearance of emphasising action over and against contemplation. This is a characteristic 
they pass on to Kierkegaard and the existentialist philosophers following him such as 
Heidegger. But, Arendt argues, this appearance emphasising action is deceptive: 
Upon closer inspection... none of these philosophers is actually concerned with 
action as such. We may leave aside here Kierkegaard and his non-worldly, inward-
directed acting. Nietzsche and Bergson describe action in terms of febrication -
homofaber instead of homo sapiens - just as Marx thinks of acting in terms of 
making and describes labour in terms of work. But their ultimate point of reference is 
not work and worldliness any more than action; it is hfe and hfe's fertility. (313) 
In its unwillingness to generalise its observations to the status of universal truths, 
Arendt's account is less satisfying than Heidegger's. It offers seemingly atavistic 
observations as a means of understanding a contenqjorary dilemma. Nonetheless, the accoimt 
has the ring of authenticity about it that Heidegger's had lacked. One of the reasons for this is 
that Arendt's account is not so premised on either a triumphaUst or a cynical account of the 
present state of the human condition that it cannot locate merit and failure in it without 
invoking a predetermined bias. This is the greatest strength of this study. IfGadamerhas 
reminded the academic community that 'universal objectivity' is inpossible because of the 
necessity of prejudice, Arendt's account has the greater merit of distinguishing prejudices 
from one another (rather than resuscitating the indiscriminate and generic form of 'prejudice' 
of life in language that Gadamer had). This strangely gives it an air of objectivity that neither 
Heidegger nor Gadamer have, who both associate life itself so strongly with prejudice (as a 
bulwark against universality) that the discriminations within their framework seem 
inconsequential. 
Just as it seemed in:q)ossible to Arendt for man himself to answer the anthropological 
question, so it seems impossible to solve the hermeneutic aporia of inconprehensibility by an 
appeal to life itself Life cannot be an answer to the question of being or provide a notion of 
truth. Nor can it lead to a critical method. Ricoeiu-'s remark of the possibility of an critical 
moment in Gadamer's philosophy, suggested by the distance inherent in our consciousness of 
effective history, in the recognition of otherness inherent in the idea of the fusion of horizons 
and in his philosophy of language, v^ich recognises the 'dialogue that we are' by being 
within a certain tradition seems to be altogether dissatisfactory i f life is taken as a true 
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prejudice. There can be no true sense of critical distance taken on life, i f the language of hfe 
is the prejudice and it is employed by a hving being. The relative distance to all of these 
things suggest nothing to me that would satisfy as a philosophical notion of truth. 
Arendt's account seems to me to point to a way forward upon the front of 
hermeneutics precisely because she steps outside the model of thinking of the 'general 
hermeneutic' period. She does not accept uncritically the idea of life as being or life as a 
prejudice of the sort that can give rise to the notion of truth. Such notions belong to different 
frames of referraice - those of the Classical world for instance, or those of revealed religion. 
The definition of man as an animal who reasons, who reckons with consequences, or as one 
who 'interprets himself she questions as the ideology of socialised man. It is not an 
innocuous definition leading to the aporia, as she knew - it was the basis of totalitarianism, a 
nihilistic process motivated by paradoxical convictions: 'on the one hand the belief that 
'everything is possible' and on the other that hiunan beings are merely an animal species 
governed by laws of nature or history, in the service of which individuals are entirely 
dispensable.'(/«/roi/wc/?o«, xi) 
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Chapter 3. Wordsworth's understanding of nature in the ^Preface to Lyrical 
Ballads* (1802) and the hermeneutic significance of feeling 
William Wordsworth's Preface to Lyrical Ballads (1802), the second version of his 
introduction to the surprisingly popular compilation of poems that he and Coleridge penned 
together, is justly famous as a sort of manifesto for the English Romantic movement as a 
whole."*" Despite its widely acclaimed status as such, at least since the time of A.O. 
Lovejoy's assertion that one would do better to speak of 'Romanticisms' when characterising 
even the major writers of the period - illustrating very nicely the effect of what a recent critic 
has called the sublime 'aesthetic of individuaticm'"" - the inadequacy of using only one 
ejqplanatory model to characterise Romantic poetry has been recognised by critics. TTiis 
originally helpful observation of high degrees of individuality among the Romantics has been 
elevated to the unfortunate status of being the characteristic principle of the movement in 
recent years though by the inclusion of a great many of the peripheral writers of the period to 
the canonical six. The central difficulty that these inclusions have caused is in linking writers 
together who appear to be so incongruous that it makes their collective definition as 
'Romantics' virtually meaningless. This sheer incongruity has led to the somewhat lazy 
association of the writers to the time-period itself or to the sheer individuality of their 
expression. This seems to me to have occurred according to an organicist rationale, i.e. their 
'representativeness of various walks of 'Ufe." It is not my intention to try and remedy that by 
providing a new (or even an old) definition of Romanticism. What I sinqjly wish to observe 
at the outset is that many of the contemporary studies I have read have largely abandoned the 
question of whether what was written is meaningful and, i f it is (or is not), under what terms it 
can be said to be so. The types of questions philosophical enquiry has eagerly pursued in 
enlightened ages and the types of answers religions have always claimed to provide in the 
same have both ceded to studies informed by a combination of complacent pragmatism and 
lukewarm cynicism. These may be symptoms of what has been called the postmodern 
malaise in critical studies. 
This chapter presents the gulf that opens up between the two prime architects of the 
Romantic movement in England on matters that concern precisely such issues. I hope to 
approach the tqjic and the issues in it hermeneutically. It seems important to recognise that 
100 Similar status could be attributed to Coleridge's Biogranhia Literaria (1817) or SheUey's Defense of 
Poetry (1821) for that matter. All three, it is said, have quite similar views on the place of the poet and 
the importance of the imaginatioa . 
^"'Frances Ferguson. Solitude and the Sublime: Romanticism and the Aesthetic of Individuation. 
(1992) 
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this is not simply an abstract theoretical stance or a random attempt at a new reading 
suggested by current interests. The point on which all the Romantic poets seem to diverge in 
their emphases appears as a deeper hermeneutic issue with explicit theological inqjlications 
very early on, among the central architects of this initial 'poetic ejq)eriment' in England 
themselves. In fact, the aim Wordsworth ejqjressed at his Preface's very outset to present a 
'selection of the real language of men in a state of vivid sensation,' while enormously 
influential on his peers, never met with much satisfaction with its sterner critics, among 
whom Coleridge was the most acute and persistent. So misconceived was the hermeneutic 
claim of the Preface in fact that his collaborator in the initial project felt the need fifteen years 
later, in his own great critical work, Biographia Lrteraria (1817), to address the claims 
Wordsworth had made on their mutual behalf and to distance himself from them. It is one of 
the secondary claims of my discussion then that Coleridge's Biographia has not been fully 
recognised for repeatedly raising the hermeneutic issues it does with Wordsworth's Preface. 
In particular, it has not been recognised that its attack on Wordsworth's theory was informed 
by his attempt to imderstand the issues as a Christian and as a writer alljdng himself with his 
literary and cultural tradition against Wordsworth's tone of hermeneutic rebelUon against 
both. 
The substantiation of that claim will have to wait for a more detailed ejq)osition of 
what Wordsworth wrote in the Preface, but I might as well confess the prejudice I adhere to 
straight away. I have attempted in this chapter to present a 'Coleridgean reading' of 
Wordsworth by making e)q)hcit reference to the Christian theological underpirming of the 
arguments in the Biographia. This is often neglected in critiques of the work, which tend to 
read Coleridge as a Kantian or asfiilly sympathetic with the German philosqjhical tradition. 
This may in part owe itself to the historical accident that Coleridge acted as probably its 
prime mediator to the English-speaking world. The contemporary philosophical scene in 
Germany was doubtless enormously influential upon Coleridge too. The 'illustrious sage of 
Konigsberg' - as Coleridge called Kant - offered him a framework and a stringent logic with 
which to explain the power of the human mind to think in universal terms, and even after 
fifteen years of acquaintance with his work he still read him 'with undiminished delight and 
increasing admiration.''"^ 
This should not however lead us to misunderstand the tenor of Coleridge's critique of 
Wordsworth in the Biographia. nor his representation of theoretical issues against the tenor of 
Biographia. IX, 84. (AU page references wiU be made to the Everyman edition unless indicated 
otherwise.) 
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how the German philosophy of the period has more conventionally been imderstood. 
Coleridge, I think, was sympathetic to the tenor of the argument I have made in the more 
exclusively theoretical chapters previous. He was entirely at odds with the development of 
Romantic hermeneutics that enshrined the aporia within the very heart of textual 
interpretation. He was, as I shall demonstrate, in fact wholly sympathetic with the emphasis 
that Arendt has more recently placed on the crucial importance of agency and of meaning to 
interpretation and on the inherent problem of organicism - it informs his attack on the 
'mechanico-coqjuscular' philosophy that ran in English thought from Locke through Paley 
and to Bentham. Furthermore, the resuscitation of meaningful prejudice by Arendt underlies 
his presentation of the primary imagination. And his well-known political conservatism was 
based, much as Arendt's own emphasis was, on a traditional - in fact 'Classical' -
understanding of the importance of the public sphere in promoting and maintaining himian 
freedom - as it is the space where the free self-disclosure of the human agent is protected and 
encouraged. 
These observations suggest that Coleridge, even i f he did approve of Kant and his 
contemporaries, must have read them rather differently than posterity has tended to. He 
would have needed to. The note of hermeneutic rebellion that Wordsworth sounded against 
his literary and cultural tradition in his presentation of the imagination, based on a power 
which in the Preface he calls 'selection,' Coleridge could just as easily have detected in 
Kant's own attack on the sensus communis according to his operative 'prejudice against 
prejudice' - as Gadamer has read Kant. And of course he did detect it. But he chose to see 
an ulterior motive in Kant's particular philosqjhical emphasis, one detecting in his Vemunft a 
drive for meaning that he, like Arendt (and Pannenberg) saw as a drive in the mind towards 
God. He therefore read him judiciously and selectively, for he would have disagreed with 
him on a number of issues //he had taken them at face value: 
In spite therefore of his own declarations, I could never believe it was possible for 
him to have meant no more by his Noumenon, or Thing in Itself, than his mere words 
express; or that in his own conception he confined the external cause, for the 
materiale of our sensations, a matter without form, which is doubtless inconceivable. 
I entertained doubts likewise whether in his own mind he even laid all the stress 
which he appears to do on the moral postulates. (EX, 85) 
Coleridge of course did not have the benefit of Kant's acquaintance in the same vray he had 
had Wordsworth's. Whereas he could attribute Kant the benefit of the doubt and attribute 
him what he considered to be the best of motives, he could not do so in Wordsworth's case. 
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forhekne«whathe<houghtaU«>oweU'« Nonetheless his unde,aa„ding of K r f s 
as a drive towaris .earUni may y« be proved coneC if Area*, and «,e emphas,s of 
this thesis, is correct. 
I intend to restrict myself in the rest of the thesis to a focus upon the major poets 
falling in the Wordsworthian mould, Wordsworth and Coleridge of course, but Keats and 
Shelley as well because they make the most coherent and sustained challenge upon the issue 
of meaning in their abiUty to tease out the consequences of organicism and present them in 
vivid and compelling imagery. I hope as a consequence to redress the critical balance 
disrupted by the current critical overemphasis on individuality and 'internal sense' -
understood in an 'organic' sense - or on 'historical or intellectual context' bereft of any SSOSQ 
of interest in the concerns consigned to the traditional areas of metaphysics and theology. I 
intend to do so by looking at the issue that these poets, living in a more enUghtened age than 
ours, would have considered to be more crucial, the issue of transcendence or sublimity, 
which, as Frances Ferguson notes, is actually the basis of their aesthetic of individuation. The 
sense of this transcendence is something that Wordsworth calls 'feeling' and it is of central 
importance to his account of his poetics in the Preface. 
The silence that he and his contemporaries refer to in their poetry is intimately related 
to it. Silence is the poet's often ecstatic ejq)ression of the failure of language to ejqjress that 
'feeling,' a failure whidi, it turns out, is precisely what marks it out as the highest sort of 
poetry. For the failure verifies its very transcendent quality and expresses the 'something 
divine' that Shelley claimed 'to be about poetry,' the promotion of the spirit of man. It is a 
sign of this spirit's very universality that for Shelley, it even warranted removing the formal 
terms of personal agency as prejudicial criteria of poetics and of politics in pursuit of \n^at he, 
Wordsworth and Keats would have understood as 'unity.' I shall address Shelley's radical 
emphasis more ejqjhcitly in the next chapter. But it will be my contention that this sense, this 
spirit, this truth of the 'imity of life' was v^at all three presented as an alternative to the 
traditional drive for meaning - as it was contained in the sensus communis - in their writing. 
Obviously this has manifold implications, not the least of which is the most readily apparent, 
the political. Their new form of common sense, devolved from the political sphere and 
Indeed, Coleridge's Biographia. as the Editors to the Bollingen Edition of the work make clear, was 
prompted by Wordsworth's publication of a new edition of his Poems (1815), which included a great 
deal of discussion of the terms of 'imagination' and 'fancy' that Coleridge regarded as his own private 
property. It also included, tacked on as an afterthought, the original Preface to Lyrical Ballads to 
which Coleridge took exception. This haunted Coleridge throughout the composition of the 
Biographia. indeed at the stage it was half-complete (the second half was written first), Coleridge 'was 
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political terms of relations, i.e. in its purest form as pubUc debate and correspondent 
corporate action, resulted from the withdrawal from this sphere and from its characteristic 
feature of speech and the advocacy, in its place, of the ultimately inejqjressible, more 
universal common sense of what I shall describe as intimacy. However, it is not my primary 
intention to address the exphcitly political dimension of this change in the sense of common 
sense that we detect in Wordsworth, Keats and Shelley's writing. My primary intention is to 
address the more theological or, i f you will, metaphysical dimension of this change, i f for no 
reason other than it was these Romantics' own primary emphasis. 
The foremost issue at hand in Wordsworth's Preface relates to the question of 
whether it is true, as he claimed, that meaning is utterly inejqjressible but nonetheless 
perceptible in contemplation upon bodily feeling (and can act to unify on that basis) or 
whether meaning is something that can be laid hold of by language and ejq)ressed directly. 
Wordsworth's claim for poetry, which actually has surprisingly little to do with language per 
se, nonetheless takes the form of an appeal for a special kind of language unlike that of 
normal language. He inqjlies in the Preface that true poets use a form of language not only 
essentially superior to but indeed ahogether different from that of normal use. It is not a 
distinction between poetry and prose that he is after. Nothing essential distinguishes the best 
prose from poetry, he says. It is a distinrtion between real language and language per se. 
Despite appearances, this does not entirely contradict v i^iat he says about employing 
the 'real language of men' in his poetry, particularly that common to men of the rustic life. 
Common and normal are far from synonymous. In fact, it is one of Wordsworth's chief 
laments in the Preface that the powers of society's hegemonic institutions, wdiich tended to 
normalise behaviour and disrupt natural affections (as his Lyrical Ballads so frequently 
depict), were so gaining in influence that the normal was now virtually indistinguishable from 
the common. This could largely be attributed to the growth of cities and the expansion of 
their regulated and bureaucratic society. What Wordsworth notes in the following passage 
are however the synptoms of the decline of the sensus communis : 
... a mukitude of causes unknown to former times are now acting with a combined 
force to blunt the discriminating powers of the mind, and unfitting it for all voluntary 
exertion to reduce it to a state of almost savage torpor. The most effective of these 
causes are the great national events which are daily taking place, and the encreasiug 
accumulation of men in cities, where the uniformity of their occupaticm produces a 
craving for extraordinary incident which the rapid communication of intelligence 
(Editors'Introduction, t). 
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hourly gratifies. To this tendency of life and maimers the literature and theatrical 
exhibitions of the country have conformed themselves.(249, my itaUcs)"** 
His appeal to 'the common' or 'the real' as opposed to the normal in his poetry and in his 
hermeneutics therefore has a deep anti-social undertone that I shall address in more detail 
shortly. Suffice it to say here that Wordsworth broadly associates the 'normal' with the 
'normalising' and thus relates the apparently imrelated phenomenon of urban society with the 
'artificial' norms and sensibilities of Neo-Classical aesthetics. He attributes both to a sort of 
unnatural and inunoral decadence inqjosed on the human spirit. 
But i f Wordsworth, like Coleridge, registered the effects of the decline of the sensus 
communis, his poetic response to that decline was not, despite its intention, a remedy to it. In 
spite of its greater expressiveness, what distinguishes the particular 'common language' that 
he claims to have employed in his poetry is that it transcends the traditional designation of 
what language is. It is an organic process of mind and a resultant state of being. It is only the 
highest irony that this common language and its harmony with the forces within life was a 
symptom of the same crisis for poetry as was presented by the rational organisation of 
humanity into 'society.' It appUed a Cartesian form of universality (which, if we recall, was 
characterised by its doubt of all forms of appearance) as the model for its conduct and its 
product, and it did so both in the name of the sanctity of the human heart and the progress of 
the human spirit. The great irony was that the sanctity of the human heart was being 
desecrated by the notion of social progress, and Wordsworth only masked that same process 
by converting it into a form of 'natural consciousness.' For •w a^t he understood as nature, 
was in fact a sense of imiversality attributed to the forces of nature. Wordsworth embraced 
Ufe as an organic part of its larger processes. 
From the Sensus Communis to the Common Seme of Intimacy 
In the same way that Gadamer demonstrated that Kant had failed to understand the 
political dimension of the sensus communis or to comprehend what taste involved (by seeing 
it as an inferior act of judgement in want of a higher act of the same), the Romantics' embrace 
of a poetic process advocating introspection upon feeling, the bodily connection with the 
forces of life, also entailed abandoning the sensus communis and the concept of the artist as a 
maker with fixed intentions, in favour of one that e5q)ressed certain 'natural' and necessary 
forces. They attributed its 'poetic power' to the particular natural and 'original genius' of 
Brett & Jones. Wordsworth & Coleridge: Lyrical Ballads.(2°^ ed.) (1991) (All references to 
Wordsworth's Preface and to the Lyrical Ballads will refer to this edition unless otherwise stated) 
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certain individuals. Milton for example was understood to have successfiilly created his 
poetry because he was bom to do so. It was a part of the need of his nature - as a silkworm 
produced sUk from its innards. It is not altogether a moot point to decide whether the sensus 
communis and the idea of the artist as a maker of a work of art was abandoned for the sake of 
a more natural expression (as the poets themselves naturally claimed) or whether it was an 
inevitable result of the decline in the sensus communis and in the 'prejudices' of traditional 
belief that had already been brought about by the onset of society and the promotion of its 
normative and totalitarian powers as a substitute for more accountable political powers. But, 
ultimately, it is most important to observe that both effects are a fimction of the same changes 
and reflect a decline in adherence to the ideas of formal agency and causality. They replaced 
the moribimd sensus communis and its inherited en^hasis on the purpose or on the meaning 
of life with a form of common sense that reacted against society, but was strangely in tune 
with it and its uimatural promotion of the life-processes.'"' 
Nonetheless for the purposes of this discussion, it is more important to recognise the 
basic fact that the simultaneous decline of both the sensus communis and the traditional 
tradition of the artist as a maker imitating the divine Maker was not merely coincidental. The 
Romantic artistic simulation of the Ufe-processes brought the inexpressible, i.e. the felt, into 
the heart of the aesthetic process as its prejudice in the stead of tradition and the prejudices of 
the world of appearances. '"* This then became the basis of a new and less discriminatory 
form of common sense, one which like Kant's redefinition of taste needed 'no higher form of 
judgement.' I would like to bring that into bolder relief by looking at a commonly noted 
artistic tendency of the Romantic age. 
This change was rather ironically though understandably associated with traditional autiiority 
because it was, after all, traditional authorities that initially indulged in the increase in power that social 
organisation brought Nonetheless, the somewhat ambivalent designation 'Enlightened absolutism'/ 
despotism characterises the unprecedented type of change in the workings of government by historians. 
The effect however is clear. What traditional authorities embraced soon embraced them. TTie forces of 
the universe were adopted as a perspective against the natural and traditional boundaries e.g of the 
political or the family for the [xuposes of 'the common good,' life. 
Perhaps the clearest indication that society constitutes the public organisation of the life 
process itself may be found in the faa that in a relatively short time the new social realm 
transformed all modem communities into societies of IsAwurers and jobholders; in other 
words, they became at once centred around the one activity necessary to sustain life. (Arendt. 
THC. 46). 
Here the EngUsh language neither has nor can follow the change that has come about with 
Romanticism's individuaUstic aesthetics. The problem lies in expressing the internal cause of this 
incomprehensibiUly. All of the idioms of the language expressing a lack of comprehension are external 
- incomprehensibility can envelop, shroud, descend upon or surroimd something, but it is impossible to 
express how it can be incomprehensible from within. It might be answered that it is possible to say that 
something is incomprehensible or that one fails to comprehend. But these fail to cai*ure the change in 
emphasis. 
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Ut pictura poesis? 
The most popular manner of e3q)ressing this change in the sense of 'coirunon sense' 
(and certainly the one most explicitly concerned with the artistic issues at hand) has been to 
note the shift from the neo-Classical to the Romantic period in the somewhat simplistic terms 
of a shift from a mimetic to an expressive poetics. Shelley described the latter form of poetics 
in an organic marmer characteristic of the period: 
All things exist as they are perceived: at least in relation to the percipient. 'The mind 
is its own place and can make a heaven of hell, a hell of heaven.' But poetry defeats 
the curse which binds us to be subject to the accident of surrounding 
inq)ressions... whether it spreads its ovm figured curtain or withdraws life's dark veil 
from before the scene of things, it equally creates for us a being within our being. It 
makes us the inhabitants of a world to which the familiar world is a chaos... It 
compels us to feel that which we perceive, and to imagine that which we know."" 
The German poet Novalis ejqjressed himself in similar terms: 'poetry... is r^resentation of 
the spirit, of the irmer world in its totality.' Elevating the natural to supernatural status was in 
fact the principle purpose of Wordsworth's contribution to the Lyrical Ballads according to 
Coleridge. However, the experience of the supernatural and the process of 'subliming 
ejq)erience' from the quotidian and the mundane to express the 'irmer world' should not be 
misimderstood by Wordsworth's frequent references to nature. It came about not by 
focussing upon nature, but rather in turning the mind's eye onto a certain idea of itself in 
relation to nature: 
I have said that each of these poems has a purpose. I have also informed my Reader 
what this purpose will be found principally to be: namely to illustrate the manner in 
which our feelings and ideas are associated in a state of excitement. But speaking in 
less general language, it is to follow the fluxes and refluxes of the mind when agitated 
by the great and simple affections of our nature.'"* 
It is by selectively observing the play of passion within, the organic response to the world 
without, that Wordsworth thinks leads to poetry. 
A concise manner of grasping this change, relating ideas of the organism to the 
supernatural, that was very popular with the poets and critics of the day was to dioose an 
analogy for poetry in the other arts. The change in the analogy that was used is instructive in 
seeing how the Romantics differed from the artists leading up to the Romantic period. Prior 
to the Romantics, the main analogy for poetry was that of painting. Hie ideal of the neo-
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Classicist poets was to create a poem hke a picture, ut pictura poesis This extremely 
popular motif of the eighteenth century virtually disappeared in the major criticism of the 
Romantic period, Abrams tells us, and it was replaced by one more in tune with the organic 
processes, and the continuous processes of introspection. Referring to the passage just quoted 
in Shelley's Defence, he writes: 
.. .the comparisons between poetry and painting that survive are causal, or, as in the 
instance of (Shelley's) mirror, show the canvas reversed in order to image the inner 
substance of the poet. In place of painting, music becomes the art frequently pointed 
to as having a profound affinity with poetry. For i f a picture seems the nearest thing 
to a mirror-image of the extemal world, music, of all the arts, is the most remote: 
except in the trivial echoism of programmatic passages, it does not duplicate aspects 
of sensible nature, nor can it be said, in any obvious sense, to refer to any state of 
affairs outside itself As a result music was the first of the arts to be generally 
regarded as non-mimetic in nature; and in the theory of German writers of the 1790's, 
music came to be the art most irrunediately e>q)ressive of spirit and emotion, 
constituting the very pulse and quiddity of passion made public."" 
Music was of coiu^e so appealing to the aesthetic of organicism precisely because it evoked a 
tremulous response in its auditor that evoked a more enduring intemal reminder of the 
cormection of the intemal to the extemal than did the more cerebral and extemal visual arts. 
The difference with which the Aeohan lyre, one of the favourite symbols for 
composition in both the neo-Classical and the Romantic periods, was treated by the poets of 
the respective periods is particularly useful to demonstrate the diange in aesthetics towards 
organicism. Invented in 1650, it had become particularly popular with poets around the 
middle of the eighteenth century because its music could quite literaUy be attributed to nature 
rather than to human art. Its initial popularity as a subject for poetic reflection probably 
betrayed the growing dissatisfaction with increasingly prescriptive neo-Classical treatises on 
the mles for art. But it yras not until the nineteenth century that the lyre became an analogy 
for the poetic mind as well as the subject of the poet's description, as it is here in one of 
Shelley's metaphors of creativity: 
Man is an instrument over which a series of extemal and intemal impressions are 
driven, like the alternations of an ever-changing wind over an Aeohan lyre, which 
move it by their motion to ever-changing melody. But there is a principle within the 
human being, and perhaps all sentient beings, which acts otherwise than in the lyre, 
and produces not melody alone, but harmony, by an intemal adjustment of the sounds 
or motions thus excited to the impressions which excite them. (Defence. 480, my 
itaUcs)'" 
'"^ A number of other scholars have delved into this tradition in relation to Romanticism in greater 
detail. Many of them I discuss below in connection with Keats' 'Ode on a Grecian Urn,' which 
provides a fascinating confrontation of the old aesthetic with the new. 
Abrams. The Mirror and the Lamp. 50. 
' " A similar use of the lyre is also to be found at the outset of Wordsworth's The Prelude (1805) and 
ties in closely with the significant 'corresponding breeze' he alludes to throu^out: 
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We note that it is the evocation of the internal response, suggestive of an organic relationship, 
that so excites Shelley about this metaphor and it is precisely because it reveals the nature of 
man Shelley saw him. He was not alone in this insistence on seeing man as an organism. 
Friedrich Schlegel, famous for his definition of Romantic irony and the literary fragment, was 
so desperate to see music as the more natural form of art to mankind that he attributed the 
Grreek writer Simonides' failure to mention music in his famous description of poetry as a 
'speaking picture' to the fact that it was self-evident: music always acconqjanied the reading 
of lyric poetry."^ 
There are of course some significant passages in which the analogy of music is used 
in English Romantic poetry, but they are almost invariably in conjunction with both nature 
and inexpressibility or silence. Indeed, this is the association that Keats makes in his 'Ode on 
a Grecian Urn,' where he Ukens the silence of the depictions he beholds on a marble um to 
the 'music of the spirit,' the ' ditties of no tone.' But it would be too bold to claim that the 
English Romantics favoured the analogy of music to the same degree of fascination or 
commitment as their German contemporaries. It is only one analogy among others for 
t h e m . A n image that is much more popular, certainly with Wordsworth, is the wind, the 
It was a splendid evening, and my soul 
Did once again make trial of the strength 
Restored to her afresh; nor did she want 
Eolian visitations—but the harp 
Was soon defrauded... (I, 101-05) 
This would have seemed doubly imperative to Schlegel because of the sti:ength of the association of 
the poetry of Ancient Greece, as a 'natural' and 'naive' culture, with the sublime. It has subsequentiy 
been demonsti-ated that Greek poetics works on shghtly different principles than those of die Roman 
tradition, in particular in re^d to meter. A similar connotation of music and natural production must 
have informed the choice of the tide of the 'Lyrical Ballads' for the somewhat disparate collection of 
poetry that Wordsworth and Coleridge composed. 
To this day, music is a far more popular analogy for the poetic arts in Germany than it is in England 
and is also a cmcial element of its philosophy and hterary criticism Andrew Bowie attributes the 
importance of music in the German tradition to the perceived incapacity of language for trath. He 
acknowledges in music the same phenomenon I trace here to silence in English Romantic poetry. Both 
phenomena reflect negatively on the capacity of language to be tme (as a result of the decline of the 
sensus communis) and offer their alternatives with greater 'internal' validity: 
The understanding of music in German philosophy after Kant caimot be separated from that 
philosophy's perception of language. My reason for concentrating on music for much of the 
rest of the book is not because of a desire to write a specialised philosophy of music. The fact 
is that the relation of music to language, whether in the sense of music being seen as a 
language, or as revealing what language is imable to reveal, serves and an important indicator 
of the ways in which aesthetics in this period is Unked to tinith. Music can be regarded as a 
deficient means of articulation, or as a privileged one. This nexus is fimdamental to the 
philosophical history of subjectivity... (Aesthetics and Subjectivity: from Kant to Nietzsche. 
(1990). 176) 
The question that is begged by this perceived deficiency is wherein it Ues. The obvious answer is in 
language's inabihty to express the organic ideal of 'feeling.' Language has decidedly inappropriate 
notions of causality inherent in it that mitigate against it being the art form par excellence of this 
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'corresponding breeze.' It is distinctive for remaining quasi-pictorial and natural - or at the 
very least, its evidence is more visible than is music. The wind carries many of the same 
coimotations and implications of inspiration and of 'truth to the human spirit' that music does 
in the German Romantic tradition. Nonetheless, music remains useful as a means of 
comparing poetry to other art forms even in the English Romantics' poetics and giving us 
some objective criteria by which to discern the change from the pictorial tradition. 
It is not the intention of this chapter to make repeated reference to Wordsworth's 
poetry, let alone to provide a 'close reading' to extract various propositions I then wish, 
organically, to argue from. However, a look at a particularly famous one of Wordsworth's 
contributions to the Lyrical Ballads would probably be helpful to illustrate the tendencies I 
have been arguing to characterise 'Romantic poetry' and its patent organicism. His 'Lines 
written a few miles above Tintem Abbey' admirably expresses many of the claims I shall 
making in general about his poetry and the workings of his hermeneutics. It is worth 
recording the process of thought he describes in it and the significance he attributes to it. The 
poem is pronqjted by his retum, after five years absence, to the site of his childhood, whose 
quiet beauty, he recognises, has accompanied him even in 'mid the din/ Of towns and 
cities'(26-27). Ihe sense of serenity that 'nature' bestowed to him that he now encounters 
again in its presence gives him cause to reflect on its consonance with another, more 
important sense, that 'aspect more sublime' 'that blessed mood' gently pronq)ted by 
'affections' that lead to a state of tranquillity, at wiiich point 'we are laid asleep/ In body, and 
become a hving soul.'(46-47) It is the spiritual conversion of this 'aspect more sublime' that 
allows us, he attests, to 'see into the life of things.'(49) What Wordsworth describes in other 
words is akin to a 'religious ejqjerience' that he feels, in retrospect, as an inexpressible, 
'organic' correspondence between himself and a sense of stilhiess bestowed upon him by 
nature. 
. . . I have leamed 
To look on nature, not as in the hour 
Of thoughtless youth, but hearing oftentimes 
The still, sad music of humanity... 
...Andlhavefeh 
A presence that disturbs me with the joy 
Of elevated thoughts; a sense sublime 
Of something more deeply interfused. 
Whose dwelling is the Ught of setting suns. 
And the round ocean, and the hving air. 
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man, 
A motion and a spirit, that inq)els 
aesthetic. But the underlying organicism is the reason I have seen feehng, rather than music or silence 
as central to the new aesthetic. 
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All thinking things, all objects of all thought. 
And rolls through all things.(89-92; 94-104, my italics) 114 
What is particularly interesting about Wordsworth's description of this ejqjerience of 'nature' 
is that although he uses words to convey it, the words he uses are those vihich suggest his own 
words' failure to esqjress it. He looks on nature, but not nature per se, rather as a reflected 
and historicised (etemalised) experience of'nature'; the music he hears, connoting humanity, 
is sad and still; the presence he feels leads him not to elevated language, but to elevated 
thoughts; the sense is not sensual but sublime; and the situation in vdiich it takes place is 
everywhere that the mind of man is, disencumbered of its corporeal, worldly frame, i.e. the 
universe. Wordsworth's evanescent use of language 'ejq)resses' his sense of agency. 
It is interesting to note, though it rarely has been paid much notice by critics, that Coleridge, 
despite his extensive acquaintance with their work, signally diverges from his German 
contemporaries on this central point. Music figures all too rarely in his writing. In fact an 
allusion to (contemporary) painting formed the basis of one of the objections that Coleridge 
made to the followers of Wordsworth: 
Something analogous to the materials and structure of modem poetry I seem to have 
noticed (but here I beg to be understood as speaking with the utmost diffidence) ia 
our common landscape painters. Their foregrounds and intermediate distances are 
comparatively unattractive; while the main interest of the landscape is thrown into the 
background, where mountains and torrents and castles forbid the eye to proceed, and 
nothing tenq)ts it to trace its way back again. But in the works of the great Itahan and 
Flemish masters, the front and middle objects of the landscape are the most obvious 
and determinate, the interest gradually dies away in the bacl^ound, and the charm 
and peculiar worth of the picture consists not so much in the specific object which it 
conveys to the understanding in a visual language formed by the substitution of 
figures for words as in the beauty and harmony of the colours, lines and expression 
with which the objects are represented. Hence novelty of subject was rather avoided 
than sought for. Superior excellence in the maimer of treating the same subjects was 
the trial and test of flie artist's merit.'" 
It is significant that while invoking painting as an analogy for poetry, Coleridge avoids 
offering the typical ut pictura poesis rationale of imitative power. This signals that the real 
issue for him here (and the leitmotif for him elsewhere in the Biographia). is the non-sense of 
a philosophy and the lack of power of a poetics that cannot claim a coherent perspective of 
agency. Neither Descartes' 'universal perspective' nor the organicist understanding of life 
according to its processes delivers such a sense. 
Shelley makes an explicit allusion and allegiance to this vision and tiiis language in Mont Blanc. 
BiographiaLiteraria. XVI, 183. (my italics) 
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Hiis appeal to painting does not necessitate a collapse into a defence of blank 
copying for him then. It had a distinction he wished to make between imitation and copying. 
The difference was contained in the former's 'apparent naturalness of ..rqjresentation, as 
raised and qualified by an imperceptible infusion of the author's own knowledge and talent, 
which iirfusion does indeed constitute it an imitation, as distinguished from a mere copy.' 
(BL. XVn, 190) In other words, he suggested that these new portraits of nature (and poetic 
efforts in imitation of organic processes of feeling) were uimatural. The organic perspective 
rebels against the terms of agency of the primary imagination and thus, to use Arendt's words, 
'against existence as it has been given.' What it seems to me that Coleridge is grasping at in 
attacking this new school of 'Wordsworthian poets' and landscape painters is the loss of 
perspective that is the effect of the loss of the sensus communis and the embrace of the 
universal perspective of introspectim. Coleridge suggests that the great irony of this artistic 
expression of what is apparently inmost (and therefore could, by virtue of its proximity, be 
thought most clearly ejq)ressible) is what simultaneously obliterates any sense of perspective 
for anyone save the poet himself The seed is scattered, but it misses the furrow of the 
developed sense of the language and avoids the natural prejudice of agency. The perspective 
taken on the 'landscape' may be universal, birt those standing on earth cannot benefit from it 
wfithout the use of a telescope or, as the case may be, a microscope. 
Religious language, the poet as prophetic amanuensis for the silent voice of nature and the 
'selection' of transcendence 
I would now like to tum to look at how the organic 'imiversal perspective' adopted by 
Romantic hermeneutics (which I am disassociating Coleridge from) was apphed to the 
discussion of 'rehgious language.' According to both Wordsworth and Coleridge poetry was 
ligious language' in the sense that it possessed the metaphysical power to express the 
biding unity of things. However Wordsworth distinguished himself from Coleridge in 
suggesting that the distinctiveness of religious language (and therefore of the nature of unity) 
stemmed naturally from symbiosis with nature. By the time he had come to write the 
Biographia. Coleridge was decidedly of the opinion that, on the contrary, language's capacity 
to ejq)ress unity lay in (and always had lain in) the fact that it could not be reduced to nature 
or understood as a mere organic response to it. This was fiindamentally the case with the 
word of God, the express terms and agent of his primary imagination, but it was also tme of 
re; 
a 
92 
the great poets, the defenders of the language, who employed the secondary imagination."* 
With those restrictions in mind, Coleridge wrote what initially sounds to be something quite 
similar to what Wordsworth did, that 'the best part of human language, properly so called, is 
derived from reflections on the acts of the mind itself.' 
He reveals his fimdamental difference from Wordsworth in e^laining those acts of 
the mind though. He explains them as acts informed by the prejudices 'written' on the human 
mind by God through the traditional behef in the truths of the Bible and Him to whom they 
point. They cannot be reduced to 'natural man' and his organic relationships, for language 'is 
formed by a voluntary appropriation of fixed symbols to internal acts, to processes and results 
of imagination, the greater part of which have no place in the consciousness of imeducated 
man.''" 
This fundamental disagreement with Wordsworth led him, in the second half of the 
Biographia. to avail himself of both literary tradition and literary criticism to demonstrate two 
things. It led him firstly to demonstrate that poetry does not function as Wordsworth suggests 
it does and never has. Coleridge's critique of Wordsworth was primarily directed at two 
manifestly incongruous things, Wordsworth's praise of the 'low and rustic Ufe' as a seed-
groxmd for the poetic temperament - because of its allegedly imsullied organic communion 
with 'nature' - and his claim to have imitated (if purified) rustic diction in his own poetry. 
However something far more profoimd seems at issue for him than exposing that incongruity. 
The issue linking the two was inherent in Wordsworth's definition of poetry. Coleridge 
especially objected to the hermeneutic claim Wordsworth made in pronoimcing his own 
particular stylistic approach, blurring notions of causality, temporality and personal agency, to 
be a touchstone for poetry of all kinds, as i f it had wholly transcended all formal criteria of 
judgement. To put it another way (for this is the issue at hand), he objected to his Preface's 
tendency to argue as if the natural feeling' his poetry testified to couldfunction as the 
cultivated notion of taste. This claim for feeling as the highest form of taste, in all of its 
Kantian universality, was inqjossible for Coleridge to accept. For it implied that one must 
'reject as vicious and indefensible all phrases and forms of style that were not included in 
what (he)... called the language of real life.' Wordsworth's allegedly unprejudiced organic 
"* It is thus that Coleridge echoes Dante in proclaiming it 'the first duty of the poet' to guard 'the 
purity of their native tongue.' 'For language is the armoury of the human minc^  and at once contains 
the trophies of its past, and the weapons of its future conquests.' (BL. XVI, 182). 
BL, XVn, 197 (my itaUcs). 
BL. XIV, 169. The problem with Wordsworth's appeal to real life is just like his appeal to nature. 
They are, as Coleridge points out, equivocal. 
93 
processes had a decided prejudice against the idea of agency. Divine and human, and 
traditional belief: 
The feelings with which, as Christians, we contenplate a mixed congregation risiug 
or kneeling before their common maker, Mr. Wordsworth would have us entertain at 
all times, as men and as readers; and by excitement of this lofty but prideless 
impartiality in poetry, he might hope to have encouraged its continuance in real life. 
(EL, XXn, 253) 
Secondly, it led Coleridge to demonstrate that i f poetry did work on the organic premises 
Wordsworth suggested, that the aporia of incomprehensibility would result as an artistic 
phenomenon - as it indeed ah-eady was resulting in his contemporaries' art. I shall retum to 
this fundamental divergence of the Biographia with the Preface later in the chapter. 
Firstly though I would like to ejqjlore Wordsworth's own line of thinking about the 
nature of poetry and the role of the poet. It can be traced to a broader movement of 
Enlightenment thinking that Coleridge was at pains to discredit in the first half of the 
Biographia. In the main addition of the Preface to Lyrical Ballads (1802), the subsection 
entitled 'What is a Poet?,' Wordsworth provides us with such a discussion of the nature of 
poetry and of the role of the poet. He makes both a unifying and universal claim for poetry. 
The 'object (of poetry) is truth,' he says, 'not individual and local, but general and operative' 
and Poetry itself 'is the image of man and nature.'(257) In accordance with such a universal 
and unifying power to grasp truth, the man wiio apprehends and mediates this 'general and 
operative' truth, the true poet, is distinguishable from other men by his more active power of 
empathy, by his disposition 'to be affected... by absent things as i f they were present' and by 
his 'greater capacity and readiness to express what he thinks and feels.' An open mind and an 
extraordinary fecility of ejq)ression are to be requisite marics of the true poet. However, they 
are not sufficient to enable him to be the poet that Wordsworth envisions. He suggests that a 
man's capacity and willingness are not effective to the end of poetry by their appUcation to 
expression alone. That is mere organic sensitivity and could still be regarded to conform to a 
model of the artist as a maker. But Wordsworth's next suggestion removes that possibility, 
for he suggests that a would-be poet's capacity and willingness are only effective to the end 
of poetry in so fer as they are deferred to the processes of organic self-consciousness, felt as 
much as thought: 
... our continued influxes of feeling are modified and directed by our thoughts, whidi 
are indeed the representatives of past feelings; and as by contenqjlating the relaticm of 
these general representatives to each other, we discover what is really important to 
men, so by the repetition and continuance of this act feelings connected with 
important subjects will be nourished, ti l l at length, i f we be originally possessed of 
much organic sensibility, such habits of mind will be produced that by obejong 
blindly and mechanically the impulses of those habits we shall describe objects and 
utter sentiments of such a nature and in such connection with each other, that the 
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understanding of the being to whom we address ourselves, i f he be in a healthful state 
of association, must necessarily be in some degree enlightened, his taste exalted, and 
his affections ameliorated. (246-47) 
This reciprocal process of deferring thought to feehng and vice versa ad infinitum results in 
what may be described, for lack of better words, as a state of introspective beatitude. TTie 
constant (and imbreakable) 'hermeneutic circle' of this process means that Wordsworth's 
poetry always tends, as we saw in Tintem Abbey, towards inexpressibility and 
incomprehensibility. There is no authority that can justify breaking with the truth of self-
reflection definitively because the aesthetic always calls for a firrther process of self-
legitimation. 
Hie attraction of this inejq)ressible process for Wordsworth is that it 'expresses' 
unity, i.e. in so far as the poet is thereby able to identify, to become one, vsnth his object. I f he 
does not name, he does not 'objectify,' i.e. he does not differentiate himself from his object. 
It was Wordsworth's clear didactic aim and hermeneutic belief that this state of 'introspective 
beatitude' that marked the true poet and suffused his poetry could also be mediated to the 
reader and that the reader could thereby be transported (or transport himself) into a similar 
state of organic bliss. In order to do so, the poet had to be an active passivist. Clearly not 
everyone was able to be so because of the situation they had been placed in. To have any 
hope of achieving this state of serenity, it is clear to Wordsworth that the turbulent life of the 
city and its conforming society must be avoided; it was invidious both to this blissful state of 
mind and to the possibility of mediating it. For the true poet must 'select' by virtue of his real 
nature what is really 'natural' - and that very nature of his is best cultivated, Wordsworth 
insists, by a lack of cultivation, i.e. an intimate acquaintance with nature and the passage of 
change to its beauteous forms. It is expressed by the poets, far: 
Theirs is the language of the heavens, the power. 
The thought, the image, and the silent joy; 
Words are but under-agents in their souls -
When they are grasping with their greatest strength 
They do not breathe among them. (The Prelude (1805), Xn, 270-74) 
It is clear even fi-om this brief excerpt that the commonly understood relationship of 
Wordsworth's thought towards feeling is more comphcated than a description of it as 
'ejqjressive' would suggest, in part because nature has an extraordinary meaning to him.'" 
This complexity is only confirmed by the relationship of the poet to language itself For vnth 
this deferral that leads to a transcendent state of feeling, Wordsworth also implies that the 
- A fine example of this is in Chapter Eighth of ThePrelude (1805), subtitled 'Retrospect: Love of 
Nature Leading to Love of Mankind' 
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poet's language itself can actually be a form of hindrance to his poetic power 'to express what 
he thinks and feels.' Here we must give due account of the context in which Wordsworth 
wrote to understand what he meant about language. He made it clear that language as it had 
normally come to be used had become thoroughly tainted by society and by rational thought 
'that promised to abstraa the hopes of man/ Out of his feelings, to be fixed thenceforth/ For 
ever in a purer element.'(Prelude. X, 807-09) The poet, as he demonstrates dramatically in 
the account of his ' M ' from being initially 'a child of Nature'(X, 752) to 'having two natures 
in me'(X, 869), was in constant danger of having his language socialised and, in the process, 
alienated from reality and truth. Wordsworth associated the logos with socialised, i.e. 
cultivated reason and pronoimced it opposed to feeling. 
To understand how Wordsworth could reach such an apparently improbable 
conclusion linking society and the language of reason with the loss of the sort of language of 
feeling that his poetry tapped into, we must look to the historical and intellectual context in 
which the Lyrical Ballads were written. As was discussed in the second chapter, the key (and 
imprecedented) political development of the modem age was the emergence of mass society. 
Society had effectively sounded the death-knell of both the pubUc and private spheres by 
removing the distinctions between them. It consequently took on characteristics of the 
opermess of the former and the concern with the maintenance of life of the latter. But it had 
another consequence that is particularly relevant to this discussion of the Romantic movement 
and the creation of a new form of common sense. Haimah Arendt reveals an insufficiently 
acknowledged aspect of Wordsworth's poetry in her ejqjlanation of the discovery of intimacy 
by his French precursor, Rousseau, and his protest on behalf of the 'holiness of the heart's 
afiFections' against the pressures placed upon him by society to redirect his affections solely in 
its direction: 
The first articulate ejq)lorer and to an extent even theorist of intimacy was Jean-
Jacques Rousseau... He arrived at his discovery through a rebelUon not against the 
oppression of the state but against society's unbearable oppression of the human 
heart, its intrusion upon an irmermost region in man that imtil then had needed no 
special protection. The intimacy of the heart, unlike the private household, has no 
objective tangible place in the world, nor can the society against which it protests and 
asserts itself be localised with the same certainty as the public space. To Rousseau, 
both the intimate and the social were, rather, subjective modes of human existence, 
and in his case, it was as though Jean-Jacques rebelled against a man called 
Rousseau. The modem individual and his endless conflicts, his inability either to be 
at home in society or to Uve outside it altogether, his ever-changing moods and the 
radical subjectivism of his emotional life, was bom in this rebelUon of the heart...The 
astonishing flowering of poetry and music from the middle of the eighteenth century 
until ahnost the last third of the nineteenth, accompanied by the rise of the novel, the 
only entirely social art form, coinciding with a no less striking decline of all the more 
pubUc arts, especially architecture, is sufficient testimony to a close relationship 
between the social and the intimate. (THC. 38-39.) 
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Arendt's observation suggests that Wordsworth, Uke Rousseau, based a new form of poetics 
on the 'common sense' of intimacy, the sense of intimacy of course being inexpressible. We 
can see evidence of this focus upon intimacy (and in particular the effects of the disruption of 
the private life, the homeless individual) and its hermeneutic of empathetic identification 
throughout Wordsworth's contribution to the Lyrical Ballads and in his later poetry. 
Intimacy and natura naturans 
TTie remedy that Wordsworth proposes to counter the ills of society is to turn away 
fi-om it and its associated language to feelings of intimacy, feelings that he says are prompted 
by nature rather than the conforming social prejudices. He advocates a tum to these feelings 
as i f he could circumvent social prejudices altogether and recreate the terms of human life 
without them. And since human language is, as a isocial medium, itself an il l , this retum to 
primal feeling must recur again and again, ultimately even at the ejqjense of his own 
language. The pattern he suggests appears to reverse the Cartesian enqjhasis on arrogating 
authority to the rational self by suggesting an organic connection to the world that Descartes' 
cogito had denied. The universal prejudice of the cogito had worked against the authority of 
received opinion of tradition and the relation to the world contained in the sensus communis. 
However, Wordsworth's suggestion only exacerbates the Cartesian prejudice by historicising 
it and pushing the anti-traditional en^hasis to its logical conclusion. He transfers the locus of 
authority fi-om the socialised adult world and the adult's 'reasoning power' to that of the child 
and its non-judgemental, open relationship to the stimuh of the world. Thus he writes: 
My heart leaps up when I behold 
A Rainbow in the sky: 
So was it when my life began; 
So is it now I am a Man; 
So be it v^en I shall grow old. 
Or let me die! 
The Child is Father of the Man; 
And I could wish my days to be 
Bound each to each by natural piety. 
The child at its earUest stage in life is of course an infant, literally a non-speaker. Speech is a 
dangerous thing in Wordsworth's eyes precisely because it inculcates agency. He illustrates 
its obvious danger in poems such as his 'Anecdote for Fathers,' v/here he narrates the effect 
of an overbearing fether in forcing his son into a he by insisting on a reason for the boy's 
preference of'Kilve's smooth shore' to 'Liswyn farm.' 
120 Wordsworth.'My HeartLeaps Up.' The Poems ofWilliamWoidsworth. I . (1907). 115. 
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His 'classical statement' on the child and its significance as an imprejudiced being 
though occurs in his famous ode presenting 'Intimations of Inunortality from Recollections of 
Early Childhood.' In that ode, he comes closest to revealing an answer to the mystery of the 
originator of the child and depicts the forces that oppose it. He pushes the issue of origin 
back beyond infency and displays how far the Enlightenment 'prejudice against prejudice' 
continues to inform his own organicist thought. His enigmatic suggestion that the 'Child is 
Father of the Man' of course had begged the question of who the child's father was. 
Wordsworth's clear answer in the ode. Nature, is somewhat obscured by the feet that he 
appeals to two distinct senses of it, each antagonistic to the other, which are nonetheless 
undifferentiated in name. The ode is characteristic, i f more e?q)licit than usual, in identifying 
the originator as natura naturans, which he refers to equally as God. Birth is treated not as 
the begiiming of life, natura naturata, but instead negatively as the begirming of a loss of 
glory from natura naturans: 
Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting: 
The Soul that rises with us, our hfe's Star, 
Hath had elsewhere its setting, 
And Cometh from afer: 
Not in entire forgetfuhiess 
And not in utter nakedness. 
But trailing clouds of glory do we come 
From God, who is oiu- home: 
Heaven lies about us in our infancy! (58-66) 
The poem narrates the infant's gradual decline to a state of being socialised and femiUarised 
to natura naturata, the world of cause-and-effect, bringing with it the loss of the original 
'visionary gleam.' 
For as the child grows, 'Shades of the prison-house begin to close' on the Ught from 
whence man came until 'At length the Man perceives it die away,/ And fede into the Ught of 
common day.'(75-76) Natura naturata, the prison warden or, as Wordsworth more benignly 
caUs her: 
The homely Nurse doth aU she can 
To make her Foster-child, her Inmate Man, 
Forget the glories he hath known. 
And that imperial palace \dience he came. (81-84) 
But as the 'the little Actor cons another part' in imitating social mores at each stage of his 
decline to adulthood, 'As i f his whole vocation/ Were endless imitation' (106-07), his world 
becomes noisy and dark. Of course this noisy and dark world is not his true vocation though. 
The ode continues to suggest a means of salvation from this inevitable decline into adulthood. 
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His 'Soul's immensity' forever broods beneath the surface of his 'exterior resemblance,' 
intimating the immortal state fi-om whence he came and auguring its potential retum. 
This return to native innocence is possible through the appUcation of the 'prejudice 
against prejudice,' or as Wordsworth more poetically ejqjresses it: 
.. .those obstinate questionings 
Of sense and outward things. 
Fallings fi-om us, vanishings; (141-43) 
For these obstinate questionings of the organism rightiy conceiving himself in harmony with 
natural processes are inspired by re-collections of the pre-experiences of early childhood: 
...those first affections. 
Those shadowy recollections. 
Which, be they what they may. 
Are yet the foimtain-light of all our day. 
Are yet a master-hght of all our seeing; 
Uphold us, dierish, and have power to make 
Our noisy years seem moments in the being 
Of the eternal Silence... (148-55) 
There is course a potentially positive change in the organism. These affections are no longer 
immediately available to the poet as they were as a child, but they can be appreciated by the 
very feet that the poet knows what it is to have been without them. He must be content and 
find: 
Strength in what remains behind 
In the primal sympathy 
Which having been must ever be; 
This 'primal sympathy' leads him to what he calls 'the philosophic mind,' which unites this 
sympathy with a mature attempt to re-collect it via the 'prejudice against prejudice,' the 
'aspect more sublime' he referred to in Tintem Abbey."' 
Wordsworth thus proposes a means of human regeneration by turning to natura 
naturans and, in particular, through the reflected 'obstinate questionings' of the sensual 
experience of the natura naturata and the causal inq)lications it suggests, by turning to a 'pre-
experienced prejudice' which no words can be found to express effectively. TTie creation. 
Roger Lundin, in his very usefiil chapter in The Promise of Hermeneutics entitled,' Interpreting 
Orphans: Hermeneutics in the Cartesian Tradition' traces a recurrent pattern of self-fathering through 
various mutations in English and American literature, making many similar observations to those I 
have presented here about the 'Intimations Ode.' He remarks: 'With romanticism.. .the primary 
mechanism of the Cartesian quest changed, and its scope grew dramatically, as intuition and 
recollection replaced ratiocination empirical study as the means of truth. Romanticism was to continue 
the work of the Enlightenment, but only on different terms.' (22) I discuss the Romantics' historicising 
of Cartesianism in more detail below. 
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marriage and love of this organic form of intimacy are the central Romantic project, not just 
for Wordsworth, but for Shelley and Keats as well. Harold Bloom testifies to this in one of 
the dramatic forms this project characteristically takes, that of the 'quest-romance': 
The man prophesied by the Romantics is a caitral man who is always in the process 
of becoming his own begetter... the full Romantic quest... must make aU things new, 
and then marry what it has made. 
This inexpressible state of the organism in harmony with nature, Wordsworth suggests, is the 
experience that the poet should seek to mediate, even in (and perhaps particularly in) 
conjunction with the things and events of the common day: 
For the discerning intellect of Man, 
When wedded to this goodly universe 
In love and holy passion, shaU find these 
A simple produce of the common day. (52-55)'^ 
122 
123 
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^ f ace to the Excursion,' The Poems of Wordsworth. HI. (1907). 
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Selection in the Preface to Lyrical Ballads 
Wordsworth's emphasis on the 'primal sympathy' of the 'phUosophic mind' is 
implicit in the principle entirely cmcial to his Preface (normally neglected by critics) that he 
caUs 'selection.' He repeatedly states (in various formulations) that it is the primary activity 
of the poet. This process of selection is what makes the Wordsworthian common language 
uncommon, i.e. natural (organic). It may have suffered critical neglect because of the 
apparent nonchalance with which he proposes it and the naivete with which he assiunes it is 
even possible. Wordsworth's process of 'selection' is a fimction of the passive maimer in 
which he says the poems of the Lyrical BaUad? confront the reader, each with their own 
'worthy purpose.' He attempts to clarify fiirther what he means by these poems' purposes, 
disavowing a prejudiced intention to said purpose: 
Not that I mean to say, that I always began to write with a distinrt purpose formally 
conceived; but I believe that my descriptions of such objects as strongly excite those 
feelings, will be found to carry along with them a purpose.(246, my itaUcs) 
This claim that there is a lack of design in his poems except that w^ich the objects themselves 
presented leads to the entirely revolutionary suggestion (presented ahnost as an afterthought): 
that 'feeling' ought to lead actions. It is revolutionary because the suggestion entails nothing 
other than the usurpation of the role of language in the vita activa, bequeathed in the sensus 
communis, by the 'silent' life of the feeling of the organism: 
... it is proper that I should mention one other circumstance w^ich distinguishes these 
Poems from the popular Poetry of the day; it is this, that the feeling therein developed 
gives importance to the action and situation and not the action and situation to the 
feeling.(248) 
It is therefore not just a different means of artistic representation that Wordsworth proposes, 
but a different orientation of morality and of human existence altogether. 
Wordsworth's emphasis on 'primal sympathy' in the Intimations Ode and an 'aspect 
more sublime' in Tintem Abbey has its correspondence in his emphasis upon 'selection' in 
the Preface. The difference in the sort of thought, feeling and nature that Wordsworth is 
suggesting from those we are wont to associate with all these words is made somewhat clearer 
in one of his more obscure passages in the Preface. He makes it clear that his purpose is not 
expressive. It is not to describe feelings or to present his own: it is to unite them in a 
transcendent space by removing the differences between them. It is interesting to note his use 
of the word 'situation' in the context of that transcendent space, as it substitutes a state of 
being for what we might expect, an action: 
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However exahed a notion we would wish to cherish of the character of the Poet it is 
obvious, that, yMle he describes and imitates passions, his situation is altogether 
slavish and mechanical, compared with the freedom and power of real and substantial 
action and suffering. So it will be the wish of the Poet to bring his feelings near to 
those of the persons whose feelings he describes, nay, for short spaces of time 
perhaps, to let himself slip into an entire delusion, and even confound and identify his 
own feelings with theirs; modifying only the language which is thus suggested to him, 
by a consideration that he describes for a particular purpose, that of giving pleasure. 
Here, then, he will apply the principle on which I have so much insisted, namely of 
selection... (256, my italics) 
He asserts that the more the poet applies his poetic power of 'selection' to 'situate' himself in 
the place of other persons, 'the deeper will be his feith that no words, which his fancy or 
imagination can suggest, will be to be compared with those which are the emanations of 
reality and truth.' (257, my italics) The true Wordsworthian poet would i f it were possible, 
one concludes from this, only feel deeply in primal, organic sympathy, and never speak or 
write at all.'^* He would 'select' or, as this procedure suggests, recreate himself and be 
'identified' in the 'situation' of the object of suffering. 'Pleasure' results from this vicarious 
act of identification of feeling. 
However since a poet does of course write, his writing will meet the same end of 
creating an overbalance of pleasure in the reader by taking his emotions through a purgative 
process of introspective silence. This will produce a state in keeping with the universaUty of 
the introspection and the essence of the otherwise crude emotion: 
I have said that Poetry is the spontaneous overflow of powerfiil feelings: it takes its 
origin from emotion recollected in tranquillity: the emotion is contemplated till by a 
species of reaction the tranquillity graduaUy disappears, and an emotion, similar to 
that which was before the subject of contemplation, is gradually produced, and does 
itself actually exist in the mind. (266) 
The product of Wordsworth's process of distilling feeling from the tranquillity of absence is 
transcendental or universal emotion. It is tbe resuh of the sublimation of personal differences 
(in the name of intimacy) to the ethos of perceiving the Divine being in the sublime as natura 
naturans. This en i^hasis is altogether strange; and it has not lost its strangeness through two 
hundred years of femiliarity. The main reason it is strange, I think, is that Wordsworth was 
'^ ^ This is because the object of Wordsworth's poetry is not actually of this world. It is: 
Not of outward things 
Done visibly for other minds - words, signs, 
Symbols or actions - but of my own heart... 
Therefore his ejqjression always necessarily encounters the same difiSculty, a failing he confesses: 
. . . I wished to touch 
With hand however weak - but in the main 
It lies far hidden from the reach of words. 
Points have we all of us within oiu* souls 
Where all stand single; this I feel, and make 
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not actuaUy principally concerned with cultivating the poetics of the common man at all or 
the writing of poetry in its traditional sense. That is an addition he makes to it that is 
secondary to its main matter. As Coleridge argues, Wordsworth's own poetry does not tend 
to that conclusion, nor does his poetry argue for the rather patronising defence of ordinary 
language, i.e. a lingua communis that his Preface seems to do.' 
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What he intends instead is revealed by something that he writes towards the end of 
his argument in the Preface. He tries there, revealingly, to defend himself against the 
interpretation of his theory as that of a lingua communis, even i f he does so in a way that 
almost leaves the impression that even he is rather imconvinced by it. The convolutions he 
undergoes are evident and ahnost painful. In a passage like the following one can imagine his 
intended audience, as he no doubt did, as a rather imimpressed Mr. S.T. Coleridge, Esq.. It 
gives the distinct impression of touching on a matter on which we know there had already 
been a protracted debate between Wordsworth and Coleridge. Wordsworth is dismissive of 
the latter's caU for proof: 
The Poet thinks and feels in the spuit of the passions of men. How, then, can his 
language differ in any material degree from that of aU other men who feel vividly and 
see clearly? It might be proved that it is inqiossible. But supposing that this were not 
the case, the Poet might then be aUowed to use a peculiar language when e^qjressing 
his feelings for his own gratification, or that of men like himself. But Poets do not 
write for Poets alone, but for men. Unless therefore we are advocates for that 
admiration which depends upon ignorance, the Poet must descend from this supposed 
height, and, in order to excite rational sympathy, he must e?q)ress himself as oflier 
men express themselves. To this may be added, that while he is only selecting from 
the real language of men, or, w*iich amoimts to the same thing, composing accurately 
in the spirit of such selection, he is treading on safe ground, and we know what we 
are to expect from him. (261, my italics) 
Despite that defensive tone however, it is obvious here, i f it were not elsewhere, that 
Wordsworth thinks that his emphasis on the process of 'selection' actuaUy exonerates him 
from the charge of making an argument for a poetics based on a lingua communis per se. 
Once we understand the irrqjortance and significance that Wordsworth was attributing 
to the word 'selection' in the Preface, we must wonder about the direction of Coleridge's 
attack on him in the Biographia. We must question whether Coleridge actually 
misunderstood VfoTdswoiHi by construing his argument as that for a lingua communis or 
whether he perhaps had an ulterior motive, e.g. to disarm the increasing flock of 
Wordsworth's servile imitators who were misunderstanding his argument in the Preface. I 
suspect that neither was the case. It seems to me that the key lies in recognising that what 
Breathings for incommunicable powers. (The Prelude. HI, 174-76; 184-89) 
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Wordsworth refers to as 'selection' here, he elsewhere depicts as the original aspect of the 
'Imagination.' The 'primary imagination' is of course the central definition in Coleridge's 
Biographia. and I think a matter on which Coleridge imphcitiy corrects Wordsworth's theory, 
though he does not do so at the point he presents the imagination in his argument.'^  My 
contention, which I shall pursue in more detail below, is that Coleridge viewed Wordsworth's 
argument for the 'organic basis' of a common language to be only the reverse side of a 
universalist argument. This dualism was a pattern that he demonstrated rqjeatedly in the first 
half of the Biographia to have characterised philosophy since the time of Descartes. What he 
was impUcitiy questioning in disputing Wordsworth's claim to base his poetics on common 
language was its idea of universality and, along with that, the quasi-theological claim that 
Wordsworth attached to it. 
Even when we have imderstood it for what it is, Wordsworth's emphasis on universal 
or transcendental emotion remains strange. I think this is because what it actuaUy proposes 
sounds to be much more like a new form of reUgion than what we expect from it - a 
successful poetic experiment. This of course is one of the explicit grounds on which 
Coleridge engaged it in the second half of the Biographia. The reason that Coleridge's 
argument does not seem clearer cai this point, it seems to me, is because Coleridge refiised to 
draw the distinction between religious language and ordinary language that Wordsworth was 
king (and that we too now habitually make) via an appeal to the primacy of feeling to 
ma 
'^^BL,XVn, 199. 
' If space permitted, I could go into more detail about the role of the Imagination in Wordsworth's 
poetry. It has a much better documented role in Wordsworth's poetics than does the act of 'selection' 
he refers to here and the association of the act with failure of expectations has often been noted in that 
context. One of the more famous instances occurs in The Prelude when he learns that he has 
unwittingly crossed the sunmiit of the Alps. This failure of his own prejudiced expectations could not 
be received more jubilantly or have greater significance attached to it: 
Imagination!— l^ifting up itself 
Before the eye and progress of my song 
Like an unfathomed vapour, here that power. 
In all the might of its endowments, came 
Athwart me. I was lost as in a cloud. 
Halted without a struggle to break through. 
And now, recovering, to my soul I say 
' I recognise thy glory'. In such strength 
Of usurpation, in such visitings 
Of awfiil promise, when the light of sense 
Goes out in flashes that have shewn to us 
The invisible world, doth greatnras make abode. 
There harbours whether we be young or old. 
Our destiay, ova nature, and our home. 
Is with infinitude—and only there; 
With hope it is, hope that can never die. 
Effort, and expectation, and desire, 
And something ever more about to be. (VI, 525-542) 
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language. The coimection of a theological argument with what is now also viewed as the 
separate fields of poetry and philosophy nevertheless is blatant throughout the course of the 
Biographia. They are held together by Coleridge's overtly Christian 'transcendental 
deduction' of the imagination at the end of the first half of the work. 
As we have seen, there were significant reasons for Wordsworth to think that such a 
hoUstic remedy was in order, for such was the nature of the threat that had presented itself 
His poetic effort worked on a practical level against the tendency he perceived to be at work 
in society to normalise people in a maimer that left no room for the freedom of the will. For 
Wordsworth the feeling of intimacy - derived from 'natural sympathy' - was the remedy. To 
enter into an adequate discussion of the waj^ s in which Wordsworth's poetics present a new 
form of Enlightened religion, it would of course require another thesis. Nonetheless, there are 
some observations that can be made that wiU guide the discussion and support this claim. 
Religious language and the Romantic refraction of the Enlightenment 
These observations cannot be admitted as evidence of direct influence. Nonetheless, 
the analogies are too strwig to be dismissed. I would first Uke to make these observations in 
relation to what the Romantics wrote and then ejq)and the discussion to the hermeneutic 
issues of meaning. The first observation is that there is a politicoi>hilosq)hical tract that 
appeared in Germany in 1796 that made e?q) licit the atterrqjt that we can see less formaUy 
ejqjressed in the English Romantics. Often caUed 'Das aheste Systemprogranmi des 
deutschen Idealismus,' it proposed the need of a new form of religion and a new form of state, 
based on reason and 'the notion of my self as an absolutely free being.' TTie 'highest act of 
reason,' it proclaimed, was an 'aesthetic act' that would replace the acts of the priesthood. 
'We must,' it says, 'have a new mythology, but this mythology must be in the service of the 
Ideas,' i.e. objects of freedom: 'it must become a mythology of reason.'^ ^^  It seems to me to 
substantiate the view that Wordsworth (and, by an in^Ucation he resented, Coleridge) had 
created a system of poetry with similar such intenticms w^en a contemporaneous movement 
with similar characteristics made such intentions explicit. Coleridge's apparent complicity 
with a project of such intentions may in fact partly ejq)lain his attack on Wordsworth in the 
Biographia Literaria. He wished to distinguish his own views on precisely such issues. 
Quoted from Andrew Bowie's Aesthetics and Snhiectivitv: From Kant to Nietzsche. Manchester: 
Man. U.P., 1990. Appendix, 265-66. 
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Secondly, there is the train of arguments that Gadamer makes about the character of 
Romanticism and its relation to the Enlightenment. He observes first of all that: 
In general, the Enlightenment tends to accept no authority and to decide everything 
before the judgement seat of reason. Thus the written tradition of Scripture, like any 
other historical document, can claim no absolute validity; the possible truth of the 
tradition depends on the credibility that reason accords it. We can know better: this 
is the maxim with which the modem Enlightenment approaches tradition and which 
ultimately leads it to undertake historical research. It takes tradition as an object of 
critique, just as the natural sciences do with the evidence of the senses. (T&M. 272) 
Since prejudices must ultimately be justified by rational knowledge to be considered true, the 
Enlightenment and its 'prejudice against prejudice' work to 'determine the self-understanding 
of historicism' that appears latterly in the Romantic period. However that did not take place 
transparentiy. Nor can it be understood so. 
For the process of that determination was made indirectly through the refiaction that 
Romanticism effects upon the aims of the EnUghtenment. The consonance (and dissonance) 
of Romanticism with the preceding movement can be seen in the philosophy of history it 
shares with the Enlightenment, which 'through the romantic reaction to (it) became an 
unshakeable premise: the schema of the conquest of mythos by logos.' Gadamer elaborates 
on what he means by this: 
What gives this schema its validity is the presupposition of tbe progressive retreat of 
magic in the world. It is supposed to represent progress in the history of the mind, 
and precisely because romanticism disparages this development, it takes over the 
schema itself as a self-evident truth. It shares the presupposition of the 
Enlighterunent and only reverses its values, seeking to estabUsh the validity of what is 
old siir^ly on the feet that it is old: the 'gothic' Middle Ages, the Christian Em-opean 
community of states, the permanent structure of society, but also the simphcity of 
peasant hfe and closeness to nature.(273) 
This explains the feet that rather than finding the Enlightenment's 'feith in perfection' as a 
'complete freedom from 'superstition" we find, he observes, a different emphasis in 
Romanticism: that all of these ancient things have acquired 'a romantic magic, even a priority 
over truth.' For Wordsworth, the magic is particularly associated with natura naturans, the 
foundation of what later becomes known as Lebensphilosophie. 
Romanticism's paradoxical reversal of the aims of the Enhghtenment and the 
tendency it follows 'to reconstruct the old because it is old, the conscious retum to the 
imconscious, culminating in the recognition of the superior wisdom of the primeval age of 
myth' actually only perpetuates the abstract contrast between myth and reason though. It 
takes the form that we see so characteristically in Wordsworth and his contenqjoraries' 
writing: 
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.. .the romantic reversal of the Enlightenment's criteria of value actually perpetuates 
the abstract contrast between myth and reason. All criticism of the Enli^tenment 
now proceeds via this romantic mirror image of the Enlighteimient. Belief in the 
perfectibility of reason suddenly changes into the perfection of the 'mythical' 
consciousness and finds itself reflected in a paradisal primal state before the 'fall' of 
thought. (273-74) 
The Romantics' conviction of this 'fall of thought' and commitment to an organicist view of 
nature, I have suggested, is expressed by their characteristic attenq)t to understand language 
and its socialised prejudices to attain this 'paradisal, primal state' - connoted by the word 
silence. But it is ahnost shocking to recognise that Wordsworth's 'revolutionary' conviction 
that there was a sort of nonsensical spiritual language that lay behind and beyond the grasp of 
normal language, whose best analogy was to feeling, vihich could be most keenly perceived 
in emanations of reality and truth most closely tied to nature and 'selected' from the 'real 
language of men' was not entirely novel. 
This is however the case. Both Robert Lowth and H u ^ Blair, to name just two of the 
more prominent examples of the age, preceded him in it and both related this language to the 
sublime. This, I propose, instmcts us how to understand Wordsworth's emphasis on 
transcendence and his use of silence - as an organicist's appropriation of the eighteenth 
century category of the sublime to reflect this 'paradisal primal state.' Stephen Prickett 
suggests that to imderstand Wordsworth's familiar and at the same time odd linguistic 
associations and his adherence to the idea of a 'religious language' closest to 'common 
language' we must first look to these men and their associations of the sublime with the 
sacred.^^* They are short steps from the sacred to the subUme to the natural and to the simple. 
To select one moment of particular significance, we can look to Lowth's prose translation of 
passages widely acknowledged to be 'poetic' in the Old Testament. In his translation we note 
the ready currency (and associations) that had already been created for Wordsworth's sort of 
arguments. Lowth's translation of the Hebrew scriptures into language less 'poetic' in tibe 
traditional English sense seemed to confirm the idea that aU meaning should be regarded 
'historically' from a universal vantage or 'aspect more sublime.' Its imiversal sense could be 
best gleaned through 'feeling' divested of 'artificial language.' 
Prickett notes that it was the acknowledged power of Lowth's prose translation of 
Hebrew poetry into English - based on his conviction that the Hebrew verse was 'sin^jle and 
unadorned' and owed its 'almost ineffable sublimity' not to its elevated terms but rather to the 
dq)th and universality of its subject-matter - that provided Hugh Blair with the idea we now 
'^ Stephen Prickett Words and the Word. (1986) 
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ahnost instinctively associate with Wordsworth and Coleridge, the idea that poetry 'is the 
language of passion, enlivened imagination.''^' The consonance of the evidence of these 
previous writers' trains of thought with those we habitually designate Romantics of course 
also argues that Romanticism was not primarily a poetic movement at all. It is far better to 
see it as a 'spiritual movement' and one that can be closely alhed to a form of Deism: 
I f the Enlightenment considers it an estabUshed feet that all tradition that reason 
shows to be impossible (i.e. nonsense) can only be understood historically - i.e. by 
going back to the past's way of looking at things - then the historical consciousness 
that emerges in romanticism involves a radicalisation of the Enlightenment. For 
nonsensical tradition, which had been the exception, has become the rule for 
historical consciousness. Meaning that is generally accessible through reason is so 
little believed that the whole of the past - even, ultimately, all the thinking of one's 
contemporaries - is understood only 'historically.' Thus the romantic critique of the 
Enhghtenment itself ends in EnUghtenment, for it evolves as historical science and 
draws everything into the orbit of historicism. The basic discrediting of all 
prejudices, which imites the experimental fervour of the new natural sciences during 
the Enlightenment, is universaUsed and radicalised in the historical 
EnUghtenment.(275-76)""' 
This understanding of Romanticism as a historicising of the Enlightenment also holds 
true of how it treats the central point of its aesthetic, the point of absence. We can note this 
absence in the form of silence, the literary firagment, hyperbole. Romantic irony or any 
number of other tropes expressing absent points of origin in the poetry. What is expressed in 
these tropes of absent origin is the historicising (and organicising) of the Deist notion of God 
as transcendence perceived (and perhaps originating in feeling). By historicising it, they not 
only create what has been variously called 'the aesthetic of individuation' and 'the self-
fethering tendency' in poetry, they make the meaning of human life and human history 
revolve around the history of an aU-powerfiil absence. David Sirtqison comments; 
Rather than admitting that we can never achieve certain knowledge of first principles, 
and then insisting on absolute coherence and closure between the parts of any sj^em 
buih upon those assumed first principles. Romantic aesthetics insists upon a recourse 
to emptiness, a re-founding in imperceptible begirmings, at every point of transition 
between the parts of its systems. The organic model itself, whilst appearing to 
introduce an indubitable continuity, yet locates that continuity at some level beyond 
or within what can be apprehended as phenomenal appearance; we can only wonder 
at the transition from seed to blossom. '^' 
Robert Lowth is commonly acknowledged as the originator of the so-called Higher Criticism in 
BibUcal studies. His Lectures on the Sacred Poetry of the Hebrews were delivered first as die Oxford 
Poetry Lectures in 1741 before being published in Latin in 1753. They attained a wider degree of 
popularity with their ti:anslation into English in 1787, largely thanks to critics like Hugh Blair. The 
statement by Blair is fiom his Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres. (1820). n, 270-71. 
It is this same conviction however that prompted the great nineteenth century search for an 'original 
language' that underlay all existent languages and inspired the 'universal histories' Uiat abounded at the 
's^rip.riH Simpson Tronv and Authority in Romantic Poetiy. (1981). 18L 
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The connection in Lowth's Lectures of the universal with the natural and of ancient, less 
socialised forms of religion with unadorned yet vitally powerful language only amounted to 
proof to a man Uke Wordsworth, who hated cities and particularly lamented their debasement 
of human sensibilities, that a means of righting that tendency lay in 'turning back' to the most 
universal and at the same time most innate feeling. The connection that writers such as 
Lowth and Blair had made in their observations of the writing of the ancients provided him 
with a means of uniting the universal with the natural with the intimate and with the true. 
What Wordsworth based his whole poetics on, as M.H. Abrams has akeady observed 
with considerable force of argument and anple demonstrations (if too dualistically), was 
effectively an analogue of the Christian kingdom of God. In particular, it imitated the 
relationships involved in it, e.g. of believers to that kingdom and the relation of the Creator to 
his creatures and creation. In fact, Wordsworth could claim, even i f with an entirely different 
emphasis, to be acting 'in the same spirit' as the original movement by converting the 'dead 
letter' to the more common currency of feeling. This new spirit of course had its 
consequences that on the surfece seemed entirely happy with the Enlightenment's 
imambiguous enphasis on a highly ambiguous form of freedom and its 'prejudice against 
prejudice.' It brought the universality of salvation to the individual not only irrespective of 
his beliefs, his words and his deeds, it brought that salvation under the control of reason and 
made it entirely immanent in this world, 'where we find our happiness, or not at all.' 
However, it was not as undifferentiated or unbiased as it appeared. It no longer 
brought judgement upon all (and saved some by imputing them righteousness for their belief), 
but it did condemn those who, like the urban dweller, had offended the sanctity of the human 
heart and its natural feelings. These, the sensual and unreflective, stood self-condemned 
through their lives in the 'sleep of Death.'"^ The conparison can be extended still further: in 
the former instance, akhough the salvation of that kingdom was open to all, Christ's sacrifice 
was revealed to and believed by those who are chosen by God and who respond to him. 
Wordsworth, on the other hand, enacted an analogue to this kingdom of salvation in the 
refracted, organic form of imiversality of a kingdom offeeling, revealed to and believed by 
those who are chosen by nature and who respond to it. The reahn of this 'natural kingdom' 
was universality and it was associated with nature by the organic ejq)erience of the sublime. 
The language of this kingdom of feeling was quintessentially silence, in part because it was 
'Preface to the Excursioa' The Poems of Wordsworth, m, 60-61. 
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ftae of any htt of p^judice and in part because h most closely app,o,uMateda>e feding of 
• _ 133 the organism 
I am aware tbat this thesis profoundly contradicts at least two normal opinions. The 
first crae, firmly entrenched at least since the time of the nineteenth-century historicists, is that 
society is a term that can be appUed to human community across the ages - the modem forms 
of it being merely the sublimed product of characteristics that were present in germinal form 
throughout the ages. This opinion has long been supported by evolutionary theory and has 
led to metanarrative theses rooted in one of two altogether incompatible and mutually 
exclusive directions: either that the source of infinite complexity and diversity of matter and 
Ufe can be attributed to something infinitely vast 'out there,' (reflected in its 'Big bang 
theory') or to something infinitely small within us, i.e. what has been called the 'selfish gene.' 
These are derivations of the terms of Romantic aesthetics and its 'organic model,' which, as 
Simpson noted, 'whilst appearing to introduce an indubitable continuity' by a reference to 
history, 'yet locates that continuity at some level beyond or within what can be apprehended 
as phenomena] appearance' leaving us in feet with utter uncertainty: 'we can only wonder at 
the transition fi-om seed to blossom.''^ 
The second is the perception that worship had always been inexpressible when it was 
its most sincere and that the Romantics' organicist emphasis is therefore not entirely 
unorthodox. This relates to the notion of the inexpressible 'religious impulse' of'feeling.' 
But, as Prickett points out, the belief that there was in feet such a thing as 'religious 
language,' which can be seen to underlie this view (its correspondent terms), was altogether 
unprecedented prior to the modem obsession with the sublime: 
The notion that the actual words used to talk about reUgious ejq)erience should be 
seen as constituting a historical or epistemological problem of a special or even 
unique kind is rather less than three hundred years old. There always have been, it is 
true, philosqjhers and theologians who have tended to view language per se as a 
somewhat sloppy and ineffective medium for precise communication.... Nraie of 
these authorities, however, was inclined to view the language used to describe 
religious e?q)erience as presenting a special case - a difPerent order of problem fi-om 
the perennial one of 'words and things' as a whole. Sudi a suspicion was scarcely 
voiced before the beginning of the eighteenth century, and then was voiced, not as 
one might expect in connection with the peculiar problems raised by bibUcal 
narratives, but in relation to the current critical passion for classification of literary 
kinds.'^' 
134 T\„,AA Qimnsem OD. cit (1979). 181. 
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Stephen PricketL op.cit (1986). 37-3» 
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Coleridge's hermeneutic response to Wordsworth in the Bioeraphia Literaria (1817): the 
Imagination 
At this point, it will probably be useful to refer directly to Coleridge's hermeneutic 
disagreement with Wordsworth as expressed in the Biographia Literaria rather than simply 
alluding to it. All of the observations that have been made about the logical difficulties of 
Wordsworth's organicist theory incline one to agree with P.W.K. Stone's assessment of 
Romantic poetics that 'at first sight (there is) no organising principle on which to collate and 
classify the mass of disorganised, heterogeneous material.'"* There does appear to be some 
hope though in so far as most of these concerns and diflRculties are encapsulated in what 
Stone describes as the characteristic Romantic concept, the 'feeling-thought of Imagination.' 
The imagination is indeed well recognised as the defining concq)t of the period. For 
example. The Oxford Companimi to English Literature (5* ed.) refers to it at the culmination 
of its definition of Romanticism, which it describes as: 
...a literary movement, and profoimd shift in sensibility, which took place in Britain 
and throughout Europe rou^ly between 1770 and 1848. Intellectually it marked a 
violent reaction to the Enligjiteimient. Politically it was inspired by the revolutions of 
America and France... Emotionally it expressed an extreme assertion of the self and 
the value of individual experience... together with the sense of the infinite and the 
transcendental. Socially it championed progressive causes... The stylistic keynote of 
Romanticism is intensity, and its watchword is 'Imagination.' (842-43) 
Unfortunately, the import attributed to the Imagination differs amongst the poets, and never 
more markedly than between the two main architects of the movement in England. Indeed, 
the Biographia Literaria demonstrates in both its form and its content that Coleridge regarded 
the role and significance of the imagination as the primary bone of contention between 
himself and Wordsworth.*" 
P.W.K. Stone. The Art of Poetry 1750-1820. (1967). 107. 
' The apparent gap between the two halves of the Biographia and the failed transcendental deduction 
has been approached by critics in various ways. There seem to be three main stances that have been 
taken: 
i) to admit the problems, yet see them as aberrations which need not belie tendencies which are 
otherwise valid for the Biographia and Coleridge's work as a whole. Of these approadies, Thomas 
McFarland Coleridge and the Pantheist Traditioa (1969) offers the best critique, ii) to deny the 
problems, seeing even the ^jparent 'gaps' in the argument as nothing of the sort but rather as an aspect 
of a philosophical stance of incompleteness which challenge the reader to 'complete (them) with the 
recognisable substance of his or her own theory.' (Hamiltoa Coleridge's Poetics. 14). Of these 
approaches, Kathleen Wheeler (Sources. Processes. Methods in Coleridge's Biographia. (1981)) 
appears to offer the most convincing argument, though James C. McKusick's excellent account in 
(Coleridge's Philosophy of Language. (1986)) tends in that direction as well, iii) to admit the problems 
and attempt to account for them This is the ajpxwch adopted by Paul Hamilton (Coleridge's Poetics. 
(1983)), whereby the gaps and subsequently the composition of the text itself are seen as being 
influenced by factors extraneous to the text 
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It seems to me that it was not the weaknesses of Wordsworth's argument caused by 
his confessed lack of femiliarity (at least in terms of first-hand knowledge) with Kant that 
Coleridge found so objectionable. It was his organicist e>q)lanation of nature and of the 
workings of human creativity as a 'natural' process. This claim was imphcit in Wordsworth's 
appeal to the superiority of a life in communion with nature, the imaginative gifts he claimed 
to be its natural outgrowth and its correspondingly naive hermeneutics appealing to that 
nature, which were afforded to him througji the act he called 'selection.' 
In attacking Wordsworth on these terms, Coleridge was, as has so often been noted, 
also at odds with his other contemporaries, though the reason for that has remained opaque to 
most critics.'^* What I propose to do is to lead up to Coleridge's notion of Imagination as it is 
expressed in the Biographia. This will take place in Coleridge's terms (to some extent) since 
he is the most cogent theorist, but not without making some observations that link in with the 
previous discussion of the universal hermeneutic claim of Romanticism and the resultant 
place of the aporia in thinking. The difference in his treatment of the same issues lies, as was 
mentioned earUer in the chapter, in vdiat Coleridge means when he says that 'the best part of 
human language, properly so called, is derived from reflections on the acts of the mind itself 
It is clear fi-om Coleridge's arguments that Wordsworth was thoroughly misguided in 
claiming to use the 'natural' language of rustics in his poetry - as i f their language was not a 
tool that had been shaipened through centuries of cultivation. Coleridge demonstrates the 
absurdity of that positicm quite forcibly. What is also clear though is that that is not really 
what Wordsworth's poetry evinces anyway. What it does evince, he maintains (and objects to 
equally), is an organicist notion of xmiversality that claims the emotional range and the 
superficial connotations of a Christian fi-amework, while denying the idea of Divine agency in 
forming it. In other words, he objects that Wordsworth and the advocates of this theory argue 
'^ ^ It led M.H. Abrams, in his widely influential book The Mirror and the Lamp (1953), to the thesis 
analogous to a distinction between religious language and acts of language. He puts it more formally 
as the distinctions between 'a poem as a poem, and on a poem as a process of mind.' This e)q)lanation 
is out of tune with the emphasis of the Biographia (and the rest of Coleridge's work for that matter), 
particularly because Abrams fails to acknowledge that it was Wordsworth's natural organicism that 
was the central problem for Coleridge, not his solution to Wordsworth's terms: 
It was above all in his exploitation of this new aesthetics of organicism that Coleridge, more 
thorou^y than Wordsworth, was the innovative EngUsh critic of his time. At the same time, 
it was, paradoxically, because he retained a large part of the neo-classic critical tenets and 
terms which Wordsworth minimized or rejected that Coleridge's criticism is much more 
flexible and practicable - more adequate to the illumination of a great diversity of specific 
poems - than Wordsworth's. The logical manoeuvre by which Coleridge managed this feat, 
though sharply differentiating 'poetry' from a 'poem,' is awkward, and has certainly led to a 
wide misunderstandmg of his intention. But by it, he was enabled to maintain a double view, 
capable alternately of dwelling on a poem as a poem, and on a poem as a process of mind. 
(124) 
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as i f the coimotations their own language evoked bore no traces of determination by their own 
tradition and only expressed the 'spontaneous' natural feeUng of the human organism. 
Coleridge maintains the contrary. Neither does the formation of these reflections 
stem from the act of transcendental introspection per se nor to the organic act of 'selection' as 
Wordsworth explains it, i.e. as a demonstration of the self-originating and self-legitimating 
power of the act of thought to (re)create from the ground of the absolutely negative. Instead 
he refers to the 'selection' of divine symbols and use of the linguistic framework that had 
already been provided by the revelation of the Divine agent and subsequent religious 
instruction. The best part of human language for Coleridge, while 'derived from reflections 
on the acts of the mind upon itself,' attributes those reflections to the distinctions that were 
primarily bestowed through divine revelation in history. This revelation fimctions as vshat 
Gadamer calls a 'prejudice,' which is not attributable to nature nor even to social convention, 
but rather to divine revelation about human nature, a revelation that has gradually been 
disseminated and adopted as a general truth. This is a persistent train of thought for 
Coleridge. What he asserts is that this general truth, which has been deUneated by Kant in 
terms of 'pure reason' now allows for miraculous insists. 
Nonetheless, this insight becomes itself a powerful delusion when it is divested of the 
metanarrative of salvation history. Thus he writes in The Statesman's Manual: 
In the infency of the world, signs and wonders were requisite in order to startie and 
break down that superstition, idolatrous in itself and the source of all other idolatry, 
which tempts the natural man to seek the true cause and origin of pubUc calamities in 
outward circumstances, persons and incidents... But with each miracle worked there 
was a truth revealed, which thenceforward was to act as its substitute: and i f we think 
the Bible less appUcable to us on account of the miracles, we degrade ourselves into 
mere slaves of sense and fancy, which are indeed the appointed medium between 
earth and heaven, but for that very cause stand in a desirable relaticm to spiritual truth 
then only, when, as a mere and passive medium, they yield a free passage to its 
hght."'' 
It is in this sense that Coleridge writes in the Biographia that the best part of human language: 
... is formed by a voluntary appropriation of fixed symbols to internal acts, to 
processes and results of imagination, the greater part of which have no place in the 
consciousness of uneducated man; though in civilised society, by imitation and 
passive remembrance of what they hear from their religious instructors and other 
superiors, the most uneducated share in the harvest which they neither sowed or 
reaped."" 
The Statesman's Manual (1905). 310-11. 
BL, XVn, 197. (my italics) 
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Coleridge traces this inculcation of the common sense of propriety and 'innate' sense of 
liberty in the English people to the Reformation, which transferred the learning of the schools 
through the pulpit into 'the phrases in hourly currency among our peasants.' The feet that 
these senses are not truly iimate, but rather the legacy of the determinations of the Christian 
faith that now seem natural to us, he proposes is demonstrated by the very obstacles that 
missionaries have found 'of finding words for the simplest moral and intellectual processes in 
the languages of uncivilised tribes.'(I97). That peasants therefore speak a universal language 
of nature, Coleridge states quite funily, is an urban myth. 
Paul de Man on symbol and allegory 
Although it is somewhat of a diversion from the argument, it seems to me necessary 
to address the charge that Coleridge also appealed to the same organic sense of universality in 
exalting thought-feeling as poetry, particularly in his concept of the symbol (and therefore of 
the imagination). For i f the Romantics' historicised and organicised sense of universality 
leads invariably to the hermeneutic aporia that has so vexed contemporary interpretative 
practices, as we have seen that Gadamer has argued, then if Coleridge merely presents an 
instance of the same organicism, his theory of poetics offers no escape from it. What I am 
suggesting however is that Coleridge effectively presents an argument akin to Arendt's, 
emphasising the necessities of the meaningful prejudices of Christian theology for the 'just 
distinctions' of philosophy and true poetry. 
But a fer more alarming possibility than one that categorises Coleridge as a Kantian 
has presented itself m the deconstructionist school of criticism in recent years. It has emerged 
precisely because it understands Coleridge to be making a universahst type of argument. In a 
well-known and influential essay, Paul de Man claimed that Coleridge's concept of the 
symbol was nothing but a ft)rm of allegory that had pretensions to a metaphysical claim. De 
Man's essay alleged that Coleridge's concept of the symbol fell into the same sort of abyss 
that Wordsworth's poetic efforts had, that of the self-referential play of the mind with itself, 
because it made no connection to a greater truth-claim than that of 'ejqjerience.'''*' His 
allegation strangely takes us to the very heart of the matter in Coleridge's account. Gadamer 
has noted (and I too have argued) that the organicist valorisation of the symbol at the ejq)ense 
of the allegory in the Romantic period is 'the product of an aesthetics that refiises to 
distinguish between ejq)erience and the representation of this e^qierience.''*^ This tendency to 
Paul de Man 'The Rhetoric of Temporality.' Blindness and hisight. (1983). 187-228. 
ibid. 188. 
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blur the distinction between experience and its representation holds true for much of 
Coleridge's own poetry too; indeed the poetry of the entire age suffers from what Arnold 
described to be characteristic of Shelley, namely ineffectuality. A poetics based aroimd the 
symbol, which has informed the New Critical practice of reading poetry as an 'organic work' 
with a special integrity, is all too often a poetics of affect, not effect. 
Nonetheless, it is questionable whether that fact can lead us to regard all uses of the 
symbol as having the same intention and obeying the same universal logic. De 
Man and most Anglo-American critics assume that Coleridge's use of the word symbol is 
tantamount to a proof of the same and they point to his wide reading of German philosqjhy as 
their historical evidence. They are supported in their view of Coleridge by the fact that he 
himself borrows extensively from the German philosophers leading directly up to his key 
definition of the Imagination in Book 13 of the Biographia and even often expresses himself 
in comparable terms. This leads them to assert that Coleridge's definition is basically 
synonymous with that of his contemporaries, particularly Wordsworth, even i f his distinctions 
are more carefully expressed (and, above all, more Kantian). My contention is that although 
Coleridge does indeed seize on the compatibility of aspects of these writers' work with his 
own, it does not warrant such a strict association. 
The evidence must be scrutinised carefully. It is beyond dispute that both 
Wordsworth and Coleridge operated within the same tradition, reacted to a similar context 
and employed similar terminology. What is eminently debatable though is whether they both 
are suscq)tible to the purely 'allegorical' model of reading language that the deconstructionist 
Paul de Man applies to them; and in particular, whether he can attack Coleridge's idea of the 
symbol as a mere obfiiscation of arguments that are as suscq)tible to deconstruction as those 
of his contemporaries are. I f that is the case, then the aporia would be as much a part of 
Coleridge's notion of the symbol as it is of his contemporaries' Romantic hermeneutics. It is 
my primary intent here to demonstrate that Coleridge's intention (and the reasons he chose to 
e)q)ress it as he did) is different than others have represented it. The merits of his argument, 
i.e. whether he succeeded in presenting the true prejudices that exonerate him from charge of 
presenting a universahst argument, I leave for the reader to judge himself Coleridge's 
objection to Wordsworth in the Biographia alone seems evidence that he perceived there to be 
0 ^ d««thU is because be 
a^ertion, »hich, given tbe e ^ o o n " " ^ X l i ; W l namely consists in tlie bringing 
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a fimdamental divergence in intaition between himself and Wordsworth that needed to be 
made clear. 
Judging from the history of the reception of the Biographia. it does not seem that he 
was wholly successfiil. In feet, quite the opposite seems to have resulted. Coleridge's theory 
has been mistaken by the critical tradition as an extension of German literary theory, which, 
because of its essential compatibility with Wordsworth's poetics, has rendered his own 
philosophical distinctions questionable and his theological additions superfluous. His 
practical criticism has been roundly praised, but his philosophical and particularly his 
theological arguments have largely been ignored or mistaken. I suspect that this rec^tion 
owes itself as much to the accident of history that placed him in a coimtry initially hostile to 
German philosophy - requiring him to present and defend more vigorously arguments that in 
a different context he might have been more wary of doing - but thereafter in general 
agreement with it. Coleridge's own exuberant association of his work with the work of 
contemporary German philosophy, an exuberance that extended to the point of plagiarism, 
has also conspired against him in making those differences known. It ought peihaps to be 
read in the hostile context in which it was written rather than in the receptive context of its 
appropriation, which, as I argued at the outset of the chapter, has understood the value in the 
German philosophical tradition in a way Coleridge did not. This would go a long way 
towards ejq)laining the incompatibilities that are apparent between Coleridge and the thinkers 
he so eagerly though not^quivocally affiliated himself to at the time. He somewhat 
overstated this strong affiliation, and most importantiy did so at the most important point in 
his best read critical work. The evidence indeed weighs heavily against the possibility of ever 
extricating Coleridge from their diadows, or Wordsworth's form of Romanticism. Coleridge 
seems to be vindictive and petty in attacking his fiiend's poetic theory. 
Be that as it may, it seems to me that Coleridge's symbol is primarily used, unlike his 
German contemporaries and fellow English Romantics, as a means of holding onto the 
traditional Christian theological intention of the allegory, which had been in:5)overished as a 
trope by the Enlightenment's appUcation of the 'prejudice against prejudice.' '** In using the 
concept of the symbol^ Coleridge thought, by contrast, that he was giving it a determination 
that allowed it to escape being implicated with this 'unenlivened generahsing understanding,' 
which he and his contemporaries obviously thought the concept of the allegory had been. 
This implication was as much of a threat in universahst thought as in materialist thought i f 
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both were ultimately related to the terms of life-experience. Gadamer writes in re-assessing 
this valorisation of the symbol: 
Nineteenth century aesthetics was foimded on the freedom of the symboUsing power 
of the mind. But is that a sufficient foundation? Is not this symbolising activity also 
in feet limited by the continued existence of a mythical, allegorical tradition? Once 
this is recognised, however, the contrast between the symbol and allegory again 
becomes relative, whereas the prejudice of the aesthetics of Erlebnis made it appear 
absolute. Likewise, the difference between aesthetic consciousness and mythical 
consciousness can hardly be considered absolute."^ 
Most certainly Gadamer has a point in this. Indeed I believe that Coleridge would 
have agreed with him that life-experience per se is not a possible ground for truth. For 
despite the strength of his advocacy of the symbol (which seems to ally him to the tendency 
that arose in the nineteenth century around the aesthetics of Erlebnis), Coleridge's intention 
had been none other than to lay claim to the ground to which the old use of allegory had 
pointed. His use of the symbol certainly appealed to life-experience, but it could not be 
reduced to it. He argued the 'continued existence' of a tradition that had been inculcated by 
the teaching of the Bible. The truth he thought it contained had nothing per se to do with 
symbolic or allegorical depiction. They were means to an end. The whole debate that has 
sprung up to be primarily about distinctive or 'religious language,' whether symbolic or 
allegorical, which Gadamer appears to open up again, was secondary to him. His use of the 
symbol was thoroughly Christian in intent and he adopted the concq)t of the symbol because 
it lay claim to both the literal and metaphorical. 
So as not to overstate the point here, I think that what de Man observes in the 
Romantics' concept of the symbol and in its feirly unequivocal valorisation in the 'organic 
work' by contemporary critics such as Abrams and Wasserman is largely correct.'"** The 
'"^ Coleridge's dismisses the 'prejudice against prejudice' that Gadamer has noted to be characteristic 
of Kant and the Enlightenment as the product of an 'unenlivened generalising understanding' I think it 
more correctly imderstood as an unenlivened umversalising understanding. 
Hans-Georg Gadamer. T&M, 81. 
De Man points out one particularly notable exception to the widespread adoption of the symbol in 
the German tradition as an example of the complexity of the intellectual climate of the debate between 
symbol and allegory, Hamann's polemic against Herder. He notes of that polemic: 
In the perspective of traditional German classicism, allegory appears as the product of the age 
of Enlightenment and is vuhierable to the reproach of excessive rationahty. Other trends, 
however, consider allegory as the very place where the contart with a superhuman origin of 
language has been preserved(189, my italics) 
He notes that Hamann, quite against the tendency of the age, mounts his attack on Herder's 'natural' 
explanation of the origin of language on the basis of the 'allegorical nature of all language.' Three 
comments are worth making here about de Man's reduction of the symbohc/ allegorical debate to be a 
linguistic dispute of the first order: Firstly, 1 object to de Man's nonsensical use of the word allegory 
here. Allegory cannot be considered as a place other than figuratively, in which case the object of its 
figuration ought to be named. As it stands it is a figurative reference to a figure of speech, which he 
probably intends to refer to a place of absence that is 'contarted' The traditional use of allegory on 
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symbol cannot be regarded as a generic solution to the supposed generic problem of 
metaphorical diction. He is correct m questioning 'the supremacy of the symbol' 'as the basis 
of recent French and English studies of the romantic and post-romantic eras, to such an extent 
that allegory is frequently considered an anachronism and dismissed as non-poetic.'*'*^ Such a 
sense of the symbol owes itself to a mistaken notion of religious language that de Man quite 
rightly suspects, though it is also true of a model of thinking without true prejudices that he 
himself adopts. Where I think he lapses into error however is by not differentiating 
Coleridge's use of the symbol (and therefore his use of the imagination) from that of the other 
Romantics. This leads him to attack Coleridge on the basis of a position he does not espouse. 
This mistake is particularly puzzling since de Man admits that the problem with the symbol 
may actually have originated with the critics:"** 
Wasserman's claim for Coleridge as the reconciler of what he calls 'the phenomenal 
world of understanding with the noumenal world of reason' is based on a quotation in 
which Coleridge simply substitutes another self for the category of the object and thus 
removes the problem from nature altogether, reducing it to a purely intersubjective 
pattem. 'To make the object one with us, we must become one with the object — 
ergo, an object. Ergo, the object must itself a subject — partially a fevourite dog, 
principally a fiiend, wholly God, the Friend.' Wordsworth was never guilty of thus 
reducing a theocentric to an interpersonal relationship."' 
What de Man observes here is true on one level - the ironic. What he describes Wordsworth 
as never having been 'guilty of was precisely the substance of Coleridge's accusations in the 
Biographia - that Wordsworth's Prefece not only made no sense, but had abstracted all 
personal and logocentric character from God. De Man's insight reveals his very bUndness to 
that. Moreover, what he refers to as theocentric here seems to me to be in keeping with 
the other hand reflects the perceived inadequacy of language to hilly grasp its object (or, if you will, 
the blasphemy of trying to make it subject to cognition) by naming it directly. Secondly, de Man 
somewhat clumsily conflates the Judaeo-Christian account of language with those of an EnUghtenment 
understanding of Greek mythology by referring to the superhuman origin of language as if language 
were something superadded to man after creation. The account in Genesis however stresses that God 
is a being who speaks and brinp everything that is into being by the power of his words, thereby also 
marking his mastery over it; similarly mankind speaks and relates to the world through language as an 
intrinsic part of being made in imago Dei. Thirdly, Hamann's traditional sense of the word allegory 
was becoming obsolete. As such, the point de Man is making here is purely pedantic. The allegory 
was replaced by the concept of the symbol, though not usually with the intent Hamann had had for 
aUegoiy. Its fimction was usually appropriated by the writers of the age for the wholly secular 
intention of what Gadamer calls Erlebniskunst, i.e. which Abrams describes as Romanticism's 
characteristic 'natural supematuralism.' The organic common sense that has developed on the symbol 
is however not Coleridge's, but that of his fellow Romantics. It contains the aporia. 
"^DeMaaoacit 190. 
' He cites the tendency of later Enghsh and American criticism to misunderstand in the symbol a 
dialectic of subject and object, 'in which the experience of the object takes on the form of a perception 
or a sensation The ultunate aim of the image is not, however, as in Ck)leridge, translucence, but 
synthesis, and the mode of this synthesis is defined as 'symboUc' by the priority conferred on the initial 
moment of sensory perception.' (193). That critical tendency is one of pure associationism and he 
rightly dismisses its claims to 'transcendence.' 
"'^DeMaaop.cit 198. 
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Wasserman's (and Wordsworth's) own conflation of metaphysics with theology. His sense of 
theocentricity is more universalist and impersonal than theocentric, except in the Deist sense 
of that word. It is wholly abstracted from any sense of the formative power of the acts of God 
in the world. The 'intersubjective partem' that de Man pronoimces Coleridge 'guilty of is in 
keeping with the distinction between Christian theology, which is centred upon the God who 
became incarnate and died as an atoning sacrifice for sin 'once for all,' and metaphysics, for 
which the formative influence of history hes outside consideration. The two realms certainly 
do to an extent overlap, but they are not co-extensive. 
TTiis distinction between what Coleridge meant and what de Man and others have 
mistaken him to have meant becomes clearer in de Man's discussion of Coleridge's femous 
distinction between the symbol and the allegory in The Statesman's Manual. De Man's intent 
is to discredit any sense of 'real presence' in language that Coleridge, it is said, attributes to 
his universalist argimient. Coleridge initially presents, de Man notes, what appears to be 'an 
unquaUfied assertion of the symbol over the allegory'"" in fiill harmony with what Gadamer 
characterises as the broader Romantic tendency of Erlebniskunst to signify 'art that comes 
from experience and is an e3q)ression of experience' and more derivatively, 'that is intended 
to be aesthetically e3q)erienced.'"' In consonance with this broader tendency Coleridge says, 
for example, that in the life of the symbol, life and form are identical: 'sudi as the life is, 
such is the form.'"^ These assertions taken on their own suggest that in the symbol 'no 
disjunction of the constitutive feculties takes place, since the material perception and the 
symbolic imagination are continuous, as the part is continuous with the whole.'"^ By way of 
contrast, the allegory as he presents it is 'but a translation of abstract notions into a picture-
language, which is itself nothing but an abstraction from objects of the senses; the principal 
being more worthless even than its phantom proxy, both alike unsubstantial, and the former 
shapeless to boot.'''* The difference between symbol and allegory appears so fer to be clear 
and distinct. 
However, says de Man, these distinctions are then confused by Coleridge in The 
Statesman's Manual. For there, rather than emphasising the organic or material richness of 
the symbol - as we might have ejq)ected given his association of 'the essential thinness of the 
''"ibid. 190. 
' " (jadamer. T&M. 70. It may be in the 'iiaention to be aesthetically experienced,' which Gadamer 
rightly notes as a contemporaneous and not entirely equivalent phenomenon, that we can note the 
beginning of the concept of a separate 'religious lamguage' of 'real presence' referred to earlier. 
S.T. C;oleridge. Essays and Lectures on Shakespeare and Some Other Old Poets and Dramatists. 
(1907). 46. 
"^DeMan. OP. cit. 191. 
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allegory with a lack of substantiality' - Coleridge praises above all the symbol's 
translucence of the eternal through and in the temporal.' This is aU too much for de Man: 
The material substantiality dissolves and becomes a mere reflection of a more 
original imity that does not exist in the material world. It is all the more surprising to 
see Coleridge, in the final part of the passage, characterize aUegory negatively as 
being merely a reflection. In truth, the spiritualization of the symbol has been carried 
so fer that the moment of material existence by which it was originally defined has 
now become altogether uninqjortant; symbol and allegory alike now have a common 
origin beyond the world of matter. The reference, in both cases, to a transcendental 
source, is now more important than the kind of relationship that exists between 
reflection and its source. (192) 
De Man chief conqjlaint, we note, is that Coleridge's notion of symbolic language has 
abandoned the characteristic traits of 'religious language,' i.e. an adherence to certain magical 
words as i f they contained 'presence.' Coleridge makes no claims to greater ontological value 
for his symbolic language in and of itself De Man concludes that the difference b^een the 
symbol and the allegory 'is a pure decision of the mind.' 
It might be usefiil at this point to cite the passage in The Statesman's Manual that de 
Man refers to at greater length, firstiy, because it usually is cited out of context (as is the case 
here) and, secondly, because there, significantly, the imagination and the fency are also 
prominent in it. It is important to see Coleridge's distinction between the symbol and the 
allegory in the context of a conq)arison that he had just made. He commented on the 
distinction between universahsing forms of philosophy and the truths of the Bible, primarily 
in terms of how the latter works organically, by means of 'educts' through wiiidi truths flow 
and take their form: 
The histories and political economy of the present and preceding centiuy partake in 
the general contagion of its mechanic philosophy, and are the product of an 
unenlivened generalizing understanding. In tiie Scriptiu-es they are the living educts 
of the imagination; of that reconcilmg and mediatory power, vihich incorporating the 
reason in images of the seme, and organizing (as it were) the flux of the senses by the 
permanence and self-circling energies of the reason, gives birth to a system of 
symbols, harmonious in themselves, and consubstantial with the truths of which they 
are the conductors. (321, my italics) 
SymboUc language has ontological value, not because the words are 'magical,' we note, but 
rather because they are consubstantial, i.e. because the truths to which they attest have that 
predicate. This truth can make them 'true prejudices,' not the language itself 
srs^rs=iei 'aSs ; r^a%s.-«e.„^of«.- .or 
'Uving educts.' 
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Having made this comparison of the two and having attributed the difference between 
them to the symbol's ability to convey 'hfe,' the woilc of the 'reconciling and mediatory 
power' of the imagination, Coleridge goes on to assert the consequences of the feilure to 
accept both the literal and the metaphorical sense of Scripture: 
A himger-bitten and idealess philosophy naturally produces a starveling and 
comfortless religion. It is among the miseries of the present age that it recognises no 
medium between literal and metaphorical. Faith is erther to be buried in the dead 
letter, or its name and honours usurped by a counterfeit product of the mechanical 
understanding, which in the blindness of self-complacency confounds symbols with 
allegories. Now an allegory is but a translation of abstract notions into a picture-
language, which is itself nothing but an abstraction from objects of the senses; both 
aUke insubstantial, and the former shapeless to boot. On the other hand a symbol... is 
characterised by a translucence of the special in the individual, or of the general in the 
especial, or of the universal in the general. Above all by the translucence of the 
eternal through and in the temporal. It always partakes of the reahty vfhich k renders 
intelligible; and while it enunciates the whole, abides itself as a hving part in that 
unity, of which it is the representative. The others are but empty echoes which the 
fency arbitrarily associates with apparitions of matter, less beautifiil but not less 
shadowy than the sloping orchard or hill-side pasture-field seen in the transparent 
lake below.(322) 
We can see that Coleridge has not attacked allegory because it refers to the here and 
now of sense perception, but rather because that is the only reference it is making. The 
abstraction from that is therefore mere pretension. In a figurative (though, he would argue, 
entirely real) sense, he s&ys that allegory thus leads to an 'insubstantial and shapeless' form of 
understandiug, and an illusory notion of the world and of God. Allegory smacks too much of 
assocationist psychology, which itself denies the pre-formative role of a language (in which 
historical acts, the best part of language, as well as sensible observations are captured) in 
informing thinking. Coleridge is not referring here to a 'transcendent source' - that is the 
pure Deism 'without history or divine acts' that misinforms de Man's own understanding of 
Coleridge's reference to God. Such is indeed 'a starveling and comfortiess,' as well as a 
nonsensical religion, but that is clearly not yffbst Coleridge is saying here with reference to the 
symbol. The irony of w^at Coleridge wrote in attacking the use of the allegory however is 
that it could also be appUed to the use of the symbol by the writers appeaUng to the veracity 
of Erlebnis or 'feeling.' Their use of the symbol, Coleridge might argue, was allegorical. 
The Imagination in the Biographia Literaria 
What I propose that the Biographia primarily demonstrates is Coleridge's repeated 
effort to bring poetics and literary theory into harmony with Christian doctrine from whence, 
he imphes, comes the meaningful and true prejudicial terms of right reason and 
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understandmg. For the 'truth is its own hght and evidence, discovering at once itself and 
felsehood... '(EL, XVin, 218) The conviction of these true prejudices leads him to try to 
persuade the reader of the inadequacies of the philosophy that Wordsworth (and many of the 
philosophers he examined in the first half of the work) recommended - Cartesian forms of 
universality and their 'lifeless and godless' dualism."* Wordsworth's is a difficult argument 
for Coleridge to contend with precisely because it tends to propose conclusions similar to his 
own, i.e. that there was a unity that transcended all forms of appearance, which kept 'the 
heart alive in the head' and enabled a correspondence between the mind and nature. This 
unity, both poets believed, was one that could be symbolised in art. Nonetheless, a problem 
presents itself for Coleridge in so fer as this unity appears to relate the natural quite 
transparentiy to the imiversal without any sense of distinction between them. It seems to me 
that Coleridge distinguishes himself from Wordsworth by proposing different concepts of 
nature and of the universal in the Biographia. 
To follow Coleridge's train of thought in it we must acknowledge the ground wherein 
he saw the abiding unity within its broad range of material to lie, in the unifying vision of the 
Bible. This contained within it the fimdamental notion of agency that his contemporaries' 
appeal to 'organic' e3q)erience denied. As he states not six months previously: 
.. .the words of the apostie are literally and philosc^hically true: We (that is the 
human race) live by feith. Whatever we do or know, that in kind is different from the 
brute creation, has its origin in a determination of the reason to have feith and trust in 
itself This, its first act of feith is scarcely less than identical with its own being. 
Implicite, it is the copula - it contains the possibility - of every position, to which 
there exists any correspondence in reality... .The primal act of feith is enunciated in 
the word, GOD: a feith not derived from ejqjerience, but its ground and source, and 
without which the fleeting chaos of fects would no more from e)q)erience, than the 
dust of the grave can of itself make a Uving man. TTie imperative and oracular form 
of the inspired Scripture is the form of reason itself ia all things piu-ely rational and 
moral.'" 
Coleridge's association of reality and the 'form of reason itself with the truth of revelation 
explains his unusual sense of universality 'in all things rational and moral.' It also helps us 
understand his objection to Wordsworth's claim to take 'a selection of the real language of 
men in a state of vivid sensation.' For he understands the reality to Ue not in the testimony of 
subjective experience, which can be contradictory and illusory, but in the formal prejudices 
instilled by Holy Scripture that are the groimd and source of interpreting and understanding 
1 ^ Thomas McFarland, in his rnlPrid»e and the Pantheist Tradition (1970), mterprets this as part of 
Col^d^s^or t S o i d the danger of pantheism, but I think it probabty more accurate o see n as 
S to^mote monotheism against the twm extremes of seeing God everywhere ^ « ^ ) 
w Mm Zhere (Deism). By this I do not mean to question that Colendge was not Tnmtanan, but an 
seeing him , . . 
rather that that was not the front on which he was fighting. 
'^ ^ The Statesman's Manual. 315. (myitaUcs) 
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that subjective experience truthfully (and meaningfiilly), discovering at once itself and 
felsehood. 
His own form of 'high argument' is however not a 'religious discussion' that can be 
sundered from the philosophical and poetic issues in the Biographia. Nor is it merely 
appended to the end of both halves of that work."' To imderstand it in either of these ways is 
to make a distinction between normal and religious language that Coleridge firmly resisted, as 
I have already argued. It foils to acknowledge that the vast range of material in the 
Biographia constitutes a proof of his refusal to see the intellectual issues he deak with 
heterogeneously or in a con^jartmental manner. This does not demonstrate the identity of this 
reality or its arguments with the proofs of the senses or of other forms of arguments he 
provides. As he points out, 'things identical must be convertible.'"' It demonstrates rather 
that he was seeking 'a total and undivided philosophy,' in which 'philosophy would pass into 
religion, and religion become inclusive of philosophy.' And that was the basis of the 
arguments he made throughout the Biographia. Nonetheless, this goal of unity did not lead 
him to obviate all forms of difference by taking a 'universal perspective' on ontology of the 
sort characteristic of Descartes and the rationalists. He did not reintroduce 'the absolute and 
essential heterogeneity of the soul as intelligence and the body as matter. ''*' The 
philosophical distinctions he made had neither the prejudice of imiversality against all 
prejudices, nor did they base themselves on the organicist appropriation of the sublime's 
aesthetic of individuation, an aesthetic of absent delimitation (vdiich may have played a 
greater role in the compartmentahsation of specialist knowledge than has ever been 
acknowledged). His distinctions still had an important sease of difference to them. 
Desprte appearances, Coleridge's belief that he could achieve an 'equatorial point' 
between making 'just distincticms' and presenting a unifying vision was based on the feet that 
he did not even propose to investigate 'an absolute principium essendi.' He admits that 
The editors to the two volume edition of the Biographia. while unfortunately implying a separation 
of different types of language (and argument) in the work - they see it as part of Ctoleridge's attempt to 
'find an anchorage for his philosophy in the bottomless sea of fkith' - nonetheless make a helpfiil retort 
to the critics who have argued that the work as a whole lacks unity: 
The development of the philosophical chajxers, fiom materiahsm and associationism to 
transcendentalism ends - as Coleridge thought it should - with God No matter in what order 
he wrote the Biographia. he arranged that the philosophy of its first volume concludes with 
divinity, just as the second volume builds to a crescendo in Chapter 24, with the proclamation 
of Christ and of God the Father, the same 'great I AM' of theses VI and DC {Editors' 
Introduction, bodii) 
BL, XVni, 205. He offers a typically colourfiil and appropriate example of what he means: 'An 
ideahst defending his system by the fact that when asleep we often beUeve ourselves awake, was well 
answered by his plam neighbour, 'Ah! but when awake do we ever believe ourselves asleep?' 
'*°BL,Xn, 154. 
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would have opened it to many valid objections. Rather, it was based on the attempt to 
investigate 'an absolviteprincipium cognoscendi.'^^^ This differentiated what he attempted 
from what Wordsworth proposed, because it meant that he was not thereby following 
Descartes' ontological and 'fencifiil hypothesis of material idea, or certain configurations of 
the brain, which were as so many moulds to the influxes of the external w o r l d ' - as 
Wordsworth's nature and the experiential 'language' he claimed to derive from it was. The 
principle of knowledge he sought was one that would not work like a principle of origination 
by virtue of its pure and 'unprejudiced' self-referentiality, which Wordsworth had called the 
act of 'selection.' Coleridge did not move from an organicised void as did most of his 
contemporaries, from 'the profounder thought that in the negative as such there lies the 
ground of becoming, of the imrest of self-movement.''** 
Instead he took the Divine act of creation as a given, as the groimd of the very 
possibility for human creativity. And because he took the creation of mankind in God's 
image as axiomatic, he took the act of divine self-revelation (which, unlike human self-
revelation through actions, carried within it the power of actuality that men only possessed, 
except through its imitation, m potentiality) as a paradigm for the human power of 
imagination to reconcile the self and natiu-e as intimations of the second coming of Christ. 
This resemblance of the human to the divine did not impinge on his idea of creativity in the 
least; or, i f it did, then it only did so in so fer as it compassed it within the bounds of what 
Newton and Kant had demonstrated men's minds could explore through the use of reason.'*' 
For i f a man repeated the acts of the Creator, then he was creative - otherwise he merely 
employed the arbitrary, sensual relations of what Coleridge caUed the fancy. Nor did this 
rational capacity for universal thinking lead Coleridge to conclude that mankind (or the world 
for that matter) was any less a created being; on the contrary, man's capacity to think 
universally (as Arendt argued Kant's idea of Vemunft armounced) and yet also unify his 
thoughts into an organic coherence worked as a confirmation for him that he, who had been 
created in imago Dei, could think in terms that transcended the visible. 
BL, Vm, 74. 
EL, Xn, 154. The two different acts of the intellect that are necessary 'to obtam adequate notions of 
any truth' are the acts of division and the unification. Nonetheless, they are not equal. While division 
is the technical process of philosophy, unification ought to be the result (Cf XIV, 171). It is his lament 
that the process is usually proposed and accepted as the result by philosophers. 
'*lBL, V, 57. 
G.W.F. Hegel. Science of Logic. (1969). 166. 
In fact, the suggestion that creativity perhaps ought to be Umited to the guidelines set by nature was 
not really explored by Coleridge with the same interest that it was by the young Mary Shelley in her 
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To present this in more philosophical terms (as the Biographia does more frequently 
than some of his other works), i f the imagination's capacity to think in universal terms and yet 
present a unity in a particular form did not begin by originating spontaneously from the pure 
origin of nothingness (i.e. of transcendence taken as the origin of nature), how did it work 
then? For 'rather than admitting that we can never achieve certain knowledge of first 
principles, and then insisting on absolute coherence and closure between the parts of any 
system buih upon those assumed first principles. Romantic aesthetics insists upon a recourse 
to emptiness, a re-founding in imperceptible beginniugs, at every point of transition between 
the parts of its systems.''** But Coleridge suggests on the other contrary, in reflecting on the 
historical development of philosophy, the imagination functioned in a via media: 'Our 
inward experiences were... arranged in three separate classes: the passive sense, or what the 
school-men call the merely receptive quality of the mind; the voluntary; and the spontaneous, 
which holds the middle place between both.''" The imagination certainly did not copy and 
slavishly associate given things - he attributed that power to a facuhy he designated the 
fancy. The imagination on the contrary was 'at once active and passive' - and thus 
'spontaneous.' The 'spontaneity' of Coleridge's 'organicism' is decidedly different from his 
contemporaries. 
This mediating role needs to be expanded sUghtly. To be accounted passive, the 
imagination of man had to acknowledge the priority of the creation of the world and, more 
importantly still, of himself in the divine image. I f there is any doubt on Coleridge's 
intentions on this point, without such an acknowledgement, it would have been uiq)ossible for 
him to say that the primary imagination involves the '^repetition in the finite mind of the 
Infinite I AM' and still claim a distinction for the imagination from the fancy. To be active 
however, and therefore voluntary, it required the same acknowledgement of creation (and 
specifically of its repeatability by virtue of being made in imago Dei). Coleridge selects his 
words very carefully then when he concludes his rejection of Wordsworth's attempt to ground 
the selection of the transcendent on Nature: it is, he says, 'inpracticable; and i f not 
impracticable, it would still be useless. For the very power of making the selection implies 
the previous possession of the language selected. r >168 
166 
167 - |rT?4 ^ w o r t h comparing the active or voluntary element of the act of i m a ^ o n in 
Worf^orth and Coleridge. In Wordsworth's case, the voluntary element is contamed mwhat he 
2^ 3^  fr i^ LsSndent process of'select^ ^^^ 
'voluntary aiJr^riation' to be that 'of fixed symbols to internal acts. (XVn, 197) 
BL, XVin, 201. 
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What then is the 'spontaneous, which holds the middle place' between the passive 
and the active? Here we must look to Kant and to Coleridge's interpretation of the 
importance of Kant's philosophy, in particular of his concept of Reason. I think Leslie 
Brisman is correct in suggesting that 'Coleridge borrows the term Reason from Kant, but all 
his own is its association with the Holy Spirit over and against the Understanding and the 
'natural' feculties of the mind.''® Coleridge as suggested earlier consistently uses the 
Kantian term Reason differently than a more conventitmal reading of Kant would suggest, as 
a drive for meaning. He differs as much in his reading of Kant as do those who have tried to 
understand him as a philosopher in the more conventional Kantian mould. Whether Coleridge 
is right in this supposition about Kant's motives is difficult to discern. 
What is more certain is his consistency in interpreting the concept of reason as right 
reason,' that is as the inclination of the mind of man towards freedom, towards the 
'unconditioned,' towards God, as a result of the work that the Holy Spirit had done in forming 
the 'civilised' iatellect: 
In order to have an efficient behef in Christianity a man must have been a Christian, 
and this is the seeming argumentum in circulo incident to all spiritual truths, to every 
subject not presentable under the forms of time and space, as long as we attempt to 
master by the reflex acts of the understanding by what we can only know by the act of 
becoming. 'Do the will of my fether, and ye shall know whether I am of God.' (287) 
This association of Kant's Reason, rightly imderstood, with the work of the Holy 
Spirit is very helpftil in explaining v^ a^t Coleridge intended by the term 'spontaneous' and its 
'middle place' between the passive and the volimtary. It also helps us to resolve the central 
problem of Kantian philosophy, the repeated reference to 'spontaneity' at crucial junctures. 
Andrew Bovne explains why the term 'spontaneity' is entirely crucial to all of Kant's 
Critiques. It is related to the problem Kant has of grounding self-consciousness as the highest 
principle of his scientific and moral philosophy. In that concept the problem of understanding 
our free will is linked to the problem of describing the existence of self-consciousness: 
As we saw, there can be no evidence of freedom, which Kant caUs a'^ fact of Reason,* 
because it caimot appear. Freedom is, though, the centre of Kant's enterprises. He 
talks of a 'causality through freedom' v^diich can bring into new states of the world 
which can only result from our free activity. Reason, the 'capacity for purposes,' 
reahses somediing which cannot be empirical - freedom - in the world. How, 
though, are we to know this? As we shall see, BCant's aesthetics will later try to 
provide an answer to that question. Reason involves something which is infinite, in 
the sense that it cannot in any way be determined by anything finite we know about 
the world. It 'shows a spontaneity so pure that it goes beyond everything with which 
sensuousness can provide it.''™ 
169 
no 
Leslie Brisman. 'ColeridgeandtheSupematural.' (Summer 1982). 125 ^ 
Mdrew Bowie. A.cth.t ir . .nd Subierti^itv Fron(^ant to Nietzsche. (1990). 21. ^ 
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Kant's difficulty in grounding self-consciousness and delineating freedom is not Coleridge's. 
The 'spontaneity' that he refers to as a 'middle ground' between pure passivity and pure 
voluntarism is provided for him by God as he has revealed himself This revelation acts as 
the truth, the realm of the primary imagination, which 'is its own light and evidence, 
discovering at once itself and falsehood,' and it is 'the prerogative of poetic genius' to imitate 
it and 'to distinguish by parental instinct its proper offspring from the changelings which the 
gnomes of vanity or the feiries of feshion may have laid in its cradle or called by its 
names.''^ ' 
This association of spontaneity with divine revelation indeed clarifies Coleridge's 
ejqjlanation of the various facets of the imagination. It is probably helpful to repeat them 
here: 
The imagination... I consider either as primary, or secondary. The primary 
imagination I hold to be the living power and prime agent of all human percqjtion, 
and as a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM. 
TTie secondary I consider to be an echo of the former, co-existing with the conscious 
will, yet still as identical with the primary in the kind of its agency, and differing only 
in degree, and in the mode of its operation. It dissolves, difiiises, dissipates, in order 
to re-create; or where this process is rendered impossible, yet still, at all events, it 
struggles to idealise and to unify. It is essentially vital, even as all objects (as objects) 
are essentially fixed and dead.' 
The primary imagination, as Coleridge calls it, is the symbolic and 'prejudiced' basis by 
which the finite mind can think and act and 'hve,' the work and life of the Holy Spirit. It is 
what he commonly refers to as 'the light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world,' 
the very 'translucent' quality that the symbol incorporates. 'But i f it be asked by what 
principles the poet is to regulate his own style, i f he do not adhere closely to the sort and order 
of words which he hears in the market, wake, high-road or plough field? 
I reply: by principles, the ignorance or neglect of which would convict him of being 
no poet, but a silly or presunqjtuous usurper of the name! By the principles of 
grammar, logic, psychology! In one word, by such a knowledge of the facts, material 
and spiritual, that most appertain to his art as, i f it had been governed and apphed by 
good sense and rendered instinctive by habit, becomes the representative and reward 
of our past conscious reasonings, insights and conclusions, and acquires the name of 
taste... by the power of imagination proceeding upon the all in each of human 
nature... by meditation, rather than observation... and by the latter in consequence 
only of the former."^ 
Coleridge's primary imagination, then, does not meet the ejqjectations of the rationalist. It is 
not primary in the sense of being iimate, it is primary in the sense of being fundamental and 
BL, XVin, 218. 
i^^BL,Xin, 167. 
^"BL ,XVin, 217-18. 
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logically prior to the applicaticm of the secondary.Its universality derives from being 
instituted by the acts of God, fbundationally in the Bible and continually by the ccmsonant 
work of the Holy Spirit, not from the mind's derived capacity of universality. Coleridge's 
poet, who uses the secondary imagination, is a second maker, but only in so fer as he is 
guided by the first. 
It is difficult to assess Coleridge's equation of the imagination with Ae work of the 
Holy Spirit. On the positive side, it offers an account of imiversaUty that is nonetheless 
rooted in tradition and which lays hold of eternal truths. It does not fell foul of the Kantian 
'prejudice against prejudice' at the first hurdle by entering the aporia of the spontaneity, nor 
does it shrink away from confronting the rationaUst's paranoia of felling back upon 'dogmatic 
assertions.' On the contrary, I think he genuinely tries to resolve the central problem of 
Kant's spontaneity, the infinite regression that marks the 'pure' use of reason. He is entirely 
right in noting that Kant's allegedly pure use of reason could only have been based on the 
legacy of Christianity. It was the underlying prejudice for both him and his audience in their 
attempt to explain the findings of Newton's imiversal science in terms of human psychology. 
Coleridge's definition of the imagination is an attempt to link an accoxmt of 'true prejudices' 
aOsmpt, he 
's use 
to the power of the mind to think in universal terms and to be open to freedom, without 
dispensing with the integrity of the foundation upon which it vras based. In this attsTopi, 
provided two prime exanples of the imagination at work, the Biographia itself and Kant' 
of the secondary imagination in breaking the 'slavery' of materialist and associationist 
theories of the workings of the mind. 
Deviating from the underlying theological thrust of the Biographia. which constitutes 
its unity, had of course more practical implic^ons that Coleridge was also at pains to 
demonstrate in the 'practical criticism' of the second half Taken as a wiiole, the work argues 
that bad theology makes for bad philosophy and leads, eventually, to bad poetry. He 
demonstrates in its second half that because Wordsworth's Preface proposes a theory of 
poetry that is fimdamentally anti-artistic and incomprehensible, yet inspires a degree of 
admiration bordering on 'religious fervour,' it not 'rebels against existence as it has been 
given' but also constitutes a profound intellectual and spiritual heresy. For v i^iat Wordsworth 
calls 'selection' in the Preface, the process of 'situating' and even identifying oneself with 
To go back to the symbol of Ught, used here in a more Uteral sense, he makes an analogous point 
with regard to it that he does to language: , . ^ ^ ^ 
It would be easy to explain a thought from the image on the retma, and that from the geometry 
of light, if this very light did not present the same difficulty. (BL, YUl, 77) 
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another's sensations inspired by his organicism, Coleridge refers to as an abstraction of the 
fancy: 
Fancy, on the contrary, has no counters to play with but fixities and definites. The 
fancy is indeed no other than a mode of memory emancipated from the order of time 
and space; and blended with, and modified by that empiiical phaenomenon of the will 
which we ejq)ress by the word choice. But equally wtth the ordinary memory it must 
receive all its materials ready made from the law of association.'" 
It is plain that what Wordsworth designates as 'selection' and gives transcendent power in the 
Preface. Coleridge confronts with his notions of the 'imagination' in the Biographia. notions 
to which the two-world view was intrinsic and, as Coleridge implicitiy argued it, necessary 
for comprehension to take place. The collapse of the two was what gave Wordsworth's 
poetry its distinctive power - its capacity to allude to more than met the eye - but 'just 
distinctions' needed to be maintained in order to prevent grievous error (sudi as 
Wordsworth's theory presented), and bad poetry, as his followers produced, from resulting. 
175 BL, Xm, 167. 
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Chapter 4 Shelley's Organicist Theology in Mont Blanc 
Shelley's Utopian argument 
On Sunday, 20 July 1816, three weeks after having returned from his Swiss lake tour 
with Lord Byron and shortly after having written his Hymn to Intellectual Beauty. Shelley set 
off from Geneva with his wife Mary and her half-sister Claire Clairmont to visit the valley of 
Chamouni, a well-known tourist resort. On the path from Servoz, three leagues from 
Chamouni, they were confronted with the majestic landscape surrounding Mont Blanc. The 
effect of this landscape on Shelley was profound. He described the experience in a letter to 
Peacock: 
Mont Blanc was before us, but it was covered with cloud; its base, fiirrowed with 
dreadfiil gaps, was seen above. Piimacles of snow, intolerably bright, part of the 
chain coimected with Mont Blanc shone through the clouds at intervals on high. I 
never knew I never imagined what moimtains were before. The immensity of these 
aerial summits excited, when they suddenly burst upon the sight, a sentiment of 
exstatic wonder, not imallied to madness. And remember this was all one scene, it all 
pressed home to our regard and our imagination. Though it embraced a vast extent of 
space, the snowy pyramids which shot into the bright blue sky seemed to overhang 
our path; the ravine, clothed with gigantic pines, and black with its depth below, so 
deep that the very roaring of the imtameable Arve, which rolled through it, could not 
be heard above - all was as much our own, as if we had been the creators ofsuch 
impressions in the minds of others as now occupied our own. Nature was the poet, 
whose harmony held our spirits more breathless than that of the divinest."^ 
It was a theophany of sorts for him, but the terms his response took to it were altogether 
strange. On the one hand, he claimed the ejqjerience to have been so intense, it was akin to a 
private possession. One might have expected it therefore to be inestimable, as things of 
intimate worth tend to be. However, it seems to be precisely the intimate 'proximity' of the 
experience to him that led Shelley to identify it with creating the impression in others' minds. 
This could be attributed to simple immodesty on Shelley's part, delusions of grandeiu". But 
the association bears too great a similarity with Wordsworth's own to be simply accounted so. 
I explore the mukivalent resuhs and effects of Shelley's claims, first to own the scene he 
beheld in Mont Blanc and then to be its author on his relationships between himself, his 
audience and God in the following. 
The language of the poem is characterised by tones, diction and even ostensible 
subject matter that are fittingly Wordsworthian. However much the influence of Wordsworth 
marks the poem thou^, it is still very much one bearing the distinctive stamp of Shelley's 
idiosyncratic genius. The idiosyncrasies of the Shelleyan style and thinking in the poem belie 
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attempts to bracket it sinq)Iy as an imitation of the eflforts of Wordsworth or Coleridge,'" 
though the nature of the relation to his predecessors is one of the many important issues 
which must engage a critique of the poem. Many of these telltale marks were the product of 
Shelley's studied intellectual inclinations, but, at the time he wrote the poem, various other 
ideas amenable to his general outiook were also commanding his interest, as we know from 
his letters to Peacock - Buffon's theory of Nature's inevitable self-destruction. Peacock's 
'esoteric Indian duaUsm,' and the curious but characteristic connection he made between 
God's non-existence and tyranny. 
Shelley's Mont Blanc provides an interesting twist m the foundation that 
Wordsworth had set in directing his poetry towards the transcendental state of feeling 
produced by 'selecting' an 'aspect more sublime' on life. For i f Wordsworth presented, as 
Coleridge was to demonstrate in the Biographia. a fimdamental intellectual error and 
theological heresy by suggesting that this artistic imaginative act needed no recourse to any 
prejudice but Ufe itself, Shelley embraced his poetic self-representation as a mediator of life 
that much more radically and resolutely. David Sin:5)Son ejqplains the dynamics of Romantic 
poetry to run according to an analogy of a Uving organism, a process whose attraction he 
traces to its ability to avoid the idea of causality: 
Rather than admitting that we can never achieve certain knowledge of first principles, 
and then insisting on absolute coherence and closure between the parts of any system 
built upon those assumed first principles. Romantic aesthetics insists upon a recourse 
to emptiness, a re-founding in inqjerceptible beginnings, at every point of transition 
between the parts of its systems. The organic model itself, whilst appearing to 
introduce an indubitable continuity, yet locates that continuity at some level beyond 
or within what can be apprehended as phenomenal appearance; we can only wonder 
at the transition from seed to blossom.'^ 
This is precisely the effect of a shift from an imderstanding of life as the work of a Divine 
Creator to an understanding of life according to the model of an organism that Arendt 
recorded. It is with the intent of recasting the similarly causal, monotheistic associations of 
the Deist topos into the terms of an organism that we must imderstand Shelley's Mont Blanc. 
For not only did he atten^t to undermine and obscure the notion of agency in language, he 
also attenqjted to remove the sense of nature as having been created by an agent. He did so in 
various wise: through aUegiance to various ejqjhcitly heretical doctrines and symbols, 
through a process of embracing the Wordsworthian sense of universality as an epistemology 
and through the deconstruction of his own metaphors. 
'^ * 'To Thomas Peacock, Esq.' July 22"", 1816. The Complete Works of SheUev. VI. (1965), 137. (my 
itahcs) 
Coleridge poem 'Hymn before Sxmrise in the Vale of Chamouni' used the same landscape for its reflection some years earlier, as Shelley certainly must have known 
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It is by these means that Shelley demonstrates in a way more consistent than any of 
his contemporaries the intellectual and spiritual imphcations of the Wordsworth's Romantic 
aesthetic, founded upon a generative emptiness {natura naturans). In a sense, he can be seen 
in this demonstration as Coleridge's negative image. Whereas Coleridge attacked 
Wordsworth's premises of the poet as a 'natural' mediator of the processes of life and argued 
for the positive necessity of prejudices, in particular the terms and conditions of the primary 
imagination in order to create (rather than be 'fancifiil') and the formative effect of the sensus 
communis upon imderstanding in order to understand, Shelley, in embracing Wordsworth's 
premises as radically as he did, demonstrated their absurdity by demonstiating how they 
undermined the idea of agency in terms of presentation. The issue of Shelley's obscurity and 
how it is we are to understand it is then the main topic of the discussion in Mont Blanc. It is 
my contention that Shelley's consistent adherence to the organic model of hfe causes him to 
lose artistic authenticity in the poem, because the reader is left vnthout the orientation 
provided by a distinction between the poet's perspective and the world he surveys. 
My hermeneutic aim at reading Shelley is somewhat novel, but it is certainly not 
without its predecessors. For the most part, these have concentrated on the immediate effect 
of Shelley's use of language, though there have always been the undertones of heresy in 
Shelley's poetics. Matthew Arnold simply thought him a 'beautiful and ineffectual angel, 
beating in the void his luminous wings in vain.' F.R Leavis more trenchantly con^lained 
that Shelley habitually confused the tenor and the vehicle of his metaphor. The failure to 
dissociate the two, a consequence of Shelley's 'weak grasp on the actual,' also led him, in 
Leavis's estimation, to write ineffectually. At one time, Leavis's syn:q)athies were so widely 
held that Shelley's place in the literary canon was in serious doubt. An entire reassessment of 
Shelley has taken place in more recent decades however. Richard Cronin offers a more 
syrrqjathetic response to Shelley's poetry, more characteristic of the revival of Shelley's 
standing as a poet in recent decades, defending his use of metaphor as one befitting his 
intentions for it, as 'the picture of an integral thought': 
Metaphor, for Shelley, is most powerful when it is not a comparison between one 
thing and another, but a single, whole apprehension which refuses analysis into its 
constituent parts. Indeed... Shelley suggests that the use of metaphors in which tenor 
and vehicle are clearly distinguished is an evidence of imaginative weakness. 
Cronin is no doubt right when he suggests that Leavis's objection essentially denies Shelley 
the validity of his use of metaphor. It is worth remarking in passing what will be conmiented 
David Simpson, opxit. (1981). 181. 
'"'^  Richard Cronin. SheUev's Poetic Thoughts. (1981). 21. (myitahcs) 
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upon in greater detail in the following: Cronin's description of Shelley's use of the word 
'imaginative' and 'metaphor' demonstrates precisely how for words can be stretched to 
represent ihe aporia of incomprehensibility around a Romantic notion of 'imperceptible 
beginnings.' For surely a metaphor that does not compare cannot by definition be a 
metaphor; similarly inconprehensible is the notion of the imagination without a cdierent 
sense of agency to divide the agent from the world he imagines. 
Cronin suggests that the mark distinguishing Romantic verse from its poetic forebears 
is that, 'put briefly, meaning in Augustan verse is aggregative, meaning in Romantic verse is 
propositional.' (15-16) This sounds authoritative, but what does it mean? It means, he 
explains, that in Shelley's verse, 'character or value' 'do not exist outside the temporal 
sequence of... words.' Poetic creation, in other words, is taken in Romantic terms to have a 
sense compatible with its understanding of life as a 'spontaneous' appearance. It is 
coterminous and coeval with the process of speaking. The former practice appeals to the 
meaning of words and concepts and distinctions established by tradition, even when deviating 
from it; the latter claims to begin the whole process ex nihilo, as a 'self-interpreting 
orphan.""" 
Cronin's remark is helpfiil in e}q)laining the frequent confusion of tenor and vehicle 
in Shelley's use of metaphor. What he gives insufficient attention to though is the manner in 
which Shelley's poetic practice does, on a broader scale, exactiy what he claims Leavis's does 
to Shelley's writing in particular - it questions the validity of artistic associations. For 
Shelley's own self-referential use of language inherently rejects the validity of referential 
language, metaphoric or otherwise. His practice of rejecting or manipulating orthodox 
references is, with the possible exception of Blake, more consistent and resolute than his 
contemporaries. Since the late 1970s, the balance has swung to support the validity of the 
tenor and thus the vehicles of Shelley's claims, or at the very least the failed workings of his 
metaphor. What Shelley has demonstrated for critics most strongly informed by 
deconstructive practices of reading is his 'heteroglossy,' the genuine conflicts in his writing 
that transcend even the New Critics' attempts to resolve them (and preserve the sacred 
integrity of 'organic form') by appealing to a supervening process of irony. Shelley has gone 
from being outside the 'Romantic canon' to being, in many critics' eyes, central to it precisely 
because of his heteroglossy. That revision has however itself occurred, to use Cronin's terms, 
in a 'propositional' fashion. The actual grounds whereby validity may be judged have only 
rarely been assessed in criticism, regardless of whether one accepts the vaUdity of a self-
180 Lundin. op. cit. 24. 
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referential use of language or of a more traditional 'aggregative' use of language. 
However, Leavis's criticism, for all of its contrary charges of Shelley's ovm 
'imaginative weakness,' does not even concem itself with the intentions of Shelley's use of 
metaphor (though he seems to discern them as clearly as Cronin and many others have). It 
simply suggests that authorial intention carmot be the criterion of validity without 
qualification: a subjective perspective that acts on the presumption that it legitimates itself 
invahdates itself Since we can observe in the different hermeneutic processes of verse before 
and after the Romantics (reflecting different theological premises and different common 
senses) an entirely different tendency of authorial intention before and after the Romantic 
period, it is clear that legitimacy caimot be contingent simply upon that intention. The real 
question then is which use of language is legitimate, and since we are deaUng with two 
opposing conceptions, the solution to that question obviously does not lie in the realm of 
authorial intention per se. 
I f we cannot accept authorial intention as the criterion of legitimacy in and of itself, 
an insight which alone will already make us ill at ease with Shelley's apparently self-
referential use of language, how can we approach the poem in a manner that will engage with 
the conventional notions of agency related to the topos of Mont Blanc and rq)resentation of 
them in terms of processes? Richard Holmes, one of Shelley's biographers, claims that 
Shelley's emotional response to the landscape around Mont Blanc vtas informed by the 
intellectual position he had already adopted as an atheist."^ Although this does not appear to 
be helpful, it is one of the keys to interpreting a difficult poem to which a coherent position is 
otherwise difficult to attribute, indeed one v^^ch displays conflicting and shifting inqjulses. 
To be sure, the concerns of the poem are many, but that is the one that accounts for the rest. 
However, it is precisely this claim that is also so problematic. For how are we to understand 
atheism without an estabUshed and prejudicial notion of theism? And how do we understand 
'heteroglossy' without the estabUshed prejudices of personal agency and voice? Shelley's 
presentation of atheism is a far more complex subject than it appears. As I just stated, his 
atheism is informed as much by universal philosophical scepticism (in the form and process 
of the 'Romantic hermeneutic') and by his radical attempts to subvert the logical notion of 
agency in the poem as it is by the explicidy 'conventional heresies' we can note in it. How 
can these 'heresies' be understood except as varying attempts to present an ahemative to 
orthodoxy, in other words, how can they be understood except as attempts which share the 
i^RichardHolmes. SMeyOheMit. (1974). 340. 
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common sense of feilure and impracticability? These are considerations that will inform my 
reading of Shelley's literary critics and my assessmerrt of Mont Blanc. 
One of the modes by which atheism is expressed in this poem compatible with the 
notion of an organic model is in the dualistic terms of natural forces. Shelley combined in a 
novel marmer the putative supremacy of the natural forces of Peacock's Indian deity 
Ahrimanes, the spirit of darkness, cold and death, with the supremacy of the 'large codes of 
fraud and woe' of the Christian God over their respective opposing forces of Oromazes, the 
spirit of light and warmth, and the powers of the poet. Further on in his letter to Peacock he 
makes his agreement with Buffon's theory of natural entropy clear, but denies it to be his 
intention to write upon natural effects so much as the terrible effects of such tyrannous power 
on humanity: 
I will not pursue Buffon's sublime but gloomy theory, that this earth which we 
inhabit will at some fiiture period be changed into a mass of frost. Do you who assert 
the supremacy of Ahriman imagine him throned among these desolating snows, 
among these palaces of death and frost, sculptured in this their terrible magnificence 
by the unsparing hand of necessity, & that he casts around him as the first essays of 
his final usurpation avalanches, torrents, rocks & thimders - and above all, these 
deadly glaciers at once the proofs and symbols of his reign. - Add to this the 
degradation of the human species, who in these regions are half deformed or idiotic & 
all of whom are deprived of anything that can excite interest & admiration. This is a 
part of the subject more moumfiil & less subhme; - but such as neither the poet nor 
the philosopher should disdain."^ 
Despite his resolution not to pursue Bufifon's 'gloomy' theory, the tone of Mont Blanc is 
hardly cheery and it does seem to synthesise those aspects of Ahriman with the Deist God that 
many others had come to associate with Mont Blanc. His dismissal of Buffon's theory is 
probably more closely associated with Peacock's assertion of the supremacy of 'Ahriman' 
rather than the vestiges of his 'presence' that he acknowledged to be in Mont Blanc's 
landscape. Shelley objected to all these associations of God together, as befitted the 
'democrat, philanthropist and atheist' he considered himself to be.'*^  
These vestiges had other cormotations for Shelley though. For both him and his 
companions, the emotional association of the mountain with an orrmipotent but benevolent 
God by increasing swathes of well-heeled tourists to the region was infuriating, given their 
blindness to the ills of the local inhabitants. This wilfiil blindness to the plight of the 
wretched inhabitants sirtqjly encapsulated for them these toiuists' equal insensitivity to the 
penurious eflFects of their own tyrarmous rehgion and government at home. Shelley's 
182 'To Thomas Peacock, Esq.' July 24, 1816. The Complete Works of SheUev. VI. (1965), 140. 
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association of the imagery of Ahriman and what he represented to both Deist and Christian 
frames of thought is the largely unspoken synecdoche of the poem, but the polemic against 
Christianity is really the stronger because it is implicated in a general attack on the evil of the 
conditioning effects of 'ossified' language in a way that the Deist thought is not. 
The debate between Peacock and Shelley was of course protracted and emerged some 
years later in the context of his more famous and aggrieved reply in The Defence of Poetry 
(composed 1821, pubUshed 1840) to Peacock's pessimistic Four Ages of Poetry (1820). The 
nature of Shelley's divergence from Peacock's Ahriman on this point can perhaps be seen 
more clearly and helpfully, i f in a different light there. The weight of his argument rests upon 
the distinction Shelley wants to uphold between two kinds of utility and their relationship to 
some immutable and universal criterion of pleasure: 
.. .poets have been challenged to resign the civic crown to reasoners and mechanists 
on another plea. It is admitted that the exercise of the imagination is most delightful, 
but it is alleged that that of reason is more usejul. Let us examine as the grounds of 
this distinction, what is here meant by Utility. Pleasure or good in a general sense, is 
that which the consciousness of a sensitive and intelligent being seeks, and in which 
when found it acquiesces. There are two kinds of pleasure, one durable, imiversal, 
and permanent; the other transitory and particular. Utihty may either ejqjress the 
means of producing the former or the latter. In the former sense, whatever 
strengthens and purifies the affections, enlarges the imagination, and adds spirit to 
seme, is useful. But the meaning in w^ich the Author of the Four Ages of Poetry 
seems to have employed the word utility is the narrower one of banishing the 
importunity of the wants of our animal nature, the surrounding men with security of 
life, the dispersing the grosser delusions of superstition, and the concihating such a 
degree of mutual forbearance among men as may consist with the motives of personal 
advantage. (500-01) 
Whereas Peacock associated utility in Benthamite terms with the amelioration of the 
conditions surrounding humanity (including their social relations) and he commended reason 
as their governor, the more 'imiversal utility' Shelley claimed (and suggested is particularly 
effected by poetry) results from a more profound act of engaging with and changing the 
human condition itself'** The connection between Shelley's earlier divergence from the 
views of Peacock and the Deists, which he elaborated upon in Mont Blanc, and his more 
famous one here in The Defence is clear: others' Mont Blancs, particularly those of other 
poets, in either their 'rational' use of language or rational intentions, i.e. their appeal to 
notions of causality, only refer to conditioning forces. Their utility can therefore be praised in 
Holmes records that this is how he described himself in a series of hotel registers m the region, og. 
cit. 342. 
Since we are aheacfy conditioned beings by merely being in the world, the distinction in utihty 
which Shelley wishes to make here regardmg a certain use of language seems at best one of degree 
rather than of kind. However, the import of what he is saying is clear even if the distinctions are not -
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a limited and transitory manner at best,'*^  whereas his Mont Blanc, both in its use of language 
and its intention, addresses the human condition confronting those conditions and is thus 
universal. 
When it comes to critical assessments of Shelley's enterprise in Mont Blanc, it is 
surprising that given his acknowledged antipathy to Deism that there have not been more 
attempts than there are to read the poem as the attenqjt by a prophet of another religious 
persuasion to assert his own claims. That aspect of the poem obviously places Mont Blanc 
firmly in the sublime tradition. Just as Coleridge in his poem 'Hymn before Sun-rise, in the 
Vale of Chamouni' rather incongruously associated the moimtain with the God of the Bible, 
Shelley also used poetic license to dismiss both. One reason for an occasional lack of critical 
attention may be that Shelley's poem is in a sense also a predominantiy self-conscious poem, 
ejqjressing the nature of poetic creation. It presents Shelley's notion of the spirit of poetry 
(which draws it into intimate relation to his concept of humanity) and enacts its own theory 
on itself This aspect of the poem seems purely self-referential. Given that self-referentiality 
however, it is also surprising that more critics have not focussed on the philosophical and 
linguistic ramifications of this form of self-consciousness in Mont Blanc either, since the 
philosophical-linguistic theory is itself iDheretstiy nihiUstic to the point of obscurity. What is 
most surprising though is that the two aspects have not been adequately combined in a critical 
reading, as both are very much a part of the poem. 
The reason why they have not been adequately combined is apparent - there is no 
conventional concept or topos that can encompass both the intention of parodying the 
tradition of the sublime (which would invite judgement according to that model) and the 
intention to be purely self-referential (which can, it is claimed, be judged only according to 
the human condition - whatever that is). The two claims are mutually exclusive. Since 
however the atheist perspective in the poem is patent in it, it follows on from that that if no 
topos can encompass this position, its position must be Utopian}^ I hope to demonstrate then 
that two seemingly contrary yet complementary projects are part of the great undertaking in 
Mont Blanc: on the one hand, Shelley presents a utopia, in the strictest sense of a perspective 
'Poets are the unknown legislators of the world' in whose service the votaries of reason govern, albeit 
without the knowledge of what Shelley calls 'the spirit' 
'^ ^ Language is itself one, if not the primary, of the conditioning forces. Ahrimanes' attributes of 
darkness, cold and death, are taken by him to symbohse necessity, tyranny and indeed all the negative 
governing (or conditioning) powers of authority. 
By using the term 'utopian' I am intending a literal sense of the word as 'no place' rather than its 
conventional association as an ideal place. The reader may choose to see the irony in my usage of it 
upon reviewing the critical arguments that tend to ideaUse and laud these tendencies in the poem. 
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of «o place by no one ; on the other, he alludes to the traditional topos an allusions of this 
Mont Blanc in the writing of others. This allows Shelley's utopia to appropriate the same 
intellectual ground as w^at it alludes to. This Utopian character, in other words, is a product 
of Shelley's organic model, which incorporates the res extensae of the surrounding world into 
his res cogitans. 
What I am assessing in the foUowing is Shelley's assessment of ^ he human^dihoi, wWch stems 
froThis inclusion of the transcendent (the Uteraiy absolute) withmhis concept of the self. 
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/ . Critical Responses 
There are four critics I look at in the following, all of whom have seized on aspects of 
Shelley's obscurity and its relation to the topos of the poem. I have not presented them in any 
particular order, but I do critique them with as much an eye on Shelley and the reading of the 
poem I shall present as a summary of what they have written. 
i) Frances Ferguson 
Frances Ferguson addresses Shelley's engagement with the mountain as a Deist 
symbol and states, 'in his efforts to counter the myth of natural religion that is attached to 
Mont Blanc, Shelley does not destroy the mountain's symbolic value but merely inverts it. ''*^ 
Her observation is true in two senses: firstiy, it tacitiy accepts other poets' Deist cormotations 
and merely reverses their verdict - God is not an extension of nature - the mountain qua 
mountain would say nothing were it not for 'the human mind's imaginings.' Secondly, the 
poet appropriates the legitimating role from the 'moimtain.' Though the second point 
controls the first, these two aspects of the inversion are inextricably linked. 
Ferguson's article falls into the pattern estaWished by Eari Wasserman of 
understanding the poem's meaning according to its form, as an 'epistemological' 
demonstration. Far from being the exercise of pedantry that such a formal practice might 
suggest, it raises questions with far broader implications. This is particularly the case in this 
poem because the description of Mont Blanc, she suggests, is invaded by the allusions it 
makes to imiversal forces and the mind's interplay with them. She presents the strengths and 
weaknesses of his approach most clearly in her analysis of Wasserman's discussion of the two 
irresolvably contradictory trq)es of the poem, sufficiency and excess. '*' Hers is as much a 
critique in dialogue with his as with the poem itself, a practice that seems warranted by the 
very tenor of the observations that Wasserman made. It was of course significant in 
informing the conclusions that Wasserman reached that he used the idea of tropes, 
conventionally referring to a figure of style, to express the semantic claims in Shelley's poem. 
'*^  Frances Ferguson. 'SheUey's Mont Blanc: Whatthe Mountain Said'(1993). 43-55. 45. 
'** Starting perhaps with Earl R. Wasserman's magisterial treatment of the poem in Shellev: A Critical 
Reading (1971), in which he posited in the first six Unes of Mont Blanc the voice of the mind and the 
'Universal mind,' critics have understood there to be different voices in the poem Wasserman's 
suggestion is helpfiil in so far as it demonstrates how the poet's finite mindtsads towards universality. 
It is also clear however, that althou^ he makes this allusion, Shelley deUberately avoided making 
voices understood in an exclusive sense explicit in the poem. 
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Form and content, allusion and meaning thereby became as inextricable in his critique as they 
had been, he claimed, in the poem itself. 
Ferguson confirms the relevance of Wasserman's duahstic terms of sufficiency and 
excess to the form and content of Mont Blanc. The trope of sufficiency, she suggests, 
manifests itself m the poem in various ways. It can be seen in his description of the 
landscape's forces of action and reaction, such as we observe in the ravine's 'active' 
charmelling of the river's flow and the latter's 'passive' formation by it. It is signified by 
Shelley's use of anagrams and other forms of phonic similitude sudi as his 'relational 
pxmning' of rave, ravine and Arve. And it is similarly prominent in his use of antitypes, such 
as we see in the mountain's correspondence to the vale in one instance, which transmutes to a 
correspondence with the cave in the next. These shifts are themselves attended by the 
changing 'location' of his narrative voice, which bring with it constant changes in 
perspective. Indeed this voice changes in respect to all aspects of the physical/ metaphysical 
world with which it engages itself in the poem except change per se - that would require a 
stable 'situation' which would render the other 'changes' empty rhetoric. TTie 'threat' of his 
poetry being reduced to mere rhetoric, Ferguson suggests, hangs over the poem. 
The other trope Wasserman mentions, that of excess, follows closely upon the 
suggestions of sufficiency in the poem and leads to yet further attempts at supplying meet 
images to the landscape Shelley portrays, suggesting that what had seemed sufficient is not. 
For Ferguson, this practice of retroactively undermining his own tropes of sufficiency by 
suggesting their insufficiency produces a wonderful excess of images, with concomitant 
possibihties of meaning. She notes that Shelley's use of language in Mont Blanc glories in 
presenting the inextricable involvement of thoughts in the process of e^qjressing (or 
becoming) other thoughts or in relating to thmgs. Rather provocatively she remarks that this 
practice raises questions about the status of language. But instead of exploring the effect of 
Shelley's apparent refusal to make fixed discriminations upon the meaning of words or 
things, she prefers to give an account of its 'aesthetic effect,' its suggestion of wholeness and 
interrelatedness. Like Wasserman, whose intellectual thrust she broadly adepts, Ferguson 
sees the significance of Shelley's 'elaborate sdiema of reciprocity' to lie in its status as a 
'metaphor for a total universe that is indifferentiy things or thoughts and that is located in the 
One Mind.'"" 
189 Ferguson, ibid. 44. 
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HoweverjFerguson recasts Wasserman's argument in terms ostensibly more amenable 
to Shelley's own. She argues that these relations in the 'One Mind' are better understood by 
relating Shelley's aUgnment of epistemology to 'love' instead of the focus that Wasserman 
had suggested for them, to ontology. This departure from Wasserman's emphasis is the key 
feature of her reading of Mont Blanc. In re-adjusting Wasserman's terms, Ferguson seems to 
have made an advance on his reading because 'love' is a term of considerable interest to 
Shelley in a way that 'being' is not. The broader question of whether it is the function of 
criticism to recover authorial intention w^ile ignoring a perceived failure of the poet to make 
himself comprehended I shall defer for the moment in order to trace the imphcations of her 
change in the terms of understanding Shelley's poetics. For even assuming that Ferguson's 
critical intention is sound, her reading raises a new critical difficulty. It requires us to 
understand exactly what Shelley meant by 'love.' Although it diverts us somewhat from 
Ferguson's reading of Mont Blanc, it is important to understand Shelley's meaning of 'love' 
in order to assess her critique, particularly since it seems to me that his sense of it is 
idiosyncratic. 
Epistemology, Deism and Shelley's View of Love 
Fortunately, Shelley realised that his conception of love was sufficiently 
unconventional to write on it directly and e3q)lain his views. He provided his thoughts on the 
subject in an 1818 essay 'On Love.' Some brief extracts from that essay should be sufficient 
to acquaint us with its general thrust. However they cannot be presented without some 
comment on their context or some reflection on the estabUshed notion of the word. The first 
thing that should be noted is that he uses the word love in a sense that mtentionally combines 
both personal and Christian theological in:q)hcations. It is not only the universality of the 
love or the monotheistic overtones of the 'One Mind' common throughout his thought that 
suggests this, it is his e3q)Ucit claim that the end of love is 'a proper Paradise w^ich pain and 
sorrow and evil dare not overleap.'"° The key theological point that Shelley makes about 
love entails removing a distinction (or equating) what are, in terms of Christian doctrine, 
different kinds of love. The Oxford English Dictionary describes these distinct kinds of love 
in theological usage as 'the love of complacency, which imphes approval of qualities in the 
object, and the love of benevolence, which is bestowed irrespective of the character of the 
''^ I do not mean to deny the manifold allusions and nuances of the poem (nor in his writing as a 
whole) to other theological ideas. The poem has Gnostic elements, echoes of Lucretius, Plato and 
aUusions to Arithmanes. But the literary theme he chooses in writing Mont Blanc is that which his 
immediate predecessors called 'the sublime' and his interest in using the idea of love m relation to it, 
which I beUeve Ferguson is right in noting that he does, evokes Christian connotations immediately. 
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object.' Whereas the former is a more general sense of the word, the latter is the sense used 
by the apostle John to describe the unique salvational power of divine love when he writes 
'this is love, not that we loved God, but that he loved us and sent his Son as an atoning 
sacrifice for our sins.' (1 John 4:10) 
However the dynamic of making the two senses synonymous is not quite as simple as 
removing a distinction or 'questioning the status of language' would suggest. Rather, a series 
of changes are brought about in Shelley's concept of love in which characteristics of both are 
combined. Four interrelated things are worth noting about Shelley's concqpt of love in his 
removal of the distinction between the complacent and the benevolent attributes of love. 
When seen in conjunction, they cause the external sense of the sensus communis to cede place 
to an internal sense but, more in^ortantly in this instance, they lead to a notion of love that is 
presented in complacent terms yet purports to function as a substitute for the scheme of 
salvation enacted by Christ's unique benevolent act of Divine love. This is the standard by 
which the currency of Shelley's understanding of love more or less exphcitly measures itself. 
The effect is comparable in this sense: while Christ's sacrificial love acts as an atonement to 
cover sin and thereby restore believers in Him to a right relation with God, Shelley's 
comparable act of love acts on the assunq)tion that he shared with Kant and the 
Enlightenment: that he could remove all prejudice fi-om human thinking and create a pure 
inner state of being. This 'iimer being,' he suggests, is, the mind's 'own place,' to use 
Milton's words, a 'paradise within, happier far.' 
It is probably most helpfiil to arrive at an understanding of Shelley's conclusion in his 
essay 'On Love' if I first make a series of observations about the philosophical and literary 
context in wiiich Shelley was writing. It seems to me that these act to inform his conclusion 
about vidiat love is. The first step in the process of appropriating the character of benevolent 
Divine love as a personal motive for 'poetic action' had already been made for him when 
Deist writers related the concept of love to a rational proxy of the divine, an absolute absence 
or 'void,' rather than to a personal notion of God."' The characteristic Deist conception of 
God that Shelley confi-onted in the poetry and philosophy of the Enlightenment portrayed 
Him as 'a blind watchmaker' who had set the universe in motion according to certain 
immutable 'laws' and had left it to run according to them. God was infinitely distant, 
impassible, infinite, absolute. This conception was reflected in the common literary topos of 
the eighteenth century, the sublime, which Shelley of course e^qjlicitly alludes to by writing 
This is not to say that Shelley accepted these terms, as his polemic 'Against Deism' bears evidence, 
but that it nonetheless influenced the way he regarfed the subject. 
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on Mont Blanc. The subhme experience was defined by the feeling of relief at having been 
preserved from the threat of being annihilated by something suggestive of these rational 
concqjtions of the Creator, typically a grandiose landscape sudi as that of a mountain. 
Shelley's advance on these inherited terms of understanding takes place when he 
reformulates them to suit an organic model. This organic model had a profound effect on the 
way he formulated and thus understood the whole experience of the sublime. It no longer led 
him, as it had his Enlightraiment predecessors, to perceive the infinite (God) externally in (or 
beyond) nature. It led him to understand both the feeling of being threatened and the sense of 
relief from that threat as aspects of an internal experience of sublimity, i.e. as a fimction of 
his own mind's 'bodily' capacities. If we remember that this absence had the role of the 
'Divine watchmaker,' we can understand his extraordinary, even 'revolutionary' claims for 
the power of creativity of the artist. Furthermore, this organic understanding of the absolute 
as a Junction of his own capacities to perceive leads him to claim an 'attraction' to the world 
that was prompted by the intellectual void (God) within himself and the relations in his mind. 
This appropriation of the primary power of creation to the mind of the artist has a 
form of correspondence in another change in understanding that Shelley displays in contrast 
to the perspective of more 'objective' forms of rationalism. These have akeady been alluded 
to in the discussion of the second chapter of the reappraisal that Romanticism made in 
historicising and 'biologising' the 'world-view' of the Enlightemnent. After Descartes' 
assun:5)tion of universal doubt had brought into question the connection between our thoughts 
and the world of things, scientists and the men of letters of the age were led to entertain 
various nightmare scenarios of solipsism, i.e. fears that the extemal world and Ufe in it may 
not really exist. 'Saving the appearances' was arguably the primary aim of experimental 
science and corresponding motivations can be seen to underlie philosophical and artistic 
speculation.''^ A famous response to the 'void' that had been created, which expresses the 
common sentiment, was uttered by Pascal in response to the blankness of the night sky: 'the 
eternal silence of these infinite spaces terrifies me. 
,194 
But the organic model and its intemalisation of the absolute to 'historical' fecticity as 
the 'spontaneity' of perception led Shelley to conclude that the void of incomprehensibility 
lay not between us and the world of appearances at all, but rather 'within our own thoughts.' 
Cf A D NuttalL A mmmon Skv: pi^ ii»<=opliv and the I iteraiY Imagnanon. (1974). 
- S e dfficuSwith these explanations, wWch ranged from matmalism to assoaaUve psychology 
to i d S i ^ were traced by Coleridge in the first half of the Biogra^. 
Pensfes. iii. 206. 
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This meant that the void had effectively been repositioned. The result of this repositioning 
was that he believed that the distinction between things and thoughts could not longer be 
made with any certainty.'^ This lack of distinction, combined with the 'creative universality' 
that accompanied the very act of thinking in his organicist model, led Shelley to his idea of 
unity. He ejqjressed it coherently in his essay 'On Life,' some time after the essay in 
question: 
The view of hfe presented by the most refined deductions of the intellectual 
philosophy, is that of unity. Nothing exists but as it is perceived. The difference is 
merely nominal between those two classes of thought which are vulgarly 
distinguished by the names of ideas and of external objects. Pursuing the same thread 
of reasoning, the existence of distinct individual minds similar to that which is 
employed in now questioning its own nature, is likewise found to be a delusion. The 
words, /, you, they, are not signs of any actual difference subsisting between the 
assemblage of thoughts thus indicated, but are merely marks employed to denote the 
different modifications of the one mind.'" 
This sort of unity of 'life' in which the truth of distinctions was held to be entirely contingent 
upon perspective (or 'situation') and which coxild in turn be subordinated to the idea of one 
'universal mind' seems to necessitate a radical revision of language itself It undermines 
words and concepts that have aeriological connotations. The most important of these for the 
sake ofSie poem Mont Blanc was no doubt the model of the artist as a maker (homo faber), 
which ceded to the model of the artist as a mediator of the processes of Ufe. Hiis is the 
perspective on life of the animal laborans. Once this model was espoused, words could no 
longer properly be understood to designate the fundamentally different surrounding world, for 
they obeyed the same logic of the process as food does to the ingesting organism: that of 
becoming a part of the being that ingested it. 
Ferguson is correct then - Shelley does often question the status of language. But 
this is not the focus of his essay 'On Love' or his poem Mont Blanc. In these writings, 
appropriating the idea of universality within a subjective perspective does not lead him to 
question the status of language. It leads him to question the status of the 'religious 
ejq)erience' of the sublime to which universahty is related objectively in a landscape. This is 
precisely because of the topos's association with being the work of the 'bUnd watchmaker.' 
For Shelley, the experience of the sublime may be better understood as an act projecting the 
universality of the 'human mind's imaginings' onto nature. This first attribute of his concept 
of love stems from that projection, its creation of a universal community. Qwts against his 
Deist predecessors' views, from Shelley's organicist perspective the experience of the 
This of course had the hermeneutic effect that was traced throughout the introductory chapters of the 
thesis, the aporia. 
This was the effect of David Hume's radical critique of cause-and-effect statements. 
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subUme leaves one neither with a sense of relief at having been preserved from the destructive 
forces of an omnipotent power, nor paralysed by a feeling of solipsistic isolation. It 
empowers him to awaken a community outside 'himself according to the 'bodily' ejqjerience 
of the 'life' within: 
(Love) is that powerful attraction towards all that we conceive or fear or hope beyond 
ourselves when we find within our own thoughts the chasm of an insufficient void 
and seek to awaken in all things that are, a community with what we experience 
within ourselves.'** 
The terms of this community, we note, are not those of a community with others but 'with 
what we ejqjerience within ourselves.' If these others are not of one mind with him on his 
organicist view of the One Mind, he feels himself whoUy separate from them, a point that 
becomes clearer as his essay progresses. Shelley's humanistic love is inspired by the 
imperative of universahsm, characterised by the tyranny of inejqjressible conviction and 
prejudiced, in being located in thoughts, to be beyond discussion. 
It is worth while to make a brief comparison of Shelley's sense of community to the 
more conventional senses of it which were discussed by Arendt in the second chapter. What 
is remarkable about Shelley's community is that it is neither conceived in relation to a 
political realm, i.e. a forum where other 'free' people can be related to and communicated 
with, nor is it related to the private realm of a family; nor is it even the relation of 
communicants across the ages 'in Christ,' 'as members of one body,' 'the priesthood of all 
believers.' Instead it is the 'community of the organism,' to use another seminal Romantic 
metaphor, in his 'marriage' to the world. But that marriage is centred upon and even 
inseparable from a 'situation' of 'internal experience.' Other people's agency is entirely 
secondary to Shelley's sense of community, and of love. They are organisms that obey 
certain natural laws, in disobedience to which, through immorality or a failure of reason, they 
can fall into disease, which according to Shelley 'is not a natural state of the human fiame.''" 
The second attribute of Shelley's concept of love is one that comes by way of what 
may be described as a process of 'idealised personification.' The absence of all forms of 
agency - of 'prejudices' in their broadest sense as formal characteristics - in the hterary 
absolute, that had been appropriated for the individual organism by a subjective perspective, 
is projected back to form an idealised anthropology. The relationship is one of microcosm to 
"''OnLife.' 477-78. 
'^ 'On Love.'472. 
'The Vegetable System of Diet.' The Prose Works of Percy Bvsshe SheUey. Ed. E.B. Murray. 
(1993). 150. 'I hold that the depravity of the physical and moral nature of man originated in his 
unnatural habits of Ufe.' 'A Vindication of Namral Diet' iMi 77. 
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macrocosm, or perhaps of cell to body. All forms of 'prejudice,' 'all we condemn or despise,' 
have been removed from this 'ideal relationship' by a process which Wordsworth had called 
'selection' in his Preface to Lyrical Ballads (1802). The lack of 'formal prejudice' of the 
'chasm of an msufficient void' 'within our thoughts' is the basis of a love more pure and all-
embracing than an exclusive sense of personal agency would permit if it was taken on its own 
terms: 
We dimly see within our intellectual nature a miniature as it were of our entire self, 
yet deprived of all we condemn or despise, the ideal prototype of every thmg 
excellent or lovely that we are capable of conceiving as belonging to the nature of 
man. 
The third aspect of Shelley's concept of love is to be noted in the relationship of his 'ideal 
prototype' of man's 'intellectual nature' to the world. It bears remarkable and I think not 
coincidental similarity to the terms of Descartes' conception of the self as an immaterial mind 
{res cogitans) to which a material extension (res extensae) is fitted. He presents it first in a 
series of images that suggest its purging of prejudice before designating it as the invisible, 
Utopian place to which 'Love tends': 
Not only the portrait of our external being, but an assemblage of the minutest 
particulars of which our nature is composed: a mirror vdiose siuface reflects only the 
forms of purity and brightness: a soul within our soul that describes a circle around 
its proper Paradise which pain and sorrow and evil dare not overleap. To this we 
eagerly refer all sensations, thirsting that they should resemble or correspond with it. 
The discovery of its antitype... this is the invisible and unattainable point to which 
Love tends; and to attain which, it urges forth the powers of man to arrest the feintest 
shadow of that, without the possession of which there is no rest or respite to the heart 
over which it rules.^ *" 
The fourth aspect of love reflects on the conclusions he has reached hitherto. He 
tacitly corrects Wordsworth on his misplaced 'situation' of the origin of'feeling' in nature, 
but he adopts!. his ethics of 'internal purity' against all forms of fixed prejudice, a purity to 
which the solitude of nature, corresponding to this pure void, relates. The self s universality, 
evoked either by 'soUtude' or that 'deserted state' of unsympathetic company, is yet 'spoken 
to' by the silent eloquence of a correspondent universality in nature: 
Hence in solitude, or in that deserted state when we are surrounded by human beings 
and yet sympathise not with us, we love the flowers, the grass and the waters and the 
sky. In the motion of the very leaves of spring in the blue air there is then found a 
secret correspondence with our heart. There is eloquence in the tongueless wind and 
a melody in the flowing of brooks and the rustling of the reeds beside them whidi by 
their inconceivable relation to something within the soul, awaken the spirits to a 
dance of breathless rapture... 
'°<''On Love.'473. 
'OnLove.'473. 
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The terms that Shelley uses here to describe Love resonates in the diction and the 'social 
relationships' with 'nature' throughout Mont Blanc - but they are undeniably the intemahsed 
processes of the organism 'metabolising' vnth the world around it. 
Love or death? 
If we try to decide whether Ferguson is more correct then in insisting that Shelley's 
epistemology is related to love than Wasserman is in relating it to ontology, we are in 
somewhat of a quandary. In Wasserman's defence, Shelley's definitions of love and Ufe, with 
their refusal to distkiguish between thoughts, things or individuals and tendency towards 
'universality' free of prejudice makes it difficult to distinguish what he caUs love from a less 
personal, inteUectual engagement with the metaphysics of existence. Love for Shelley seems 
not to have any of the connotations of giving or of personal sacrifice that are common to a 
definition of the term - nor even the 'complacent' sense of the word as 'an approval of 
qualities in the object.' On the contrary, he presents it as a want of some 'inconceivable 
relation to something within the soul'^ *" - food for the body of the mind. He also seems, in a 
maimer consistent with his adoption of a praetematuraUst view of transcendence (or, what is 
entirely similar, his organicist view of universality), to have v^oUy secularised the concept of 
love. The dependent need of the creation and the creatures within it on their Creator depicted 
in the Biblical writings seems to have vanished. Shelley's need seems to be proportionate to 
that corresponding to equals - to a 'democratic' view of transcendence if you will or to 
dependent parts of a food chain.^ "^ And yet, while he has made 'conq)lacent love' equivalent 
to 'benevolent love,' he has retained the power of salvation of the latter and related it to the 
authority of universality against all forms of prejudice. 
Ferguson's view seems to differ littie from Wasserman's then when we realise that 
Shelley's sense of love has been divested of its relation to our sense of being persons with the 
traditional attributes of personal agency. It has been reworked to be a relationship of 
'inteUigences' or sources of thoughts, imaginations, ceUs in the 'one Ufe' of the organic 
universe. The term 'Love' has however the detraction of seeming to make personal what the 
entire tenor of Shelley's intellectual philosophy and the wandering perspective of his poetry 
'On Love.' 474. The narrovmess of SheUey's definition of love to but half of its Christian 
conception (and recasting at the ejqpense of a personal relationship) has perhaps been obscured by the 
fact that his presentation is made in the terms of a figuration of personal relationship that was itself 
merely a figural expression to begin with - the evocation of God's person by a lack in nature. 
Hugh Roberts helpfiil work Shelley and the Chaos of History (1997) suggests that we need to look 
to a Lucretian atomist perspective to understand Shelley's 'entropic' view on love, which is no doubt 
infonnatiye of Shelley's thought, but does not engage with the topos of Mont Blanc. 
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had rendered impersonal. The question then becomes whether we can even use Shelley's 
term of love, as Ferguson has, without a similar understanding of what it is. TTiat would beg 
deeper questions than the answers that are provided by Shelley, and Ferguson offers us no 
illumination. To e?q)lain what I mean here by deeper questions, it seems impossible to 
conceive of love as a finite and mortal being without involving an 'answer' that addresses 
such things as the moral issues of good and evil or the perception of injustice in death. The 
capacity to think xmiversally as individual organisms is no answer to that. It also ignores the 
muhivalent connotations of the word love in the English language, which Shelley, as we have 
seen, collapses, but not at the expense of alluding to these connotations. Ferguson thus seems 
only to have perpetuated the confusion caused by Shelley's definition. 
Secondly, to adopt Wasserman and Ferguson's reference to antipodal tropes in Mont 
Blanc, while it explains the 'sufficiency' of the relationships in the poem to term them those 
of love (in Shelley's sense), it does not account any better for the 'excess' that is present in 
the poem and in his 'intellectual philosophy' that both critics have been keen to en^hasise. 
To correct this diflficuhy, that excess might more prc^erly be termed as insufficiency, the 
more obvious antipode to sufficiency. But this merely quibbles with terms that are of 
secondary importance to the process of the poem. The process would be better described as 
one in which words repeatedly fail to meet their object because these objects are not 
conceived as such - they are parts of the continuing metabolic process of the organism. Once 
satisfied, a hunger for more is acquired. In other words, the trope that Wasserman sees as that 
of 'excess' could just as readily be seen as betraying the insufficiency of the previous, 
'sufficient' image and lend itself to a scqjtical view of language and all of the things it 
describes. This sort of 'radical' scepticism, which has been closely associated with Shelley 
by studies since Pulos,^°* is however only the polar opposite to Wasserman's view and not 
really an alternative, for it inqjhcitly adqjts the same rationalist premises on the crucial 
subject of metaphysics. It equally ignores the theological claims of the poem and how they 
are subverted by the organic model in the poem. 
Ferguson's link of qjistemology to love does have the merit though of tying the 
practice in the poem to the aesthetic model to \s^ch it adheres, that of the sublime landscape. 
For the ejqjerience of the sublime primarily resuks from the feeling of escaping some sort of 
threatened privation, whether of human society or of Ufe itself In the process of invoking 
'feeling,' Ferguson's account brings the personal dimension of judgement that is so lacking in 
Shelley's account to the fore - though ironically perhaps by allusion to the word love's more 
204 C.E. Pulos . p.^rwpTn.th- AStudvof_ShgllgX:sScgBtic^- (1954) 
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traditional and intensely personal sense! Shelley, Ferguson suggests, 'converts the isolation 
of the mountain from a threat into an opportunity.'(49) He does this by making the mountain 
and its surroundings familiar. For example, he addresses the mountain with the familiar 
'Thou' and refers to the trees on it as its progeny: its 'Children of elder time', or 'giant brood 
of pines.' Ferguson claims that Shelley's apparently unusual use of the sublime is therefore 
completely Kantian because he cannot locate it in any of the sensible forms that his 
predecessors have. This neglects to consider the play of organicist thinking in the poem -
which is not an aspect of Kantian thought. This landscape, and in particular its threat to 
annihilate him, was attractive to Shelley for two related reasons according to Ferguson: nature 
needs to be perceived to be destructive in order to create the sublime experience, and this in 
turn requires that he hypostatise 'an eternity of human consciousness.' To achieve both of 
these aims, his consciousness must simultaneously be personal and not-personal. Only an 
organic model of consciousness can e3q)lain such a depiction of continued reciprocity and its 
antagonism to the idea of causality. 
On the whole, Ferguson's suggested reading of Mont Blanc is of no little merit, above 
all because it relates it to the femiliar pattern of the sublime, which obviously influenced the 
form and content of the poem. Secondly, it makes an argument for the odd combination of 
the intimate emphasis, physical imagery and abstract philosophical ideas of the poem (even if 
she insufficiently illuminates her main term of distinction). Hiis allows her a basis of 
confronting the problems in the poem, even if I am not convinced by it. Like in Keats' Ode 
on a Grecian Um Ferguson notes that the ending of Moat Blanc seems out of sorts with rest 
of the poem. She also asks the intriguing question at the outset of her article about how the 
mountain's silence relates to that of the um, a question I hqje to address later. For what 
Ferguson says here of Mont Blanc appUes essentially to both great poems: 
its power dq)ends upon its never being able to move out of the world of death. 
Because it can never be aUve, it can never be subject to death; because it can never be 
conscious, it can never experience fear (or love or any other emotion, anticipatory or 
otherwise). (52) 
How does Shelley reconcile the final verse paragraph, in which the mountain is 
directly addressed as an agent, with the first four then, in which metabolic processes are 
depicted? It does indeed appear that in Ught of its predecessors that the final verse may 
'represent a massive qjistemological error and a mistake in love as well.' Ferguson seems 
unclear v^ e^ther or not this is the case, partly because she does not fully acknowledge the 
problem with the use of the word love. She rightly interprets Shelley's portrayal of the 
interplay of the forces of the material world to contain a consistent confusion of these 
activities with the issue of agency. This confiision, she says, leads him and us to the insight 
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that 'in treating natural objects as occasions for sublime e3q)erience, one imputes agency (and 
therefore a moving spirit) to them. '(53) Shelley therefore argues that this is proof of our 
capacity for self-transcendence rather than evidence in nature's design pointing to a 
transcendent god according to Ferguson. What she does not acknowledge though is that this 
is only half of his practice. He also consistently (and more crucially) presents his own agency 
as if it were merely a natural activity. In other words, his is an argument by design, but he 
also claims to be a designer, a part of nature like the mountain certainly, but one who speaks 
and lives. This is a crucial tendency in the poem that is not addressed by Ferguson's critique. 
Ferguson's closing remark involves her most intriguing claim in this respect, though 
she does not seem to see the implications, that Shelley: 
collapses Kant's account of the 'purposiveness without purpose' that we discover in 
aesthetic objects as he speaks of Mont Blanc as if it had purposes in relation to 
humans. (52) 
To my mind this he indeed does, but that is because he also conflates the Deists' merely 
transcendent god with a Christian God, that is a God also of personal relationship and of 
historical intervention. This makes it fer more than merely the aesthetic poem that Ferguson 
concludes it is. However, this strange turn at the end of her ejqjosition does not detract from 
the sensitivity of her other critical observations. Ferguson foils in her description only where 
the poem foils - in naturahsing the sublime, in placing words in the silence and in asserting 
dim apprehensions of the sublime to be evidence of our power over it and signs of its 
submission to us. Most seriously, she does not ever question the problematic distinction 
between thought and things. 
ii) Angela Leighton 
Like Frances Ferguson, Angela Leighton places Shelley and his Mont Blanc firmly in 
the tradition of the sublime. She sees the tradition to be so influential on Shelley's writing in 
foct that she suggests it functions as a guiding principle for imderstanding his writing as a 
whole. The sublime tradition, she says, is one in which 'the apparent emptiness of the scene 
is relieved by the mind's compensating sense of presence.'^ "' She compares the poem more 
closely than Ferguson does to its immediate poetic precursors, to Wordsworth's 'Inmiortality 
Ode' and Coleridge's 'Hymn before Sxmrise,' but concurs with her in argxmient that Shelley's 
aesthetic perennially divorces inspiration and composition, marking his own path in the 
artistic representation of the sublime. She provides a particularly keen insight into the 
dynamics of aesthetic theory by contrasting Shelley's poetic practice with Wordsworth's. She 
205 Angela Leighton. Shellev and the Snhlime: An Interpretation of the Major Poems. (1984). 48. 
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notes that whereas Wordsworth is wont to recoil from the expeheace of terror of the subhme 
and the sense of loss its aUenation engenders in him, and praises the recompense for it in a 
keener sensitivity to beauty in later years, Shelley strains in his poetic depictions for an 
immediate unity with 'the sublime' per se - which of course is by definition impossible. In 
other words, she says, vihile Wordsworth condemns Burke's sublime of terror, Shelley seems 
eager to accept it, but by doing so he pre-empts the experience. 
This intention to embrace the transcendent is something that has consequences that 
Leighton, like Ferguson, is reluctant to grasp. They go fer beyond her explanation of them as 
a perpetuation of the sublime tradition in new guise. We can observe how she mistakes the 
change by recapitulating her accoxmt of Shelley's appropriation of the sublime. Her own 
observations mark the crucial shift that Shelley's poetry makes from the sublime tradition to 
something that intends much more and at the same time much less than it. She notes, in a 
feirly standard epistemological description of the subUme, that: 
The infinite vistas of the Alps traditionally indicate the presence of a Deity whose 
nature exceeds the scope of human comprehension, but vAio may be affirmed by that 
very excess. (48, my italics) 
This summary of coiu^ se already neglects to include the characteristic emotional state 
accompanying the ejqjerience of the sublime, a neglect which is telling. It paves the way for 
her next logical step, when she comes to summarise the attraction of that 'traditional' 
landscape for Shelley: 'The emptiness of the scene,' she says, 'is relieved by the mind's 
compensating sense of presence.' What we note about her summary of the sublime (which 
like Ferguson's is too sensitive to its subject) is that the original sense contained in the 
subUme that God must necessarily be infinitely vast in every sense (particularly those 
cormoting the terror-inspiring sense of his omnipotence) has vanished. This leads her to draw 
the sensible impUcation that he is not there. By felling to note the 'loss of power' in the 
change, the 'epistemological reversal' that Shelley then makes appears a matter of course. 
Something that exceeds the maximum threshold of the senses is thereby (without sensual 
contradiction) easUy equated with something below them, and with concomitant relational 
in^lications. This summary of course makes Shelley's practice seem to lie very much in the 
sublime tradition, for Shelley's practice entails that: 
Such a Power defies perception by the senses but nonetheless commands the attention 
of the imagination. (48, my itaUcs) 
Leighton, like Shelley, equates the problem of sensory inadequacy, which presents itself in 
the way the sublime exceeds the threshold of human perception, with an Enqjiricist argument 
regarding the unreliability of the perception of all things. She thus has no difficulty in 
attributing to die mind this same transcendent Power, or to use the non-Shelleyan language of 
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Wasserman, Ferguson and Leighton, this 'conq)ensating sense of presence.' Her reading, like 
that of the others, is somewhat 'emotionally illiterate.' 
Leighton's e5q)ression of the issue is compatible with Shelley's then, but it is 
misleadmg as criticism. The foilure of the senses in the sublime landscape becomes the 
primary issue for Shelley because it is the means to introduce its relation to silence for him 
and, in turn, a means of expressing the necessity of his own act of language: what is not there 
cannot speak. But the issue can be regarded for more accurately and for more conventionally. 
A more theistic expression (and a reading more sensitive to the definitive emotional aspect of 
the sublime experience) emphasises the inadequacy of hiunan words to do justice to the 
majesty and splendour of God, but does not deny them nominative power. But even in 
relation to the purely epistemological concerns of the poem, it can still be maintained that 
language's inadequacy does not necessitate the conclusion that by Leighton's account appears 
unavoidable - that language is absolutely incapable of naming an object - even if its 'object' 
is transcendent. To regard language in this manner, again characteristically, apphes absolute, 
'universal' criteria to the use of language inappropriate to beings that are always already 
prejudiced by the terms of their human nature to make cause-and-«ffect statements and 
require such prejudices to understand (they are inherent in grammar). Leighton assumes, as 
Shelley did, that Hume was correct in rejecting the possibility of cause-and-effect statements. 
But Gadamer's demonstration of the necessity of prejudices re-opens the closed box on 
notions of causality. 
This has for greater implications than is being acknowledged here and for greater 
relevance to the topic at hand. If Shelley's universaUst assunqjtion is accepted that words are 
like things, that is fundamentally unreUable, it entails that human language does not have the 
capacity to fimction as a mediimi by which man can disclose himself as an agort. Human I 
words become not simply fragmentary and inadequate, they become void of any content 
whatever. Language, like the senses that are always held in suspicion by the Empiricist and 
the scq>tic, becomes unreliable as words become like things. This is precisely what Shelley, 
as we have aheady seen, contended in his essay 'On Life' - and it is a follacious assimqrtion 
that critics influenced by post-Structurahsm (as many contemporary critics attracted to 
Shelley are) share with him. 
However, this is not the orthodox view of language, despite the frequency 
with which it is e?q>ressed in contenporary debates. On the contrary, the more estabUshed 
view, the view that stood the test of time until the onset of 'Romantic hermeneutics,' is that 
human language has the capacity to reveal the speaker because it resembles divine language. 
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This is explicit in the Genesis accounts in which God brings all that is into being through 
words, creates man in His own image and has man repeat His act by naming the creatures He 
has created. We have ah-eady seen how crucial this view was in Coleridge's definition of the 
primary imagination. A modem Biblical scholar describes the importance of language for 
God's self-revelation in the Biblical tradition by saying, that this self-revelation: 
... is a distinct reality charged with power. It has power because it emerges from a 
source of power which, in releasing it, must in a way release itself.... No one can 
speak without revealing himself; and the reality which he posits is identified with 
himself. Thus the word... confers intelligibility upon the thing, and it discloses the 
character of the person who utters the word.^ "* 
Leighton's treatment of Mont Blanc is more complex though because it also includes 
Shelley's Hymn to Intellectual Beauty in its assessment. As in Mont Blanc she notes that 
there is a constant tension in the Hymn between celebrating w^at is there and being 
disso+is*(ed with it. Tins tension manifests itself in questions vihich 'implicitly require 
another voice to answer,'^ "' leaving the poet dissatisfied with the very thing he celebrates. 
UnUke in Mont Blanc. Shelley expUcitly rejects revealed religion in the Hymn, but otherwise 
the pattern is similar. He exposes the subUme voice because it too closely approximates that 
of religion and appropriates it for himself Shelley's 'grateful embrace' of the sublime means, 
Leighton admits, that he never ejqjeriences it. Having accepted that, Shelley is still feced 
with problems - problems that ensue with his proleptic abortion of the experience. As 
Leighton reminds us, Shelley remarks in his essay 'On Life' that 'there is a spirit within...at 
enmity and dissolution.' This divisive spirit - at enmity even with the atheist tones 
discernible in the poem -1 think explains the schizophrenic nature of Shelley's imagery.^ "' 
Leighton is no doubt right in asserting that Shelley's deity in Mont Blanc is not 
strictly the God of Christianity - certainly the allusions to storm and pain could be associated 
with that of Zoroastrian mythology. Shelley is a highly syncretic thinker. She also notes that 
though Shelley is at pains to avoid the 'vulgar mistake' of personification, it is nonetheless 
central to Mont Blanc. Again, this agrees with the spirit of opposition she observes in the 
poem as a vsdiole. Personification does occur in the poem de facto because of his practice of 
allowing abstractions to govern active verbs.^ ** This is Shelley's brilliant (or fetal) 
compromise between strict personification, making the mountain 'a debased kind of God,' 
and addressing the landscape as a 'possible sign of some greater Power which the poet desires 
John L.McKenzie. 'The Word of God in the Old Testament.' (1960). 205. 
- ^ ^ i "a n ^ l e strain of the Gnostic account of two equivalent and ^ g forces that mns 
thro^JToutsi^^thou^t Itisaddjssedmm^^^^^^^^ 
2<»DOTald Davie. P.nHty nf Diction in Enghsh Verse. (1967). 38. 
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to realise as a voice.'(61) The dynamics of the theory of poetry, the issue that primarily 
concerns Leighton, revolves around the foct that 'composition still desires to recover the 
fullness of inspiration, which is the lost Power of its own writing.' Thus she reads his poem 
as the pursuit of the source of a poetic power that is analogous to a power in nature. 
I agree with Leighton that Shelley's 'philosophical concerns are yoked to aesthetic 
concerns.' I differ from her though in seeing both to be a product of his idea of God, inherent 
in his choice of topos and presentation of an organic model of creativity in stead of the typical 
notion of God as maker. This seems to me the obvious conclusion of her own observations: 
In Mont Blanc he confronts the landscape of religious conversion, he describes an 
autobiographical ejqjerience of awe, fear and enligjitenment and he uses the language 
of exalted and personifying address. He too is writing a kind of hymn or ode to the 
genius of the place. However, unlike Coleridge, Shelley questions the model within 
which he writes and, as a result, the language of 'Mont Blanc' comments anxiously 
on its own workings. (62) 
For this reason, Shelley's mental journey moves from the introductory stanza, encapsulating a 
neat 'agnostic epistemology' 'in time and terminology somewhat out of stqj with the rest of 
the poem' (63) to a landscape which 'traditionally compels speculation about first causes, 
and, in spite of his atheism, Shelley's questions are also teleological.'(67) Here I think 
Leighton slightly misconstrues the issue, for surely it is because of his atheism that his 
questions are teleological. ff they were not teleological, they might be agnostic. Does this 
show us the in:q)ossibility of avoiding intention in a poem, even one that would be agnostic? 
Peihaps. 
Various subtleties in the poem prevent such a sixaplQ interpretation though and bring 
Leighton to describe a process similar to that of Wasserman and Ferguson of contradictory 
inq)ulses: we can observe the poet's stXsmpt to make nature's voice his, yet also the 
persistent concern (which is actually not a concern, but a presupposition) 'that there might be 
no voice there to precede and to authenticate his own'(69); we can note a pervasive seise of 
threat, v^ile the god (or Power) still remains unknown, distant and indifferent; we can record 
the language to be diaracteristic of the Lucretian gods,^ '" while also noting a protest against a 
personalised and familiar God at the end of the poem etc.. Leighton claims that in Shelley's 
final and femous lines. 
And what were thou, and earth, and stars, and sea. 
If to the human mind's imaginations 
Silence and solitude were vacancy? 
210 T-ijQothy Webb. A Voice Not Understood (1977). 39. 
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he 'neither affirms nor disproves the nature of his object.' This is true. However, in the gap 
left by the feet that affirmation and refiitation are not, strictiy speaking, mutually exclusive of 
one another and her claim that Shelley's last question is 'an aesthetic one,' the 'presence' 
which Shelley submits to the imiversal power of his doubts is never reaUy engaged. Though 
Shelley can, as Leighton suggests, 'imagine 'thou' or nothing'(72), this can merely 
aestheticise the entire issue: the truth of the matter is that he can only choose to imagine 
either conclusion because his existence and free will aUow him to do so. If he chooses not to, 
the possibility exists beyond his choice, despite what he in:^ )Iies. This is again the irony of 
Mont Blanc. 
m)JerroldE.Hogle 
Jerrold E . Hogle's reading is decidedly different from Leighton's and Ferguson's as it 
takes a stance less interested in the formal aesthetic or 'qjistemological' issues in the poem, 
though it acknowledges them, than in the 'extrinsic' tenor of its thought, its political and 
social radicalism. This manifests itself in this poem through a process whidi Hogle, citing 
Derrida, refers to as a subversion of a 'metaphysics of presence.'^" This subversion, often 
manifesting itself elsewhere in Shelley's writing as revolution, could even be seen as the 
unifying theme of Shelley's thought, Hogle suggests, transcending the imity of this particular 
poem.^ '^  As he states elsewhere: 
There is... an unsettling logic in Shelley's succession of words whenever he describes 
poetic composition and poetic conception as metaphoric. At every "center" of 
Shelley's poetics, no matter where we place the "essences" of his thought, we find 
him being fijrced to reveal a prior performance of shifts that is never an essence of 
any sort and keeps decentering itself forever.^ '^  
This unsettiing logic certainly seems to be a diaracteristic of Shelley's poetry that all the 
critics can agree upon. 
But of the three critics reviewed thus fer, Hogle seems to be the least aware of the 
difficulties inherent in Shelley's poetic process. He, hke the other critics, assumes no 
essential difference to lie between things and thought. But in his eagemess to display the 
consequences of that character of Shelley's philosophy he not only entirely avoids the 
question of whether this belief is even valid, he also calls for the 'consequences' of the 
2" JerroldHogle. 'SheUey as Revisionist: Power and BeUef inMo«r5/a«c.' The New SheUey. (1991). 
^^l^s is the focus of Timothy Clark's Fmhodyinp Revolution- The Fifnin. of the Poet in SheUey. 
(1989). 
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demonstrated truths of 'Shelley's poetry' to be borne out in criticism. This is because he 
recognises that the organicist reading practice is fundamentally an attack on the notion of 
causality and he seeks to avoid those notions, even when atten:q)ting to understand what the 
author intended. This leads him to an anachronistic hermeneutic practice which, as Anne 
Mellor describes it, eschews poetic qualities at the esqjense of a wholly allegorical style of 
reading allusion.^ '"* The credo of universal relativism is fervently presented by Hogle in this 
critique. Since he finds stylistic opposition to absolutes or unities in Mont Blanc, the 
arguments Shelley presents must, he suggests, at least be equally valid - aU perspectives 
being equal where truth is contingent on a universal subjective state of transcendence. 
Shelley's self-defeating style constitutes for him an argument of significance, but not in the 
context of its significance.^" 
This is precisely the import of his question at the end of his chapter in which he asks 
whether we will interpret Shelley to be 'as genuinely revolutionary and revisionist as he 
claimed to be.' If we will, then he submits we must conclude that the poem's ending aitails 
that both perception and language admit of transcendence. Hogle treats Shelley's use of 
allusion pointedly and translates it seamlessly into the quasi-Freudian terms of 'subliminal 
transference.' He asks the ihetorical question to the critics who prevaricate and demonstrate 
their reluctance to seize upon the obvious 'Nietzschean' significance of Shelley's 
demonstration: 
Will we see that there is no vacancy and that there is a relationship to be celebrated 
between mountains, valleys, stars and seas because there is always already a 
subliminal transference in the way we perceive and in the methods by which language 
helps 'create' such thoughts-about-thoughts? (127) 
Quite against his intentions, Hogle I think not only misconstrues Shelley, he offers a 
demonstration of the real difficulty of a basic equation of things and thoughts according to a 
prejudice against all prejudice. A lack of intellectual rigour leads him not only to 
complacency, but to a curious form of authoritarianism: no conclusion can be drawn from 
Shelley's demonstration except that we ought to rejoice that there is no vacancy. 
213 JerroldE. Hogle. 'Shelley's Poetics: The Power as Metaphor' Keats-Shelley Journal (1982) 159-
97. 166-67. 
Anne K. Mellor. Enghsh Romantic honv. (1980). 
Timothy Clark makes a critique of Hogle similar to my own m his article in Evaluating Shelley: 
... modem employments of Romantic-Iroiiic mediod are anachronistic in a hmiting sense and 
disturbingly self-justifying, since th^ finally affirm, not transcendental subjectivity (a 
philosophical option probably closed to us), but merely reading and rereading themselves as 
an open-ended process. (94) 
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This difficulty is only multiplied when we observe that his equation of thoughts and 
things has a different orientation than Shelley's. In other words, his own prejudices lead him 
to a different conclusion than Shelley made by deconstructing prejudices. Shelley's use of 
allusion to the transcendence of the mountain lauded by his Romantic predecessors entails 
first implicitly adopting their premises about it in order to question them latterly. He does not 
equate things and thoughts in the undifferentiated 'allegorical manner' Hogle does. Shelley 
rejects their conclusions, but remains wholly dqjendent upon the reader's understanding of a 
fixed literary tcpos to do so. This dependence on the tenor of its allusion is the inevitable 
consequence o f allusive language that an 'allegorical reading' claims not to exist, or defers ad 
infinitum. A critique such as Hogle's is only being blind to the hermeneutic issues it raises 
and seems to me to 'celebrate' the aporia of incomprehensibility. According to him, Shelley 
wishes sinqjly to demonstrate what he calls the 'subliminal transimiptive process'(l 12), and 
release the transformative energy that the hierarchical unity imposed on it in Wordsworth and 
Coleridge's later poetry 'enslaves.' 
However, the tenor of the poem w i l l not support such a reading. The different 
'voices' that are heard in Mont Blanc do not speak as unequivocally in favour of democracy 
(or what Hogle in feet argues for, equivocacy) as he would have them speak. In feet, it is fer 
more plausible to hear a call for a true prophetic voice in the poem against the pretensions of 
the felse prophet, represented by the voice of the mountain. It is only confiising as such 
because Shelley's 'prophetic' voice is not calling for a retum to one God, but to gods. I shall 
explore this in more detail shortly. In general, Hogle is correct that all the things that speak in 
the poem have the same status in so fer as they are all as 'merely nominal' as the 'existmce of 
distinct individual minds' were to Shelley. Nonetheless, we can observe in the poem that 
these 'nominal' voices tend to conform to the character of one of two definable types. There 
are the dualistic 'voices' his fellow-critics have detected, for which the idea of truth 
ultimately has no value, which utter themselves fi-om a 'democratic perspective' and vanish 
(e.g. his river Arve) and there is a 'Voice' that asserts its authority and remains as an assertion 
of 'objective' truth and is thus branded tyrannical. It contains 'large codes of fi^ud and woe.' 
In Mont Blanc his symbolic icy mountain imdoubtedly has this Voice. That Voice and its 
apparent Power is challenged and subverted. Shelley's primary means of subverting the 
'form of power' of the mountain-tyrant in Mont Blanc is by referring to the silence of its 
voice, insinuating that it would say nothing were it not given something to say by one such as 
him. 
Hogle suggests that his critique is radically different than the other critics he mentions 
and the two I have reviewed here. These critics have tended to put Shelley in the context of 
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the sublime tradition or to read him as a poet-philosopher of epistemology. Hogle's Shelley 
is essentially an iconoclast. Hogle believes that the fundamental aim of Shelley's writing is to 
question the basis of any unified objective system of value. However, Hogle confuses unity 
with uniformity. As we have already seen, the particular form and significance of that system 
is really what is at issue for Shelley, not the unity. Shelley's questioning is unified in its 
objection but not imiform in its means of doing so. It is certainly this lack of uniformity that 
makes a uniform intention difficuh to ascribe to him, but Hogle confuses the vehicles of 
Shelley's metaphor with their tenor. This sort of careless 'allegorisation' characterises his 
imderstanding of the words Shelley employs in the poem as well. The trqjartite analogy of 
transcendence to vacancy to silence, all three representing various senses of negation of a 
formal sense of a 'presence,' admits the conflation Hogle suggests without sensual 
contradiction. However, Shelley's subtle allusion of transcendence to vacancy to silence 
cannot be reduced to one of the three, i.e. transcendence as he suggests. I f it could, then it 
should be possible to reduce the three to any of the three terms indiscriminately. (They could 
entail, for instance the vacancy that Hogle e3q)hcitly rejects). However, they are not, as Hogle 
takes them to be, synonymous. Nor are they used with the one allegorical intent he suggests. 
Silence does not entail transcendence (and particularly not a 'sublimmal transumptive 
process'), though it is a trope for it and it is one that can be manipulated equally to connote a 
presence or an absence without contradiction. Shelley's Mont Blanc is not as unequivocal as 
Hogle would wish it to be. He fails to grasp this because he even more radically confuses the 
vehicle of met^hor with its tenor and the form of an argument with its sense than Ferguson 
and the'other critics who have followed Wasserman have done. 
He is not however entirely incorrect in sensing that Shelley alludes to Wordsworth 
and Coleridge's symbols in order to attack the 'the service of monotheistic religions, social 
hierarchies centred on one dictating figure or class, and German ideaUsm positing internal and 
eternal Absolutes'(108) that have impUcitly been adopted in their poetry (even i f the attack he 
sees on German idealism is surely anachronistic). In this way, Shelley's poetry is more 
consistent with its philosophical aim: 
Not content with simply performing a transfer among images that his predecessors do 
not attenpt themselves, Shelley draws their conceptions back towards what he thinks 
has made those notions possible initially, a centreless and non-Christian metaphysic -
with a particular sense of language - which both his precursors dqjend upon yet 
refuse to acknowledge. (115) 
Hogle's emphasis on Shelley's iconoclasm brings out aspects of his poetry that have been 
neglected by the many critics who have more or less accepted a shift in a 'metaphysics of 
presence' to the subject. I f this shift in the 'location of presence' has taken place, then how 
do these critics account for the feet that subjects differ in their perceptions say of truth or 
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beauty without severing them fi-om 'presence?' Without some sort of reference to a reality 
outside of the self, language does threaten to descend into rhetoric. How can it then be 
maintained that this 'subjective transcendence' is the same kind that was held to be 
universally valid in the theocentric, objective and metaphysical fi-amework? It must be of this 
kind to have such a 'presence.' 
I f it is not of this kind, then unless we judge that the claims of authority lose their 
credibility with the subjective shift of Romantic hermeneutics, Hogle's conclusion seems 
ineluctable, that this presence, both before and after the subjective shift, is only a ihetorical 
figure, a simple incidence of transference of'thoughts-relating-to-thoughts': 
Transference is the 'cause' behind constructions of causality, in other words, being 
itself 'the secret strength of things/ Which governs thought', and Shelley releases that 
feet fi-om its repression in Wordsworth, Coleridge and others by making that energy 
the 'Power', thereby overthrowing any idea of a Oneness which can be viewed as 
commanding all transformations from a position conq)letely beyond them.(l 18) 
Again, the issues are not as simple as Hogle presents them. Like Wordsworth and Coleridge, 
Shelley also emphasises unity, 'the view of life presented by the most refined deductions of 
the intellectual philosophy,' and his is a unity o f the processes of life in man and the imiverse 
conceived in organic terms. Shelley's unity, i t seems to me, is informed by the 
Enlightenment 'prejudice against prejudice,' adopted radically as an attack on the notion of 
causation. It is the organicism it adopts in its place that leads to the aporia - but Hogle has 
mistakenly embraced such terms as a general and ineluctable problem of thinking. 
Leaving aside the hermeneutic problems inherent in Hogle's position, it is also fer 
from clear that his eclectic mixture of Freud, Derrida and political correctness meets, as he 
argues, the spirit of Shelley's argument in Mont Blanc. For one thing, Shelley's suggests in 
the poem that the power that is there in the mountain is not one that is available to one and aU, 
not even to aU 'democratic hxunanists,* but only to those whom he, like Wordsworth, calls 
'poets': 
Thou hast a voice, great Mountain, to repeal 
Large codes of fraud and woe; not understood 
By all, but which the wise, and great, and good 
Interpret, or make feh, or deeply feel. (80-83) 
For this reasrai, aside from Hogle's notes on the anarchic tenor of Shelley's thought and his 
greater willingness to seize on its extra-aesthetic dimensions, Ferguson and Leighton come 
closer to presenting a reading compatiblek^-ttShelley's intentions. 
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iv) James Rieger 
James Rieger's critique of Mont Blanc takes a different perspective on the issue of 
form and content than the previous three critics. He presents a helpful study marked by the 
characteristics o f enlightened liberal scholarship. The central issue for him in Shelley's 
writing as a whole and his chief 'heresy' (unsurprisingly for a scholar informed by the values 
of the Enhghtenment) is his obscurantism, which he declares enters the main tradition of 
EngUsh verse with Shelley. Obscurity poses a great problem for the reader and the critic, he 
observes, because it requires us to decide how it is that we are to understand it. Shall it be 
'condemned as crankiness, a mental tic, a fiaudulent impulse that can only lead to fake art?'^'* 
Whatever we decide, he insists it must be confi-onted directly. Since it presents itself to us as 
an 'acconplished feet,' Shelley's obscurantism must be 'dealt with pragmatically,' he asserts, 
because 'the use of words is at all events a moral enterprise.' However, having first 
proclaimed the moral duty of the critic with some intrepidity, he then hedges his remarks. 
The moral impulses and rational beliefs of the scholar are harried and cajoled by his 
supervening prejudice against intolerance and prescriptive criteria of judgement. 
The pitched battle between the two takes place within the short space of a few pages 
of his introduction. On the one hand, he suggests that the blind eye of polite tolerance is not 
an option for the critic. There is no point in simply pretending that obscurity 'is not there' in 
Shelley's poetry and prose. "The question of obscurantism, like that of sincerity, is one of 
intention and regards dead men, not living poems. We have been too well bred to address it. 
Yet it must be addressed, for it gapes wide and is itself obscure in the history of poetic 
practice.'(16) How then does Rieger suggest that we confi:-ont obscurity, i f he insists we 
must? By taking, as Coleridge had suggested, the truth, which is 'its own light and evidence, 
discovering at once itself and felsehood'?^" y^parentiy not. Far worse than blindly ignoring 
the moral msperative to confi-ont the issue would be to seize that akemative and 'to post signs 
warning of an open feUacy.' The designation of fellacy as such, he says, 'is surely the 
giddiness of dogma.' What then are we left with? j^parently with one of two options: we 
can revert to seeking the dead man's intention - an exercise that he had just dismissed as an 
exercise o f mere politeness - since we have, he submits, 'no standard of appraisal but the 
successful dissolution of privateness, genuine or affected, into the poem itself;^" or we can 
James Rieger. The Mutiny Within: The Heresies of Percy Bvsshe Shelley. (1967). 15. 
^"BiographiaLiteraria. XVin,218. 
It would be interesting to pursue the link between the intentional fallacy and the frequently 
expressed view of poetry as 'a successfiil dissolution of privateness' he fsesents in light of what I have 
olKerved about the decline of objective tmth and the sensus communis, but it passes beyond my remit 
to do so here. 
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avail ourselves o f the comfort of the critic's own probity in asking after the poet's good 
intentions and trust in his ability to determine whether a poem 'has been honestly or 
dishonestly inspired.'(16) It is either Scylla or Charybdis then. The vigilant and muscular 
critic is hamstrung before he reaches the first hurdle. 
This hermeneutic and ethical ambivalence, demanding critical action and 
accountability yet taking umbrage in an imsubstantiated claim of moral authority, hangs over 
a very promising book. Rieger's study provides illuminating research into Shelley's little 
acknowledged interest in the 'obscene creation myths of the Gnostic and dualist Christian 
heresies' and it demonstrates that they attain frequent ejqjression in the symbols in his poetry. 
Nonetheless, despite his interest in Shelley's obscurity, he only touches on the hermeneutic 
implications that vexed the other three critics about this issue, and caimot really answer them. 
Nor does he really even attempt to engage with hermeneutic issues as such. He works on 
borrowed arguments and stands on the opposite side of the EnUghtermient/ Romanticist divide 
with regard to the formal component of truth to the other critics I have reviewed. He 
contends that because it is a poem and has formal qualities, Shelley's Mont Blanc ought not to 
be subject to the sort of criticism rather befitting an ontological discourse. His rationale for 
this is based on his notion of truth, wiiich has no formal (or formative) prejudices. The deep 
truth is not only imageless for Shelley, but Rieger as well. It is for this reason that he contests 
formalist readings of Mont Blanc such as Wasserman's that suggest that it is an 
'epistemologieal poem.' In an effort to combat Wasserman's formalist and 'Platonic' reading 
of Shelley, he appeals to Plato's doctrine of the transcendent forms and argues that: 
because it is after all a poem and not an ontological discourse, "Mont Blanc" remains 
in the realm of eikasia, not episteme. The dialectic it develops is one of tropes, not 
categories.'(90) 
This marks a retreat to the staid Enlighteimient argument that it is not so much that poets he 
as that they caimot tell the truth. Their art does not make semantic claims. It is primarily an 
aesthetic act. 
Had his book not predated the other critics I have reviewed by some decades, he 
could be believed to be arguing a point of view similar to theirs with regard to language, i.e. 
that Shelley's use of images that deconstruct themselves function to question its very status. 
There is a significant difference of course. Deeonstructionist critics doubt the testimony of all 
language to claim ontological presence, because they observe in formal 'poetic language' its 
tendency to deconstruct itself in an analogous way to the manner in which Enqjiricist scq)ties 
had observed the feilure o f the senses to deliver absolute certainty. Seeiog language as a 
whole, deconstructionists would assert that poetic language is not the special case of language 
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that Rieger claims. Poetry reveals sinqjly more readily than other forms of language the 
tendency all language has to remain 'in the realm of eikasia, not episteme.' The aporia of 
obsciuity is, they argue, inherent in language. Despite his emphasis on the overarching 
heresy of Shelley's obscurity, Rieger obviously intends to argue no such thing about poetic 
language. He simply contends, I think, that prosaic language has less of an impediment to 
truth because it is less formalised (and therefore less 'prejudiced'). Obvious formalism in 
language demonstrates a different use for language than making claims of truth.^" TTie 
intention o f poetic language is not to reveal truth, but at best to allude to it, much as Plato's 
particulars signify the truth of the Forms by their forms. Form, in other words, prejudices the 
intention of language away fi-om revealing the truth and toward another end, e.g. evoking 
immediate pleasure peihaps. 
His claim that allusion is an inherently deceptive practice and that more prosaic forms 
o f discourse have greater ontological validity cannot bear scrutiny of coiuse. As we have 
already seen in the chapters discussing hermeneutics, formal and formative prejudices cannot 
be dispensed with in any use of language. However, I think that the observations that he 
makes can be construed fer differently. The figurative quality of poetic language need not be 
interpreted to signify the absence of meaning in language. In feet, had Rieger acknowledged 
that prejudices are a necessary component of all forms of thinking, he might have drawn a 
different conclusion about the feet that tropic uses of language require more ejq)Ucit 
acknowledgement by the reader of their form in order to comprehend their meaning. These 
very formalities could be taken to demonstrate the necessity that the reader commit a 
performative act to achieve meaning, requiring that he has (already acquired) the capacity to 
do so and wi l l exercise good feith in using that capacity. This would reconnect the performer 
to the notion of a sensus communis conveyed by language and an inculcated ethics of 
interpretation. The conclusion of course could not be restricted to formal uses of language. 
A l l language requires such a working knowledge in order to be used and understood and all 
language can be used to reveal or to deceive. But figurative language demonstrates the 
necessity of ethical performance in a much more obvious way than do the more prosaic uses 
of language. 
'^^  'Wherever Shelley abandons the descrijSive-meditative mode for abstract reflection in 'Mont 
Blanc,' he becomes hard to understand The poem's cruxes testify to its technical immaturity; as 
discourse, it is not so well written as p-ose. But the criterion is irrelevant, not to say philistine. The 
basic hnguistic unit of poetry, including the 'poetry of statement,' is the metaphor, as the category is 
that of philosophy. The obscurities in 'Mont Blanc' are not examples of a confused metaphysics; they 
are simply weak figures.'(107-08). 
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I f he had acknowledged these aspects of language, he might also have been led to a 
fer different conclusion about the evidence his book relates of Shelley's adoption of expUcit 
heresies. He might have made a causal connection between the prejudicial implications of 
these heresies ( i f he followed their logic through consistently enough) and the obscurity in 
Shelley's writing. As i t is, he claims the obscxirity only stems from the feet that Shelley's 
allusions are unfemiliar. But he could have drawn the more obvious 'dogmatic' conclusion 
that Shelley's poetry is obscitfe because it performed its logic according to a heretical sensus 
communis informed by specious philosophy and a compatible theology, e.g. Gnosticism, 
Lucretian atomism or a form of dualism. 
This is what his own research suggests. He observes what he calls three forms of 
heresy in Shelley's writing, v/hich range from being formal heresies to being informal, as it 
were the effects o f these formal heresies.^ '^' The first and the most seminal of these pertains 
to Shelley's heterodox use of aspects of'magic, hagiology, and obscene creation myths of the 
Gnostic and duaUst Christian heresies' in many of his major symbols. The second is related 
to Shelley's dqjiction of God's relationship to the world and its immanence or transcendence. 
This, on a less expUcitly theological level, is the very matter that preoccupies the 
deconstructionists and modem critical debates about 'presence' in language. TTiis observation 
about Shelley's treatment of the issue of divine transcendence also relates to the question of 
(poetic) language, Rieger explains, as it 'doubts the possibility of metaphor. Poets like to 
think they prophesy, but are their utterances ontologically trustworthy?'^' A 
deconstructionist would simply answer in the negative because of the lack of presence in the 
text whatever the mode of e)q)ression. Thirdly, there is the issue I have already discussed at 
some length, that o f Shelley's obscurantism. According to Rieger, i t 'embraces the other 
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two. 
However, the first group of heresies in particular observes a different dynamic than 
does the last, which most easily lends itself to the rationahst (and poststructurahst) terms of 
'linguistic approximations of the absolute.' This first group of heresies imphcitly 
acknowledges, by offering an alternative theological preseirtation, a doctrinal fiamework of 
To see this point, it is required to think causally. The question is, what formal presupposition could 
lead to the conclusion that immanence and transcendence, things and thoughts were essentially 
indistinguishable? The answer might be that there was an atomic explanation for the binary 
oppositions in nature. This can be traced back again to Lucretian atomism or various Gnostic 
interpretations. Of course, it is actually the effect of Cartesian universality, the discrediting of the 
senses, that first led Shelley to trace these heresies backwards to formal causes that would also 
destabilise the sensus communis. But in Mont Blanc he demonstrates in organic terms the reciprocity 
of the two directions of heresy - from formal heresy to obscurity and fiom obscurity to formal heresy. 
m. 14. 
iMd. 15. 
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truth with a particular story and terminology, which Shelley has seized upon to deviate from 
the prevailing orthodoxy. This was a common theme in Shelley's writing on theological 
matters. For exanq)le, in his 'Essay on Christianity,' Shelley describes God as 'the interfiised 
and overruling Spirit of all the energy and wisdom included within the circle of existing 
things,' and 'the overruling Spirit of the collective energy of the moral and material wor ld ' ^ 
- in other words as i f divine agency were the sum total of all organic forms of activity. This 
bears remarkable similarity to his definition of Love that was exploTed in more detail 
previously. Shelley's reference to Lucretian and Gnostic gods in Mont Blanc, which are quite 
amenable to this notion of conflicting forces, are nonetheless of a different order than his 
equally heretical claim of the absence of God. 
This has another dimension. The characteristic perspective of the Biblical writings, 
the orthodoxy against which Shelley presents his heretical perspective, is not readily 
amenable to his suggestion that the authors, the prophets, were presenting such subjective 
impressions o f transcendent divinity: 
.. .the word God according to acceptation of Jesus Christ unites all the attributes 
which these denominations contain, and is the interfused and overruling Spirit of all 
the energy and wisdom included within the circle of existing things. It is important to 
observe that the author of the Christian system had a conception widely differing 
from the gross imaginations of the vulgar relatively to the ruling Power of the 
Universe. 
On the contrary the prophets have the collective burden of acting as an amanuensis for God, 
which entails that they too possess some of his personal characteristics, as presented in 
descriptions of him as the Creator, the Lover, the Good Shepherd and the Father. The main 
point is to note a different type of theological claim and to object to its conflation with 
another: the truth o f divine revelation can be accepted or rejected, but it caimot be reduced to 
Shelley's organicist notions o f inspiration. This idea has been inculcated by the prejudices of 
such a model of thinking without acknowledgement as such. But the organicist notions of 
artistry do not predate Hume's radical attack on causahty m his An Enquiry Concerning 
Human Understanding in 1851. Causality (and the notion of God as Maker) is a cmcial 
element o f both Classical and Bibhcal thinking. It is an anachronistic prejudice of Shelley 
(and those follow him in interpreting according to the Romantic hermeneutic paradigm) to 
foist the metanarrative of organicism on the past. I t is a violation that has not gained 
legitimacy by its rq)etition. 
Ed E . B . Murray (I993). 251. 
'On Christianity.'Md- 250. 
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Furthermore, understanding language as blank counters for spiritual oiergy to imbue 
can only lead to the conclusion that Shelley drew - that words are as atoms that can be 
rearranged to be a story, in feet any story, in and of themselves. This is precisely what his use 
of the word silence in Mont Blanc coimotes. The word silence is a microcosm of the 
macrocosmic story he narrates through his performed epistemology and allusion to a Deist 
topos. Its illegitimacy has been argued by Maurice Blanchot, who has pithily observed the 
great feiling of organicism. Since the poetic has become everything (in the eclipse of the two-
world view, i t must be added) in Romanticism it has become nothing: 'neither in the world 
nor outside the world; master of everything, but on condition that the whole contain nothing; 
pure consciousness without content, a pure speech that can say notiiing. A situation in w^ich 
failure and success are in strict reciprocity, fortune and misfortune indiscernible.'^ In this 
sense, Rieger is correct in suggesting that Shelley's use of obscurity embraces his other two 
heresies, because it informs his decision to embrace the conclusion that these heresies entail. 
When Rieger claims that obscurity embraces the other two heresies, he yokes two 
apparentiy compatible but very different arguments together. The first 'heresy' he cites, the 
collective doctrinal deviaticms from orthodoxy, actually refers to a tradition that lends 
understanding rather than sirr5)ly defying it through the suggestion of obscurity. In so fer as 
the allusions that Shelley uses refer to a tradition that did not atten^t 'to approximate 
absence,' but rather claimed divine revelation, Shelley's poetic license can indeed by 
regarded as heretical in the dogmatic sense that neither he nor Rieger acknowledges. Hie 
common ground between the 'Romantic' and the Biblical perspectives, the feet that God is 
transcendent and therefore inexpressible as an 'object' is one of accident (and only apparmt 
congruence). When Shelley misuses this language i t is not because he 'feils to approximate 
his object.' It is because he intentionally refigures the allusion to be one of approximation. 
Like Rieger, Shelley mistakenly conflates this to amount toade facto refutation, as it then 
becomes susceptible to the sceptical premises o f the first point. His use of figurative 
language has no object then because it is neither based on divine revelation nor on any 
empirical reality. His judgement of his own language is true, but it does not bear upon the 
orthodox claims of language. 
Alternative interpretations of heresy 
Rieger need not have reverted back to an Enlightenment explanation of Shelley's 
heresy. The obscurity that resulted from Shelley's organicist prejudices could have been 
^ Maurice Blanchot. T I , . infinite Tonversation. (1993). 356. 
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interpreted to demonstrate the necessity of a monotheistic fi^mework of creation for a 
credible theory of human perception and a coherent process of understanding. For Shelley's 
poetics and philosophy, by the very consistency with which he used not only heretical figiues 
and images, but also employed a commensurately heretical grammar (attacking the logical 
integrity of the sense of personal agency in language) presents a superb demonstration of the 
intellectual necessity of theological orthodoxy. Divine agency is the cornerstone that 
guarantees human agency is not just a practically useful concept: it is crucial for 
understanding human understanding. The most obvious conclusion that can be drawn from 
Shelley's consistent poetic appUcation of his heretical theological and philosophical 
convictions is that it resuhed in obscurity because it enployed their false prejudices. This is 
however a point that emerges rather despite Rieger's evident Enlightenment prejudice in 
deciding the 'heresy of obscurity' to be the greatest of Shelley's heresies, and the one that 
embraces the others. 
As he has presented it, Rieger only recapitulates an Enhghtemnent fellacy about 
poetic language because he apphes the criteria of universaUty, the prejudice against prejudice. 
But he could have argued in his demonstration of Shelley's explicit and prolonged interest in 
heretical doctrine that allusive language is truthful (which is the substance of the entire 
'Platonic' discussion for himself, Wasserman, and the other critics) in so fer as it reflects 
upon the truth of orthodox dogma. The tenor o f such a claim, I admit, immediately conjures 
up ideas (inculcated by the Enlightenment's 'prejudice against prejudice') o f a complete 
abrogation of critical responsibility or an absurd Kierkegaardian 'leap of feith.' But true faith 
is not blind in the way this description suggests. On the contrary, a blind leap of feith, as 
Kierkegaard presented it, is only a product o f the feet that he had brought the principle of 
Cartesian imiversal doubt into the very heart of revealed religion. Begiiming from the 
position of doubt, it is suggested, the believer 'leaps' into feith. This is not what I am 
suggesting. That is a position as hermeneutically absurd as it is unorthodox. Orthodox belief 
is groimded primarily on a feith, however hesitantly it is grasped, in God as he has revealed 
himself in acts recorded m the language of the Holy Scriptures. It is not feith leapt upon from 
the idea that there must be a transcendent source of all that is iimnanent - though that may be 
a fine idea - or the idea that i f God did not exist, men would have to create him for moral and 
social reasons - that regards the issue subjectively, by looking at humanity in a glass as it 
were. That invokes a process of deduction that can only lead to verifiable opinion, not truth. 
A more synpathetic reading of Rieger's restriction of the language of poetry to the 
realm oi eikasia could interpret it in a different spirit than simply as a remarit on ontological 
quality in poetic language. He might be referring to the poet's different intention in ordering 
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his language in a tropic manner. It is an issue of style, not substance; or i f it is substance, then 
it is ultimately o f substance gained through allusion, not through meaning provided 
spontaneously o f its own accord as the organicist model suggests. He implies that the 
prospective intention of using allusive poetic language, quite apart from the hermeneutic 
question of recovering authorial intention to which it is so commonly related, does not and 
caimot succeed or feil by being demonstrated true or felse as a philosophical argument could 
be. It feils first and foremost by feiling to have moved the reader or auditor. And it feils to 
move the reader most comprehensively by being incomprehensible. In Mont Blanc, this 
incon:q)rehensibility is propagated by the confusion of agency with activity. 
Rieger would probably have foimd the suggestion of more recent critics that Shelley's 
use of tropes 'questioned the status of language in general' to be as specious as he found 
Wasserman's claims for their ontological truth to be questionable. At best, these critical 
interpretations based themselves on the organicist model's failure to acknowledge the primary 
intention of poetry as poetry to evoke pleasure. What sounds like a hermeneutic argument on 
Rieger's part was doubtiess not intended as such. It was a single remark that poetic form is a 
wholly secondary issue in the matter of truth (or 'ontology' as Wasserman preferred to 
formulate it more 'Platonieally'). 
His sinqjle remark however leads to a rather more startUng conclusion about the 
recent role of criticism in poetic interpretation. I f studies of Shelley's use of language have 
caused the truth-claims that the New Critics attempted to establish in 'poetic language' to 
'deconstruct,' then he would suggest it was the attempt to estabhsh 'intrinsic form' as a truth-
claim (as a microcosm of a purely self-reflexive Romantic hermeneuties) that was misguided, 
not Shelley's use of contradictory or self-defeating allusions per se. Having said that, the 
similarity between the New Critics' argument about truth-content of poetic form and 
Shelley's use of obscurity in his poetic form as an expression of content would subject his 
poetry to the same judgement. This is precisely what Rieger almost argues in his critique of 
Shelley, that his truth-claims were heretical and thus fell flat in artistic representation. But he 
makes the conclusion of the EnUghtenment thinker in Gadamer's sense. It is not that poets 
he, it is that they carmot tell the truth because they refer to imaginative constructs. 
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2. The 'play within the play' — Organicism within the Deist topes 
I 
The everlasting universe of things 
Flows through the mind, and rolls its rapid waves. 
Now dark —now glittering— now reflecting gloom— 
Now lending splendour, where from secret springs 
The source of human thought its tribute brings 
Of waters, — with a sound but half its own. 
Mont Blanc begins with a skilful presentation of a potted epistemology reflecting 
Shelley's organicist intellectual philosophy. Simultaneously, its first six lines act as a sort of 
proleptic gloss to introduce the poem's themes and as a hermeneutic paradigm to explain its 
use of metaphor thereafter. Form and content are Unked on various levels throughout the 
poem. It wi l l probably be useful to give a more careful exegesis of these first six Unes and a 
cursory mention of the issues they raise before embarking on a broader treatment of the poem. 
In particular, I would like to contrast the terms and connotations he estabUshes in the first six 
lines, which form the pattern of describing the universe as an interplay of organic forces for 
most of the poem, with the very different terms and connotations that the ending presents: a 
challenge to the idea of God as the Maker of the universe. These demonstrate how Shelley 
attempted in Mont Blanc to assert a claim for the poet as conductor of Power by depicting 
'God' as the sum total of natural forces, dependent upon him for his expression. God was 
merely a modification of one active, vital force that was involved in all human creative 
ventures: 'all the inventive arts maintain, as it were, a synqiathetie connection between eadi 
other, being no more than various ejqjressions of one internal power, modified by different 
circumstances, either of an individual, or of society. ' ^ It is not my primary intention to 
provide a 'close reading' of all the various nuances of the poem or to recover the author's 
intention in writing it. Rather, I wish to demonstrate the workings of Shelley's hermeneutic 
presuppositions in the poem and to question their validity. This w i l l go beyond merely 
arguing for their admitted 'aesthetic feilure' in order to explore somewhat more deeply what 
Lea vis meant when he charged Shelley to have a 'weak grasp on the actual.' 
The opening lines of the poem offer us a step in this direction by confronting us with 
immediate logical problems. In a curious introduction for a poem composed on the subject of 
'Mont Blanc,' we are presented with a universe that 'flows through the mind,' a universe that 
is 'everlasting' and 'o f thiags.' A number of questions are raised by these descriptions: I f the 
universe is of things, how come they do not perish as things do? And i f they are things, how 
can they be in the mind? Even i f it is because these things are the equivalent of thoughts, how 
can they be everlasting? I f i t is everything that is in the mind, how can it be a mind as we 
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understand it as a personal attribute that cogitates and designates and, most inqjortantiy, 
subjects to understanding? And i f the relationships between mind and universe are as co-
extensive as this suggests, does this not collapse any distinctive sense that the word 'mind' 
has together with 'the everlasting universe' so as to make both words meaningless? 
The answer to these questions, it would seem, is that it is possible for tiiese qualities 
to exist in conjunction because they adhere to something like the Cartesian concept of mind 
and, more specifically, its capacity to doubt universally according to the Cartesian formula: 
dubito ergo sum.^^ This premise of universal doubt is the basis of the 'universal perspective' 
that Heidegger and his successors regarded as characteristic of Cartesian-derived subjectivity. 
It is the thread of philosophical scq)ticism that runs through Shelley's writing.^^* If, as this 
presentation suggests, no true distinctions are in the mind except the ones originating in its 
very act of self-reference (true external distinctions having been erased by universal doubt), 
then no true contradictions can be either. The use of paradox without true distinctions in the 
first six lines establishes the dominant logical process that characterises the first four stanzas 
of the poem. 
Nonetheless, this mind is not wholly sundered from the world of appearances as the 
Cartesian model is. It contains a reciprocity to the 'external world' that obeys the biological 
laws of the organism, ingesting and in a sense becoming informed by what it metabohses. 
The words he uses accordingly allude to their conventional meanings, but are altered by being 
'metabolised' - much as we observed earlier with his idiosyncratic definition of 'love' - and 
according to its terms. They are not slight adjustments. An entire perspectival change is at 
work, with concomitant philosophical and, as befits his chosen Deist topos, theological 
implications. For Shelley presents us in Mont Blanc with an organic theological model, 
which only feils to appear dogmatic because it eschews the inferences of causality that are 
normally associated with dogmatism. 
James A Notopoulos. The Platonism of Shelley. (1949). 404. 
Shelley uses the definite article in referring to 'the mind.' Either he means the mind generically (as 
in the mind of everyone who has one) or some sort of more unified and transcendent sense e.g. 'Mind,' 
the source of that generation. I think he refers to both senses indiscriminately. This is a reading 
similar, but not the same as Wassennan's distinction of two senses of mind in this poem - Universal 
Mind and the 'individual human mind.' Not only is that reading too Platonic, it is also too 
differentiated for the sort of ambiguity Shelley employs here. Shelley wants to introduce notions of 
creation and creativity in his poem whereas Plato did not in his theory of the ideal forms and their 
particulars. 
^ Cf. Pulos. op. cit. (1954); T . A Hoagwood. Skepticism and Ideology. (1988). 
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Anne Mellor's 'ironic' reading of this tendency in Romantic poetry as a w^ole is 
based on the same set of observations as my own. She describes the same sort of theological 
premises of organicism to inform the practices of Shelley and his contemporaries: 
The artist who shares this conception of the universe as chaos must find an aesthetic 
mode that sustains this ontological reality, this never-ending becoming. Clearly, he 
cannot merely impose a man-made form or sj^em upon this chaos: that would distort 
motion into stasis. Instead, the Romantic ironist must begin skeptically. He must 
acknowledge the inevitable limitations of his own finite consciousness and of all 
man-made structures or myths. But even as he denies the absolute vahdity of his own 
percq)tions and structuring conceptions of the universe, even as he consciously 
deconstructs his mystifications of the self and the world, he must affirm and celebrate 
the process of Ufe by creating new images and ideas. Thus the romantic ironist 
sustains his participation in a creative process that extends beyond the limits of his 
own mind. He deconstructs his own texts in the e^ectation tiiat such deconstruction 
is a way of keeping in contact with a greater creative power. (4-5) 
Nonetheless, an 'ironic reading' of Shelley seems to me to have several shortcomings, as 
valid as the observations it makes are. Firstly, having acknowledged the theological 
significance of the universal view to the subsequent train of thoughts, it tends to ignore it 
thereafter in the name of exploring its effects. Secondly, it seems somewhat historically 
inaccurate to suggest that such a project was his: Shelley was not influenced by the German 
Romantic Ironists,^^' v/hile he was directly influenced by the biological thinking that had 
compatible tendencies, such as that of Erasmus Darwin. Thirdly, the topos of this poem and 
many of the others that Shelley wrote deal with issues that are more or less e>q)licitly 
theological. Issues that affect anthropology, as organicism does, are fer more influential there 
than those of literary speculation per se. Finally, this idea of Romantic irony commits the 
reader to understanding the entire poem as an e3q)licit display of such a practice - as an 
'organic work.' I think that this poem however clearly moves away from such a stance in the 
final stanza. 
Irony is however a self-legitimating postulate that can justify itself in either a 'closed' 
or in an 'open' ending, so it seems hopeless to argue with critics committed to sudi a 
perspective. Such a practice of reading seems to me to be committed to being uncritical - to 
the position of the critic as the 'unprejudiced conductor' of the 'power' of poetry. It 
recognises the symptoms of the problem, but refuses to make any sort of diagnosis of the 
form of the disease it confronts (to use Shelley's metaphor). It wallows in the aporia of 
organicism. Like the deconstructive practice Mellor goes on to criticise, ironic readings take 
^ He was of course influenced by Coleridge though, who was. However I thmk it significant in that 
respect that Coleridge does not take to Friedrich Schlegel as we m i ^ have expected him to i f 
Coleridge's organicism had observed the same dynamic as Schlegel's. I don't think it does, but it has 
transcended the Umits of this thesis to discuss that. 
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poems of the Romantic age out of their context in intellectual history and absolutise the 
tendencies they identify in Mont Blanc, as i f demonstration were argument. 
I f we are not to understand it only as a display of Romantic irony, one way of 
understanding the effect of this 'organic epistemology' is to conqjare the 'mind' to which he 
refers to the transcendent 'mind' of God, for whom, being omniscient, there is no past, 
present or fiiture and for whom speech is action. This comparison brings into sharper 
perspective the change he proposes for the notion of human language. It takes us to the heart 
of Shelley's heretical presentation in the poem, the shift from regarding speech as the 
quintessential divine attribute to regarding silent thought as such. This is how the poem 
concludes, with the silent mountain being challenged by the thinking poet for its impotent 
silence. It is an ironic practice, for it is only his own organic theological conception derived 
from Cartesian imiversality that suggests the primacy of thought (rather than words) to the 
human mind. It leads him to assume that such a relation also captures the essence of God's 
relationship to the universe. Agency, like language in the poem, is in the state of metabolic 
process and it is clear to Shelley that even i f God is not there, some vital and unifying force is. 
This is not the orthodox account of either God or man that Shelley represents 
however. The Genesis Creation accounts, as previously mentioned, emphasise the indelible 
link between the creative power of a 'transcendent' God and his use of language?^ By 
God's acts of speech all that is comes into being. Language (and in particular the spoken 
word) is thus the orthodox theological basis of understanding God's relationship to his 
creation and, since man is created in God's image, it is a basis that has a wide range of 
inplications for human relationships and understanding too. Speech, in both Classical and 
Biblical understanding, is the primary basis of communication and the repository of common 
sense, as well as the means by which an agent discloses himself and 'appears' in the worid to 
others. These are issues that have been averred to earUer in the second and third chapters and 
need not be delved into more deeply here. Witii this shift to understanding the primary 
human attribute to be thought in the mind - which is fer less 'woridly' than are spoken, 
revelatory words - it is instructive to note how Shelley deviates from orthodoxy and, in 
particular, how his heresy, his 'choice of opinion,' effects the notions of agency and 
relationships cormected to the being of God and, by implication, the relationships connected 
to human being. The heretical, organicist imderstanding of 'love' and of ' l i fe ' was addressed 
^° Cf Genesis and the Christological import of the Word given by John 1. Ideas and connotations of 
transcendence and immanence are actually a product of the Enhghtenment response to Cartesian 
universality and one must be wary of adhering to them too feithfiilly. 
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earUer in the chapter, as was the change in emphasis they reflected from seeing man and his 
relationships in terms of agency to the terms of processes. 
Heresy of the sort Shelley begets here by presenting agency and even the objective 
world in terms of natural actions could probably most naturally be attributed to having 
removed the primary power of agency from the concept of God, in defiance of his orthodox 
conception as a Maker. This is certainly a correct understanding of the effect of the 
presentation. But a more historical understanding of the intellectual spirit of Shelley's heresy 
can be gained i f we realise that an additional, absolute character has been felsely attributed to 
God that an orthodox account would not have had. In Une with his operative 'prejudice 
against prejudice,' derived from Hume and others, Shelley's 'divine mind' has the added 
power of transcending the prejudices of language and formal agency as well. Shelley's 
identification of God with a silent and inexpressible form of ideal power seems to ful f i l the 
category of the subUme, from which the topos of his poem is inseparable, but it is crucially 
different: 
The sublime, as Kant explains it, is...prograimnatically ambivalent: it demands 
simultaneous identification with and dissociation from images of ideal power. Unless 
the subject in some degree identifies with the ideal, the ejq)erience reduces to mere 
pretense. But total identification collapses the distinction between ideal and 
empirical agency and leads to a condition o f 'rational raving' that Kant designated 
'fenaticism.'^' 
One of the great difficulties created in Mont Blanc by Shelley's ambivalent 'personification' 
according to his organicist philosophical4heological premise of the 'one mind' is that it leads 
him into the sort of 'rational raving' Kant describes. 
But it does so in a way that Kant had doubtiess never envisaged - as a collapse of the 
idea of the distinctive agency of God (and, by inplication, of human beings) altogether. In 
Mont Blanc. Shelley never dissociates himself from the image of an agent of ideal power - as 
would have suited a presentation of the subUme - because it would have been a redundant act. 
He had never acted to identify with it to begin with. Organic identification was his basic 
epistemological and theological postulate, not the action he took as a distinct agent 
confronting another. The 'everlasting universe of things/ Flows through the mind' of the 
divine, -whose 'secret springs' are 'the source of human thought.' [My representation of this 
in more e>qjUcitly 'personal' terms of course feils to capture the ambiguity in which Shelley 
clothes these organic relations] In this ambiguity we can see a degree of consistency in 
Shelley's philosophy far beyond the 'prejudice against prejudice' that Kant employed so 
231 Steven K n ^ . Personification and the Sublime. (1985). 3. 
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rigorously: a prejudice against the basic distinction of agency as such. Shelley's prejudice 
towards the notion of God was that he should be entirely without any formal or personal 
characteristics - an organic, spiritual thing like a thought infusing the material world, an idea 
which he says is part of the teaching of Jesus Christ: 
He is neither the Proteus or the Pan of the material world. But the word God 
according to the acceptation of Jesus Christ unites all the attributes vsiiich these 
denominations contain, and is the interfused and overruling Spirit of all the energy 
and wisdom included within the circle of existing things. 
The addition of this 'transcendent attribute' to divinity, i.e. its lack of formal agency 
however has the effect of obviating the logical s&asQ in which God relates to the world as its 
author. The peculiar transcendence his mind presents in lacking a distinction between things 
and thought also brings it to implicitly deny the distinction between essence and existence, i.e. 
what Coleridge calls the 'superinduction of reality' in the latter.^^ Both senses are placed 
indiscriminately within the reahn of silent thoughts and, in the process, are thereby removed 
from the semus communis, from personal commimication and from the effect of history. Al l 
thoughts are treated, as it were, as mathematical equations, existing in theory, but bearing no 
true (or distinctive) correspondence in reality. This apparently minor diange from speech to 
thought has enormous rqjercussions: in presenting the relationship of the transcendent God 
to the world according to the terms in which he understands his own thought, i.e. purely (self-) 
.relationally, Shelley removes the nominative power of language as a characteristic of God. 
This removes the characteristic means by which God expresses his dominion over creation, a 
relationship that reflects creation's dependence on him and also confimis the real distinction 
between him (and the creatures made in his image) and creation. It is this that leads Shelley 
to the second heresy that Rieger noted, the removal of any true difference between the ideas 
of divine transcendence and immanence. The removal of the distinction between the two is 
betrayed in the natural images Shelley uses. Not only do they tend to suggest evanescence an 
'unremitting interchange'(39), they suggest mystery and 'secret chasms.'(122) 
Shelley's attack on the connection between language and the notion of agency could 
(and ultimately does) result in the hermeneutic aporia. In feet, it would not be incorrect to 
state that the aporia is the immediate eflfect of having removed the superinduction of reality 
that distinguishes thought from things, the characteristic 'weakness' of Shelley's imagery. 
Indeed this aporia is exemplified by the disorientated and disorienting series of images that 
'On Christianity.' oacit. Ed. E.B. Murray (1993). 250. , ^ ^ 
^^BL XVIII,204 The difference between essence and existence is made clear by the example 
Coleridge offers- 'Thus we speak of the essence and the essential properties of a circle; but we do not 
therefore assert that any thing which reaUy exists is mathematicaUy circular.' This distmcuon between 
essence and existence is one that Shelley's organic postulates igaore. 
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characterise the first four stanzas of the poem. Incomprehensibility or, as Rieger rightly 
describes it, obscurity is the result of Shelley's atten^t to sever the prejudicial character of 
agency fi-om language (and indeed from all manner of sources) in these images.^ Without 
that natural grammatical sense of agency, language is truly incomprehensible. For words do 
indeed have a particular and 'exclusive sense,' despite Shelley's dogmatic contention to the 
contrary, wiiich aheady effect an inherent sensus communis and framework of agency in their 
coimotations and terms of reference. Neglecting this exclusive and prejudicial sense produces 
nothing but obscurity, and of coiu-se it alters the natural relationships of mankind to things 
and to his fellow man. 
In so fer as this practice of subverting agency characterises the majority of Mont 
Blanc, the poem could be understood as a demonstration of the intellectual philosophy. In the 
first four stanzas of the poem, he largely portrays the mountain as a nonanthropomorphic, 
amoral power and the other natural forces as lesser instances of somewhat the same.^' This 
is typical of his 'rational raving' and depicts, in the background of the broad canvas of a 
landscape painting as it were, the consequences of his heretical grammatic/ syntactic 
relations. However, in the conclusion, Shelley directs his attack on divine logocentricity into 
the conventional form of personal address. This shift to intimate terms of personal address 
suggests that he relates to the mountain much as a human agent would relate to a 
personification. Coming at the conclusion of a poem in which repeated disorientation has 
been established its standard of reference, the switch to more conventional terms of reference 
shocks the reader in a way that perhaps no poem, with the possible exception of Keats' Ode 
on a Grecian Um, can be said to emulate. The intenticm of this shift is consonant with the 
motivation for depicting divine agency in terms of natural actions, but it shifts its line of 
attack in order to assert, in conventional language, his dominion over the silent 'mountain': 
-Winds contend 
Silently there, and heap the snow with breath 
Rapid and strong, but silently! Its home 
ITie voiceless lightning in these solitudes 
Keeps iimocently, and like vapour broods 
'The words /, mdyou and they are grammatical devices invented simply for arrangement and totally 
devoid of the intense and exclusive sense usually attached to them. It is difficult to find terms 
adequately to express so subtle a conception as that to which the intellectual philosophy has conducted 
us. We are on that verge where words abandon us, and what wonder i f we grow dizzy to look down the 
dark abyss o f - how Uttle we know.' ('On Life,' 478). 
There are of course exceptions to this practice of avoiding anthropomorphism that add clarity to the 
picture, such as his reference to the communicants at the mountain's Holy Mass: 
Thy giant brood of pines around thee clinging, 
Children of elder time, in whose devotion 
The chainless winds still come and ever came 
To drink their odoiurs, and their mighty swinging 
To hear - an old and solemn harmony; (Q, 20-24) 
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Over the snow. The secret strength of things 
Which governs thou^t, and to the infinite dome 
Of heaven is as a law, inhabits thee! 
And what were thou, and earth, and stars, and sea. 
I f to the human mind's imaginings 
Silence and solitude were vacancy? (V, 134-44) 
In that conclusion, he fmally asserts what he had demonstrated througjiout: his is the claim of 
the speaking Creator agaiast a silent pretender. However this sudden reversal into 
comprehensibility questions, i f nothing had before, the validity of his own linguistic usage 
until that point in the poem. Indeed, one must question whether the poem would not have 
been ahogether incomprehensible without such an orientation. 
Once the play of the theological and philosophical postulates (and their connotations 
and imphcations) are recognised in Mont Blanc. I think Shelley's intentions are as clear as his 
use of language is ambiguous. He wants to claim for 'human thought' transcendence of the 
traditional limitations upon human e5q)ression, Umitations inherent in the prejudice of human 
agency and language, but he also wants to gainsay that there is something other than the 
human (and particularly a higher agent). However he needs to allude to a siqjematural being 
in order to present his own claims as a Creator. The ideological and philosophical integrity 
with which Shelley adhered to the organic model of Ufe unfortunately lead him to lose artistic 
authenticity in this poem, since there can be no ambiguity where distinctions between subject 
and object have been a priori removed. His use of allusion only presents us, on an 
intellectual level, with a more oblique manner of opposition, q)position being a tacit 
acceptance of the same premises and reversal of the judgement upon them. TTie one possible 
way of reading Mont Blanc that would escape this censure would be to read it as a strict 
parody, but unfortunately that seems an inqjossible reading - that would require Shelley 
accept wdiat he most certainly did not.^* 
What does seem most likely is that this is a genuine attempt at presenting an artistic 
model of a wholly natural anthropology - with imiversal, dualist and Gnostic allusions - as a 
counter-claim to those normally associated with the Deist topos. In other words, Mont Blanc 
not only fimctions as a poem acting as a window into Shelley's psycho-linguistic processes -
as more 'formaUst' or epistemological readings have rightly en:q)hasised - it is also a mirror 
reflecting the theological and philosophical convictions he had. But I think this is where the 
emphasis of a critique of the poem ought to lie, not in transcendence as such or in the 
linguistic relations of the poem. They are removed both from reality and from the 
236 The use of paro<fy is however what I shall contest Keats employed in his Ode on a Grecian Um. 
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conventional prejudices of the tradition in which Shelley wrote. It has a more logical 
rationale as well: given the intellectual necessity of prejudices that Heidegger and Gadamer 
have demonstrated, it is most correct to see Shelley's practice as demonstrating the prejudicial 
effect of heretical postulates rather than, as it is usually presented by structuraUst 
understandings of language, as an interplay of allegedly endemic linguistic failings to lay hold 
of 'presence.' Mont Blanc primarily displays Shelley's attenpt to give a poetic accoimt of 
human creativity independent of a metaphysics and in particular of a dogmatic theological, 
i.e. logocentric expression. 
One final manner in which I would like to trace this attack on formal agency is by 
observing how Shelley treats origins in the poem. The collapse of the distinction between the 
ideal and the enpirical in his inspirited universe takes place most obviously in the collapse of 
the distinction between things and 'human thought,' reflecting the collapse between the 
universe and the human mind. However, there is within that postulated unity and change also 
a duality o f light and darkness to be noted that interact in a complementary fashion, 'Now 
dark—now glittering—now reflecting gloom—I Now reflecting splendour... '(3-4). Similar 
logical problems to those at the poem's outset continue as we are also presented with the idea 
that hxmian thought might not just be, but have a source. This suggestion contains the same 
ambivalence. 'The source of human thought'(5) comes from 'secret springs,' simultaneously 
hinting at and concealing its origin or cause, a suggestion that is further confused by the fact 
that their sound is 'but half its own.'(6) 
Presumably this source is also within the everlasting universe of the mind i f all things 
and thoughts are in it. But i f it is the source of thought and is within mind, then there is also a 
difference between the two, but i f the mind is everything, how can it have a source of 
everything within it that is not either the source of mind or mind of it? It is impossible to 
picture in one's mind precisely v^at Shelley envisages - and that of course is the intention. 
One must have adopted the same spirit and the same philosophical theology as the artist in 
order to sympathise with it. 
At root, these repeated gaps in Shelley's logic, like those at the poem's outset, are 
poetic expressions of the 'spontaneity' at the centre of all rationalist philosophical 
frameworks. Shelley sinqily decentres and thus removes the inherent hierarchy of the original 
Kantian sense of spontaneity, hi line with this decentring, it is also unclear where the sound 
he refers to issues from. It could be the tribute, but it could also be the source. Most likely it 
hes in the logical antipode to the mountain however: 
In the still cave of the witch Poesy, 
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Seeking among the shadows that pass by 
Ghosts o f all things that are, some shade of thee. 
Some phantom, some feint image; till the breast 
From which they fled recalls them, thou art there! (U, 44-48) 
We can probably assume that the antagcmists of darkness and light are also each half 
responsible for the soimd. There is every reason to think that sound has an analogy with light 
here and therefore we have little difficulty seeing some sort of aUgnment by Shelley to a 
dualistic Manichean or Gnostic view of creation combined with his sceptical fiamework. 
Alternatively, i t could relate to the Lucretian atomism that Jerrold Hogle and Hugh Roberts 
have seen to inform Shelley's presentation. 237 
However, Mont Blanc is concerned with alluding to and yet concealing origins 
throughout. Shelley frequently uses dream-sequences in his poetry to avoid the idea of fixed 
locations or natural causes. This is again the case in Section I I I of the poem,^periiaps alluding 
to Milton's reference to the source of his inspiration in Paradise Lost the Holy Spirit, the 
'celestial patroness, who deigns/ Her nightly visitation unimplored,/ And dictates to me 
slumbering',^* the poet begins (again) with such an allusive dream vision. It rejects the 
Christian view of resurrection in fevour of a less certain suggestion: 
Some say that gleams of a remoter world 
Visit the soul in sleep, - that death is slumber. 
And that its shapes the busy thoughts outnumber 
Of those who wake and live. - 1 look on high; 
Has some unknown omnipotence imfurled 
The veil of life and death? or do I lie 
In dream, and does the mightier world o f sleep 
Spread fer around and inaccessibly 
Its circles? (HI, 49-57) 
Leslie Brisman suggests that this dream sequence acts as a buffer 'between the overwhelming 
presence at the end of section I I ('Thou art there!') and 'Mont Blanc appears - still, snowy, 
and serene-' (63).^' The shadowy connection of the two certainties however only intensifies 
his quest for the origin he seeks, and it leads him to speculate on yet another possible place: 
Is this the scene 
Where the old Earthquake-daemon taught her young 
Ruin? Were these their toys? or did a sea 
Of fire envelop once this silent snow? (ID, 71-74) 
The silence that greets this question - for 'None can reply - all seems eternal now'(75) 
becomes the ground of possibility of an answer that wi l l only be given at the poem's end: 
JerroldE. Hogle. The New SheUev. (1991). 115. HughRoberts. op. cit. (1997) 
Tnhn Milton Paradise Lost. IX, 21-23. 
Leslie Brisman. T?r.niantir Orip;iTis (1978). 147. 
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The wilderness has a mysterious tongue 
Which teaches awful doubt, or feith so mild. 
So solemn, so serene, that man may be 
But for such faith with nature reconciled. 
Thou hast a voice, great Mountain, to repeal 
Large codes of firaud and woe; not understood 
By all, but which the wise, and great, and good 
Inteipret, or make felt, or deeply feel. ( E , 76-83) 
Shelley's organicist postulates, in their refusal to attach themselves to a notion of 
causality or an idea of agency, do conform in the end to the Wordsworthian idea of poetry as 
'the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings,' feelings Shelley could sense welling so 
deeply within him when beholding the sublime landscape of Mont Blanc. And he, like 
Wordsworth, thought that these feelings, when held within the premises of the organicist 
framework, could 'repeal' the 'large codes of fraud and woe' that he attributed to be irtq)licit 
in the ideas of agency and, consequently, of discriminatory hierarchy. These feelings are the 
'voice' o f poetry that speaks in Mont Blanc - even when confronting the 'Deist' idea that the 
mountain speaks in the end. But even this final confrontation has set up a straw man to be 
knocked down - Deism posits no voice in the moimtain either, but rather in the sense of 
grandeur that comes from the failure of the senses to comprehend its immensity. Shelley's 
opposition to the Deist premises was thus less consistent than he presented it as. His was in 
fact merely an evolved model of the same unorthodox theology. But vAiat Shelley's 
incapacity to present his ideas comprehensibly demonstrates, in the very poem that is 
designed to embody them, is that they are misconceived. They are caught up, in their 
organicist premises, in a recurrent crisis of self-legitimation. 
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ODE ON A GRECIAN URN (1820 version) 
1. 
THOU still umavish'd bride of quietoess, 
Thou foster-child of silence and slow time, 
Sylvan historian, who canst thus express 
A flowery tale more sweetly than our rhyme: 
What leaf-fring'd legend haunts about thy shape 
Of deities or mortals, or of both. 
In Tempe or the dales of Arcady? 
What men or gods are these? What maidens loth? 
What mad pursuit? What struggle to escape? 
What pipes and tunbrels? What wild ecstasy? 
2. 
Heard melodies are sweet, but those unheard 
Are sweeter, therefore, ye soft pipes, play on; 
Not to the sensual ear, but, more endear'd. 
Pipe to the spirit ditties of no tone: 
Fair youth, beneath the trees, thou canst not leave 
Thy song, nor ever can those trees be bare; 
Bold Lover, never, never canst thou kiss. 
Though winning near the goal-yet, do not grieve; 
She cannot &de, though thou hast not thy bliss. 
For ever wilt thou love, and she be fair! 
3. 
Ah, happy, happy boughs! that cannot shed 
Your leaves, nor ever bid the Spring adieu; 
And, h a i ^ melodist, unwearied. 
For ever piping songs for ever new; 
More happy love! more ha^jy, happy love! 
For ever warm and still to be enjoy'd. 
For ever panting, and for ever young; 
All breathmg human passion far above, 
That leaves a heart high-sorrowfiil and cloy'd, 
A bummg forehead, and a parching tongue. 
4. 
Who are these coming to the sacrifice? 
To what green altar, O mysterious priest. 
Lead'St thou that heifer lowing at the skies, 
And all her silken flanks with garlands drest? 
What httle town by river or sea shore, 
Or mountain-built with peacefiil citadel. 
Is emptied of this folk, this pious mom? 
And, little town, thy streets for evermore 
Will silent be; and not a soul to tell 
Why thou art desolate, can e'er return. 
5. 
O Attic shape! Fair attitude! with brede 
Of marble men and maidens overwrought. 
With forest branches and the trodden weed; 
Thou, silent form, dost tease us out of thought 
As doth eternity: Cold Pastoral! 
When old age shall this generation waste, 
Thou shalt remain, m midst of other woe 
Than ours, a Mend to man, to whom thou say'st, 
"Beauty is truth, trath beauty,"~that is all 
Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know. 
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Chapter Five - Keats's eternal urn 
Introduction 
The final chapter of this thesis examines the topic of silence and the crisis of self-
legitimation that emerges in Keats's parody of Enlightenment values of art in his 'Ode on a 
Grecian Urn.' He does so by confronting an object d'art, the fixed product of a maker, from 
the contrary 'Romantic perspective' of life and its processes. The ode has a peculiar place in 
the canon of English literature. It has been used as a touchstone for the legitimacy of the 
various schools of literary criticism that have emerged since the time of the Second World 
War. I wi l l examine a few examples of these approaches at the end of the chapter, which in a 
sense concludes the thesis on the same sorts of issues it had started on: the hermeneutic 
aporia that has emerged in interpretation. I have argued that this is a product of the shift from 
the age-old imderstanding of creativity in terms of causality, for which the artistic model was 
that of the maker (or homo faber), to a more organic one that understands creativity as a 
fimction of ' l i fe , ' and thus presents it in terms of biological Ufe-processes, with miraculous 
begiimings and uncertain ends, as befits the artistic model of life of the animal laborans. 
The critical response to the ode has hinted at such a change in the model of activity, 
but not openly avowed it. The questions posed time and time again by critics in regard to the 
ode centie around its conclusion: whether Keats agreed with it, whether it was a 
demonstration of artistic control or a loss of it, whether he intended it to be acceptable to his 
readers and, i f so, under what conditions it should be considered legitimate. In terms of the 
poem's basic structure, one can reasonably conclude that it is legitimate because the 
conclusion provides a definitive answer to the constitutive tiope of the ode, interrogation.^ 
On the other hand, that judgement is questioned by the ode's paradoxical themes. Indeed it 
has been argued that the disillusionment and fiiistration that result from the speaker's 
questionmg are wholly at odds with the certainty of the conclusion.^'" The disjuncture of 
form and content has made the ode a topic of much critical discussion. The feet that the 
conclusion appears at odds with the rest of the poem has forced critics to e^qjose their 
theoretical underpinnings and hermeneutie assumptions. TTie ode's formal incoherence has 
invited the application of a different hermeneutic of reading than would have been warranted 
i f the poem had been more transparent to understanding, as it would have been had it been 
'^^  Helen Vendler. The Odes of John Keats. Harvard BehiapP., 1983. 118. 
It is not only the rest of the poem with which the conclusion is at odds. As Walter Jackson Bate 
notes, 'in even the most spontaneous letters of a year and a half before (and we are significantly forced 
to go back that &r in order to find remarks at all analogous), Keats never comes to anything as bald as 
the simple equation of these two abstractions, "beauty" and "truth," that he permits the um to make 
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intended as a determined 'work of art.' However, it was written by a poet who conceived his 
poetic activity not in the conventional terms of a maker but rather as a mediator of life. Thus 
it appears as a 'work in progress,' an understanding of the activity based on the metabolic 
processes of life. 
This aspect of the poem has not gone unnoticed by critics. An enq)hasis on the 
autonomy o f the text, that is its resistance to a fixed determination of meaning (whether as a 
purpose or an end), marks all the 'formalist critics' I refer to in the section of the chapter 
dealing with their responses to the ode. The standard reading must broadly tend toward a 
'Romantic view' (for lack of a better term) which regards the conclusion as a poetic defence 
of the centripetal power of poetry to draw opposites, even axrtitheses into organic imity. The 
most femous and enduring of such readings is presented by Cleanth Brooks in The Well-
Wrought Urn (1947). It is perhaps a measure of the influence of LA. Richards's 'practical' 
criticism that the perspective of the American New Critics of the 1940s, of which Brooks is a 
prime rq)resentative, has been taken as an accurate representation of this unifying character 
of 'Romantic' thought by the critical tradition. Ridiards, while proceeding along Utilitarian 
Unes in books such as the Principles of Literary Criticism (1924) and Science and Poetry 
(1926) came to the Amoldian conclusion (following the German Romantic writers and 
Coleridge)^^ that the kind of truth flunished by poetry is analogous to that formerly provided 
by religion, i.e. one which mediates life and a means of leading it. 
I f this is claimed to be poetry's proper merit and especial province, then it follows (as 
the New Critics insisted) that individual poems 'must not mean but be.' For i f poems mean, 
they signify an end that the poems do not themselves embody - they can be designated as the 
products of design. This emphasis on the being of a poem tries to avoid the problem it sees in 
traditional accounts of a poem as a work of art, the 'intentional fallacy,' i.e. the notion of 
causality that would accompany the model of art as the product of the poet working as the 
homo faber. For this model entails that poetry can never truly provide significance of its own 
accord: it might mean something that has already been fixed and determined, but it can never 
be truly raeanmgful in and of itself And the New Critics and their successors are determined 
to see poetry as a demonstration of an organic unity that would in some sense be desecrated 
by such an 'extrinsic' determination. The practical ramification of such a view is the New 
Critics' insistence on a practice of criticism that enqihasises the self-contained and 
here (least of all does he advance anything seriously comparable to the words that foUow).' John 
Keats. Oxford: Oxford Paperbacks, (1%7) 517. ^ , ... , w „fthP 
^ I have argued though, the fact that he thereby misinterprets Colendge's appeal to the truth of the 
imaginative work is connected to his behef in the Bible's revealed truth about the workmgs of the 
human mind. 
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indeterminate nature of the literary text, frequentiy known in practice as 'close reading.' This 
assumption of the literary text's self-containedness is certainly axiomatic, but it is logically 
consistent with the view of poetry as a particular soiu-ce of truth, a view which undoubtedly 
can be traced to the nascent stages of a philosophy of life in the early nineteenth century. 
This development was prepared by the Romantics themselves, whose poetics emphasised, as 
David Simpson notes, 'self-finding and self-creation, with the consequent disestablishment of 
the text as an authority and the stressing of its fimction as a heuristic stimulus.'^^ This 
'heuristic stimulus,' which Keats called 'the greeting of the spirit,' was always a precondition 
that the Romantics set for the reader to understand their poetry. 
However, even the 'heuristic stimulus' presented by the form of textual obscurity 
entails considerations that cannot be reduced, as the New Critics would have it, to the text's 
'being.' This is revealed by the peculiar emphasis the Romantics placed on the importance 
that the reader share a lived process of thought with them, an issue which formalist accounts 
tend to overlook in their exclusive emphasis on the text .^ This sort of hermeneutic 
iit^jerative, the 'shared life ' of the 'sympathetic imagination,' which we have seen so strongly 
emphasised in Wordsworth, Coleridge and Shelley, is not always as readily associated with 
Keats. He does however fell into the same pattem. He betraj^ a similar understandiog, for 
instance, in a letter to Reynolds: 'Axioms of philosophy are not axioms until we have feh 
them on the pulses.. .We read fine — things but never feel them to the ful l until we have gone 
the same steps as the Author.'^' Not only must a poem be, Keats suggests, the reader must 
also come in a manner to identify spiritually (and we might now say existentially) with the 
author. For the reader also must not mean, i.e. find a fixed purpose in the poem, but be with 
'^'^  David Simpson. Irony and Authority in Romantic Poetry. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Littlefield, 
1979. 26. 
Simpson argues for a similar desire on both Kant and Hegel's behalf, 27-29, though also notes 
important differences. See Coleridge's discussion of Kant in Coleridge: The Philosophical Lectures. 
1818-19. Ed. Kathleen Cobum. 388-90. 
'To JH Reynolds.' 3 May, 1818. This sentiment is what one would expect fiom a poet who 
stressed the importance of the experience of a 'World of Pains and trouble' to the development of what 
he called an 'identity' or 'soul' from its beginning as a mere 'inteUigence' or 'spark of the divinity.' 
By means of the 'hornbook' or 'Minds Bible,' which he calls the human heart, the intelligence is made 
tlu-ough suffering into a soul, making the world of pains and trouble a 'Vale of soul-making.' ('To the 
George Keatses,' 14 Feb-3 May 1819). The himian heart is the formal animus of existence, and 
therefore must in some sense be coeval with himian life as Keats sees it. What is worth noting though 
is that, in order to avoid that notion of causaUty (the notion of a divine Maker), he also attempts to deny 
the existence of the person (heart) prior to its activity in forming the inteUigence. Thus he can claim, 
when discussing the issue of the Salvation of Children who die in infancy, that his system (unlike those 
which posit existence upon worldly appearance) does not affront 'Our reason and humanity' because, 
'in them the Spaik or intelligence returns to God without any identity.' (my italics) This appeal to 
something simultaneously prior to and more meaningfiil thai experience and yet still inseparable from 
it is the sort of intellectual crisis of self-legitimation that is at the very heart of Keats's philosophy of 
life. 
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the 'spark of intelligence' that hes in it. The 'negative capability' that he so highly prized in 
Shakespeare was also an attribute of his ideal reader. 
The 'existential' precondition of all knowledge, which in Coleridge referred explicitiy 
to a life informed by Christian belief, can thus be just as readily observed in Wordsworth, 
Shelley or Keats in their calls for the reader to share 'the same spirit as the artist,' even 
though their understanding of ' l i fe ' and the 'spirit' differed from Coleridge's: 
In order to have an efficient beUef in Christianity a man must have been a Christian, 
and this is seeming argumentum in circulo incident to all spiritual truths, to every 
subject not presentable under the forms of time and space, as long as we attempt to 
master by the reflex acts of the understanding what we can only know by the act of 
becoming. (BL, Conclusion, 287). 
The difference of course can be traced to the crisis of self-legitimation inherent in the 
new biological model of creativity - the poet is in a state of symbiosis with his work, rather 
than being in a position of Au^Kcf^ Jyover it. The problem of relating the model of artistic 
activity to the processes o f life alone was that life: 
like the term stimulus in medicine; explaining every thing, it explams nothing; and 
above all, leaves itself unexplained. It is an excellent diarm to enable a man to talk 
about and about any thing he likes, and to make himself and his hearers as wise as 
before... (whereas with poetry, as is the case with painting) the specific object of the 
present attempt is to enable the spectator to judge in the same spirit in which the 
Artist produced, or ought to have produced.'^ "** 
In order to judge in the same spirit Coleridge thought that some explicit 
acknowledgement of design was requisite. It was not that he was averse to the model of 
becoming. It was the fact that it was inadequate on its own. He attributed hfe to a source that 
had a causal relationship to creation as well as a constant role in sustaining its evolxrtion. As 
he said elsewhere, 'The model is nothing less than that of the redemptive act of Christ 
himself; He is become as we are, that we may become as He is.' For Coleridge, the reference 
to the infinite I A M gave him the artistic model of Creator and sustainer of all life, a 
combination lacking in his contemporaries' atten:5)ts to avoid the notion of causality. It was 
an attempt that made incomprehensibility as much a part of Romantic poetics as the aporia is 
a part o f Romantic hermeneutics. 
One of the great ironies of this grand attempt at avoiding fixed notions of design 
though is that an even more determined pattern was estabUshed: the pattern of necessity that 
it takes on from the Ufe-forces it seeks to mediate. The Romantics' insistence on the reader's 
willingness to share life (or be 'sympathetic') as a precondition for understanding their poetry 
'^^  PreUminary Essay. 'On The Principles of Genial Criticism' in Biographia Literaria. edited with his 
Aesthetical Essays. Ed. J. Shawcross. (1907). 222. 
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announces harmony with ' l i fe ' and the 'spirit' to be a crucial hermeneutic issue, consigning 
even formal textual considerations to secondary status. The text represents the body in which 
the poet's spirit had inhabited, a body to which only a certain type of reader's spirit wil l fit: a 
sympathetic one who wil l not pose questions that require an answer according to the model of 
cause-and-effect. This might be acceptable on sudi terms. However, the explicit requirement 
of a kindred spirit unravels the Enlightenment aim to achieve unprejudiced creative 
ejq)ression. For it entails that p o ^ has a purpose other than the artist's 'spontaneous' 
intention to create for creation's sake or, as it is usually ejq)ressed in terms more congenial to 
an attempt to avoid notions of causality, disinterestedly. 
But no less veherment is the Romantic writers' insistence that the reader 'believe in 
order to understand' what they, the authors, are trying to say, than is Coleridge's insistence 
on the precondition of Christian belief as the terms of the primary imagination. Both parties 
acknowledge the truth of what Coleridge asserts in another essay: 
... it is the nature of all disquisitions on matters of taste, that the reasoner must appeal 
for his very premises to feets of feeling and of inner sense, which all men do not 
possess, and which many, who do possess and even act upon them, yet have never 
reflectively adverted to, have never made them objects of a f i i l l and distinct 
consciousness. The geometrician refers to certain figures in space, and to the power 
of describing certain lines, which are intuitive to all mm, as men; and therefore his 
demonstrations are throughout compulsory. The morahst and the philosophic critic 
lay claim to no positive, but only to a conditional necessity. It is not necessary, that 
A or B should judge at all conceming poetry; but ifhe does, in order to a just taste, 
such and such fecuhies must have been developed in his mind.^*^ 
The differences between Coleridge and the others are crucial of course, precisely 
because the terms of what needs to be believed differ (as does the locus and model of 
authority for creativity). Coleridge's deferral of the artist's secondary, i f genuine creative 
powers to the Divine terms and conditions of the primary imagination that it repeated in order 
to be deemed creative was not shared by his contemporaries. On the contrary, mudi of what 
was written by Wordsworth, Shelley and Keats suggests that they regarded a reference to 
authorial intention, or the 'striving after feet and reason' to be an anathema to the true poet. 
This was Coleridge's great feiling in Keats's eyes - he had the irritable habit of reaching for a 
ground of authority of 'feet or reason' beyond those given by the immediate responses of his 
being to beauty. Behind this objection we can probably note an objection to the two-world 
Essay Second, ited. (1907). 225. It is probably usefiil to refer to Coleridge's definition of taste here 
to avoid a misunderstanding. At the end of this essay he defines taste according to a two-world 
understanding as 'the intermediate feculty which connects the active with the passive powers of our 
nature, the inteUect with the senses; and its appointed fimction is to elevate the images of the latter, 
while it reaUses the ideas of the former. We must therefore have learned what is pecuhar to each, 
before we can understand that 'Third somethmg,' which is formed by a harmony of both.' (227) 
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view that was no less an anathema to him. Keats maintained, on the contrary, in f i i l l 
agreement with Wordsworth and Shelley's emphasis on one world and one Ufe, that such a 
doctrinal prejudice as Coleridge suggested was antithetical to his model of artistic creativity: 
'The Genius of Poetry must work out its own salvation in a man: It cannot be matured by law 
& precqjt, but by sensation and watchfiihiess - That vAxich is creative must create i t s e l f ^ or, 
similarly, ' i f Poetry comes not as naturally as the Leaves to a tree it had better not come at 
a l l ' ^ ' or 'ahnost any Man may like the Spider spin from his own inwards his own airy 
Citadel,' ' f i i l l o f Symbols for his spiritual eye. '"° 
A firm belief that the Romantics' 'organic work' provided not only the 'heuristic 
stimulus' but also a groM/K/of belief for the reader characterises both the New Critical and 
'Romantic ironist' interpretations I discuss below. Deconstructive readings have enq)hasised, 
on the contrary, that the New Critics' attempt to provide a basis of meaning via pure self-
referentiality can only ever result in an endless chain of signification without achieving a 
ground for their life - or 'being' as it is usually mistakenly called. This seems to me an 
accurate portrait o f the dilenrnra of modem hermeneutics derived from the Romantic premises 
of one life, which does not affect Coleridge's claims in the way it does his contemporaries. 
His poetics was not primarily based on self-referentiality as theirs was, but on self-
referentiality expressed secondarily as identified primarily in Christ and his foimdational 
work in the schema of creation and salvation. 
Keats's Ode on a Grecian Urn fbcusses primarily around issues of temporahty and its 
effect upon the truth of the spiritual hfe that Keats promoted as poetry's alternative to 'a 
Christian scheme of salvation' - 'a Vale of tears' he called it in opposition to his own 'Vale 
of soul-making.' The issue of temporality is the basis for the central antithesis in the ode: the 
contrast between the mutability of life and the eternity of art. The critical tradition, following 
or opposing the New Critics (and thus often imphcitly adopting the same paradigm) has 
usually interpreted this antithesis in one of two contrary ways: either to uphold the 
transcendent, eternal values of the um or to condemn them. These thematic approaches have 
been extrapolated to include the issue of whether or not Keats was an 'ideaUst' or a 'reahst,' 
by which is meant whether he accepted or rejected transcendent values."' Scholarship on 
Keats, like that on Wordsworth, Coleridge and Shelley has often interpreted these terms of 
transcendence to be Kantian, i.e. as universality conforming to the mind's powers to think in 
? o John T a y W 27^*^^>^^818. Of course, in this particular mstance Keats is referring to the 
effect on the reader and not to the artist's disposition 
^ 'To J.H. Reynolds,' 19 February, 1818. 
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terms of space and time. In one sense they are. They are represented intellectually by the 
urn's deathless eternity as an attribute of imiversality. But the emotional life of the um's 
beholder, to which the um is at best a dissatisfectory soiu-ce of comfort, suggests a fer more 
vital sense of spirituality in Keats than such an abstract sense can warrant. My reading shall 
suggest that this idealistic versus realistic paradigm is a felse one."^ The response of the 
artist of 'Ufe' to a 'dead' objet d'art is far more in evidrace in the ode. 
We must also keep in mind certain general fects about the ode and its critical 
reception: that Keats published the ode originally in The Annals o f the Fine Arts: that the 
descriptions of some of the depictions on the um bear an incontrovertable similarity to 
Haydon's description of the figures on 'Raphael's Cartoons at Lyaestra'; that Keats would 
have had, like his intellectual mentor Hazlitt, a distaste for the fecility of the pictorialist type 
of thought and claims to a dead form of eternity presented by Haydon's art and of Christianity 
stripped of himianity by Deistic thought; the feet the ode concludes with the sort of clear 
statement that is as striking as it is entirely atypical of the rest of Keats's poetic corpus. Al l of 
these considerations have led me to the conclusion that the current readings of this ode are 
inadequate and do not meet Keats's poetic aim in this ode. 
In general, the debate has taken on the quasi-theological dimensions inq)licit in such a 
distinction of realism and ideaUsm, which are vaUd and usefiil to the issues surrounding the 
debate inherent in the themes, but confusing initially to a discussion of Keats's ode on a 
Grecian um. To a greater or lesser extent, criticism in EngUsh literature has subsequetrtly 
acted or reacted to the paradigm of the New Critics since the time of their criticism (a point I 
shall attenqjt to show), which was in tum a reaction to a cmde and materialist understanding 
of reality and of the spiritual issues of the poem. Ironically, my conclusions shall show that 
the materialist and the Utopian perspectives, the 'realists' and the 'idealists,' were identified 
by Keats as two sides of the same coin and dismissed as being inappropriate to man in his 
'Ode on a Grecian Um.' This dismissal is inherent in the choice of relationships suggested 
James O'Rourke. 'Persona and Voice in "Grecian Um".' (Spring 1987): 27-48. 
It should be noted from the outset that this distinction does not connote a crass temporal/ eternal 
distinction as both still obviously occur within the context of finite time. This problem is well noted by 
O'Rourke when he states that: 
Interpretations of the "Ode on a Grecian Um" which set the transience of Ufe over against an 
art whose spatial form signifies the transcendence of temporaUty have no means of 
distmguishing between the spatial form of sculpture and the temporal nature of language.(31) 
In other words, the ground of debate has been shifted by critics to a question which is strictly polarised 
- as i f the spatiality of the um did not admit to tempor^ty. Admittedly this is the argument put forth 
by the um and desired by the speaker, but it is a perspective which is undermined in the ode, not 
opposed or embraced outright That the eternal is ther*y evoked Ity the um may be and has been held, 
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for the lun. Two relationships for the um are enqjhasised from the poem's verjr beginning by 
the speaker (who reveals his sympathy to a Keatsian position on life), one corresponding to a 
bride and one corresponding to a foster-child. Both of these are partnered by a form of 
absence. In the former instance, it is that of quietness (which is usually named as silence in 
the poem), in the latter instance, it is that of 'slow time.' Significant by its absence though is 
another relationship. The absence of a reference to the urn's 'parent,' i.e. its author or maker, 
in the invocation at the outset of the ode facilitates the specious claims of an eternal 
perspective on the one hand and a philosophy of life (avoiding the purposive connotations of 
creation) on the other. This is emphasised by the otherwise strange reference to the urn as the 
'foster-child of silence and slow time.' 
This critical divide has been encouraged finther (one could argue created) by the 
somewhat artificial controversy surroimding the ending. My reading suggests that the ode 
must be read within the context of the ut pictura poesis tradition and a specific manifestation 
of that tradition, that o f elq)hrastic writing. Both of these had undergone a transformation in 
the time preceding Keats as a resuh of the debate brought on by Lessing's response to 
Winckelmann wiiich had, briefly summarised, distinguished the 'formal successiveness of 
poetry and the simultaneity of the visual arts.' As Roy Park points out, antii)ictorialist 
thinking, which can be considered broadly to follow the arguments of Lessing, underlies the 
thought of the English poets and critics of the Romantic period."^ This view of Keats's 
contemporaries is key to understanding the opposite view presented by the um itself and is 
shared, generally speaking, by the readers of and contributors to the Armals of the Fine Arts 
such as his fnend Benjamin Haydon. Far from agreeing with the um, Keats offers us a 
parody of the sort of logic such readers would use to justify the superiority of statuary to 
poetry, namely its silent eternity (adapting slightiy, but importantiy, Winckelmarm's 'stille 
GroBe.'). Although the speaker approaches the um in the hope of attaining the sweeter music 
of eternity its tale offers, and re-asserts its suflBciency to man after it has 'spoken' to him, the 
frequent references to our mortality and the expression of desires left unrequited throughout 
the poem leave us little doubt that these final assurances are measured ones. 
but this too is a confiismg, unhelpfiil and ultunately dangerous pretense, as Keats argued The eternal 
can distract from the hfe of the present 
Roy Park. Hazlitt and the Spirit of the Age. (1971). 117. 
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The Form of the Poem 
Keats employs various formal means of intensifying the sense of the ode. The choice 
of the ode is o f course itself the first aspect of the poem worth commenting on, i f briefly. As 
Paul Fry notes in his The Poet's Calling in the English Ode: 
In order to penetrate the stiange logic of an ode, one needs especially to understand 
two figures of speech, invocation and prolepsis (or anticipation), and one figure of 
thought, irony - "for vdiich," as Kenneth Burke remarks, "we could substitute 
dialectic."...Invocation, which is the motive of an ode, we may call a stubborn 
apostrophe, a purposeful calling in rather than a caUing out...Dialectic motivates 
change, and invocation in theory could motivate constancy through change. But now 
enters the figure that thwarts change in all discourse.. .prolepsis. Prolepsis is the 
figure that forecloses a topic before it is feirly entered upon.(10-12)^ 
Though the catalytic figure of prolepsis is one that leads to interpretatione, 'a rq)etition or 
ampUfication in other words'"' and would very often be located, by definition, at the 
begirming of the ode. Fry notes along with Helen Vendler a stmcture of 'experiential 
begirming'"* in Keats's odes, 'a confused but arresting passage of special intensity 
somewhere in the middle of the poem that has seen further than was intended and r^airs 
itself correctively, involutes or veils itself, in both the qjening and closing phases of its 
argument.'"^ This observation shall prove particularly relevant to the discussion. For as 
Barbara Hermstein Smith notes, 'a principle of closure is available only when the dialectic 
process can be represented as intemally resolved' and this is not the case in Keats's ode. The 
implications o f this wi l l have to be examined. 
There are however other formal aspects of the ode whidi also contribute to the 
unresolved dialectic. Although the following categories are by no means exhaustive, critics 
have observed his use of certain stylistic devices. Some of these deserve closer examination: 
1) Dramatis personae 
2) Movement by the interrogator 
3) Elq)hrasis - the tradition and implications in light o f the statuary-poetry debate 
Dramatis personae? 
For more on the tradition itself see Jochen Schmidt, Die Gcschichte des Genie-Gedankens. 1. 
(1988), 202-23. On the archetypal reception of the ode in Romantic thought see for example 
J.G.Herder. "Von der Ode." Fruhe Schriften. (1985). 61. Fry's entire introduction is a worthy 
summary of the central aspects and his distinction between hynm and ode is instructive. 
Richard Lanham. A Handhst of Rhetorical Terms. (1968). 60. 
Helen Vendler. 'The Ejqjeriential Beguinmgs of Keats's Odes.' Studies m Romanticism 12 (1973): 
591-606. 
" ' Fry. OP. dt. 13. 
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Most critics seem to be agreed that we are given a dramatic persona in the form of the 
'speaker' in the ode,"' whose presence becomes apparent when • the poem's continuity is 
'disrupted' by the oracular pronouncement of an obviously different 'voice,' the controlhng 
persona of the um, in the final stanza. The insertion of quotation marks indicating reported 
speech heightens this percqjtion, regardless where they are placed. For some readers, among 
whom T.S. Eliot is the most femous, the change in tone at the end of the ode with the 
aphorism 'Beauty is truth, truth beauty' is abrupt and a 'serious blemish on a beautifiil poem.' 
Several other critics, however, some of whom I shall look at in the following, have sensed for 
various reasons that the flow of the poem is disrupted by pauses in the aesthetic ejqjerience 
throughout, making the final stanza less of a reversal than a fulfillment of its previous 
anticipations."' Just as with Mont Blanc, this seems to be reading more into the poem than 
its author intended. Nor must we accept the argument that the ode symbolises the 'creative 
process' uncritically. The process that the poem's speaker undergoes in his encoimter with 
the um may be creative, but whether it is intended to be approved of is another matter. We 
have just as much reason, i f not more, to think that the ode's overdetermined closure reflects a 
type of thinking of which Keats strongly disapproved - it is after all vs^ at the um, the 'cold 
Pastoral,' says. The apparent resolution of the interrogator's astonishment and mystification 
without any acc^table rationale for the reader can equally be regarded as an indication that 
something has happened in the interrogator's mind as a result of his viewing of the um of 
which we should be wary. There is however a more compelling argument against this reading 
which I shall leave until my reading of the ode later in the chapter. 
Movement 
One aspect of Keats's choice of subject-matter for his ode, which I beheve has been 
overlooked in the desire of the cultural anthropologists acting as critics to find an historical 
object corresponding to Keats's um, is the necessity that one would have to circle aroimd an 
um or rotate it to view it in its entirety. This aspect of an um would make it advantageous to 
Keats, I think, for a simple reason: movement changes aesthetic experience in so fer as it 
emphasises the process of change. Of course, we cannot see the observer moving around the 
um, but there are obvious indications that he is doing so, such as the changing scenes he 
describes confi-onting him. Movement also requires time, the condition fi-om which the um 
appears exempt, to become a more obvious factor in the aesthetic experience. This is not to 
This began I beUeve with Cleanth Brooks's reading of the ode in his chapter on Keats in TheWeU-
S Da^dSnpson's reading in Chapter 1 of his Irony and Authority in Romantic Poetry. 
(1979); or Barbara Jones Guetti's 'Resisting the Aesthetic' (Spring 1987): 33-45. I shaU discuss these 
two approaches in the following. 
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IS say that our actions occur outside of time, but rather that the temporality of the ejqjerience 
being included as one of the primary elements we are to observe in relation to the 'silent 
eternity' of the urn. As William H. Race notes, Keats's ode presents a recusatio to the 
tradition ofekphrastic writing because he himself (or at least his thought) intrudes as much 
into the description of the object as does the actual object described. In many respects, the 
ode appears thereby to reflect the thinking process itself, which takes place in time and is 
known to us, but never makes an appearance in the world. 
The process of circling around the urn might not seem sufficient to qualify as an 
'action' by some accounts. However, the obvious emphasis on the passionate activity of the 
perceiver, reflected in the structure of the ode - the repeated, yet subtly different encounters 
with the um, the deliberative pauses between stanzas and the strong reactions of the viewer -
makes it clear that this 'lived' aspect of experiencing the urn as an art object was indeed what 
Keats had in mind when selectiag an um for this poem. Movement entails that the pure 
contemplation of the um is intermpted by an activity that brings the experience out of its 
inplied transcendence and back into a relation with the exigencies of mortal Ufe. Along with 
that movement brings moral and mortal considerations in what may at first appear a strictly 
intellectual exercise. Hiese are certainly concerns that beset Keats at the time, as is evident 
fi-om his letters. All too often, Keats's moral concerns and sentiments have been divested 
fi-om their artistic exposition in criticism. I f poetry is to have the 'life-affirming power' 
which Keats thought it had, surely we rhust understand the action (and the concomitant 
temporality) in the poem as a central part of it.^*" 
The change in 'scenes' in the stanzas is represented in the stmcture of the ode 
architectonically stanza by stanza. The final stanza is a response both to the musings of the 
previous stanza, which diverted the observer's gaze to something wholly mental and not on 
the um, and to his contemplation of the base of the um - that is, the part of the um whereupon 
all the beauty stands and its 'apophthegm.'^' The clarity of this apophthegm is completely at 
odds with the confusing array of sensations and reflections presented previously in the ode, 
though it does match the desire of the invoking voice. Though the imsettled feeling carries 
Nancy M. Goslee presents several interesting accounts of the importance of stationing in Keats's 
poetry. See for example Uriel's Eve: Miltonic Stationing and Statuary in Blake. Keats, and Shelley 
(1985) or her article more specifically relevant to the odes, 'Phidian Lore: Sculpture and 
Personification in Keats's Odes.' (1982): 73-86. The aspect of movement, neglected in studies of this 
sort, is an important consideration however if one wishes to draw in the moral implications which 
Keats thought poetry had. Therein hes the link between aesthetics, reason and action that most other 
schools of criticism cannot account for. 
Which I believe to be the 'leaf-fiinged legend', taking the last word Uterally, that Keats mentioned 
(proleptically) at the outset of the ode. 
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throughout the ode because of the pervasive paradox, it is of a different nature here. The poet 
has wholly given himself over to rationalising the urn's qualities to extend beyond itself It 
thus becomes the quasi-transcendent being he greeted it as proleptically in the invocation. 
Ekphrasis - the tradition and implications in light of the statuary-poetry debate 
A final aspect of Keats's use of language in the ode that has been noted by many 
recent critics in specific connection with the visual arts is his use of ekphrasis. As critics 
since Ian Jack have pointed out,^ *^  Keats's response to the um is generically defined, both in 
respect to his subject and the form of writing. Ekphrasis or descriptio is a terminus technicus 
referring to those passages in poetry in which a particular sc^ie that has been d^icted on an 
object by its original creator is described at length by the poet. The locus classicus for 
ekphrasis is the description of Achilles' shield in Homer's Hiad 18.483-608. There have been 
several views taken by critics about the significance of the use of ekphrasis in modem 
descriptive writing. The inqjlications of ekphrasis for a New Critical view of 'art about art' is 
explored most thoroughly in Murray Krieger's study, which claims that Keats's ode is in feet 
the locus classicus of ekphrastic poetry. He would have it that the plastic, spatial object of 
poetic imitation symbolises 'the fi-ozen, stilled world of plastic relationships which must be 
superimposed upon literature's turning world to 'still' it.'^*^ The arrest of life in art is wdiat 
makes it 'classical.' It develops most fiiUy the potential of the spatial form to represent the 
human conquest of time in 'the well-wrought, well-hghted place of aesthetics.'^ ** A second 
view on ekphrasis tends primarily to see its significance in relation to the use and abuse of 
power inherent in the act of naming and determining meaning. A number of quasi-Freudian 
readings attribute symbolic significance to the practice of ekphrasis. Noting the images of 
ravishment and sexual tension in the poem, they argue that the use of ekphrasis is a typical 
eighteenth century form of poetry that represents the conquest of the world by the power of 
reason in general and the ravishment of the female 'object' by the eye of the male 'perceiver' 
in particular.^' 
Andrew Bennett sees ekphrasis in Romantic poetry as a step towards removing 
language as a medium between man and the world and embracing a more sensual (and tme) 
Ian Jack. Keats and the Mirror of Art (1967). 
Murray Krieger Ekphrasis: the illusion of the natural sign. (1992). 265-66. 
James O'Rourke. op. cit 29. 
Grant F. Scott's reading in The Sculpted Word: Keats. Ekiduasis and the Visual Arts. (1994) 119-
150, an argument followed more perceptively by James AW. HefiFeman in his Museum of Words: The 
Poetics of Ekphrasis from Homer to Ashbery. (1993), who reads the conclusion of the ode as an 
apparent 'work of iconophilic homage' which, because we cannot know the um except through Keats's 
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grasp of the material world by the human spirit. He notes that i f Lessing was right in locating 
the difference between painting and poetry in the respective spatial/ temporal treatments of 
their subject-matter, then one way of producing the effect of the visual in writing is through 
imitating it in what he calls a 'grammar of the visual' That is, 
... instead of using the past tease, complex syntactical clauses and non-visual 
hypotheses, the poet can use the present tense, disdain conjimctions (the effect par 
excellence which language is able to claim over the visual arts is the assertion of 
cause and effect in narrative) and refer only to the visual aspects of the scene... ' ^ 
Bennett suggests that this particular style of writing thus mimics the ability particular to 
painting to stop time. The power of elq)hrastic poetry is such that it represents in words the 
ability of the sculptor/ artist to capture a fleeting moment etemally in marble. In this logical 
representation of sculpture, it emphasises the pathos of temporality, without whidi the plastic 
art would have no groimds for appeal to finite beings such as ourselves. This is consonant 
with Krieger's view. Bennett supports Krieger's point by emphasising that Keats's particular 
achievement in this ode is in creating an awareness of the inherent contradiction in praising a 
work of the plastic arts for its eternal perspective whilst simultaneously writing about it, 
suggesting the possibility that 'the poem itself is capable of capturing an eternal moment and 
affecting the reader in the same way as the 'eternal moment' of painting.'^' Obviously, 
Keats's paratactic use of language questions the status of language as much as Shelley's Mont 
Blanc had. Bennett's is an excellent study. 
William H. Race's discussion of the characteristic features of this form of writing is 
also instractive to a reading of Keats's ode, though it takes another tack. He expands the 
discussion of ekphrasis to iaclude its use prior to Keats, rather than sinqjly assuming, as most 
critics have, that Krieger was correct in seeing Keats's ode as archetypal.^ His broader 
scope pays dividends by bringing to our attention an aspect of ekphrasistic poetry that tends 
to go unnoticed, but which is an important aspect of Keats's ode. Ekphrasis, 'an expository 
speech which clearly brings the subject before our eyes,' is often typified by another 
in5)ortant feature which Aphthonius, a poet and school teacher of late antiquity, mentions 
concluding one of his descriptions of the acropoUs at Alexandria: 
words, thus 'actualizes the potential that elq)hrasis has always possessed - the capacity to question and 
challenge the art it ostensibly salutes. '(115) 
^ Andrew J. Bennett 'Enticing conclusion: John Keats's 'Ode on a Grecian Um' Word & Image. 
Vol.5 (No. 4), Oct-Dec. 1989. 302-14. For a comparable discussion of syntax see Theodor Adomo's 
'Parataxis: Zum Spaten Lyrik Holderlins.' 
iM- 307. 
William H. Race. Classical Genres and English Poetry. (1988). He discusses Keats's ode himself 
on pp. 72-75. 
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Indeed, its beauty is greater than words can tell, and i f anything has been omitted, it 
happened because of wonder.^' 
Race's study shows that the concluding expression of wonder at a beauty beyond words, in 
which the poet eventually confesses himself incapable of capturing the feeling evoked by the 
object he describes is one of the prime features of elqjhrastic writing. The convention in the 
genre is for the descriptive passage to be followed by a movement from the object described 
to the perceiver's response of wonder at it. The convention of subordinating a response to the 
object at hand. Race notes, has not been adhered to by Keats in his ode. Rather, the 
observer's response of wonder is a primary feature of the description. Compared to the locus 
classicus, in^onder at the artistry of a demiurge is a response to the effect of the work of art, 
in Keats's poem the wonder rather significantly accompanies the whole process. Race's 
account has the merit of making particularly clear how the paratactical tendencies of Keats's 
writing that his fellow critics have observed not only has the temporal effect akin to the effect 
of statuary, it also inverts his spiritual response to the object. This tends to have been 
obscured by current accoimts of ekphrasis that do not locate the locus classicus in Classical 
literature and in its paradigm of the artist as a maker. 
The sense of 'wonder' is not just a ccmvention of ekphrastic writing however. It has 
implications that are most obviously associated with a response to the marvel of creation. 
Perhaps the association of this response to the lifeless depictions on the um offer us an escape 
fi-om the critical conundrum that has resulted fi-om associating the 'statuary affectation' of this 
ode to strictly philosophical or linguistic criteria (as has been the wont of the formalist 
critics): for it ejq)resses the pathological effect of the icon on the psyche of the perceiver. It 
is no doubt for this reason that graven images are forbidden by some religions. This is at the 
heart of the matter of Keats's ode. It is the danger in descriptive poetry that wdiere the writing 
too closely approximates tibe image, it is a short leap to the situation in which the image itself 
narrates and v^ere the material becomes 'reified' as an idol. Sudi a process, in which 
notions of causality are more or less explicit, draws the mind away firom the processes of life. 
This aspect of the ode becomes clearest when the focus of description, decisively for 
the 'action' of the ode, leads the um's admirer to wonder about things not dq)icted on the um 
at all, the 'green ahar' and 'little town.' Bennett claims that this gives the effect of 'looking 
at the other side of the vase.' The poet's dissatisfection with this etemal, yet unlived, union 
acts, just as the word 'forlom' does in breaking him fi-om the enchantment of his situation in 
Keats's parallel poem, 'Ode to a Nightingale': 
Cited in Race. Md. 56. 
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hke a bell 
To toll me back fi-om thee to my sole selfl 
Here however the self that Keats retums to is a different one from the one that had originally 
greeted the um in the first stanza, largely because of the nature of the object itself. Its etemal 
hfe lured him into a false paradise, the dissatisfaction of which he has leamed by the end of 
the poem. 
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My Interpretation 
To present an accqjtable discussion of Keats's 'Ode on a Grecian Um' it is plain that 
one must be prepared to discuss its ending. Given the paradox and reversal of the poem, it is 
not inappropriate to begin there. David Simpson focuses on this key issue when he cites 
Barbara Hermstein Smith's study for its particular emphasis on the problematic strength of 
the closure of the poem: 
i f Keats had deliberately set himself to constmct the most securely closed poem ever 
written, he could hardly have bettered them. They are all there: verbal repetitions, 
monosyllabic diction, metrical regularity, formal parallelism, unqualified absolutes, 
closural allusions, and the oracular assertion of an utter and ultimate verity. And yet 
it is an open question whether or not these lines offer a poetically legitimate or 
effective resolution to the thematic stmcture of the entire ode."" 
I think we can agree that the strong closure upsets the paradoxical thematic stmcture of the 
ode as a w^ole and hence questions the legitimacy of the resolution. However, I think we 
must also see this 'overdetermined closure' as part of Keats's intent, though not necessarily 
for the reason that Simpson will state, i.e. as 'a suppressed cyclic imperative, demanding re-
reading and reconstmction in the attenqjt to justify the pseudo-finality of those lines. '^'' 
Although one certainly wants to re-read the ode to clarify for oneself the puzzling conclusion, 
this reading suggests that Keats intended that the reader read his poem to demonstrate the 
hermeneutic issues involved with Romantic aesthetics - which the evidence of his letters etc. 
cannot support. 
It seems incumbent upon the critic not only to account for the ending though, but 
indeed the xmusually pronounced binary opposition throughout the ode of \^ diich the ending is 
only the final and most dramatic e5q)ression. This demands the sort of holistic or organic 
approach to the poem such as a 'formalist' reading would supply. As Helen Vendler, one of 
the best critics of Keats's poetry, remarks: 
TTiis binary pattern, so strictiy maintained, is not natural to Keats in so compulsive a 
form. The odes are all stately, and show many parallelisms of diction and syntax; but 
the norm is exceeded by far in the Um, and suggests a deliberate constraint on 
vn 
reverie.^^ 
Such a deliberate constraint must be accounted for in a maimer which would be able to 
explain both it and the ending. In this respect, the 'formalist' philosophical or linguistic 
readings do seem warranted and indeed necessary. My contention however is that w^iile they 
are warranted insofer as Keats's ode is written in terms which are amenable to such a reading, 
™^ Barbara Hermstein Smith. The Poetics of Closure: a Study of How Poems End. (1970). 195. 
"^^  Simpson, op. cit. 12. 
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the absolute and abstract terms in the ode and the 'argument' appended to it were being 
parodied by Keats. I f this is in feet the case, these critical readings feil to meet Keats's intent 
in writing this ode and arguably the aspect of his thought that demonstrated the desire for a 
highly sensual and emotive form of poetry, a poetry that conveyed 'life' as he conceived it in 
terms of organic, cychcal processes. 
It seems to me that the poem's 'overdetermined closure,' i.e. the feet that it breaks the 
aesthetic contract previously estabUshed with the reader, can only be imderstood if we 
dissociate Keats fi'om what the um says at the conclusion. This does indeed dismpt the 
impression of the poem as an 'organic whole.' It does not however exclude the idea that 
Keats confi-onts in the um the product of a form of art, that of the homo faber, which he 
wishes to oppose with his more organic ideas of creativity. For the emphasis of the formalist 
critics on the philosophical and linguistic paradoxes presented in the ode can be merged with 
a broader formal consideration of its genre and topos, which these critics have rather 
ironically tended to ignore. This is because formalist readings are only formaUst in the very 
restricted sense of being self-referential, i.e. restricted in their understanding of the emphasis 
of organicist thinking to the form of the poem. There is a reason why critics have ignored the 
obvious formal extrinsic considerations such as genre and topos, however. Keats's radical 
change of the ekphrastic convention in the poem, noted earlier in the chapter, makes it 
difficult to place it in its formal tradition. Nonetheless, I believe that he still wished to allude 
to the genre while providing a different emphasis than an adherence to its conventions would 
have allowed. The changes the main 'protagonist' in the poem undergoes in response to the 
um suggests such a self-conscious process. 
The formalist critics therefore understandably associate that speaker and his practice 
in the poem with Keats himself and his treatment of the conventions of the ekphrastic genre. 
The association has the additional benefit for such critics of making it more amenable to their 
interpretative practice, which pays 'attention to the role of the interpreter in the constitution of 
textual meaning'^ '^  rather than to authorial intent or to traditional generic limitation on the 
possibilities of interpretation. His 'subjective tum' on the genre allows them to frame the 
human dilemma he presents in terms that call for creative discourse that remakes the world. 
Such a practice of interpretation is consistent of course with typical Romantic poetic practice. 
However, there is no reason to assume that Keats agrees with the conclusion of the ode or 
presents such a break in form for the sake of creating an 'imperative of the continual process 
2 " As Andrew Bowie explams the predilection of many modem critical studies. Fmm Romantiasm to 
Critical Theory The Philosophy of German Literary Theory. (1997). 4. 
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of reading.' Certainly the inversions are characteristic. Certainly the practice of the speaker 
of the poem is hardly distinguishable from Keats's own. Certainly the characteristic formal 
practice of Romantic hermeneutics argues that Keats's protagonist could be a 'Romantic 
poet.' How then can we know i f it is not Keats's voice that the um represents at the 
conclusion of the ode? The answer of course is that we cannot. 
However, if we look beyond the poem's intrinsic relations, not so as to ignore them or 
deny that they are typically Romantic in their constmction, but rather to argue that they do not 
and of themselves necessitate that they represent Keats's own perspective as such, we are 
likely to admit the evidence that Keats may weU have intended otherwise than to 
represent a view which he would have happily adhered to in the conclusion. As was 
ggested earUer, the ekphrastic form and Greek statuary topos of the poem themselves 
indicate the fact that Keats was engaging with a wide variety of contemporary artistic and 
intellectual issues. We need not overstate his allegiance to the associations he makes. It is 
reasonably safe to assiune that Keats shared the view of most of his avant-garde poetic and 
intellectual contemporaries on 'Classical values,' particularly that of his intellectual mentor 
William Hazlitt, that "utpictura poesis was no longer a Uving issue.'^  
m 
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This is precisely the point. Ffazlitt was in feet a formative intellectual influence in 
this period in Keats's hfe. As Robert Gittings notes, he was the 'only modem writer that 
Keats quoted at length in his letters, and it is sometimes difficult to disentangle Keats's prose 
from Hazlitt's so alike is the style and thought. '^" This is precisely what makes it so 
surprising that Keats's 'Ode on a Grecian Um' should lean so heavily 'for its ideas and their 
ejq)ression on two articles written by the high-priest of etemal art, Haydon, in The Examiner 
of 2 and 9 May.'"* Haydon's views on the subject miUtated strongly against Hazlitt's. In 
fact, these two claims are irreconcilable: either Keats is attacking Hazlitt's perspective or 
Haydon's in his ode. There is, I think, ample evidence that the latter is the case. And his 
means of doing so is parody - the sort of parody that demonstrates the ill-effects of this form 
of art on the beholder, which is finally broken by what the speaker of the ode acknowledges 
as the um's voice, not his own. 
The contrast in tone between the ecstatic assertion of certainty in the final lines of the 
Ode and the earher puzzled, excited, querulous, unfulfilled and occasionally indignant tone 
2'^RoyPark.OE^t (1971). 117. 
2 " John Keats. 147. 
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has led critics writing from formalist perspectives to various conclusions. It has led them: i) 
to aflBrm enthusiastically the power of art in effecting such a change - this has been 
designated the 'idealistic' reading of the text (Brooks), ii) to postulate the play of different 
qualifying 'voices' in the Ode in an endless cycle of 'Romantic irony.' (Simpson), iii) to 
claim that Keats distances himself from the statement of the um and thus asserts a 'robust 
realism.' (Walter Jackson Bate), iv) to claim an illustration of a bad reader in the response -
one not possessing the capacity of negative capability. These possibiUties are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive and can be found together, though the first two are rather uneasy 
bedfellows with the latter two. I am more inclined to support the tenor of the latter two 
readings, though none of the readings suggest a plausible irrtaition for Keats to write this ode 
as it is that take into accoxmt its form and content. Most recent critics have espoused a 
combination of the first two readings and have taken the final line to be the voice of the poet, 
the 'meta-commentator,' to which the voice of the 'speaker,' the um's amazed and 
bewildered iirterrogator throughout much of the ode, acts as a foil. Such a reading ultimately 
leaves us with the finistration of the desires of both voices, such that: 
The speaker leams by the poet's rebuke, and the poet leams through the intransigent 
mystery of his 'own' creation, and its refusal to allow him to escape with the illusion 
of an achieved metacommentary.^ " 
In other words the supposed 'metacommentary' at the Ode's conclusion (the objective view) 
is nothing of the sort. 'The drama seems to have taken us on a perilous journey only to retum 
us to the point from which we started.'^ ^ According to such a view, Keats presents us with 
an alluring example of the mystery of art - the aporia of undecidability. 
This conclusion has proved attractive to the New Critics and deconstmctionists as 
well as those who attenqjt to read the Ode ironically as David Sinpson does. TTie supposition 
of multiple personae in the Ode t^ni-ie.tr, order \o axplaiii\ the contradiction as a function of 
something like a drama,is indeed tempting because it furnishes us with a didactic intent in the 
author which accounts for the confusion the reader has upon reading and even re-reading the 
Ode, an intention which never quite seems to woric upon the reader in the same way it does 
the speaker, v^ o^ seems so certain of what the um 'says' to him despite not knowing what its 
author meant it to say. Sinqjson's reading, although I think it ultimately g ^ the 'message' of 
'^^ iMd.465. 
David Simpson, op. cit. 14. Simpson's reading, following Brooks and Wasserman's, of course 
strongly depends on the later version of the poem, presented at the outset of this chapter, being 
adopted. He notes apologetically that this reading (and therefore this version of the ode) has become 
more acceptable to criticism 'peihaps as a consequence of its own historical needs as much as of any 
imperative towards ultimate tmths. '(8) The inverted cormnas surrounding 'Beauty is Truth, Truth 
Beauty' in the 1820 version of the poem are, significantly, missing in the Annals, where they were first 
published, and the four transcripts. 
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the ode approximately right, i.e. the inducement of the speaker into a state of aporia,'''^ does 
not seem to provide any sort of plausible e3q)lanation for the rest of the stmcture of the poem 
as it is presented to us. Indeed, as it is, Sinq)son's suggestion merely presents us with 'a spate 
of uninterpretable ironies has the same effect as providing no ejq)erience in irony at all.'^'" 
His unstable notion of irony has what Booth calls a 'dulling effect.' 
Moreover, such a metanarrative reading which posits different voices must also 
ignore the original published version of the ode in The Annals of the Fine Arts, wiiich 
includes the posited 'poet's metacomment' within the saying of the um. The justification for 
preferring the later version appears dubious aside fi-om the harmony with which such a 
reading both adheres to a common vision detected in the corpus of Keats's poetry and letters 
and fuels an endless supply of new criticism. In a certain respect these two aspects have 
perpetuated one another: Keats has been deemed particularly interesting because his poetry is 
said by critics to esqjress certain 'timeless' problems, vs i^ch are however only problems 
endemic in Romantic hermeneutics and the practice of representing art as a process of Ufe. 
This timelessness has translated itself so that his excellence seems to consist in the feet that 
one can write endless sheaves of criticism about him, a feet equated with profimdity. In feet, 
the perpetual appeal to a relevance that critics never even attempt to define ensures that Keats 
will always be relevant in this way. 
The irony of these formalist critical readings though is that they are very evidently 
products of a more radical version of Lebensphilosophie that wishes to understand art not 
only fi-om the perspective of the processes of Ufe, but its end product as a living organism as it 
were. The 'life' that the Romantic poets sought to mediate is thought to reside in the Uving 
words on the page. This seems to me altogether too narrow an emphasis. The intent to deal 
with epistemological problems errq)hasised by the critical schools I shall discuss, problems 
which follow on naturally fi-om this belief in the 'hfe' of the organic work, was only rarely 
expressed by Keats in his copious correspondence. It must be seen to be grossly exaggerated 
as a poetic influence. Keats was preoccupied by thoughts of love, death, suffering and poetic 
feme, not abstracted epistemological argument. Even more fer-fetched is the recent 
propensity that critics sudi as Jerome McGaim present of reading everything written by Keats 
as a reflection of social radicalism, as i f his combination of acquaintance with radicals and a 
^''^ Aporia, an impasse, is the term Plato uses to describe the state in which Socrates left his 
interlocutors following his destraction of their claims to know something. Keats manages quite the 
opposite - he illustrates the power of the unage to induce an observer mto beUeving himself to know 
something which we, the reader, know he does not. hiterestingly, this delusive effect upon the Ustener 
is Plato's main objection to both the Sophists and the poet/teacher in his dialogues. 
Wayne Booth. A Rhetoric of Irony. (1974). 227. 
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syn:q)athetic nature made him a de facto pre-Marxist in his poetics. We must be careful to 
keep the issues he concentrates on in his poetry and letters at the forefront of our reading. 
One plausible akemative to a reading that would contest a reading of the Keatsian 
'philosophy of life' and its processes in confrontation with the etemal values of the work of 
art, with its fixed aims and intentions, is indeed presented by McGaim. This must be 
addressed before continuing. I f we direct ourselves back to the much-debated issue of which 
ending to the ode should be regarded as definitive, McGann resists the supposition of most 
other critics that it is a later version of the Ode. Indeed he provides a very plausible proposal 
that suggests a different way of 'reading' the mn: that the illegible, unintelUgible 'leaf-
fiing'd legend' of the ode's begirming is in feet the same that is so clear and absolute at the 
end of the ode in the apophthegm, 'Beauty is truth, truth beauty.' That is to say, in a maimer 
following his 'progression' in the poem to imagining scenes riot on the um in stanza four, the 
speaker himself can now 'read' what he earher could not.^" This has the additional beauty 
for the critic of obviating the problematic issue of the ending in the two versions of the ode, as 
it is what the speaker imagines that is now asserted to be depicted on the um (so vividly in 
feet that it speaks!) even though it was initially illegible. It seems only that much more 
obvious when we consider that the metacommentary voice is in utter agreement with what the 
um says in the later version (which most critical editions use). What the um 'says' must then 
quite literally be understood as a figment of the 'speaker's/ poet's' imagination in all versions 
of the ode. The concem as to which quoted passage expresses the author's tme intentions for 
the ode thus becomes irrelevant as there is only one 'voice' in feet in the 'Ode on a Grecian 
Um.' And it has been 'dulled' and transformed throughout the ode almost into the very 
image of the um. 
But McGann's suggested reading must ignore the obvious distance the speaker takes 
from the um's pronouncement in the conclusion - it is clearly the um that utters its etemal 
verity, not the speaker, and the speaker distances himself from it by making it clear that it is 
what 'thou,' that is the um, 'sayst.' The impression that Keats, on the contrary, wished to 
parody this etemal transcendence is strengthened by the anecdotal evidence that he had been 
exchanging cool letters with Haydon, 'the high^riest of etemal art,' throughout the month of 
. ^ r i l immediately prior to penning the ode.^ *^  
^ ' This would of course fit Keats's usual sentiments on silent or unfinished works. For example, Keats 
commente ^ a^December 1818 joumal-letter about engravings from the frescoes in Ae Campo Santo at ftS^rare 'even finer to me than more accomplish'd works - as there was left so much room for 
Imagination. 
Robert Gittings. John Keats. (1979). 465. 
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Silence 
The key to a reading that would emphasise the philosophy of hfe confi-onting the 
'etemal perspective' of art without reading the poem as an 'organic whole' is Keats's 
speaker's reference to silence in it. I f we take the speaker to be addressing the xun fi-om the 
perspective of a 'philosopher of life' (and as a would-be worshipper) the silence of the um 
and its lack of response to his persistent attempts to engage with it in dialogue can be 
interpreted as a symbol of the meaninglessness of the aesthetic experience of the um as a 
work of art for him. The um's depicted allusions, predetermined by its maker and 
indeterminable by him, and its relative transcendence of the ravages of time, attract but also 
fi-ustrate him. They give him no common ground of life on which to relate to the um. His 
description of the um as a 'fiiend to man,' despite its allusions to the absolutes of Beauty and 
Truth its silence bespeaks, can thus be understood as a projection of his own desires (in 
evidence throughout the ode in the oxymoronic reflexive nature of the description) to fill the 
longing in his heart for etemal life, a longing he knows however to be impossible to fulfil for 
the silent um: "Iliou, silent form, dost tease us out of thought/ As doth etemity: Cold 
Pastoral!' 
Unfortunately, the matter is complicated for us because the speaker in the ode is a 
somewhat biased spectator - fer fi-om providing us with a metacommentary voice that would 
guide us away fi-om this error, he in feet seems very much to desire self-oblivion and self-
deception; he repeatedly apphes his 'negative capability' to the um as i f it were a living 
being. Consequentiy he provides us with littie criticism of the um's artistry uirtil the late note 
of me that the um will not provide him with what he desires and he claims it possesses 'more 
sweetly' in its silence than he does in his words. He receives what he desires fi-om the lun 
through his Uving imagination, which speaks for the um, but as such it only gives him what 
he gives it - life. There is no true reciprocity because he desires a marriage of equals, 
something befitting him, and that the mn caimot afford him, nor he it. 
Another aspect of the encounter is worth remarking on though. In spite of the latent, 
i f obvious conflict between the speaker, who approaches the objet d'art fi-om the perspective 
of the philosophy of Ufe, and its status (that resists it), it is noteworthy that the um's artistry ii 
initially considered superior to his own. This appears to be because it does not appeal to him 
as a mortal man, but as a 'spirit,' perhaps the sort of intelligence, the 'spark of the divine' he 
referred to in his letter to J H Reynolds of 3 May, 1818. Hie um's silent artistry is 'sweeter' 
and 'more endeared' because it pipes its ditties exclusively to the spirit, notXoHas sensual eai 
which shall, Uke 'this generation,' 'waste'. Moreover, it aUows us a tenq)orary diversion 
fi-om our thoughts of mortality, it 'tease(s) us out of thought/ As doth eternity.' Here the 
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fector of 'slow time' enters the frame as it did with its spouse, silence, the foster-paroits of 
the um in the first stanza.^ *^  This understanding of man as a spirit may very well be a 
demonstration of the feet that the Enlightenment's universal perspective, inherent in the terms 
of the Cartesian subject, has been perpetuated and exacerbated by the shift to organicism in 
the Romantic period rather than truly resolved by it. Its crisis of self-legitimation continues, 
not because it is referred to verification in a transcendent source as before, but because it is 
referred back to hfe itself, hfe as an answer to the question of Ufe. 
now 
as a 
In the 'Ode on a Grecian Um,' Keats depicts a process whereby the um is approached 
silent and etemal aesthetic object but is, as a human being, affected by it in ways 
incompatible with such qualities. The images presented to him on the um's surfece do appeal 
particularly to his imagination, but because he only asks questions in the first stanza that will 
inform his fectual knowledge of the figures on the um,^ *^  the pageantry of life, he receives or 
imagines responses in kind in the final. He does not receive answers to the sort of questions 
which beset him and leave him with a 'burning forehead and a parching tongue.' The certain 
claims it offers from its etemal perspective marginahse the human perceiver (and by 
extension the humanities) which always require an ex tempore human treatment and not an 
unassailable 'etemal' perspective. 
The queries, then, bypass matters which are of obvious concem to Keats in the ode. 
But Keats is concerned in this ode to trace the effect of a certain approach to art to its 
conclusion and thus to teach by bad exanqjle. As stated earlier, the diction of the speaker in 
the ode actually suggests that he is affected by the um, almost to the point of being 
transformed in its image. It becomes imclear whether he speaks for the um or it speaks for 
him. As Paul Fussell notes in his Poetic Metre & Poetic Form: 
While most poets like to introduce spondaic substitutions initially or medially, Keats 
seems fond of introducing them at the ends of Unes; indeed terminal substitution is a 
hallmark of the Keatsian style.(41) 
Indeed we note this substitution of a spondee at numerous points in the first two stanzas: in 
the words 'slow time' in the first, and in most of the endings of the second. The effect of the 
This is the point wherein the issues dealt with in the ode can be expanded to encompass a much 
broader reading The parent of the um, its creator, the artist, is not Keats's interest, nor is there any 
hint of rivahy or comparison with the artist of the um, but rather with the um itself The statuaty-
poetoy debate of WinckElmann and Lessing thus takes a new twist as the art-object is torn fiom its 
relation to its creator and is seen by the perceiver as a self, like himself, out of touch with his Creator 
and 'existing' as it were without any notion of having been created. What would seem to be an artistic 
issue thus e^ qpands to become an issue concerning the human condition itself 
As he does similarly in the fourth. These latter questions however distinguish themselves from 
those previous by implicitly recognising the need to look beyond the particular figures on the urn, like 
in life, to where they have come from and where they are going, to which the um provides no answer. 
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spondees, to slow the lines to almost a total stop, of course gives the ode a solid stmcture like 
the um itself It adds a more marked polarity to the encounter between um and 'man,' of 
object encountered by a spirit requesting 'ditties of no tone' and indulging in the 
bittersweetness of momentary oblivion to his fears of death and his sense of meaningless 
existence. The two types of media, the verbal one that Keats uses and the one he is 
describing, achieve a sort of fusion. Though the 'Ode on a Grecian Um' does not occur in 
stricUy descriptive language, the syntax mimics the um's corporeaUty and the manner of 
thinking reflects this - the being of the um is thought to reside in the object rather than in 
relation to its creator's (author's) intention.^" 
The final stanza reveals the underlying reproach of the author for this perspective of 
etemal art. Keats personally is of course not entirely opposed to this perspective either. As 
Gittings notes: 'Beauty in art and the truth of life are seen as complementory to each other in 
Keats's 'World of Pains and troubles'.'^ ** Keats's perspective on life and art was no longer, 
like Haydon, that in whidi Beauty and Truth make 'all disagreeables evaporate', but that in 
which the 'Chamber of Maiden Thought,' where we see nothing but 'pleasant wonders', 
'becomes graduaUy darken'd and at the same time on aU sides of it many doors are set 
open'^ *^  and the world becomes a 'vale of Soul-making.'^ '* However, as I have argued, 
Keats's own perspective is not being presented in the ode (despite similarities the conclusion 
bears with statements in earUer letters), but rather that of a typical reader of the Armals who is 
being parodied. One must dismiss the suggestion that the speaker of the ode is reflective of 
Keats himself, who, though his letters, poetry and biography seem to reflect these concerns 
constantly, rarely seems any more content with the solution than my reading would suggest. 
One thing is clear, and that is that the um's message is not such that will provide any 
consolation to a mortal or an understanding of his mortality. It asserts a timeless truth which 
is tme only insofer as it is timeless but of littie use to a human being wanting meaning in a 
mortal existence: 
'Beauty is trath, truth beauty' - that is aU 
Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know. 
Augustine, in his treatise entitled 'On Original Sin' explains sin as the act of regarding created 
things' essences (and therefore their good) as residing in fliemselves rather than in relation to their 
Creator. Keats's ode would seem to suggest that unless a reading of a text takes into account the author 
and his intention in creating it, a similar 'sin' occurs - that is that we thus create a solipsistic text which 
only reflects ourselves. The effect is ironically that we can never recognise ourselves. 
Robert Gittings. John Keats. 469. 
To J.H. Reynolds, 3 May 1818. 
^ To the George Keatses, 14 Februaiy - 3 May 1819. 
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For we know tiiis is neitiier what we know (let alone aU we know) - because tiie um's 'silent 
eternity' says it - nor aU we need to know, because we, like Keats and the readers of the 
Annals, are this wasting generation. 
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Suggested Interpretations: Four Representative Critics 
In this final section I have taken four critical approaches to Keats's 'Ode on a Grecian 
U m ' as representative of the attempts to engage with the hermenentic difficulties created by 
Romantic poetics and its practice of writing that eschews ejqplit notions of causality, in 
particular the model of the poet as a maker. I have presented these approaches in a loosely 
chronological fashion because many of them can be more clearly understood as a partial 
reaction to their predecessors. The four approaches are as following: (i) The New Critical; 
(ii) The Deconstructionist; (iii) The New Historicist; (iv) The Romantic Ironist. Most of these 
categories have rather blurred boimdaries and traits of one can often be found coalescing with 
traits of another, particularly in more recent approaches, but the purpose of this ejq)osition is 
to identify the critical tendencies and relate them to the Romantic ideal of the artistry of Ufe 
that Arendt described at the end of the second chapter of this thesis. 
A New Critic 
The New Critics, xmder the influence of T.S. EUot, claim that poetry is essentially a 
quickening of the diverse and conplex totality of human experience. The meaning in a text is 
inherent not just in the individual words on the page, as has been occasionally charged, but in 
the text as a self-contained unit. By the New Critics' account, 'a reading which selects such 
statements out of context for either praise or blame springs firom the 'message-hunting' 
inqjulse' that attributes meaning to the poem that is not warranted by its formal integrity.^ 
Syntax, taken in its broadest sense as an 'ordering together' (and here not just words but 
coimotations, associations, ideas etc. is meant) is obviously a primary consideration of such 
an approach. The critical habit of paraphrase, by contrast, is an anathema to such an approach 
as it perceives a certain reduction to lie in the 'translation.' At the heart of this imderstanding 
then is the perception that poetry depicts an understanding of life that is far more subtle and 
complex than can be understood in ordinary language and in the latent sense of causality that 
is presented in it. 
The pedigree of the New Critical view can probably be traced to Coleridge's 
suggestion in the Biographia Literaria that the language of poetry and the language of science 
are fer more appropriate antitheses than that of poetry to prose, though it is primarily a 
reaction to the naive historicising criticism of the nineteenth century, the sort that Browning 
mocked for its desire to note the ejqjress inqjortance o f 'what Mr. Keats had had for 
breakfest' when he wrote xxxxx, i.e. the critical equivalent o f logical positivism. To be feir to 
the New Critics, I think we must imderstand that it is more a certain mindset that their 
2«9 
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criticism opposes rather than an actual poetry/ prose distinction. Nonetheless, the myth of 
poetry's sacred transcendent language has been firmly entrenched by these critics, an issue on 
which they have rightly been attacked subsequently. 
The special truth-claim of poetry is the guiding light to this school of criticism. Hie 
following excerpt illustrates this school's motivation against the Bilightenment view that 
poetry makes no truth-claims because it bases itself on the inconstant ground of human 
feeUngs: 
This general question of the "truth" of poetry is answered i f we reflect for a moment 
on the impulses which take us to poetry. We do not read poetry for the scientific 
truth of particular statements. We do not read poetry for specific moral instructions. 
Statements that taken in isolation would seem to raise issues of scientific truth or 
felsity, and statements that would seem to embody specific moral judgments are not, 
as we have seen, to be taken by themselves, but as fectors contributing to the 
development of the total experience and the total meaning which the poet is trying to 
develop for us. A reading which selects such statements out of context for either 
praise or blame springs fi-om the "message-hunting" impulse... A reader should 
constantly remember that such detailed statements should be interpreted in the Ught 
ofthe total effect. (491) 
What 'the total effect' actually entails is the key point of difference between this sdiool and 
its would-be successors: for, with the exception of the deconstructionists (who question, in a 
totaUsing way, whether the 'total effect' is an applicable notion given the problems of 
Romantic poetics), all of the schools of criticism that are dealt with in the following make a 
claim to base their critique on an appeal to a 'totality' or larger schema. But this is the only 
one ofthe schools which does not appeal, despite its detractors' claims, to a transcendent or 
universal schema based on reason. The totality for this school is contained in the idea that the 
author's intent in conqjosing the poem as it is is still 'aUve' in the text; and it assumes that it 
may still be accessed by the reader i f he accords due respect for the integrity of the text as a 
form of life, i.e. he does not dissect it or inject it with foreign ideas, as it were. 
Hie assunqjtion of the New Critics that particularly raises the ire o f other schools of 
criticism is that they employ no prejudices in their notion of art. This is maintained in spite of 
the fact that they employ a more or less traditional sense of the literary canon v^^ile excluding 
the issues of historical or biographical intentions fi-om their consideration. The feet that 
prejudices are not even considered to be an issue in most of these accounts, in particular the 
prejudice their living notion of ait has to a religious sense of transcendence (despite its 
obvious correspondences) makes i t all the more obvious that it does have them. Nevertheless, 
they make no reference to prejudices. This is because they associate their claims to the 
universal criterion of transcendence and 'organic' representations of it. Their notion of 
Brooks and Warren. Understanding Pn^trv: An Anthology for College Students. (1938). 491. 
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universality is flavoured with the sense of a two-world view, while espousing the one-world 
view of the 'organic work,' a feet that makes them dissatisfectory to universahsts and 
Christians alike. 
With this background in mind, if we move on to Cleanth Brooks's reading of the ode 
in The Well-Wrought Um. we find that he contends that the poem was 'intended to be a 
parable on the nature of poetry, and of art in general.' He suggests that we should read the 
ode as a formal unity, but realises that this necessitates that he explain the apparent injury to 
the integrity of the poem made in its final lines. We must read it carefully. Brooks insists 
that to perceive this unity, we need to ask the right questions of the poem. We should avoid 
posing the sort of question that would force us to refer outside the poem for an answer, Uke 
'what did Keats the man perhaps want to assert here about the relation of beauty and truth' 
and instead ask a question that could be answered by sole reference to the structures of the 
poem, such as 'was Keats the poet able to exemplify that relation in this particular poem?'^ *" 
In other words, he proposes that we should consider how the relations of the poem are 
constructed to make it a microcosm of the macrocosmic themes it contains. To maintain the 
coherence of the poem. Brooks' reading proposes that the final lines are spoken in a different 
voice, as in a drama.^ '' This allows us to waive 'the question of the scientific or philosophic 
truth of the lines' 'in fevor of the application of a principle curiously like that of dramatic 
prq)riety.' It is clear to him that 'some such principle is the only one legitimately to be 
invoked in any case' because the ode would otherwise display a sort of incoherence that 
argues it to be a failure. 
The structure of the ode is based on paradox. It is the formal unity of such apparent 
contradictions that Brooks, following Eliot, asserts to constitute the essence of all great art. 
Precisely because it can unify the disparate and complex. Brooks contends that a poem can 
e5q)ress what is otherwise inexpressible. The 'ironic undercurrent' that asserts itself in the 
third stanza of the ode can thus be understood in terms of the broader definition of paradox (in 
which sense is controverted) so that 'warm and stiU to be enjoy'd' may have the additional 
layer of meaning 'warm because still to be enjoy'd.'^ ^ Brooks rebufis Garrod's suggestion 
^ Cleanth Brooks. The WeU-Wroueht Um. (1947). 153 
Behind his suggestion of dramatic propriety, we must understand a reference to T.S. Eliot's 
criticism of the ode. Eliot had asserted that Shakespeare's 'Ripeness is all' had a truth that Keats's um 
did not precisely because it did not expUcitly purport to assert the truth. It had been uttered by a 
character in a play as a subjective opinioa Brooks turns Eliot's statement back iqxm him by locating 
the um's utterance similarly 'in the mouth of a dramatic character,' 'governed and qualified by the 
whole context of the play. '(154) 
'^iMd. 154. 
itad. 159. 
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that Keats loses control o f the ode at the end of the third stanza and takes it 'ferther than he 
meant to go' by again emphasising the underlying unity of theme in the ode that the urn's task 
as a 'sylvan historian' is sudi that the 'town implied by the urn' in the fourth stanza 'has a 
richer and more important history than that of actual histories. '^^ It is worth noting that both 
Brooks and Garrod make the assumption that it is Keats himself who addresses the um in the 
ode - this seems integral to the view of the organic work being a representation ofthe spuit of 
the poet. Brooks, like Wasserman, suggests that the concluding lines valorise an 'insight into 
essential truth' that is to be distinguished fi-om the 'data' and 'fects' of the material world.^' 
It is precisely this reference to an essential truth that is inherent in, yet not reducible to, the 
life ofthe organic work that has pronpted the reactions against it as propagating a new form 
of metaphysics. It is neither the life nor the transcendence that is objectionable to its 
successors per se, it is the connection of the two. 
A Deconstructionist 
In an essay dedicated to the memory of Paul de Man, Barbara Jones Guetti looks at 
the apparently incongruous combination of Keats's 'Ode on a Grecian Um' and Marx's 
Communist Manifesto together in order to demonstrate something that de Man himself had 
rq)eatedly tried to establish.^'* Contrasting him to Stanley Fish, whose 'reader response' 
perspective contends that texts are written and achieve their meaning in the context of their 
'interpretative communities,' Guetti says that de Man tried to estabUsh that no such 
'interpretative community' existed because ofthe inherent 'problem of reading' 'literature.' 
Both Keats's and Marx's works, she claims, set to reprimand 'literature' in their own ways. 
the former by appearing 'to valorize the um as an aesthetic, ahistorical, and virtually wordless 
or 'silent' object,' the latter by asserting a rival claim to 'show' something that hterature tends 
to distort more openly. She attempts to obliterate the distinction between canonical and non-
canOTiical literature and 'between 'poetic' and 'referential' discourse'^" by asserting that the 
incon:q)rehensible, 'magical' character of what is normally called 'literature' also typifies 
more prosaic writing such as Marx's. She adopts de Man's understanding of literature as a 
place where differences between the dualistic forces of grammar and rhetoric are 
indistinguishable, which makes reading it 'an unreliable process of knowledge production' 
not 'leading to the knowledge of an entity (such as language)' but only providing 
'consistentiy defective models of language's impossibility to be a model language.'^'^ 
» i ; « E a d W a s s = n » n - s I t e F m ( l « 3 ) m a k « a ^ g b t t y d i i r e „ n , i « e ^ ^ 
m 33. 
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Guetti's proposal for understanding the ode is not entirely dissimilar to Brooks's 
reading in so far as both see the dominant figure of the ode as that of 'address' as opposed to 
the 'description' that critics who have attempted to read the ode ekphrastically have 
suggested. They take the questions 'Uterally' in the sense that they posit an 'enquirer' in the 
poem. But whereas Brooks had proposed to solve the potential disunity of the poem by 
taking it 'literally' as a dramatic piece of dialogue between a mortal voice and an etemal 
(universal) voice, Guetti proposes to take the Ode as a frustrated attempt to 'read the um', i.e. 
as a monologue in which the voices of grammar and rhetoric are indistinguishable. For 
Guetti, the language itself does speak, but it still cannot be attributed to the 'exclusive senses' 
of personhood that a dialogue would suggest. Exclusive senses of agency would open the 
possibility o f a determination of the words' meaning, either in reference to the author's or the 
reader's or the community's intention, which would re-introduce by the back door the model 
of the artist as a maker rather than as a mediator of life. Deconstruction is of all the critical 
schools the most scrupulous in avoiding that coimotation, just as it is Shelley, the hero of 
deconstruction, who is the most scrupulous in avoiding it in his poetry. 
In Guetti's hands the ode becomes an exercise of q?istemological e?q)loration by the 
individual, whose inevitable end in feilure 'demonstrates' the impossibility of commimication 
or achieving a common sense of unity. In other words, she takes it as a demonstration of the 
unavoidability of the hermeneutic aporia. This follows on fi-om her reading of de Man and 
his discussion of the problem posed by recent apphcations of the concept of imiversaUty in 
hterary theory. 
As suggested at various points throughout the thesis, one of the primary issues at 
stake in literary theory is whether it is possible to access truth through language, an issue 
problematised by radical notions of subjectivity and their effertive creation of more than one 
unified objective world - the problem of hermeneutics for subjects conceived as Uving atoms 
in an organic universe, which nonetheless depends on notions of causality m order to become 
comprehensible.^The universality of subjectivity, whic^He Man calls rhetoric, wars in a 
dualistic battle with the particular referents of language, which de Man calls grammar. There 
is another problem however. De Man also made it clear that the lack of a consensus on what 
constituted literature had created a discrepancy between truth and method, between (and one 
must see an explicit rejection of Gadamer's primum opus here) Wahrheit andMethode. The 
immediate consequences of this observation are clear: 
2^ Paul de Man. Allp.pories of Reading. (1979). 19. 
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I f there is indeed something about literature, as such, vsiiich allows for a discrepancy 
between truth and method...then scholarship and theory are no longer necessarily 
compatible; as a first casualty of this complication, the notion of 'literature as such' 
as well as the clear distinction between history and interpretation can no longer be 
taken for granted. For a method that cannot be made to suit the 'truth' of its object 
can only teach delusion.^" 
De Man seizes upon the problem (which I also addressed in the first chapter) of the wedding 
Gadamer had tried to arrange between a sense of universality and common sense in 'hfe' and 
its prejudices. I f the critical method is based on universality, yet the truth is based on a 
dogmatic notion of tradition as developed by the sensus communis of life's prejudices, then 
truth and method, as they are put into practice in scholarship and theory respectively, are quite 
possibly incommensurable activities. The 'resistance to theory' that de Man senses is a 
resistance by scholars to the continued attempt by theoreticians to apply methodically the 
EnUghtenment's universal 'prejudice against prejudice.' 
De Man is forced into an imtenable position however by his 'prejudice against 
prejudice,' a situation he acknowledges. He admits that although 'a general statement about 
literary theory should not, in theory, start fi-om 'pragmatic considerations,' progress has 
occurred along 'theoretical rather than 'pragmatic lines',' only because of the dqjendence the 
sj^ematic approach has on axiomatic preconceptions of what was 'literary.' In other words, 
something 'literary' has been found by theoreticians because they had been prejudiced to 
understand what was literary in advance. However, he still maintains that because this 
subject-matter caimot be derived a priori, i.e. universally, any perception of 'progress' in the 
realm of theory is illusory. Gadamer caimot claim to promote the advance of the human spirit 
or appeal to truth by referring to life's prejudices. 
De Man points out a significant problem here, which is revealed cm examination of 
the issue o f the literary canon: i f what is (or was) conceived as literary is no longer agreed 
upon, then it cannot be known i f it is true according to the criterion of universality (which he 
rightiy detects behind the idea of the 'absolute prejudices of l ife ') . For exan^le, i f our 
understanding of the most noble genre of literature of all, the epic, entails that we have more 
or less ejq) licit notions of heroism - such as create memorable words and deeds - passed on 
down to us by the Greeks, and i f the glory o f such deeds is recast by Milton, in his Christian 
revision o f the epic, as vainglorious because they are pridefiil, individualistic and destructive, 
and i f we tend to side with Milton in these afiairs, but, in a postmodem world, we more than 
likely reject his Christian interpretation of the idea of heroism, in what sense can we say that 
^ Paul de Man. 'The Resistance to Theory.' The Resistance to Theory. (1986). 3-20.4. 
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we derive our imderstanding fi-om the perspective of truth, i f truth is derived fi-om life? And 
how do we propose to come to such a perspective on the vainglory of the individual fi-om an 
appeal to the prejudices o f 'life'? The incompatibility that he suggests might exist between a 
imiversal, critical method and historical truth must, it seems, be right - though one might 
retort that truth is not dependent upon the assent of a consensus. 
But de Man clearly wi l l only accept truth on the grounds of universal assent, and 
therefore this problem for him contains the in^)licit assumption that truth requires that it be 
universally (and repeatedly) verifiable. I think de Man inverts the real problem, both 
chronologically and logically speaking, when he suggests that the lack of consensus on v^at 
literature is has created a discrepancy between truth and method. The contrary is the case: 
the feet that 'truth' has a different source than does the current universal 'method' has led to a 
lack of consensus on what constitutes literature. Truth cannot be knownmethodically. And it 
cannot be known (or 'read') universally, that is, theoretically, in the manner he suggests. For 
what he demands of tradition involves an impossible drive for absolutisation - a drive whose 
initial feilure in the Enlightenment had prompted the Romantics to grasp the notion of the 
organic body as a means of uniting the impossible divide between the Cartesian opposition of 
res cogitans confi-onting a world of res extensae. De Man in his attack on the New Critics 
reverts back to the aims of the Enlightenment. 
I think it must be clear following what I have already written that Guetti's attenq)t to 
'read' the Um first as a subjective epistemological 'address' and then as a feilure according to 
such terms can hardly receive approbation. But the particulars of sudi a reading should also 
be addressed - one exanqile should suffice to throw light on at least a coiqjle of the exanqjles 
Guetti proposes. The example Guetti uses to buttress her own argument in de Man's 
'Resistance to Theory' is the 'dilemma' he said was posed for the reader by the title of 
Keats's The Fall of Hyperion. For de Man the problem with the poem begins before one even 
begins, with the ambiguity of the genitive in the title. This ambiguity is intensified because of 
the depersonalised sense in which narrative is presented by the Romantics. I f we remove the 
primary prejudice of personhood and r^lace it with a more ambiguous sense of 'selfhood' 
(which, as Shelley suggested, can be eroded further to a lack of true distinction between 
thoughts and things), it leaves us with a genuine dilemma in interpreting the creative (or 
possessive) sense associated with the genitive. Do we interpret the genitive in ITie Fall of 
Hyperion: 
as meaning "Hyperion's fell," the case story of the defeat of an older by a newer 
power, the very recognizable story fi-om which Keats indeed started out from but 
from which he increasingly strayed away, or as "Hyperion falling," the much less 
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specific but more disquieting evocation of an actual process o f felling, regardless of 
its begiiming, its end or the identity of the entity to whom it befells to be felling.^ 
De Man is technically quite right in pointing out the ambiguity of the genitive (though in feet 
it is transcribed by the English dative ' o f ) . He is also quite right to point out that ' i t matters a 
great deal how we read the title,' for i f Hyperion, to take one half of the genitive construction, 
is taken to be the genetivus subjectivus, then the poem is about Hyperion's particular fell; i f 
Hyperion is taken to be genetivus objectivus, then of course it follows that the subject of the 
poem wil l be the fell and Hyperion wil l be a particular case illustrative of a broader 
possibility. However in practice this usage in English is imambiguous: every native speaker 
would understand by the title that we were talking specifically about Hyperion's fall and only 
the context of the poem itself could suggest otherwise i.e. there is not a grammatical or a 
syntactical ambiguity in employing the dative transliteration of the genitive in English. 
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On the assunqjtion, however, that an ambiguity was present at the most basic level of 
language, one could actually extend the compass of the ambiguity beyond this particular 
poem to all genitive constructions. This wi l l lead us to question, as Guetti intuitively notes de 
Man does in commenting on Yeats's 'Among School Children,'^ how we can actually know 
the 'dancer from the dance' or, more abstracUy, how we can know a subject from a predicate, 
or a being fi-om an action. Now it wi l l not have escaped the reader's notice that the passage in 
Yeats commented on does not take the form of a genitive, but that hardly matters, for such 
details, though inaccurate, can be ignored when the author's train of thought is clear - and I 
think that Guetti quite rightiy sees the logical connection of agent and action belonging to it 
between both examples. What is intolerable however is the reference to Yeats's question as a 
'rhetorical question' when interpreted as 'asserting the unity of part and whole, form and 
experience, creator and creation' - which is surely what Yeats intended by the question - but 
'literal' only when 'released from such delusive affirmations of unity.'^°^ Yeats's question 
would indeed be rhetorical i f he e7q)ected no answer because he assumed that his readers, like 
he, knew the answer. The meaning 'Active' or 'spurious' attributed to 'rhetorical' is wholly 
de Man's doing and is entirely dependent upon the reader not taking language 'literally' 
enough to reject his misinterpretation, which denies fundamental syntactical structures and 
ready associations, out of hand. Yet again we must note that his observance is foisted, ahnost 
hypocritically, on his audience's 'common sense' knowledge of what it means for Yeats to be 
3 ^ S (^uld only speculate i f this is because ofthe restriction oftibe definite article in E r ^ ^ unlike 
in GSkToem^JTo desigrations of particular things (except perhaps m 'gnomic phrases [of 
universal vaUdity] such as'the pen is mightier than the sword). ^ • w.-u ^Salde Um notes, the basis upon which an entire tradition of understandmg is bmlt. 
Paul de Maa The. Rhetoric of Romanticism, (1984). 200-02. 
212 
asking a rhetorical question to begin with. There can be only one explanation for this and 
other such inconsistencies i f we do not wish to question de Man's integrity. He is not 
consistent because he is trying to preserve what his line of argument, i f it were vaUd, would 
destroy. He also is promoting an artistic model of the processes of life against the causal 
notions of the artist as maker that he, like Shelley, saw to be inherent in the 'exclusive senses 
of personhood' contained in grammatical constructions such as personal pronoims. 
Guetti provides evidence of similar readings of Keats in connection with Greek 
culture, such as in his poem addressed 'To Homer' which begins 'Standing aloof in giant 
ignorance/ O f thee I hear.' She claims that this introduction leaves us 'grammatically' 
uncertain whether the giant ignorance belongs to Homer or Keats. Even i f we are to entertain 
this suggestion of uncertainty, the feet that the 'of thee' is the object of the main clause ' I 
hear' and also the genitive attribute of 'ignorance' would rule out attributing it to be the 
subject of the subordinate clause 'Standing aloof in giant ignorance.' I f we try to apply this 
sort of problem back to a 'reading' of Ode on a Grecian Um. we are still left with the feet that 
the questions Keats poses to the um can hardly be held to be rhetorical. Although the um 
does not answer him, can this be seen as a sign that the speaker is assuming an underlying, 
tacit understanding, or can even be evoking such an imderstanding? Guetti and de Man 
misuse their terms here and confuse our understanding in the process. What sort of questions 
these are is another question, perhaps one of the questions of the ode - are they the questions 
of an 'enquiring spirit?' 
I f we then follow de Man's exanq)le, as Guetti proposes we must, and 'take the 
questions addressed to the um by Keats as real questions' (sic. which display the 'negative 
reliability of language' unlike conventional rhetorical questions - wfaidi assume that it is 
'positively reliable') we can conclude that since Keats 
doesn't know the very things about the um that would have been of utmost 
irrpottance to the people who made it...(etc.) that the um 'matters to Keats because of 
his ignorance about i t . ' ^ " 
I hope however that I am not following his example and have given sufficient reason vfhy not. 
Nor do I think the um to be impoTtant to Keats just because of his ignorance of it. Such an 
interpretation would then have it that this is a 'meditation on how the loss of meaning in the 
course of history creates aesthetic masterworks,'^"' in other words how grammatical 
unreliability somehow translates to be an aesthrtic value. This seems to me to be a 
'^^  Guetti. op.cit 35. 
ibid. 36. 
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thoroughly confused and confusing manner of understanding the poem, of aesthetic value and 
of human nature. 
A New Historicist 
The contesting and polemical formal claims of both 'deconstructive' Uterary theory 
and the New Critics, the former relating forever back upon the circularity of the life-processes 
what the latter had elevated to transcendence, have perhaps brought about the emergence of 
the 'common sense' school of New Historicism in the 1980s. Jerome McGann is one of the 
more prominent o f the New Historicists. Given the place of Keats in both New Critical and 
Deconstructionist criticism it is not surprising that he begins his influential book The Beauty 
of Inflections with a chapter cm Keats as well.^** The New Historicist method, as McGann 
employs it, is in feet based on the Marxist, so-called Bakhtin school of criticism, which 
contends that 'the material of poetry is language...as a system of social evaluations, not as the 
aggregate of linguistic possibilities. In other words, it attributes hfe to the processes of 
labour in society and the interaction therein rather than in the play of forces in the organic 
text. It is worth mentioning from the outset that many of the observations McGann makes 
regarding particular poems are in feet good ones and very informative as aids to reflection on 
them. But at the theoretical level, his approach is badly misconceived. I f the general feuk of 
the former two schools of critical thought was to derive meaning aggregatively from 
undifferentiated and depersonalised formal linguistic relations intrinsic in a text conceived as 
a form of Ufe, the general error of the latter is, as McGann is aware of but imable to avoid, to 
fell 'into a crudely reflective theory of poetry' by reducing texts to an extrinsic schema.^ "' 
McGaim's discussion actually begins with his objection to Paul de Man's treatment 
of Keats in his femous introduction to his poetry. His primary objection is that de Man, 
while usually ignoring 'extrinsic' considerations, nonetheless allows them to enter into 
criticism when and where he deems them to be appropriate - without defining at what point 
that might actually be. This ambiguity allows de Man to avoid v/hat is in feet a problematic 
issue and pursue a theory which 'aUenates' the poem from its social setting. McGaim's 
criticism here seems to be legitimate. He objects to the unambiguous end to which de Man 
has interpreted what he describes as the potential incommensurability between the 
Enlightenment notion of universality (and its method) and the pre-Enhghtenment notions of 
truth, to entail intellectual paralysis. While noting the legitimacy of the problem as to when. 
306 Jerome McGann. The Reautv of Inflections- Literary Investigations in Historical Method and 
Theory. (1985). 
307 M . M BaMitin. The Formal Method in Literary Scholarship. (1978). 133. 
McGann. itod. 20. 
De Man, Paul, ed. John Keats: Selected Poetry. (1966). 
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where and under what conditions extrinsic evidence should be admitted, I think we are forced 
to admit as well that it is a problem that eaimot be satisfectorily solved. Hiat is, other than to 
state 'where it is appropriate.' For the intellectual and spiritual exercise of criticism would 
seem to be something unquantifiable, i.e. it is an art with similar questions surrounding it as 
those of any of the humanities. Questions of what details should or should not be included in 
a critique are largely left to the critic's discretion, a conclusion that admittedly seems more 
and more dissatisfectory with the continuing erosion of the Christian sensus communis and 
promotion of radical notions of plurality according to the prejudices of ' l i fe ' - for this 
plurality is based on the idea of the fimdamental role played by biological differences, to 
which all others, e.g. nationality, religion, gender are referred. This appeal to discretion may 
prove unpalatable to some who would reduce it to a science akin to the natural sciences, but 
this is a prime aspect of criticism and wi l l always be, as de Man had conceded in referring to 
its 'necessarily pragmatic element.' 
McGann's counterproposal is however, even given this concession, unwarranted, 
because it hinges its sure foundation on a network of social relations that never allow it to 
escape 'pragmatism': 
A corrq)rehensive theory wil l show that we need not doubt the relevance of 'extrinsic' 
methods and materials; rather, vAiat the critic must weigh are the problems of how 
best and most fully to elucidate the poem's (jpresumed) networks of social relations. 
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It seems quite right that he objects to the text being taken as an object divorced from the 
world and time. A text, a textum, is of course something 'woven' and we have every reason 
to think that the etymology of the word betrays its nature here, the interwoven intrinsic and 
extrinsic fectors to which Wellek and Warren refer to more conventionally as word and spirit, 
free wi l l and necessity.^" The objection already made at some length in earlier chapters of 
the thesis to the misequation of tradition or the interpretative community with the relatively 
recent phenomenon of mass society need not be repeated here. 
I f the speciousness of this equation were not clear enough to the reader however, 
McGann obliges us by making the implications of his claim clearer yet. He delkies poetry as: 
a type of e^qjression which forces its language to exhaust itself within the hmifis o f the 
poetic experience as such. Poetic language, we say, is not directed to any extra^joetic 
use. But we must not take this correct idea to suggest that poetic experiences take 
place outside of history and specific social environments.^'^ 
McGann. OP. cit 18. 
WeUek & Warren Theory of Literature. (1970). 
'^^  McGann. OP. cit 21. 
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A strange definition indeed. Poetry is indeed poetry and not anything else, nor is it 
particularly useful as anything else (as it is exhausted) but it is nonetheless 'involved with 
extra-poetic operations,' not generically as poetic language, but as 'specific poetic 
utterances.'^'^ I t owes its genesis to society - indeed he argues it is wholly social - but it has 
no impact of its own on society in retum. McGaim's theory of poetry replaces a specious 
notion of transcendent 'poetic language' with a specious notion of'transcendental society,' 
which he only feils to see because he makes society to be so immanent. Society receives the 
same sort of felse absolutisation in his hands as the organic work did in the New Critics and 
Deconstructionists. But the narrative of life and its processes persists (against the notions of 
art that would cast it in the model of making) as a universal answer to the various questions 
about Ufe that writers raise. 
Li the end, most of McGann's observations in his chapter on 'Keats and Historical 
Method' are completely out of tenor with the broad theoretical claim he makes about society 
and the role of the artist in it as a 'social actor.' They are aimed at demonstrating that what he 
argues of Keats's Ode on a Grecian Um also applies to an understanding of Keats in general: 
'that all current interpretations o f the ode which treat the urn as an imaginary object are only 
justified on the basis o f certain past historical research.'^ ''* The observations he makes, some 
of which I have included in my own reading of the poem above, tend to be those which argue 
for understanding the context in which the poem is written, its intended audience, etc.. The 
observations can be acute in themselves, and they merit better than his theory. 
A Romantic Ironist 
The final perspective I shall examine, the Romantic Ironist, seizes upon the very feet 
that the answers to the questions of life given by the Romantic practice of poetry result in a 
vicious circle: in other words, they result in the the same terms of hfe and its processes. The 
critic I have chosen to rq)resent it, David Simpson, in his fine book entitled Irony and 
Authority in Romantic Poetrv supplies perhaps an appropriate summary of the failings of 
some of the writers de Man attacks, though also those of de Man himself, as a practitioner of 
the 'heuristic method': 
...the coalescence of subject and object...the avowed goal o f so much aesthetic 
theory... is at the same time open to criticism or misuse as the tool of the intentionalist 
heresy, the digestion of circumference by centre...(and the practitioners ofthe) 
'heuristic method' (v^o tend) towards conrolete abandonment of authorial control 
over the limits o f possible interpretation.'^ 
ibid. 21. 
ibid. 44. 
David Simpson. Irony and Authority in Romantic Poetry. (1979). 166. 
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As Simpson is acutely aware, the 'abandonment of authorial control' to the narrative of the 
processes of life constitutes nothing other than a loss of a coherent sense of authority - he 
catalogues, as I have, the crisis of self-legitimation that results from adopting such a 
fi:amework and abandoning the 'exclusive sense' of authorship that the model of the artist as 
maker entails. 
It is interesting to observe how this works itself out in practice in his criticism. In 
spite of his criticism of the characteristic fellings of the New Critics and deconstmctionist 
critics, Sinqjson's own reading of the ode adopts the formal postulate of Brooks, Guetti and 
others that there are at least two personae in the ode, that of a dramatic persona (speaker) and 
a controlling persona (poet/ Keats?) who comments at the poem's end. He largely ignores the 
attenpt to read the poem in the ekphrastic tradition as one speaker confronting an object, but 
nonetheless understands it primarily as a self-reflexive projection. As he notes, this reading 
implicrtiy 'involves the reading mind in a confrontation with and refinement of its own 
intentions and ambitions.'^'* He can maintain this apparently contradictory stance of one 
speaker with different voices because he claims that Keats enqjloyed Romantic irony in the 
poem. 'The violent fluctuation between the speaker's various responses to the um' go a long 
way towards corroborating such a reading of the ode in Sin:q)son's view. 
Simpson amasses various evidence that lends credence to an 'ironic' reading of the 
poem. The third stanza in particular is emcial to maintaining the viability of such a 
'consciously distanced 'speaker" because it operates as a point of equipoise between the 
poem's polarities. The best demonstration of multiple personae in the poem are presented by 
the differait but equally tenable perspectives the critics themselves have taken on the third 
stanza. Here he cites Earl Wasserman's reading of the third stanza as the point at which the 
subject is most engaged in the 'Ufe o f the predicate'^" and Cleanth Brooks's opposing view, 
that it is the point of highest irony and paradox,^" as the possibility of rqjresenting the 
'perspectives of speaker and poet respectively.'^" 
To support his ironic reading of the poem, Simpson also points out the relevance of 
Keats's choice of an ode. it had established connotations as a vehicle for inspired and natural 
poetic production. He reminds us to this end of Coleridge's trenchant observation that the 
form had become a vehicle for inferior writers to give vent to their passions in a 'startUng 
^" Earl Wasserman. The Finer Tone: Keats's Maior Poems. (1953). 31. 
Cleanth Brooks. The Well-Wrought Um. (1947). 145. 
ibid. 9. 
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hysteric o f weakness over-exerting itself, which bursts on the unprepared reader in sundry 
odes and apostrophes to abstract terms.' The supposition of two personae in the poem also 
allows us to account for various difficulties in the poem. For instance, it accounts for the 
negative reference to the 'ravishing' of the um at the beginning of the poem (as an aUiance of 
the poet with the um against the speaker), as well as the problematic ending. He sees another 
instance of collaboration, which allows us to avoid trying to solve the problem posed by 
having variant versions of the Ode's ending of whether the final two lines or just the aphorism 
is 'spoken' by the um: the poet is speaking for the um. 
The presence of dual voices in the ode also harmonises nicely with the sense of 
overdetermined closure, which Siirq)son conjectures Keats intentionally added to upset any 
reader who might attempt to unify the varying elements in the ode without having a Romantic 
sense of irony. For those tended to literal-mindedness and wanting to be told by the author 
what to think, Keats has ccmstructed a barrier. Simpson suggests, quite perceptively I think, 
that what the um 'says' at the end of the poem, in apparent contradiction to what it had 
previously said more ambiguously, could be precisely what Keats wanted to say to the reader 
of his poem. He proposes that: 
Whereas the speaker is forced to recognise that the world wi l l not respond to his 
desires and designs, Keats has aheady gone through the business of creating that 
world: thisum.^^" 
The 'suppressed cyclic imperative' in the overdetermined closure of the ode is actually hinted 
at i f we understand the reference to the 'still unravished' um in the ode's first Une to mean 
'yetunravished.' 
The um appears as everything which the speaker is not, in a sort of negative 
justification of its identity. As soon as the 'real' um is displaced, however, we can 
see that the creative predicament is really closer to that of the speaker than to that of 
the 'poet'; it is one where meaning does only come with the ardour of the pursuer, as 
things which are no-things take on hfe in the active imagination of the bdiolder. The 
efforts of the speaker thus become a rqjetition of the artist's pursuit.(13) 
Most of the comments Simpson makes are excellent ones, and there is ample evidence for the 
reading he proposes. 
Sinqjscjn's approach bases itself on the conclusions of arguments I made earlier 
asserting that the idea of order, as we observe it in our conc^tual language, inevitably 
reduces itself to a model of cause-and-efifeet. As this is so, language does not singly assert 
causal relations so much as assume them and it simultaneously discredits arguments that 
cannot assert them. And I also agree entirely writh Simpson's central thesis that 'causality is 
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replaced by simultaneity as 'history' is threatened by hermeneutics' in Romantic writing, a 
process that 'came to be extended from author to reader as a demand for moral self-
determination.'^^' However, I have suggested throughout the thesis a more critical stance 
towards this development. I have questioned whether we should not be doing more than 
recovering 'authorial meaning,' as valuable as I agree that practice is to scholarship, i f it bases 
itself on hermeneutic premises that wi l l never allow it to become meaningful, i.e. the premises 
of the Lebensphilosophie whose nascence we can detect in Romantic poetry. Other tasks for 
the critic could be assigned. For example, since the aporia has been demonstrated to be an 
unavoidable aspect of Romantic poetics, must we not also look beyond the authors' claims to 
meaning, to the question of meaning in general in order to assess the individual instantiation 
of the universal? In other words, must we not look to theological answers to questions about 
man, rather than referring the questions back to the 'answers' provided by the 'life-processes' 
of man taken as prejudices? This is what I believe both Arendt and Coleridge convincingly 
argued in response to these developments. 
For meaning is not restricted to the specific questions wdiich authors ask, nor should a 
critic restrict himself to such limitations. Sin:q)son argues that: 
Romantic poetry is organised to make us confront the question of authority, 
especially as it pertains to the contract between author and reader. 
This statement may make the causal link somewhat too explicit, too purposive. It cannot be 
denied that this questioning of authority, and the consequent crisis of self-legitimation, is the 
effect of Romantic hermeneutics. But the question is whether questioning audiority is the 
only intention of this practice. I have argued that the intention of such a practice of poetry 
(and of criticism) is at least as much to assert authority, the authority of the model of life 
conceived as an organic process. In other words, the claim of authority happens to occur in a 
self-debilitating way, but this does not argue against the feet that the primary intention is to be 
authoritative. It seems to me to be as such manifestly illogical, and invaUd. 
^2°iMd.l2. 
Md. Preface, ix-x. 
''Hbid.xi. 
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issues: 
Conclusion 
This thesis could be se&i as either conservative or radical in its assessment ofthe 
involved in 'Silence and the Crisis of Self-Legitimation in English Romantic Poetry.' 
It began with the contemporary hermeneuticist Hans-Georg Gadamer's observation of Kant's 
characteristic Enlightenment 'prejudice against prejudice' and his discussion of how that 
prejudice had led Kant to misunderstand and misrq)resent the politically derived sensus 
communis. This led me to various observations about the effect of Kant's universal 
perspective on the developm^it of Romantic hermeneutics, which presented a subjectivised, 
historieised and, most significantly, 'biologised' form of his 'common sense.' Romantic 
hermeneutics enshrined what later hermeneuticists have called the aporia in the process of 
understanding. I traced the development of hermeneutics from Schleiermacher up until the 
present in the first chapter. A way out of the aporia seemed to me to require an alternative to 
that universal perspective, a perspective whose feilmgs had only been exacerbated by their re-
location in the hidden hfe-processes of the animal laborans. 
To that Old, I e^qjlored in the second chapter the subject of communication in relation 
to the terms and conditions of human life (differing from those suggested by universahty) in 
more detail. I looked at Hannah Arendt's discussion of The Human Condition, which 
compared and contrasted the view of the (post-)Enlightenment to the Classical and, to a lesser 
extent. Biblical tradition. Arendt emphasised the foimdational logocentric conditions of the 
Greekpolis in defining man, as Aristotie did, as a political and 'logical' being. So crucial 
was the logos's implicit promotion of the idea of the essential plurality of the human 
condition to subsequent political understanding that it bound the Western notion of politics to 
the words and deeds o f the public sphere from the time of the Greek city-state right up until 
the time of the Enlightenment. The product of this union is the cherished Western notion of 
'free speech,' which asscwiates the idea of freedom with the pubUc disclosure of the human 
agent. 
With the onset of Cartesian forms of universality, Arendt argued, a new form of 
'logic' was introduced, analytic logic, which grew in influence with each discovery of the 
workings of forces behind the world of appearances that ejqjerimental science made. 
Analytic logic made no reference to either the fimdamental human condition of plurahty 
emphasised in the Classical and Biblical accounts or the worid of appearances. In feet, the 
relations it promoted were no longer those between human agents, let alone free agents. They 
were the relations of thoughts to other thoughts in the mind. These thougjits were common in 
the sense that they could be rqjeated by anyone without regard for circumstances - not just in 
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the specific context of the public forum - and produce the same result. These new terms of 
logic thus appeared to offer a more fundamental perspective than that which had made 
reference to the world of appearances. The consequence of this however was that a new form 
of freedom was promoted, a freedom from prejudice. It was parasitic on the previous idea of 
freedom associated with language. The verbal sense of the word logic was the first and most 
lasting casualty of what eventually became known as the exercise of pure reason. But the 
primary, specifically human characteristics followed it shortly thereafter. 
The new Cartesian concept and place of logic, divested from the pubUc sphere and 
the place it reserved for man to disclose himself through words and deeds, also contained the 
seed of a new concept of man, a seed that germinated during the Enlightenment period. It 
finally emerged ejqilicitly after the French Revolution with Kant's so-called 'anthropological 
question.' For Arendt, Kant's question of what man is is quite simply unanswerable. A man 
cannot jump over his own shadow. Nor can he be an object to himself without prejudicing 
the distinctive ideas of subject and object, and with them the distinction between man and the 
rest of the 'objects' in the world of appearances. Nonetheless, the impossibility of the task 
has not stopped thinkers since Kant from exploring this new and unanswerable question. 
Man's very resistance to self-definition has in feet acted as the lure and the goad of ^ Jost-) 
Romantic self-feshionings of the human. It informed the attempt that was made, again as 
Arendt argued it, to solve the problem of Cartesian duahsm by looking at man as an 
organism, as animal laborans, rather than according to his traditional image as homo faber. 
But this move to organicism only reversed the Enlightenment's 'prejudice against prejudice' 
by making 'life' itself a universal prejudice. This did not stop the Enlightenment's attack on 
the notion of authority; it inverted it into a crisis of self-legitimation. 
It has committed thinking to the unending process of defining man as 'something 
evermore about to be.' In this way, the imperative with which contenporary philosq)hy now 
approaches the anthrqjological question, defining hiunanity according to the fundamental 
prejudice of 'Ufe' as 'self-interpreting animals,' demonstrates the continued prepossession of 
the hermeneutic aporia, of an answer to the questions about life being referred back to the 
answer of 'life.' The Romantics' enqjhasis upon silence and absence, expressed in their 
exemplary poetic interest in the literary fragment and in ironic imperatives to process, has 
maintained its resonance and its hegemony over what is now called postmodern thinking. Far 
from the oft-claimed absence of truth, postmodern discourse trumpets the truth of the 
prejudices of life. And with the declining beUef in a Creator of life, the sense of the unity of 
hfe has increasingly ceded to a sense of diversity and insuperable difference - the 'truths' of 
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the prejudices of distinctive life-forms. The philosophy of the animal laborans has led not to 
a common sense, but to nonsense. 
I have not explored the various negative implications of the new aesthetic (and the 
new concept of himianity) as fully as I might have. I have also left largely une?q)lored the 
tendency that mass society has shown since its onset in the eighteenth century to focus all 
human activities upon the maintenance and improvement of the essential life^rocesses. 
Much could have been said though. PoUtics has largely become a handmaiden of economics 
and its 'laws of the household;' ethics has increasingly concentrated on issues conceming the 
maintenance and amelioration of life rather than 'customs,' its traditional remit. These 
tendencies have only accelerated in recent years. Kantian notions of imiversality drive the 
movement towards the somewhat improperly designated 'global village' - its true location 
may be in 'cyberspace' - the Romantic hermeneutic of self-referential mental^ rocesses writ 
large: Shelley's'one mind.' 
The same aesthetic that drives these universal centrifugal forces (which Arendt noted 
motivated the first satellite-scientists - as seen in their ejqjress desire for man to escape the 
earth and its biosphere as if it were a prison-house - can also be seen in the centripetal forces 
that motivate genetic ejqjloration. Scientists' recent appUcation of invasive techniques into 
the processes of life on a genetic level with the intenticm to ameliorate these processes (and 
maintain Ufe) seems, like the move towards 'globaUsation' and a 'world economy,' to beg 
deeper questions as to wdiy this ought to happen and according to what definition of life. 
These questions appear particularly troublesome at the margins of life, i.e. at its beginning 
and end, where the current model of self-legitimating life^rocesses seems most deficient. 
The self-legitimation of man only conceiving himself as animal laborans not only fails as a 
paradigm to capture the unique character of the spoken word to mobilise corporate human 
action, it fails to capture the essence of events such as birth and death. These questions are 
curraitly being left unanswered, I think precisely because the hegemonous concept of 
humanity applies the paradigm of self-fathering without questioning its own prejudices. 
The absence which makes it imperceptible as a prejudice in a traditional sense makes 
it seem transparent. It can however be seen by its effects. Its dynamic commits the scientist 
to the process of e3q)loration (for the benefit of 'society,' whose commitment to 'life' and its 
amelioration I traced), but never conclusion or discrimination. And yet issues are now being 
raised by contemporary science whose consequences one need not be a conservative or a 
radical to question, issues that must be referred back to this still relatively recent conc^t of 
humanity. Tliese contemporary issues act to demonstrate, as Aroidt contended, the 
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widespread 'rebellion against existence as it has been given' that the Romantic aesthetic 
entails. The truly universal forces that contemporary science hamesses without understanding 
them - understanding being possible only via language - may yet eradicate earthly life as it 
has been given, as a prejudice. To present it more ironically, the maintenance and 
amelioration of the life-processes by the power of universality now threatens Ufe and its 
processes. 
All of these issues appeared on a smaller scale as an appar^tly insignificant aesthetic 
debate between Coleridge and Wordsworth two centuries ago, which I dealt with in my third 
chapter. Logocentricity and its relation of the concept of man and his activities to the terms of 
his creation in imago Dei was the basis of Coleridge's attack on Wordsworth's poetic theory. 
It was the central pillar of Coleridge's theological definition of the primary imagination, his 
alternative to Wordsworth's Romantic hermeneutics. In that sense, the third chapter is not 
just in the middle of the thesis, but also the chapter that connects the central difficulty in 
contemporary hermeneutics, the aporia in the thinking of the animal laborans, with some of 
the central issues raised by the emphasis on silence in Romantic poetry: the issues of 
commimity, logic, anthropology and creativity. If we introduce the Coleridgean distinction 
between theoretical and practical criticism as a model, it could be said that my entire reading 
of the hermeneutic issues throughout the thesis was in a sense Coleridgean. His emphasis on 
logocentricity based its theoretical credibility on its appeal to the past and its basis in 
Christological dogma; and it has 'proved' its veracity practically by the emergence of the 
seemingly insimnoimtable hermeneutic aporia and its attendant manifestations in the present. 
The Romantic aesthetic has shown itself to propagate incomprehensibility and ensconce the 
heresy of 'life' in the heart of contemporary thinking, with no apparent way out. 
The final three chapters demonstrated much the same in the Romantics' poetry. 
Wordsworth's silence suggested imperceptible begirmings and felt correspondences between 
himself and all of nature. His poetic appeal to a sense of unity, made in the context of the 
collapse of the sensus communis of a two-world schema, was essentially an appeal for a new 
type of common sense that I followed Arendt in characterising as intimacy, the feh 
coimection of unity with 'nature.' Nonetheless, there was offence in such apparently iimocent 
terms. For all the in:q)ortance of the 'truths' Coleridge conceded Wordsworth to have 
captured in his theory, his tendency to refer his intimacy to universality and to nature led 
Coleridge to accuse him of 'the too exclusive attention to (truths) which had occasicmed its 
errors by tenpting him to carry those truths beyond their proper limits.' Wordsworth's 
adoption of a Kantian form of universality to 'life' as his truth had the effect of relating 
everj^ing to a mysterious origin to which man himself corresponded, as if human existence 
223 
entailed no prejudices of agency. Hiis resulted in his contradictory claims about man as 
essentially a spirit yet essentially a part of the natural world, the fusion of the two-world view 
I mentioned in the introduction into one. For Coleridge on the other hand, the sense of man 
being an image of his Creator continued to dominate. His definition of the primary 
imagination suggested for the areas of common sense, logic, anthropology and creativity such 
a continued relationship of copy to original: he held it as 'the living power and prime agent 
of all human perception, and as a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in 
the infinite I AM.' 
Shelley's treatment of Mont Blanc I explored primarily as a negative image of 
Coleridge's demonstration of the invahdity of Romantic hermeneutics' idea of 'one life': or, 
as a case study in futility as it were. Shelley's obsciuity I saw rather less rosily than most of 
the contemporary critics I reviewed. I maintained the primary significance of the element of 
heresy in his writing, in terms of images, terminology and linguistic practice. All of these I 
took as sj^toms of Shelley's revisionist notion of being made in imago Dei, and his 
imaginative consistency in seizing upon the radical consequences of the animal laborans. 
CausaUty was attacked radically in the poem, though the attack collapsed in the poem's 
conclusion where he lapsed into coherence, revealing that this was an alternative, organicist 
theological presentation. In it, he suggested a reversal of Coleridge's terms of the primary 
and secondary imagination, the dependence of the idea of God on human conception. 
Interestingly, this took place as a reversal of the Genesis accoimt: Shelley suggested that man 
speaks God into being. However, there was more to Shelley's poem than that. Life, taken on 
its own terms, offers no opinions on the problem of evil. Shelley seemed much more 
concemed about this issue than Wordsworth, a concern reflected in the various dualistic/ 
Gnostic heresies he attaches to his notions of Ufe. Evil was a concern of Shelley's that allied 
uneasily with his organicism. 
Finally, I looked at Keats and his confrontation of Enlightenment values of art from 
the perspective of 'life.' Keats seemed to me to demonstrate the unwillingness and incapacity 
of the artist conceiving himself in the terms of the animal laborans to comprehend art created 
by the homo faber, protesting against its feilure to be vihat he conceived himself as, Ufe. TTie 
speaker in the poem bore the marks of Wordsworth's conflation of the two-world view of 
man into a Uving, i.e. material spirit. As was the case in Shelley's Mont Blanc, the benefit of 
the new idea of art as a process of life was opposed to the idea of a silent maker of a silent 
object - an ircmic attack on an object as transcendent vihose true character was actuaUy 
worldliness. I disagreed with the critical tradition for being confused on precisely that point. 
Approaching it from the philosophy of life, they uncriticaUy interpreted the created poem, the 
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work of art it is, as a 'heuristic stimulus' for the reader to afiBrm the same play of hfe-
processes, as a demonstration of the characteristic 'organic form' of art, or as a demonstration 
of 'the impossibility of reading.' This not only demonstrated the critics' understanding of 
themselves and their task of interpretation according the terms of the animal laborans, it 
showed their hermeneutic paradigm's incapacity to understand the capacity of art to break out 
of the vicious circle of life, and their unwillingness to esteem it as such. This manifested, it 
seemed to me, the evolution of the humanities in the twentieth century into a reUgion of life, 
for Ufe's sake. 
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